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GUEST EDITORS' NOTE 
In the pragmatics literature there is no consensus concerning the sub-
ject of the field. One can find various treatments of pragmatics tha t 
differ from each other, e.g., in respect to how pragmatics is related to 
grammar and semantics, or to code use, communication and cognition; 
whether the phenomena studied by pragmatics belong to competence or 
performance; whether the pragmatic abilities of the human mind may be 
considered a module, and if so, how this module could be characterized. 
(For an overview of pragmatics conceptions, traditions and methods, see 
Jef Verscluieren, The pragmatic perspective. In: Jef Verschueren-Jan-Ola 
Ostrnan Jan Blommaert (eds.): Handbook of pragmatics: Manual. 1995, 
1-19. Benjamins, Amsterdam.) 
In the papers presented here about pragmatics and in a previous, 
first instalment of this thematic issue, which was published in volume 51 
(3-4, 2004) of Acta Linguistica Hungarica, one can also see the different 
strands. Hence, there is only a general "common denominator" valid for 
all contributions: Pragmatics deals with the use of language in various 
contexts to achieve various purposes, primarily from a linguistic point of 
view. 
The diversity of the previous and present papers and pragmatics itself 
is increased by the fact that phenomena of language use are the subject 
of several other disciplines: social psychology, sociolinguistics, rhetoric, 
stylistics, etc. Indeed, these fields amplify our knowledge about issues 
of language use. In addition, pragmatics, in accordance with its theory-
dependent. scope of interest, strives to advance aided by these disciplines 
and integrate their achievements. From among the disciplines studying 
language use, discourse analysis merits a separate mention. Very often, 
it is demarcated from pragmatics only because of its own name, which, 
however, can refer t.o a wide range of topics such as analysis of oral dis-
courses and written texts as well as conversation analysis, discourse and 
text, grammar. 
The first aim of this special issue, i.e., the previous and present col-
lections of papers is to show the diversity (in the above-mentioned senses) 
characteristic of present-day Hungarian pragmatics research. The second 
aim of the two instalments is to provide up-to-date investigations which 
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apply the theoretical and interdisciplinary approaches to several kinds 
of pragmatic phenomena in Hungarian. The editors think that each pa-
per contributes this way to the further development of theoretical issues 
and/or description of pragmatics of Hungarian language use. 
Turning to the brief overview of the papers included in this second 
instalment of the thematic issue of Acta Linguistica Hungarica, we have 
to begin with a remark concerning the arrangement of the papers. The 
articles are arranged alphabetically by their authors' names. The topics of 
the papers will also be introduced below in this order but we will a t tempt 
to indicate some interconnections between them. 
The contribution Remarks on the cognitive base of pragmatic princi-
ples by András Kertész and Csilla Rákosi aims at the exemplification of 
the applicability of plausibility analysis to linguistics. Starting from the 
criticism of Robinson (1997), the paper argues for two assumptions. First, 
as opposed to a theory of distributed systems, it is a theory of plausible 
reasoning tha t can capture basic methodological problems of theory for-
mation in pragmatics (such as circularity, category error, the arbitrariness 
of interpretations of da ta and the objectifrcation of the theorist's cultural 
and linguistic knowledge as principles of language behaviour). Second, 
the cognitive base of pragmatic principles is inferential and plausibilistic, 
rather than non-inferential and probabilistic. The line of argumentation 
put forward in Kertész and Rákosi 's contribution seems to pave the way 
for systematic investigations into the argumentational structure of lin-
guistic theories. 
In her paper entitled The concept of preference and its manifestation 
in Hungarian verbal conflict sequences, Agnes Lerch at tempts to clarify 
the nature of preference considering tha t the use of this classical concept 
of conversation analysis seems to have become confused and vague in the 
course of time. After reviewing the role of preference in conversation anal-
ysis, she suggests a complex interpretation of preference which unifies the 
different (structural, social psychological and statistical) views from the 
perspective of pragmatic principles. Furthermore, using conversations from 
radio and television series of debate programs as data, she argues that a 
deeper axrd uncontroversial interpretation of the notion of preference is 
possible if, in addition to a structural inference rule and interpersonality 
principles, one takes into consideration the role of rationality principles as 
well. So, approaching preference from the perspective of pragmatic prin-
ciples may prove instrumental in integrating conversational analysis more 
closely with new directions and results of pragmatic research. 
The paper Apology routine formulae in Hungarian by Malgorzata 
Suszczynska is a contribution to sociopragmatic research on one of the 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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Central European languages. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate tha t 
Hungarian apology routine formulae, while bearing similarity to such di-
rect apology expressions in other languages, have language-specific forms 
and functions. Hungarian apology routine formulae used by Hungarian 
adults in a written Discourse Completion Test are classified into five 
types. Their choices are influenced by such factors as the offence type and 
its severity, the social role of the interlocutor and the offender's gender. 
Two main apology types, Ne haragudj 'Don' t be angry' and Elnézést 'Ex-
cuse me' are shown to perform complementary communicative functions 
of restoring harmony in familiar vs. unfamiliar settings. Gender differences 
in the use of routine formula types demonstrate that males and females 
choose different ways to restore social harmony and may attach impor-
tance to different aspects of the context. 
This second instalment of the thematic issue of Acta Linguistica Hun-
garica also contains two book reviews (by Károly Bibok and by Jul ia 
Coryell and Saihua Xia, respectively) related to the special topic. 
* * * 
The guest editors would like to express their gratitude, first of all, for 
the opportunity given to them by the editor-in-chief of Acta Linguistica 
Hungarica, and for the assistance of the associate editor. All the papers 
were refereed by at least two reviewers, to whom we wish to express our 
special thanks at this place. Finally, we are grateful to the contributors for 
their commitment and patience during the refereeing and editing process. 
Enikő Németh T., Károly Bibok 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 

Acta Linguistica Hungarica, Vol. 52 (1), pp. 5~40 (2005) 
REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE BASE OF 
PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES* 
ANDRÁS KERTÉSZ CSILLA RÁKOSI 
The present paper aims at the exemplification of the applicability of plausibility anal-
ysis to linguistics. Starting from the criticism of Robinson (1997), the paper argues for 
two assumptions. Firstly, as opposed to a theory of distributed systems, it is a theory 
of plausible reasoning tha t is capable of capturing basic methodological problems of 
theory formation in pragmatics (such ад circularity, category error, the arbitrariness 
of interpretations of da ta and the objectification of the theorist 's cultural and linguis-
tic knowledge as principles of language behaviour). Secondly, the cognitive base of 
pragmatic principles is inferential and plausibilistic, rather than non-inferential and 
probabilistic. 
1. Introduct ion 
1.1. On objective theories of language and cognition 
In a provocative paper Edward A. Robinson (1997) claims tha t pragmatic 
theories motivated by Grice (1975) or Sperber and Wilson's relevance 
theory (1986/1995) are paradigm examples of what he calls "objective 
theories of language and cognition". This kind of objectivism has, in 
Robinson's view, at least two central features (see Robinson 1997, 256): 
(a) Researchers presuppose the distinction between subject and ob-
ject which is characteristic of the relationship between a scientist and the 
things he or she observes. This means that scientists assume to observe 
impartially external objects. As a result, it is taken for granted that the 
rules and structures described are impartial facts which are t rue or false. 
(b) Objective theories of language and cognition tend to turn the 
structures which have been created in this way into structures of the 
* Work on the present, paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical 
Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the University of Debrecen. 
We are grateful to Károly Bibok, János László, Enikő Németh T. and two anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments. Our special thanks are due to George Seel 
for improving our English. None of these people are responsible for the short-
comings of our paper. 
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mind. They assume the existence of a kind of cognitive content which 
causes people to act and which can be described independently of the 
background knowledge of the scientists who observe linguistic behaviour. 
Objective theories in this sense raise a series of fundamental difficul-
ties tha t can be summarized as follows (see Robinson 1997, 256-8). 
The first is that objective theories yield a category error according to 
which the mechanisms underlying the linguistic behaviour described are 
identified with the models of language one obtains as a result of trying to 
objectively describe the things observed. That is, the theoretical model is 
assumed to be identical with the cognitive content underlying linguistic 
behaviour which this model is intended to describe. In this way objective 
theories are assumed to translate immediately into mental structures. 
Secondly, from (a) and (b) above it follows t h a t objective theories of 
cognition are in fact nothing but the interpretat ions of the scientist. 
Thirdly, a certain kind of circularity presents itself. On the one 
hand, the theorist maintains that there exist certain principles which 
govern communicative behaviour. On the other hand, theorists use their 
cultural and linguistic knowledge in order to define basic terms with the 
help of which communicative behaviour is described. Accordingly, what 
the theorist describes is in fact the reflection of his/her own commu-
nicative and cultural knowledge.1 By way of illustration, let us mention 
the example of the Gricean maxims. At first sight it seems to be the 
case that these maxims objectively describe certain mechanisms which 
seem to underlie everyday communication and which may also account 
for certain kinds of meanings that are brought about by certain utter-
ances. Nevertheless, these maxims can be formulated only because the 
researcher himself/herself has an understanding of what in a given soci-
ety counts as brief, relevant, orderly, informative. Thus, what happens is 
that the researcher's own cultural knowledge is objectified: those pieces 
of information which are properties of the theory are assumed to con-
stitute objective accounts of what actually happens in communicative 
processes. Such knowledge is considered to be the cognitive base of prag-
matic principles, while in fact it is nothing but cultural knowledge that 
all members of a given society, including the researcher himself/herself, 
share. The researcher does not detect regularities objectively given, but 
rather, he/she projects his/her own knowledge onto the object of his/her 
1
 Independently of Robinson's argumentation, Kertész (2004a) discusses a similar 
kind of circularity with respect to cognitive semantic theories such as Lakoff and 
Johnson's embodied realism and Bierwisch and Lang's two-level model. 
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investigations while claiming the latter to be objectively detected.2 This 
inevitably leads to a difficulty which concerns the infinity of the relations 
included in the base: 
"Of coarse, it can be argued t h a t this simply means we need to objectively 
define all of the relationships within the cultural knowledge base and to allow 
the principles to act on these defined relationships. [...] In an objective 
theory, all of the conceptual base that can make a difference in interpretation 
must be explicitly defined. Bu t , if we consider this, we find t h a t the number 
of relations tha t need to be explicated is theoretically infinite. For instance, 
consider (3): 
(3) A: How are we getting to the movie? 
B: Well, I have the car. 
For B's response to mean 'I'll drive', В must have a licence, the car must 
have fuel, it must seat more t h a n one passenger, the battery mus t have acid, 
all the essential working par t s must be present and correctly assembled, the 
laws of physics must be in effect, etc., ad infinitum. Any of these facts 
of cultural knowledge can be challenged to cancel the implicature in B's 
response tha t they can use the car. [...] Because all of these assumptions can 
figure in the final implicature, an objective system must specify all of these 
assumptions in all of the different situations in order to determine which 
are in effect for a given utterance. Once we have taken for granted the 
epistemological assumption inherent in objective approaches t o language and 
cognition, we must fully formalize the knowledge base. Of course, to define all 
these possible inferences, there must be a fully spelled-out knowledge base. 
The complexity of this knowledge base has been a central concern for 
many theorists in the behavioural and cognitive sciences. [.. .] Ultimately, 
the task proved to be impossible objectively defining the full cultural base 
of understanding is an infinite process of specifying and respecifying finer 
and finer grains of detail. [.. .] It is beyond the ability of a formal system 
to capture cultural knowledge, i.e., the knowledge used in discourse under-
standing." (Robinson l!)f)7, 258 9; emphasis added) 
The difficulties thus summarized boil down to two dist inct but inter-
related problems. The first is a metascientific problem concerning the 
methodology which pragmatic theories make use of, whereas the second 
is an object-scientific one which focuses on a specific aspect of the object 
of pragmatic theories, namely, the cognitive base of pragmatic principles: 
2
 Cf. the following quotation: "As a cognitive mechanism, these principles are 
defined as decision metrics. W h a t a brief or orderly usage is, is what the principle 
is supposed to tell us. But , to make a decision, these principles must have a 
definition of the value they are determining. Unfortunately, this definition is a 
reflection of the structure of t he theorist's knowledge." (Robinson 1997, 258; 
emphasis added) 
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(P l ) The methodological problem of pragmatic theories: How can a pragmatic theory 
avoid 
(a) the category error previously referred to, 
(b) the potential arbitrariness of interpretations, 
(c) circularity, and 
(d) t h a t the theorist's cul tural and linguistic knowledge be objectified as princi-
ples of language behaviour? 
(P2) The problem of the cognitive base of pragmatic theories: How can the cognitive 
base underlying pragmatic principles be accounted for, if we know that it 
(a) contains an infinite amount of assumptions, 
(b) consists of assumptions which are context-dependent, and 
(c) cannot be captured by objective theories because the lat ter should account 
for an infinite process of specifying and respecifying the information it con-
sists of? 
1.2. Solutions to (PI) and (P2) 
Robinson's solution to ( P I ) is this: 
(SI) A theory of distributed systems avoids (P l ) ( a ) - (d ) . 
In accordance with (SI), he also puts forward a possible solution to (P2): 
"The regularities which the theories above describe emerge f rom the action of 
a distributed system as it exists in the world. They are not represented in the 
cognitive system but reflect its general existential nature. They represent an 
external observer's view of the overall activity of a number of independent 
but mutually sensitive interacting cognitive and situational factors, none of 
which independently represents any specific pragmatic principle. [...] Rather 
than viewing concepts as discrete representations, we should view them as 
relative and subjective entities. In such a view, internal representations are 
dynamic, generalized associations which always act relative to the environ-
ment. [...] I will relate objective linguistic theories to a more realistic view 
of cognition which does not depend on individual mental representations and 
calculations. [...] This approach, while it remains objective as an external 
description of behaviour, has the advantage of not utilizing locally defin-
able representations. Instead, it treats the speaker as an integral part of the 
environment by modelling the environment and the associational patterns 
and mechanisms that t ie the individual to the environment. We must not 
treat mental representations as descriptions but as probabilistic traces tied 
to the environment. Understanding is not the calculation and representation 
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of a knowledge structure in the mind. It is ra ther the state of the cogni-
tive system at a certain point in t ime in relation to the world around it." 
(Robinson 1997, 259f; emphasis added) 
The main aspects of this proposal can be summarized as in (S2): 
(S2) The sub-problems of (P2) can be solved by assuming that the cognitive base of 
pragmatic principles includes relations which are 
(a) non-inferential, and 
(b) probabilistic. 
1.3. Remarks on (SI) and (S2) 
There are a couple of important issues which seem to question the work-
ability of Robinson's model. Let us in what follows point out some of 
them. 
The model proposed by Robinson cannot avoid the problems listed 
in (PI) as he himself observes.'* Nevertheless he maintains t h a t "whereas 
the pragmatic theories [...] point towards regularities at their level of 
description, this model can be used to point to regularities a t another, 
perhaps neural or ecological, level of description" (Robinson 1997, 264). 
Thus, Robinson simply pushes the problem to another level of the-
oretical description, i.e., to another subsystem of "a distributed system" 
(e.g., perceptual system, associative memory). However, we cannot carry 
on the generation of new levels endlessly; in order to prevent ourselves 
from getting into an infinite regress we have to stop somewhere. But 
at the last level we are forced to turn the structures of the theoretical 
description into structures of the mind. 
Moreover, if we ask the question of how he knows which conceptual 
content is associated with a certain utterance, we cannot avoid answering: 
on the basis of his cultural and linguistic knowledge. So, the same kind 
of circularity seems to appear in th is model as t ha t which it was intended 
to resolve. This can be illustrated by the following quotation:4 
3
 "Of course, we can formulate objections against this model similar to those made 
earlier against the linguistic descriptive models." (Robinson 1997, 264) 
4
 The quotation refers to the following example: 
"(2) A: Did you go to Bloomingdale's when you went to New York? 
B: Well, what do you think of my new dress?" (Robinson 1997, 257) 
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"For example, in (2) the conversants are discussing whether В had gone to 
Bloomingdale's. Thus, knowledge associated with Bloomingdale's is active 
for both conversants. Par t of this knowledge is the fact tha t Bloomingdale's 
sells dresses. This is simply part of t h e cultural knowledge that A and В 
possess about Bloomingdale's. These two individuals, having been raised in 
their particular culture, have learned what Bloomingdale's is, and par t of 
this knowledge is t h a t it sells dresses. While this association may not be the 
most active thing for A at the time of his or her utterance, this relationship is 
further activated by B's response. Furthermore, A's goal is to get an answer 
to the first question, and A and В are following s tandard conversational 
pat terns. So the implicature is automatically available t o A because of the 
correspondence between A's goals and salient aspects of the conceptual ma-
terial associated with dresses and Bloomingdale's. Within this approach, it 
is not calculated; it arises from the correspondence of all of these par t s as 
they are activated within this context." {op.cit., 267f; emphasis added) 
Now we may ask what the source of the knowledge of the associations 
is that are most probable in this si tuation: surely, it is Robinson's own 
cultural knowledge. He does not mention any experiments in which the 
perceptual system and the memory of the people in this dialogue have 
been investigated with the methods of neuropsychology. Therefore, (SI) 
is not capable of capturing this kind of problem (see also section 1.1). 
At least one of t he sources of t he difficulties might be tha t the gap 
between the level of the associative memory and that of linguistic be-
haviour is too great. For instance, t he principle t h a t "[...] if we look at 
how the cognitive system [...] works, we see tha t relevance is actually 
created by this system, because it is organized to associate things re-
lated in previous experience" (ibid., 267), significantly underdeterniines 
linguistic meaning. 
In direct connection with this finding, (S2)(a) appears to be prob-
lematic as well. Suppose that there is a third person С who has never 
heard the name Bloomingdale's. Despite this fact, he or she may find out 
the implicated content of B's answer—without having any knowledge as-
sociated with the name of the depar tment store mentioned. In this case, 
we cannot claim that the implicature is automatically available to him or 
her. On the contrary: С can only 'calculate' the intended meaning of B's 
utterance by drawing inferences from the content of the question, the an-
swer and some additional background knowledge about buying dresses. A 
similar case can be constructed through the modification of the dialogue: 
(1) A: Your dress is really nice. 
В: I was at Bloomingdale's when I went to New York. 
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Here A need not have any knowledge of Bloomingdale's t o be able to 
understand the whole content of B's response. He or she can only infer 
it from pieces of information rooted in his or her cultural knowledge. 
Consequently, (S2)(a) may be questioned. 
A third example is worth mentioning: 
(2) A: Mrs. X is an old bag. 
B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't i t? 5 
If we consider the principle formulated by Robinson that "[. . .] only what 
is specifically uttered is what is fully activated" (ibid., 265f), then we can-
not find out what В intended to communicate. Certainly, A's statement 
is par t of the context, so we have to take it into consideration as well. 
But B's ut terance has seemingly nothing to do with A's words: it seems 
to be totally irrelevant in comparison to the content of A's statement. 
Realizing this, we remember previous experiences of similar situations 
and conclude t ha t В wanted to say tha t A had been impolite and he 
or she refused to talk in this way. But this means t ha t A can be in 
possession of the entire si tuation only after discovering t h a t B's contri-
bution has been irrelevant. Consequently, the link between associations 
and implicatures seems to be not as directly probabilistic as supposed by 
Robinson—therefore, (S2)(b) is problematic, too. Rather, it seems to be 
the case that we are dealing with a 'cyclic' and 'prismatic' revaluation of 
the pieces of information available. 
The point, then, is that t he claim that "the activation of the goal and 
of the perceived circumstances a t the same time results in a correspon-
dence between all of the par t s which arises as an automatic , reflexive 
mental process [...]" (Robinson 1997, 268) might be replaced by the 
following assumption: The activation of the goal and of the perceived 
circumstances a t the same t ime results in a correspondence between all 
of the parts which arises as a cyclic and prismatic inference and decision 
process. 
In sum, the above considerations indicate that both (SI) and (S2) 
may be problematic and these problems just ify the search for alternative 
suggestions. 
5
 See Grice (1975, 54). 
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1.4. Alternatives to (SI) and (S2) 
At this point of our argumentation we hypothetically put forward the 
following alternatives to (SI) and (S2): 
(SI') A theory of plausible reasoning avoids (P l ) (a ) (d). 
(S2') (P2) can be solved by assuming tha t t he cognitive lia,so of pragmatic principles 
includes relations which are 
(a) inferential in a specific sense, and 
(b) cyclic and prismatic. 
As the above summary witnesses, at first sight Robinson's views seem to 
be quite odd, and therefore, one may ask the question if the problems 
(PI) and (P2) are ' real ' problems, or rather, just arbitrarily constructed 
quandaries. Nevertheless, we will t ry to show that th is is not so and tha t 
it is precisely the unusual nature of Robinson's line of argumentation tha t 
makes it an instructive starting point for illustrating the workability of 
our approach to the methodology of pragmatics b o t h on an object- and 
metascientific level. We hope that in arguing for an alternative solution 
to (PI ) and (P2) we will be able to sketch the basic tenets of a theory of 
plausible reasoning which will prove to be a fruitful tool for solving central 
problems of theory formation in pragmatics in part icular and linguistics 
in general. 
In the rest of this paper we will proceed as follows. In section 2 we 
will briefly outline some tenets of a theory of plausible reasoning on a high 
level of abstraction (section 2.1); nevertheless, we will also show tha t it 
is not unreasonable to assume the cognitive reality of plausible inferences 
(section 2.2). In section 3 we will t ry to show t h a t (S2') is a possible 
alternative to (S2) which is capable of capturing (P2) by accounting for 
some of the shortcomings of (S2). In section 4 we will briefly touch on 
(PI) indicating that t he theory of plausible reasoning we have introduced 
can maintain (SI'). Finally, section 5 will summarize the main findings 
and raise open questions tha t seem to be worth considering in the future. 
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2. On plausible inferences 
2.1. Basic assumptions 
In this section we will summarize certain aspects of a possible theory of 
plausible reasoning. The scope of the present paper does not allow us to 
provide a precise explication of the basic notions, therefore we will con-
sciously use them preexplicatively. Nevertheless, we make the following 
terminological remarks, which are not intended to be precise explications 
but which serve to render our line of argumentation followable and un-
derstandable. 
First, the notions of 'deductive', 'conclusive', 'demonstrative' and 
'logical' inference are used as synonyms, and so are the notions of 'plau-
sible', 'non-demonstrative' and 'non-conclusive' inference.*' Second, we 
regard the basic concepts and the notational coirventions of propositional 
logic as given, and they are not introduced systematically. Third, the no-
tions of 'consistency' and 'non-contracliction' and those of 'inconsistency' 
and 'contradiction' are also treated as synonyms, respectively. Fourth, 
by 'heuristics' we understand rules (i) the role of which is to survey (in a 
non-systematic manner) relatively large domains of problems, (ii) which 
may lead to the solution of a certain problem, but (iii) which do not nec-
essarily lead to the solution or to the optimal solution of this problem. 
Fifth, by 'data ' we understand such assertions tha t embody the knowl-
edge available to us for the solution of a problem in a given informational 
s ta te (according to this formulation, we call not only those assertions 
'da ta ' which describe 'facts' or 'observations' in whatever sense of these 
terms, but also every such background assumption which we use during 
the argumentation). ' 
(
' Nevertheless, see Kertész Rákosi (2005b) for a more sophisticated t reatment 
of these notions according to which non-demonstrative/non-conclusive inferences 
include both plausible and fallacious inferences. 
' On this interpretation of 'data ' cf. Roscher and Brandoin's characterization: 
" 'Da ta ' : theses tha t can serve as acceptance-candidates in the context of in-
quiry, contentions which, at best, are merely presumptively true [• • •]• These are 
not certified t ru ths (or even probable truths) but theses that are in a position 
to make some claims upon us for acceptance: They are prima facie t ru ths in the 
sense that we would incline to grant them acceptance-as-true if (and this is a very 
big IF) there were no countervailing considerations upon the scene." (Reseller 
Brandom 1979, 69) 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
14 ANDRÁS KERTÉSZ - CSILLA RÁKOSI 
Presupposing these terminological remarks, in what follows we char-
acterize plausible inferences by taking the classical work of George Polya 
and Nicholas Rescher as our start ing point.8 We will integrate findings 
which have already been put forward in the literature and as a result 
of this integration of classical approaches we will sketch a coherent and 
many-sided account of plausible reasoning.9 
(i) The notion of plausible inference. The common features of plau-
sible inferences can be summed up in two points as a first approximation: 
"First, they do not have the certainty of a strict demonstration. Second, they 
are useful in acquiring essentially new knowledge, and even indispensable to 
any not purely mathematical or logical knowledge, to any knowledge con-
cerned with the physical world. We could call the reasoning tha t underlies 
this kind of evidence 'heuristic reasoning' or 'inductive reasoning' or (if we 
wish to avoid stretching the meaning of existing terms) 'plausible reason-
ing'." (Polya 1948, 221f; emphasis added) 
The fundamental difference between plausible and deductive inferences 
can be demonstrated through the following example: 
Deductive inference: Plausible inference: 
If A, then В It is certain tha t if A then В 
not В Л is possible, В is not certain 
not A After verifying B, A is more plausible 
modus tollens reduction 
8
 It is important to emphasize tha t Polya's and Reseller's views are fully com-
patible: "Polya's entire analysis of the logic of inductive reasoning can also be 
accommodated on the present approach" (Rescher 1976, 67). Moreover, there are 
at least two substantial reasons for concentrating on these classical approaches. 
Firstly, due to the pioneering na ture of these works, there is no avoiding their use 
in presenting the essentials of plausible reasoning (see Woods et al. 2000, 258). 
Secondly, Polya's and Reseller's ideas are not outmoded at all, because they have 
been rediscovered and integrated into current t rends which revaluate traditional 
problems of the philosophy of science such as the distinction between the context 
of justification and the context of discovery, inconsistency, the process of scientific 
problem solving, etc.; in this way these ideas have been integrated into current 
approaches to argumentation theory and AI research. Therefore, it is unavoidable 
to take those classical works by Polya and Rescher as our start ing point which 
most current accounts of plausible reasoning are rooted in. Should our approach 
turn out to be tenable, later refinements in the light of recent advances will be 
both possible and necessary. 
9
 For a considerably more comprehensive discussion of our approach see Kertész 
(2004b); Kertész - Rákosi (2005a) and Rákosi (2005). 
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(ii) The uncertainty of plausible inferences. The definitive differ-
ence between the two conclusions in the example above is that while 
with deductive inferences the t ru th of the conclusion follows from the 
t ru th of the premises with certainty, in the case of plausible inferences 
the premises merely increase the credibility of the conclusion (cf. Polya 
1954, 113). Consequently, plausible inferences are less reliable by na-
ture than conclusive inferences: they necessarily involve the possibility 
of mistakes, errors and rejectability (see also Walton 2001, 159). 
(iii) The heuristic function of plausible inferences. We very often 
find ourselves in a situation during the solving of a problem that, a t a 
certain point, we have several hypotheses (conjectures) a t our disposal 
which mutually exclude each other, but every one of which is supported 
by certain considerations and therefore each may represent a possible 
alternative in view of the amount of information which we possess. Then 
we have to decide between competing hypotheses but we cannot turn 
to deductive logic for help. Thus, plausible inferences are heuristic tools 
with the purpose of bringing us closer to the solution of a certain problem, 
inasmuch as they help us form an opinion of which possible alternative 
is the most promising on the basis of the information available to us a t 
any given moment (Polya 1948, 102; cf. also the quotation in (i); Walton 
2001, 164). 
(iv) The part ial basis of plausible inferences. With deductive infer-
ences, the premises make up a 'full basis' in t he sense that "[i]f we receive 
some new information that does not change our belief in the premises, 
it cannot change our belief in the conclusion" (Polya 1948, 223). On 
the other hand, in the case of plausible inferences the premises make u p 
only a 'partial basis', that is the complete basis has a par t which is not 
expressed through the premises: 
"[...] the premises constitute only one part of the basis on which the con-
clusion rests, the fully expressed, the 'visible' par t of the basis; there is an 
unexpressed, invisible part, formed by something else, by inarticulate feel-
ings perhaps, or by unstated reasons. In fact., it. can happen tha t we receive 
some new information that, leaves our belief in both premises completely 
intact, but. influences the t rust we put in Л in a way just opposite to that, 
expressed in the conclusion. To find A more plausible on the ground of 
the premises of our heuristic syllogism is only reasonable. Yet tomorrow I 
may find grounds, not interfering at all with these premises, that, make A 
appear less plausible, or even definitively refute it. The conclusion may be 
shaken and even overturned completely by commotions in the invisible parts 
of its foundation, although the premises, the visible part, stand quite firm." 
(Polya 1948, 22.'if; emphasis added) 
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(v) The context-dependence of plausible inferences. In plausible in-
ferences the conclusion cannot be detached from the premises. Moreover, 
Polya emphasizes tha t the 'weight' of the conclusion depends not only 
on the premises explicitly formulated, bu t also on hidden grounds which 
form the 'invisible' part of the partial basis such as the individual's back-
ground or cultural knowledge, etc. (Polya 1954, 115f). The conclusion of 
a plausible inference is always only provisional; its acceptability is closely 
dependent on the particular circumstances given. Rescher maintains, too, 
that it is definitely not universalizable formal considerations t ha t deter-
mine the evaluation of the plausibility of conclusions, but ra ther , it is 
clearly situation-specific, contextual factors in the widest sense (Rescher 
1976, 11 Iff). 
(vi) The plausibility of the premises and the emergence of contra-
dictions. It is one of the basic issues of plausibility theory t ha t it can 
treat both the emergence and the resolution of contradictions. 
Firstly, those premises which we are compelled to treat as the star t-
ing point of our reasoning are not to be regarded as certainly t rue, but 
can only be assumed to be plausible in the given context, tha t is, they 
are more credible than their potential alternatives if certain conditions 
are satisfied. This, in accordance wi th the nature of the partial basis 
mentioned in (iv), may result in the inconsistency of the basis which we 
have to use as our background for reasoning. In this sense, the basis 
is informationally overdetermined. We have to reason by making use of 
not completely trustworthy informat ion—that is, building on a partial 
basis. We know that only plausible inferences can be drawn from a par-
tial basis, and these inferences can lead to contradictory conclusions in 
certain cases: to explain one's data, one may set up hypotheses which 
mutually exclude each other but which are plausible in certain respects 
in a given context (Rescher -Brandom 1979, 160). T h a t is, the emergence 
of contradictions may have its sources in plausible inferences.10 
Secondly, resolving this kind of informational overdeterminacy is only 
possible if we decide what to abandon amidst bits of information which 
contradict each other. To achieve this, we need to exceed purely formal 
considerations, as was argued for in point (v), and somehow have to com-
pare the possible alternative decisions. If we consider conclusions to be 
tools in information processing (for more on this, cf. Rescher 1976, 97ff), 
10
 Of course, a partial basis does not necessarily lead to the emergence of contradic-
tions, but the emergence of contradictions is one possibility that may arise from 
the peculiarities of the partial basis. 
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plausible inferences can be perceived as converting a set of premises into 
information of a certain plausibility, tha t is into a conclusion (cf. also 
point (vi)). This provides an opportunity for us to compare the conclu-
sions tha t can be drawn from particular subsets of an informational set 
and choose the one which appears to be the most probable, the most 
optimal, and the most credible for us. One may use plausible inferences 
once again to resolve the (possible) contradictions that emerge as the con-
clusions of plausible inferences drawn from the partial basis, examining 
which is the most credible of the alternatives in a given context—hoping 
tha t sooner or later an informational state is reached wherein novel con-
tradictions do not arise. Tha t is: one of the possible means of resolving 
contradictions is plausible inference. 
To sum up: the simplest way to characterize the strong correlation 
between plausible inferences and the emergence of contradictions is to 
regard plausible inferences as one of the possible sources of the emergence 
of contradictions on the one hand, and as one of the possible means to 
resolve contradictions on the other. 
(vii) The cyclic and prismatic nature of plausible reasoning. We 
reason cyclically by starting off from an inconsistent set of premises. We 
return to the problems in question again and again, and supplement-
ing the partial basis with different latent background assumptions we 
transform the set of information at our disposal by drawing additional 
plausible inferences, and re-evaluate the credibility of the respective data 
(hypotheses, alternative explanations). During these cyclic returns we 
aim to filter out. hypotheses unacceptable for some reason gradually, ac-
cording to different — possibly contradictory — considerations (Reseller 
1987, 304; 1976, 11 Iff, 118).11 This way it becomes possible to compare 
one's cycles and to assess one's progress. First and foremost, there are 
two questions one may consider during this process: 
(a) The first question is whether one has managed to root out the 
contradictions within a particular cycle ( that is whether one has gained a 
consistent set of information), or whether at least the plausibility of any 
of the contradictory hypotheses has increased. 
11
 See Kertész Rákosi (2005a;b) considerably more detailed characterizations of the 
cyclic nature of argumentation in linguistics supported by a series of case studies. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
18 A N D R Á S KERTÉSZ - CSILLA RÁKOSI 
(b) The second question concerns the degree of plausibility of the 
complete amount of information within a reasoning cycle as compared to 
the total of other reasoning cycles.12 
Moreover, the cyclic reasoning is at the same time prismatic as well. 
The relation between the cyclic and the prismatic nature of reasoning is 
formulated by Rescher clearly: 
"[...] it may make perfectly good sense to proceed dialectically and consider 
an issue prismatically, by proceeding in the variable light of not merely 
different but even inconsistent perspectives." 
(Rescher 1987, 306f; emphasis added) 
"[...] 'dialectical' reasoning is a mat ter of the repeated reconsideration of old 
issues from newly attained points of view. The root idea of such reasoning 
is that of a multistage process where we repeatedly re-examine one selfsame 
issue from different and mutually inconsistent points of view. It is a mat ter 
of developing a course of reasoning in several phases or 'moments' where we 
consider an issue now from different and mutually incompatible points of 
departure, moving in a round-about way from P via 11011-P to a conclusion 
of some sort. We proceed in circles or cycles where we re turn to a certain issue 
now in this light and now iu that. We do not constantly press onwards to new 
ground, repeatedly crisscrossing the same terrain, approaching the old issues 
from different and often discordant angles. [...] In dialectical reasoning we 
make assertions that are negated ('corrected' so to speak) by subsequent 
counter-assertions. We have here a process of successive approximation as it 
were, where at each stage we assert things that are literally false and in need 
of eventual correction. When things go smoothly, however, these successive 
corrections appertain to increasingly minor and insignificant respects. [...] 
At each stage what we say is not literally correct but only correct up to a 
point." [op.cit., 303f; emphasis added) 
(viii) The universality of plausible inferences. Although Polya dis-
cusses the mechanisms of plausible inference mainly in the domains of 
12
 This cyclic nature of reasoning has to be clearly distinguished from circularity: 
"This circular process highlights the element of 'self-correction' present in sys-
tematic applications of plausibility analysis, allowing for a revised appraisal of 
the initial data t h a t provide the very materials of the analysis. There is a cyclic 
movement, a closing of the cycle which requires a suitable meshing a matching 
process that eventually retrovalidates (i.e., retrospectively revalidates) the criteria 
of plausibility assessment with reference to the results to which they lead. [...] 
The sort of 'self-criticism' at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circu-
larity, but in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more 
refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials 
from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ' the same point ' but 
does so at a different cognitive level." (Rescher 1976, 119; emphasis as in the 
original and added) 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
REMARKS ON T H E COGNITIVE B A S E O F PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES 1 9 
mathematics and the sciences, he also emphasizes tha t these mechanisms 
are universal and not specific to these domains: 
"The underlying principle is generally recognized in the natural sciences, and 
it is implicitly admitted in the law courts, and in everyday life. The verifi-
cation of a consequence is regarded as reasonable evidence for a conjecture 
in any domain. Thus our patterns appear as universal. 
We pay, however, a price for such 'universality'. Our pattern suc-
ceeds in being universal because it is one-sided, restricted to one aspect of 
plausible inference. The universality becomes blurred when we raise the 
question 'What, is the weight of such evidence?' In order to judge the 
weight of the evidence, you have to be familiar with the domain; in or-
der to judge the weight with assurance, you have to be an expert in the 
domain. Yet you cannot be familiar with all domains, and you can still 
less be an expert in all domains. And so everyone of us will notice soon 
enough that there are practical limits to the universality of plausible infer-
ence." (Polya 1954, 114; emphasis added) 
One important consequence of this stance is that scientific and every-
day reasoning may rest on the same pa t te rns of inference,1 ' although, of 
course, from domain to domain these pa t te rns may be manifested in very 
different ways. Thus, at the outset nothing speaks against our assump-
tion that even the cognitive base of pragmatic principles may be governed 
by plausible inferences rather than probabilistic associations in the sense 
of Robinson. Before, however, elaborating on this, let us turn to an issue 
which is of utmost importance. In particular, (S2') cannot be maintained 
if the pat terns of plausible inference are considered to be merely abs t rac t 
constructs which are intended to model how people argue. Therefore, 
in the next section we will show tha t the cognitive reality of plausible 
inferences may be justifiedly hypothesized, although we know very little 
about these cognitive processes and such a hypothesis is far from having 
been proved convincingly. 
2.2. On the cognitive reality of plausible reasoning 
We do not claim that, the mind is a plausibilistic system. However, we 
assume two things. Firstly, tha t the cognitive mechanisms we try to cap-
ture 'look like' plausible inferences. Secondly, that the relations which we 
1 !
 Our hypotheses (SI ' ) and (S2') are closely related, because we assume that, both 
scientific reasoning and everyday communicative behaviour make extensive use 
of plausible inferences. See sections 4 and 5. 
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interpret as plausible inferences may have some kind of cognitive reality, 
although we do not know exactly what neural processes are at work.1 1  
Let us, without striving for a comprehensive discussion of the literature, 
mention two instructive examples illustrating the psychological aspects 
of reasoning in general. 
Dolinina (2001) examined the use of 'theoretical' ('logical', ' formal ' , 
'deductive') and 'empirical' ('pre-logical', ' traditional' , ' inductive') in-
ferences on the basis of neuropsychological evidence. She proposed the 
following solution to what is called the problem of the heterogeneity of 
thinking: 
"[...] neurological experiments demonstrated tha t both mechanisms of rea-
soning are simultaneously present in the brain of one and the same per-
son, tha t both of them can be used, but t h a t each of them is controlled 
by a different hemisphere. [...] these results give a certain counterevi-
dence to Johnson-Laird's claim that formal reasoning is not represented in 
the mind. [...] In the case of reasoning pat terns, the right hemisphere ap-
pears to control the quality of information (e.g., the truthfulness of premises, 
testing t hem against the realities of the world and/or personal knowledge/ 
experience), whereas the left hemisphere is responsible for the correctness 
of purely operational mechanisms (formal correctness of inferences). [...] 
Since l i terate western-schooled individuals possess both modes of reasoning, 
the question was raised [.. .], which of the modes is normally used [...]. Some 
cognitive psychologists (e.g., Johnson-Laird and Moore) claim that the tra-
ditional, semantic way of reasoning is responsible for reasoning processes 
and is represented in the mind, the formal being only a 'performance' strat-
egy. Others (Wilson and Sperber) stress t he priority of formal reasoning. 
Deglin's neurological experiments on functional differentiation of right and 
left hemispheres demonstrated that both strategies are present in the brain 
(...], so an individual can choose whatever strategy is most appropriate to 
the circumstances." (Dolinina 2001, 130ff) 
The neurological experiments carried out by Dolinina support the as-
sumption t h a t there exist inferential pa t te rns represented in the mind. 
However, the evidence she refers to is not sufficient for giving a sophis-
ticated and convincing answer to the question of what kind of s t ructure 
14
 This cautious claim of ours is analogous to Robinson's evaluation of his own 
approach: "The point [...] is not to say tha t the mind is a probabilistic system. 
What it actually is, at yet another level of abstraction, is a bunch of interconnected 
neurons reacting to the world. But the overall behaviour created by a neural 
system si tuated in an environment looks like what we describe as probabilistic 
behaviour. This behaviour, described best with a cognitive model such as the 
one outlined above, can result in the kinds of behaviour described by linguistic 
models of pragmatics at their level of description." (Robinson 1997, 264; emphasis 
added) 
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these pat terns of inference have and of what the application of particular 
pat terns normally depends on. 
She hypothesizes that if one is able to judge the truth value of the 
premises, then one prefers the 'empirical' mode, i.e., the use of the right 
hemisphere of the brain, whereas with respect to domains one is not 
familiar with, the 'logical' mode, i.e., the use of the left hemisphere is 
preferred. Tha t is, she assumes a model which isolates the use of infer-
ential pat terns from the content of the premises. 
However, in many cases where the 'empirical' mode was used, the 
reasons given for the responses contained inferences as well, even if the 
left hemisphere was suppressed or the experimentee had no formal edu-
cation. Then the task of the right hemisphere might be not to provide 
the structure of inferences in general and the latter cannot be identical 
with the rules of formal logic. Thus, the difference between the two 'rea-
soning strategies' seems to lie not in the use of reasoning pat terns but 
rather, in the consideration of the content of the premises. Accordingly, 
the 'theoretical reasoning mode' can be characterized as the ability to 
think hypotheticallv on the basis of formal rules of deductive logic. 
The answers described by Dolinina as examples of the 'empirical' rea-
soning mode can be accounted for with the help of the theory of plausible 
reasoning. Since, according to Polya (1954, 42ff), patterns of plausible 
reasoning can be seen as tending to the corresponding pattern of demon-
strative inference when the credibility of the premises tends to certainty, 
the mechanisms of plausible reasoning might explain the use of seemingly 
deductive inferences by uneducated persons or by experimentees whose 
left hemisphere was suppressed, too. 
As a second example, we refer to research carried out by Politzer 
and Bourmaud (2002) who describe experiments which tried to give an 
answer to the question of what conclusions can be drawn if in infer-
ences of the type 'modus ponens' or 'modus tollens' the t ru th of the 
'if . . . then ' premise is uncertain or if there is at least another premise 
which undermines the t ru th of the major premise. They observed that 
the experimentees judged the uncertainty of inferences much higher with 
respect to medical topics than, for example, topics concerning mechanics. 
Tha t is, Politzer and Bourmaud, too, consider the application of infer-
ences to be domain-dependent, but they characterize the sources of this 
domain-dependence in a more sophisticated way than Dolinina does: 
"The key factor seems to be the awareness that the level of understanding of 
the causal link between antecedent and consequent of the conditional differs 
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from one domain to another: for t he participants, the link may be more or 
less strong, allowing for more exceptions to the hypothesis if it is weaker." 
(Politzer Bourmaud 2002, 347; emphasis added) 
"[...] there is one single common mechanism, namely the recognition of 
one or several factors that are necessary conditions for the consequent to 
occur and, by this very fact, are conditions that implicitly complement the 
antecedent of the conditional to make it an actual sufficient condition. The 
degree of belief in the satisfaction of those factors acts as a mediator to define 
the degree of sufficiency of the conditional premise, that is, its credibility, 
and consequently, by inheritance, the degree of belief in the conclusion of the 
argument. The t r u t h status of the conclusion is t reated by degree rather than 
in all-or-nothing manner, and this degree is closely correlated to the degree 
of belief in the premise." (Politzer - Bourmaud 20Ü2, 353; emphasis added) 
As opposed to Dolinina's hypothesis, Politzer and Bourmaud's findings 
speak for the cooperation of the formal aspect and the content. These 
findings are in full accordance with Polya's claim that the strength of the 
conclusion is directly proportional to the s t rength of the premises and 
tha t normally inferences rest on a partial basis (see 2.1 (iv), (v), and 
Polya 1954, 41ff). 
These two examples witness tha t , on the one hand, it is reasonable 
to assume that plausible inferences are not merely abstract theoretical 
constructs and tha t they have some kind of cognitive reality; nevertheless, 
on the other hand, research in this field is still immature and we know 
very little about the details of this cognitive reality. 
In the next two sections we will illustrate how our model can capture 
some of the issues raised in section 1. 
3. O n (S2') 
3.1. On the correlation between plausible inferences and the cognitive 
basis of pragmatic principles 
So as to show the capability of our approach to plausible reasoning to 
capture the problem (P2), first we have to demonstrate that the main 
tenets of this approach correlate wi th those aspects of the cognitive base 
of pragmatic principles which Robinson points out. 
As Robinson (1997, 262) maintains, one of the difficulties which one 
encounters in trying to analyse an example like 
(3) I am looking for a doctor. 
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is tha t although it. is assumed tha t the speaker means a medical doctor, 
there is an infinite amount of background information that may specify 
the meaning of doctor in different ways. For example, at a dissertation 
defence party, probably a person with a PhD degree may be meant. Now, 
objective theories in the sense of section 1.1 are expected to clarify the 
way particular contexts cause particular interpretations, whereas this is, 
as we have seen, not possible. 
Robinson suggests a solution to the problem of accounting for the 
infinity of the background information yielding the possible interpreta-
tions of (3) which centers on the idea of a distributed system tha t makes 
use of probabilistically stored concepts grounded relative to the environ-
ment. He presumes that "related things are probabilistically associated 
together in terms of, and reflecting the strength of, the frequency of their 
associations in the world" (Robinson 1997, 262). Thus, concepts are as-
sumed "to generalize statistically towards a statistically defined centre, 
or centres, at the same time tha t their associative nature automatically 
results in context-sensitive activation" (op.cit., 263). 
Alternatively, we assume tha t the interpretations of terms like doctor 
in (3) emerge as the result of drawing plausible inferences from a partial 
basis in the sense of (iv) in section 2.1. This means, firstly, that on the one 
hand the infinity of the basis is acknowledged, on the other hand, however, 
it is also acknowledged that the only par t of this basis accessible to the 
hearer, i.e., what he/she encounters is a partial basis. Whereas Robinson 
assumes a probabilistic and non-inferential mechanism, we hypothesize 
a plausibilistic and inferential one. Revealing the mechanisms according 
to which plausible inferences are drawn from a partial basis is one of the 
major achievements of plausibility theory. 
The mechanism of drawing plausible inferences from a partial basis 
is, as we emphasized in (v) in section 2.1, deeply context-dependent. 
The fact that plausible inferences are context-dependent is important , 
because context-dependence is one of the major features of the cognitive 
basis of pragmatic principles: 
"[...] there are an infinite number of possible contexts for each utterance, 
so we are faced with the problem discussed earlier about objective systems, 
needing to specify the full base of understanding of an utterance; everything 
must be represented or derivable from a representation." 
(Robinson 1997, 262; emphasis added) 
Therefore, in principle plausibility theory is capable of capturing this 
aspect of the basis at the outset. 
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Another relevant feature of plausible inferences is that they are closely 
connected both to the emergence and the resolution of inconsistencies. 
Since, as we have seen in (vi) in section 2.1, the conclusion of plausible 
inferences is not t rue with certainty, but only more or less credible; new 
information may turn up any t ime and can undermine our trust in the 
conclusions, compelling us to reconsider the situation at issue and to re-
vise both the premises and the inferences from them. It is one of the most 
attractive impacts of plausibility theory t h a t it is capable of accounting 
for these mechanisms (see Kertész 2004b, chapter 22; Kertész-Rákosi 
2005a and Rákosi 2005 for detailed discussion). Now, the emergence of 
inconsistencies is one important property of the cognitive basis of prag-
matic principles as well: 
"If something in later discourse or activity should appear to contradict or 
modify this specific understanding, then a modification of the active under-
standing is possible; one is only adding information and not contradicting a 
previous assumption." (Robinson 1997, 206; emphasis added) 
Thus, we may maintain that in principle plausibility theory is appropri-
a te for analysing the emergence and resolution of contradictions in the 
cognitive basis of pragmatic principles. 
Finally, in section 1.3 we concluded among other things that it is not 
unreasonable to assume that with respect to the phenomena Robinson's 
considerations focus on there is a kind of cyclic and prismatic inference 
and decision process at work. In (vii) in section 2.1 we demonstrated 
tha t it is precisely cyclic and prismatic procedures that are at the heart of 
plausible inferences. Therefore, it is only na tura l that there may be a kind 
of correspondence between the mechanisms governing plausible inferences 
and the prismatic and cyclic relations between pieces of information tha t 
constitute the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles. 
After having pointed out the appropriateness of plausibility theory 
for suggesting a possible solution to (P2), wha t remains to be shown is 
how plausibility analysis works. So, the next section will be devoted to 
the analysis of instructive examples. 
3.2. Examples 
3.2.1. First example 
(4) John: Did you go to Bloomingdale's when you went to New York? 
Mary: Well, what do you think of my new dress? (cf. Robinson 1997, 257) 
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Cycle 1. The information at John's disposal is insufficient, because he 
does not know whether Mary was at Bloomingdale's or not. Therefore, 
John tries to get rid of the informational underdetermination. On the 
basis of his cultural knowledge he knows tha t Bloomingdale's is a depart-
ment store in New York. 
Nevertheless, there is a piece of information which indicates tha t the 
answer might be yes: he understands tha t Mary was in New York where 
this department store is situated. Thus, a necessary condition15 for the 
affirmative answer is probably satisfied: 
(5) (If Mary went to Bloomingdale's, then she was in New York.)16 
It is possible tha t Mary was in New York. 
After it has become more credible tha t Mary was in New York (since John under-
stood so and Mary did not protest against this presupposition of John's question), 
it. is more credible that Mary was at Bloomingdale's. 
This inference is an instance of shaded reduction.1 ' 
Of course, this is only one of several possible arguments which John 
uses to reach conclusions. As a first approximation, Mary's answer leaves 
the informational underdetermination of the partial basis untouched. It 
facilitates drawing further inferences by providing John with a new piece 
of information. Tha t is, the partial basis which John's inferences rest on 
are supplemented by the new information tha t Mary has a new dress. 
Cycle 2. John evaluates the situation from another perspective in that 
he considers the information content of Mary's answer. He a t t empts to 
supplement the partial basis by further background information. At this 
point associations may play a significant role; tha t is, he has to find 
cultural knowledge which could be used in the situation at issue. For 
example: 
That Mary was in New York is a necessary condition for her having visited Bloom-
ingdale's, because she could not, have been in this department store if she had 
not gone to New York. 
10
 In our analyses " ( . . .}" will indicate implicit premises. 
1
 ' For lack of space, we cannot, introduce the patterns of plausible reasoning system-
atically and elucidate the patterns we will apply in the examples to follow. Let 
it be sufficient to refer to Polya (1954); Kertész (2004b); Rákosi (2005). For the 
reader's convenience, however, in the appendix we enumerate the pat terns which 
we make use of in the analyses. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
26 ANDRÁS KERTÉSZ - CSILLA RÁKOSI 
(6) (It is possible tha t if Mary has a new dress, then she bought it.)18 
Mary has a new dress. 
It is more credible tha t she bought it. 
This inference is an instance of shaded modus ponens. 
John's cultural knowledge also includes the information tha t Bloom-
ingdale's is a department store which sells dresses. This information gives 
rise to an analogical inference yielding the conclusion tha t Mary could 
buy a dress there, too: 
(7) (It is possible tha t if Mary bought a new dress, then she did this at Blooming-
dale's.) 
It is possible tha t she bought a new dress. 
After it has become more credible tha t Mary bought a new dress (cf. the previous 
inference), it is more credible tha t Mary did this at Bloomingdale's. 
This inference is an instance of shaded modus ponens. 
Each of the above inferences rest on uncertain premises, therefore 
they yield conclusions whose t ru th value is uncertain, too. As a result of 
the peculiarities of the partial basis mentioned in section 2.1, this means 
tha t new information may turn up which contradicts the conclusions 
already drawn. However, at this point John does not possess information 
of the latter kind. 
However, it is not difficult to construct situations in which he does. 
For example, the context-dependence of implicatures is indicated by the 
fact that if John knows that Mary never buys dresses at Bloomingdale's 
because the only thing she buys there is caviar, then he will draw the 
opposite conclusion. Tha t is, in this case the last inference of cycle 2 
will be as follows: 
(8) (It is possible tha t if Mary visited Bloomingdale's, then she did not buy a dress.) 
It is possible tha t Mary did not buy a dress. 
After it has become less credible tha t Mary did not buy a dress, it is less credible 
that Mary visited Bloomingdale's. 
This inference is an instance of shaded modus tollens. 
At this point John 's knowledge includes an inconsistent set of as-
sumptions, because the result of cycle 1 contradicts the result of cycle 2. 
18
 Of course, we cannot exclude tha t she made the dress herself or that it was 
presented to her by her husband. T h a t is why it is only possible that she bought it. 
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Cycle 3. So as to resolve the contradiction, John has to decide which 
conclusion he thinks to be more plausible. Accordingly, he examines the 
problem from another perspective: 
(9) (It is possible that if Mary visited Bloomingdale's, then she bought caviar.)19 
It is possible that Mary bought caviar. 
After it has become less credible that Mary bought caviar (because she did not 
mention it), it is less credible tha t Mary went to Bloomingdale's. 
(9) is an instance of shaded modus tollens. 
The last conclusion would speak for the assumption tha t Mary did 
not visit Bloomingdale's. Nevertheless, it is also possible tha t John re-
considers a certain part of his background knowledge: 
(10) (It is possible that if Mary bought a new dress, then she did this exceptionally 
at Bloomingdale's.) 
It is possible that Mary bought a new dress. 
After it has become more credible tha t Mary bought a new dress, it is more 
credible that she bought it exceptionally at Bloomingdale's. 
(10) is an instance of shaded modus ponens. 
However, it is not at all certain tha t John can decide between the 
above alternatives on the basis of the information at his disposal; it may 
be the case tha t he will ask further questions. 
Of course, (5)—( 10) are only some of the possible reconstructions 
of (4). Nevertheless, they have illustrated how implicatures can be ac-
counted for by plausibility analysis. 
3.2.2. Second example 
It is worth considering what happens when a third person, say Jim, who 
does not know anything about department stores in New York, a t tends 
the dialogue. Probably he will s tart his inferences by considering Mary's 
answer: 
(11) (It. is possible that if Mary has a new dress, then she bought it.) 
Mary has a new dress. 
It is more credible tha t she bought it. 
19
 This premise is the result of an analogical inference. 
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(11) is an instance of shaded modus ponens. 
Then he tries to find a connection between New York and the pur-
chase of the new dress: 
(12) (It is possible that if Mary bought a new dress, then she bought it in a department 
store in New York.) 
It is possible that Mary bought a new dress. 
After it has become more credible that she bought a new dress, it is more credible 
that she bought it in a department store in New York. 
(12) is an instance of shaded modus ponens. 
(13) It is possible that Bloomingdale's is in New York.20 
It is possible that the department store in which Mary bought her new dress is 
in New York. 
It is possible that Mary bought her new dress at Bloomingdale's. 
(13) is an analogical inference. 
The inferences which Jim carried out are even less certain than those 
carried out by John, and accordingly, the plausibility of the conclusions 
Jim has drawn are less plausible than those drawn by John. 
3.2.3. Third example 
The Gricean theory explains the following example by the violation of 
the maxim of relevance: 
(14) Peter: Mrs. Johnson is an old hag. 
Rose: The weather was beautiful this summer, wasn't it? 
We will show that this phenomenon can be explained with the help of 
our model in the following way. 
Cycle 1. First of all, Peter tries to relate his own utterance and Rose's 
reply. However great his efforts are, he does not succeed in finding a chain 
of inferences in which these two pieces of information work as premises. 
Therefore, he notices tha t Rose's reply is irrelevant.21 
2 0
 Jim can infer this information from the fact that it is presupposed by John's 
question. Cf. cycle 1 in 3.2.1. 
2 1
 Accordingly, here 'relevance' means tha t on the basis of the utterance and the 
information given, one is able to construct a chain of inferences which rule out the 
informational under- or overdeterminacy; otherwise the utterance is irrelevant. 
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Cycle 2. It may be the case t h a t Peter, due to this conclusion (and per-
haps due to the awkward silence accompanied by Rose's unsympathetic 
face), is so embarrassed that he puts up with not understanding Rose's 
reaction and with the fact t ha t he got entangled in such an awkward 
situation. However, if he has already been in a similar situation, then 
he may draw an analogical inference which will yield the implicature of 
Rose's utterance: 
(15) (When Betty answered Bruno in an irrelevant way, then Bruno's ut terance touched 
on something unpleasant for t he hearers who did not want to speak about this 
topic.) 
Rose answered me in an irrelevant way. 
It. is possible t h a t I said something which touched on something unpleasant for 
the hearers. 
(15) is an analogical inference. 
It may also be the case t h a t Peter realizes this conclusion by consid-
ering Rose's gestures and the sudden awkward silence. This makes him 
understand tha t irrelevance indicates the rejection of the topic: 
(16) (When Betty's answer was preceded by an awkward silence and other people also 
looked disapprovingly at Bruno, then they did not want to speak about the topic 
Bruno had jus t touched on.) 
Rose's answer was preceded by an awkward silence and also others looked disap-
provingly at me. 
It is possible t h a t I said something which was embarrassing for the others and 
they did not want to speak about the topic at issue. 
(16) is an analogical inference. 
(17) (It is possible tha t when Bruno said something which was embarrassing for the 
others, and they did not want to speak about the topic at issue, then Betty 
answered in an irrelevant way, because she wanted to make Bruno notice this.) 
I t is possible t h a t I said something which was embarrassing for the others, and 
they did not want to speak about the topic a t issue. 
It. is possible t h a t Rose answered me in an irrelevant way because she wanted to 
make me notice this. 
(17) is an analogical inference. 
The inferences also show t h a t after the first cycle Peter changed the 
perspective from which he evaluated the situation. 
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3.2.4. Fourth example 
Levinson (2000) discusses, among other things, basic properties of gen-
eralized implicatures. He, too—like Robinson—claims that formal logic 
cannot serve as a tool for the reconstruction of implicatures. However, 
unlike Robinson and in accordance with our hypothesis, he concludes 
tha t implicatures can be explained by reconstructing them as the results 
of plausible inferences: 
"There is a [...] problem tha t has received less attention, what might be 
called the logical problem of reconstructing speaker's intentions [...]. Let 
us (following Aristotle) assume that we reason from goals to actions utiliz-
ing a logic of action, or a practical reasoning. Now, some theorists have 
assumed that intention-recognition is simply a mat ter of running that rea-
soning backwards [...]: we observe the behavior and figure out the underly-
ing intention by the same rules that we convert intentions into the actions 
that will effectuate tliem. The logical problem is that this cannot work, for 
the simple reason that for all inference systems one cannot work backwards 
from a conclusion to the premises from which it was deduced there is al-
ways an infinite set of premises which might yield the same conclusion [. . .]." 
(Levinson 2000, 30; emphasis added) 
"What [we] clearly need is a set of heuristics, mutually assumed by sender 
and receiver, tha t can serve to multiply the coded information by a factor of, 
say, three, by licensing inferential enrichment of what is actually encoded by 
choice of a specific signal. These heuristics must at the same time constrain 
that enrichment in such a way that the overall message can still be correctly 
recovered, by guiding (or coordinating) the match between the chosen signal 
and the recoverable, augmented message." (op.cit., 30f; emphasis added) 
According to Levinson, these heuristics rest on a special kind of plausible 
reasoning, namely default logic: 
"GCIs [generalized conversational implicatures] are inferences that appear to 
go through in the absence of information to the contrary; but additional in-
formation to the contrary may be quite sufficient to cause them to evaporate. 
Thus the mode of inference appears to have two important properties: it is 
a default mode of reasoning, and it is defeasible. [...] A reasoning system is 
said to be defeasible (or when instantiated in an argument nonmonotonic) 
if an inference or argument in that system may be defeated by the addition 
of further premises. [.. .] Default logics aim to capture a [...] mode of rea-
soning—namely, the notion of a reasonable presumption, a ceteris paribus 
assumption." (ibid., 42ff; emphasis as in the original) 
Nevertheless, besides similarities, there are also crucial differences be-
tween our and Levinson's approach. The aim of the following brief anal-
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ysis is only to illustrate the difference between our solution and Levin-
son's; the scope of the present paper does not permit a more extensive 
t reatment of these differences.22 For example, 
(18) At our university some professors go prepared to their lectures, 
i m p l i c a t e s t h a t 
(19) At our university not all professors go prepared to their lectures. 
Cycle 1. The phrase some Xs are Ys means tha t there are Xs which 
are Ys: 
(20) There are professors at. our university who go prepared to their lectures. 
However, some Xs are Ys does not say anything about whether all Xs 
are Ys; its information content leaves both possibilities open. 
Cycle 2. If the hearer wants to do away with the informational under-
determination for some reason,2 ' he or she has to examine the situation 
from another perspective. The following consideration presents itself im-
mediately: 
22
 It is interesting t h a t the example we chose seems to refute Levinson's claim that 
default conclusions are cancelled if contradicting information is made available. 
2 3
 Experiments with children show tha t we need some reason to go beyond the literal 
meaning of the utterances: "If preschoolers, unlike adults, cannot readily infer 
the pragmatic na ture of the task, and are not given adequate motivation to go 
beyond the t ru th conditional content of the ut terance, they may readily settle for 
a statement which is true but does not satisfy the adult expectations of relevance 
ami informativeness." (Papafragou - Musolino 2003, 269) 
For adults the use of certain phrases, i.e., knowledge of language may fulfil this 
task (for example some, start). But. the presence of such phrases is not a necessary 
condition for implicatures: "[...] scalar inferences can be induced by partial 
contextual orderings, which may be supplied by stable world knowledge or created 
in a completely ad hoc fashion [...]: 
A: Did you get Paul Newman's autograph? 
B: I got Joanne Woodward's. 
—> В did not get Paul Newman's autograph." (Papafragou - Musolino 2003, 258) 
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(21) (It is possible tha t if there were no professor who would go unprepared to his 
lectures,24 then the speaker would have said that At our university all professors 
go prepared to their lectures.) 
The speaker did not say that At our university all professors go prepared to their 
lectures. 
It is less credible t h a t there is no professor who goes unprepared to his lectures 
(i.e., it is more credible that there are professors who go unprepared to their 
lectures). 
This inference is an instance of shaded modus tollens. 
Cycle 3. Our cultural knowledge also contains information which contra-
dicts this conclusion. Namely, one of the prototypical features of profes-
sors is that they go prepared to their lectures: 
(22) Professors go prepared to their lectures. 
The conclusion obtained within cycle 2 and (22) results in inconsistency 
which has to be resolved by the hearer somehow. 
Cycle 4. (22) is an element of the speaker's cultural knowledge as well.25 
Despite this, he or she has used some instead of all in (18). So, it is 
possible that he or she does not agree with (22). 
(23) (It is possible tha t if the speaker had agreed with the statement t h a t At our 
university all professors go prepared to their lectures, he or she would have uttered 
this.) 
The speaker did not say that At our university all professors go prepared to their 
lectures. 
It is less credible tha t the speaker agrees with the statement. 
(23) is an instance of shaded modus tollens. 
This is an argument for the implicature mentioned in (19). The 
hearer's task, then, is to consider the strength of the arguments for and 
against the implicature. 
3.2.5. Summary 
The analyses of the examples were intended to illustrate that it is possible 
to explain different kinds of implicatures by making use of plausibility 
24
 I.e., if all professors go prepared to their lectures. 
25
 This is an analogical inference. 
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analysis. The analyses have shown t h a t implicatures can be assumed to 
work along the same lines as plausible inferences do. That is, they are 
characterized by 
(a) drawing inferences from a partial basis, 
(b) using different pa t terns of plausible inferences, 
(c) the emergence and resolution of contradictions, 
(d) context-dependency, 
(e) the cyclic and prismatic revaluation of the information available. 
4. On (SI' ) 
In section 1.1 we raised two closely related problems: a metascientific 
and an objectscientific one. Up to this point we tried to solve the object-
scientific problem (P2) by the application of plausibility analysis. Never-
theless, the method of our scientific method, namely, plausibility analysis 
is no less problematic t h a n the nature of implicatures: our findings de-
pend on the effectivity of this method to a considerable extent. Therefore, 
it is important to reflect on our own argumentation metascientifically so 
as to clarify some of the methodological difficulties we encounter: 
(a) Our own line of reasoning started from uncertain premises as well: 
since we had no convincing evidence at our disposal, we assumed 
only hypothetically t ha t the inferences we discussed in the previous 
section were or could have been carried out. 
(b) This means that there was only a partial basis which our inferences 
could rely on. 
(c) Not only the persons in the above examples, bu t we, too, as re-
searchers had to struggle with the informational underdetermination 
of the partial basis. 
(d) The way we applied plausibility analysis is only one side of the prism 
through which we observed the object of our investigations, namely, 
the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles. 
(e) Accordingly, we ourselves as analysts had to proceed cyclically and 
prismaticallv by making use of the perspectives of cognitive psychol-
ogy and linguistics, and above all of our own cultural knowledge. 
For example, as we have seen, particular aspects of the theory of 
associations which Robinson argued for could be integrated with our 
approach, although in a somewhat reinterpreted way: they may give 
an answer to the question of how the premises which contribute to 
filling the informational gap in the partial basis are selected. 
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In what follows, we will make a few brief remarks on how this kind of 
cyclic and prismatic reasoning works with respect to the construction of 
pragmatic theories. Accordingly, we will motivate our hypothesis (SI ' ) 
as a possible solution to (P I ) . However, we will not go into a detailed 
discussion, because elsewhere we put forward possible applications of 
plausibility analysis to theory construction in linguistics.26 
As we saw in section 1.1, Robinson claims that we must depart from 
a theory of cognition and proceed toward a descriptive theory of linguis-
tic behaviour. The solution proposed by Robinson to ( P I ) consists in 
assuming a hierarchy of systems where every level is determined by a 
lower level. These different, hierarchically related systems correspond to 
different theories.27 
Accordingly, in Robinson's view, the relationship between the object-
and the meta-level is always unidirectional. However, we showed in sec-
tion 1.3 t ha t this methodology inevitably runs into an infinite regress 
which can be interrupted only by stopping at the level a t which there 
is no avoiding the identification of the structures of the theoretical de-
scription with structures of the mind. Moreover, we also saw that the re-
searcher uses his/her own cultural knowledge as a point of departure and 
projects it onto a lower level system. Now, the question arises whether 
our approach results in the same problems, namely, those summarized 
in (P l ) ( a ) - (d ) . 
To begin with, let us mention that Hample (1985/1992)—in refer-
ring to O'Keefe (1977/1992)—differentiates between three perspectives 
of investigating argumentation. Argument j examines the products of 
reasoning; it handles inferences as being stat ic representations of reports 
2 6
 See Kertész (2004a;b); Kertész Rákosi (2005a); Rákosi (2005). 
21
 "I have at tempted to show how regularities in one theory may be emergent from 
the behaviour of a lower-level system. [.. .] By relating this model to the regular-
ities described at a linguistic level of behaviour we do avoid the problems created 
by directly instantiating these linguistic models as cognitive theories. But, be-
cause this model is also a description, we are left with the question of whether 
or not we will run into the same problems as before, only a t a different level 
of description. Unfortunately, the answer here may well be yes. It is therefore 
necessary to take the relationship between the two levels of modelling I have dis-
cussed one step further. [. ..] In this view, we must use our objective theories not 
as ends in themselves but as methodological tools to point to regularities in one 
system as emergent from another. [...] This means we will need multiple levels of 
description capturing all of the situational, behavioural, and biological phenom-
ena tha t interact to create organized behaviour. None of these, in isolation, will 
be an adequate model of cognition." (Robinson 1997, 268f; emphasis added) 
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on the results of drawing inferences. It suggests that the aim of argu-
mentation theory is the analysis of such reports. The paradigm example 
of this view is formal logic.28 Seen from the point of view of argument 2 , 
argumentation is a process which aims at influencing the hearer 's beliefs 
or actions. In this respect, argumentation theory should focus on reveal-
ing the factors underlying argumentation as interaction. The third view, 
i.e., argumento, centers on the mental processes governing the construc-
tion of arguments. It seeks to find out to what extent and in what way 
mental processes are constitutive of the peculiarities of arguments. Thus, 
assuming that argumentation in general and inferences in particular have 
some kind of mental reality is one of the hypotheses widely discussed in 
the contemporary literature of argumentation theory. 
Hample introduces a further distinction, namely that between weak 
and strong claims for argument0 . The weak view focuses on argumenti or 
argument2 and at t r ibutes less relevance to the cognitive aspects of argu-
mentation. It suggests a methodology which takes the opposite direction 
to Robinson's proposal: we should choose the investigation of argument! 
or argument2 as our starting point and proceed towards a rgument^ be-
cause the structure of argument0 can be entirely reconstructed from the 
investigation of argument! or argument^. Thus, we can construct a theory 
of argumento if we proceed from the theory of argument! or argument2 
towards a theory of argument0 . It is clear tha t this at t i tude is similar to 
the point of view of the pragmatic theories mentioned in this paper. 
Strong claims for argumento (which, according to Hample, are rarely 
encountered) take the opposite direction: they t ry to understand argu-
mentation by start ing from the mental and proceeding towards its public 
manifestations. Argumentation in this sense is not something special, 
because it involves a wide variety of cognitive events such as perceiving, 
remembering, associating, etc. (Hample 1985/1992, 99). This reminds 
us of Robinson's conception, according to which one may understand 
argumento only if one understands the whole of cognition. 
2 8
 "In the everyday sense of the word, inference is a thought process during which 
from given knowledge we obtain new knowledge tha t has not been included ex-
plicitly [...] in the original knowledge. However, if inference is a mental activity, 
and logic: deals with inferences, then the latter still studies certain aspects of 
thinking. We have no direct insight into thought processes, we can study only 
their linguistic manifestations. [...] The task of logic can be only the study of 
the relationship between the premises and the conclusion." (Ruzsa 2000, 10; our 
translation) 
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Comparing our approach with these two views, it seems to be the case 
that our proposal can be treated either as an instance of the weak view 
according to which plausible inferences are objectifications of our own 
cultural knowledge about pat terns of public inferences; or, alternatively, 
they are instances of the strong view, thus they can be interpreted as 
constituting a new element in Robinson's 'distributed system'. However, 
there may be a third and more convincing possibility as well: 
"The weak view lias a sterile conception of invention and seemingly little 
room for creativity. [.. .] Its por t ra i t of the arguing person seems deter-
ministic and only vaguely humane. [...] The strong view, on the other 
hand, enmeshes argumento so thoroughly in psychology that arguing men-
tally ends up having no special character at all. An individual scholar need 
not maintain tha t one set of claims is superior to the other. One reasonable 
tactic is to try to shade one set into the other, in an attempt to resolve the 
tensions between them." (Hample 1985/1992, lOOf; emphasis added) 
In fact, this strongly resembles t ha t kind of cyclic and prismatic inference 
procedures which we discussed in section 2.1 and applied in section 3. 
These observations can be generalized in the following way. On the 
one hand, the peculiarities of the linguistic level vastly underdetermine 
the cognitive level, because there will always be a lot of incompatible 
theories which claim to describe certain aspects of linguistic behaviour, 
while we know too little about the way cognition works. On the other 
hand, the cognitive level has to be considered fundamental. It is only 
natural therefore t ha t a cyclic way of proceeding is required in the course 
of which we as researchers try to correlate the characteristics of the lin-
guistic and cognitive level again and again, from different perspectives, 
looking for solutions which can resolve the inconsistencies between the 
hypotheses drawn from them. Thus, our answer to the question asked at 
the beginning of this section is clearly no. 
Therefore, we are justified in interpreting the above quotation as 
supporting our hypothesis according to which theory formation in prag-
matics proceeds along the same lines as plausible reasoning in general 
and implicatures in particular. T h a t is, reasoning in the field of prag-
matics can be characterized by the same properties we summarized with 
respect to the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles which underlie im-
plicatures, namely, 
(a) drawing inferences from a part ial basis, 
(b) using patterns of plausible inferences, 
(c) the emergence and resolution of contradictions, 
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(d) context-dependency, 
(e) the continuous cyclic and prismatic revaluation of the information 
available. 
There are two ways to evaluate this finding from a metascientific point 
of view. Firstly, the sub-problems of (PI) may tu rn out to be just mani-
festations of this kind of scientific reasoning—that is, (P l ) ( a ) - (d ) can be 
interpreted in terms of cyclic and prismatic reflection on the object of in-
vestigation rather than as mistakes such as the category error mentioned, 
the circularity of argumentation, interpretations with unexplicated crite-
ria, or the fact that researchers objectify their own cultural knowledge 
as pragmatic principles. This kind of reinterpretation of the phenomena 
which Robinson labelled as methodological mistakes clearly legitimizes 
'objective theories'. The point, then, is tha t theory formation in prag-
matics works in a very different way (i.e., along the principles of plausible 
reasoning) from what is commonly assumed. Secondly, the application 
of cyclic and prismatic reasoning in the course of the construction of 
pragmatic theories may lead to the opposite result as well: namely, to 
realizing that these problematic cases are really errors. But in certain 
situations it is one of the primary functions of cyclic and prismatic re-
flection to rule out cases which are real mistakes and to distinguish them 
from the continuous revaluation of our scientific knowledge base. 
5. Conclusions 
As we saw in section 2.1, plausible reasoning is universal in that it works 
with respect to both everyday behaviour and scientific reasoning. Ac-
cordingly, it is the same principles which may be used to capture both 
object-scientific problems such as, for example, the nature of implica-
tures, and metascientific problems such as the nature of scientific reason-
ing. Nevertheless, the universality of plausible reasoning is not unlimited 
and must not mean uniformity. Rather, as the quotation in (viii) in 
section 2.1 emphasizes, the way plausible reasoning is manifested differs 
from domain to domain. Then, two crucial problems arise: 
(a) How do the two cases of plausible reasoning we considered in 
this paper — i.e., as a constitutive component of the cognitive base of 
pragmatic principles and as a constitutive component of scientific rea-
soning — differ? 
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(b) What is there in common between, on the one hand, drawing 
plausible inferences in everyday discourse such as the reasoning under-
lying implicatures, and, on the other, drawing plausible inferences in 
pragmatic theories whose task is to reveal these inferential mechanisms 
in everyday communication? 
It goes without saying tha t these questions have to be left open for 
now and should be tackled by fu ture considerations. Therefore, the line 
of argumentation put forward in this paper seems to pave the way for 
s tar t ing systematic investigations into the argumentational s t ructure of 
linguistic theories—this is a field of which very little is known and that 
which is thought to be known, is probably easy to refute. 
Appendix: Patterns of plausible 
reasoning applied in section 3.2~!1 
Shaded reduction 
It is possible tha t if A, then В. 
It is possible tha t B. 
After verifying В, A is more credible. 
It is possible tha t if A, then B. 
It is possible tha t B. 
After В has become more credible, A is more credible. 
Shaded modus tollens 
It is possible tha t if A, then B. 
It is possible tha t B. 
After В has become less credible, A is less credible. 
It is possible tha t if A, then B. 
Not B. 
A has become less credible. 
" Other versions of these schemes are possible as well, varying in the degree of the 
plausibility of the different premises; cf. Polya (1954, 26); Rákosi (2005). 
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Shaded modus ponens 
It is possible that if A, then B. 
It is possible that A. 
After verifying А, В is more credible. 
It is possible that if A, then В. 
It is possible that A. 
After A has become more credible, В is more credible. 
Analogical inference 
й] has the properties S and T 
Й2 has the properties S and T 
an has the properties S and T 
an+1 has the property S 
a,i+i also has the property T 
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THE CONCEPT OF PREFERENCE AND 
ITS MANIFESTATION IN HUNGARIAN 
VERBAL CONFLICT SEQUENCES* 
ÁGNES LERCH 
Preference is an operative notion of sequential organization and interpersonal under-
standing in conversation analysis. The complexity of the phenomenon that we are 
at tempting to grasp through this notion has manifested itself in the seemingly contro-
versial widening of the interpretation of t he notion. In this paper I argue that prefer-
ence can Ire interpreted t hrough an inference rule as a consequence of the simultaneous 
but not equal manifestation of pragmatic principles; a deeper and uncontroversial in-
terpretation of the notion is possible if, in addit ion to a s t ructura l inference rule and 
interpersonality principles, we take into consideration the role of rationality principles 
as well. In every communicative situation an interpersonal concern and a topical con-
cern is operative; in consensus-oriented contexts preference s t ructure is regulated by 
interpersonality principles t h a t govern interpersonal relations and self-projection, while 
in conflict-oriented discourse the most impor tan t role is played by rationality princi-
ples. Approaching preference from the perspective of pragmatic principles may prove 
instrumental in integrating conversation analysis more closely wi th new directions and 
results of pragmatic research. 
1. Aims 
In this paper I a t tempt to clarify t he nature of preference, considering 
that the use of this classical concept of conversation analysis (CA) which 
has an important part in interpreting utterances seems to have become 
confused and vague in the course of t ime. After reviewing the role of 
preference in CA in 2.1, in 2.2 through 2.5 I provide a critical survey of 
the interpretations of the term in the pragmatics li terature. As a result of 
a reconsideration of the approaches a t this issue, in 2.6 I suggest a com-
plex interpretation of preference which unifies the different views from 
the perspective of pragmatic principles. In section 3, I investigate the 
manifestation of preference organization in verbal conflict sequences. In 
* I would like to thank t h e two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments 
and suggestions which helped improve the paper. All remaining shortcomings 
are, of course, my own responsibility. 
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this part of this paper I argue tha t in order to grasp the na tu re of prefer-
ence it is essential to investigate forms of agreements a n d disagreements 
in conflict talk. Section 4 summarizes the results. 
2. T h e concept of preference 
2.1. The scope of preference 
Preference (preference organization) is a key analytical concept of CA, 
operative both in description and intersubjective understanding, because 
it is concerned with how actions are consti tuted and responded to, and 
how intersubjective understanding is achieved. 
According to the CA literature, preference regulates, first of all, the 
choice among alternative b u t nonequivalent second pa r t s of adjacency 
pairs, as well as the interpretation of the realized turns (Levinson 1983; 
Heritage 1984; Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1995a;b). Although actions pro-
duced as first par ts of adjacency pairs allow different reactions, they 
evoke expectations for specific preferred seconds. When the preferred 
alternative is not taken, it is experienced as being relevantly absent. I ts 
noticeable absence is routinely used as a basis for inferences. 
Prefexence is referred to as one of the most important discoveries of 
CA, because it was central t o the classic, early work on repair (Moerman 
1977; Schegloff et al. 1977), responses to compliments (Pomerantz 1978), 
the organization of reference to others (Sacks-Schegloff 1979), responses 
to accusations (Atkinson-Drew 1979), and the placement of agreements 
(Sacks 1987). 
As Pomerantz (1984) points out in her research into some features 
of second assessments in everyday friendly conversatioixs, agreements are 
the preferred next actions af ter proffering initial assessments. Absences 
of forthcoming agreements are interpretable as instances of (as yet) un-
stated disagreements. Disagreements as well as other possible reactions 
(such as no talk, disagreements weakened by partial agreements, requests 
for clarification, challenging a presupposition or the competence of a co-
conversant) are less preferred than agreements, that is, they are dispre-
ferred (to various degrees). Nowadays preference survives primarily in 
work on agreement and disagreement (Vuchinich 1990; Greatbatch 1992; 
Kotthoff 1993; Gruber 1996; Hayashi 1996; Gruber 1998; Boyle 2000). 
In CA, preference is discussed largely iix terms of responses to actions, 
but , according to the original concept established by Sacks (1995a;b; 
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in particular Sacks 1995b, 367-9 and 444-52), the scope of preference 
is very much greater. It is concerned as much with initial actions as 
with responses, because preference is a feature of the constitution of all 
actions.1 
In addition, preference operates not only within adjacency pairs but 
also across entire alternative sequences ranking sets of sequence types, due 
to the possibility of the choice among various realizations of a sequence 
type and also among alternative sequence types (Schegloff et. al. 1977; 
Schegloff 1979; Levinson 1983).2 
Sacks regarded preference as a technical concept. Others (Atkinson 
-Heri tage 1984; Bilmes 1988; 1991; Kotthoff 1993) emphasized also the 
original idea at later times, because the structural character of the notion 
has lost its importance in comparison with a psychological interpretation 
and a statistical approach to it as well. The differences in explicating 
the phenomenon of preference have given rise to some confusion tha t 
has resulted in establishing conflicting views on this mat ter , which I will 
discuss in sections 2.2-2.5 below. 
2.2. A structural approach to preference 
Sacks did not define preference exactly in his writings and lectures either 
(which enabled researchers to extend the meaning of the te rm later), he 
demonstrated what he has meant by preference by means of examples. In 
a lecture in April, 1971 (1995b, 367-9), Sacks said that there are preferred 
ways of formulating invitations: if one is inviting somebody for an evening 
during which dinner will be served, then tha t sort of information should 
be clearly included in the invitation or the invitee will have reason to 
assume that dinner will not be served. On the other hand, if the invitation 
is for an evening in which conversation will occur, this piece of information 
need not be included in the invitation. "Dinner" is a "first-preference 
invitation" : if the formulation you select is not a first preference, then 
you are indicating that a first preference is not present. It is obvious 
that Sacks is not talking about preference in a psychological sense; he 
is not concerned with what any or all of the participants would prefer 
to do or say. 
' For examples, see section 2.2 below and Boyle (2000, 599). 
2
 For more details, see section 2.3. 
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Bilmes (1988, 163) called at tention to the invalidity of complemen-
tary inferences: if one displays one's work, a painting, an essay, or what-
ever, there is a preference for expressions of approbation from the person 
to whom the work is shown. That is, if no praise is forthcoming, it is 
relevantly absent, leading usually to the inference t ha t the work has been 
judged unworthy of praise. The fact t h a t the work is not explicitly dis-
praised, on the other hand, does not lead to the complementary inference 
that the work has been judged too good to be dispraised. 
Bilmes (ibid.) highlighted two aspects of Sacks's notion of preference. 
One is the principle of ordering: (in the appropriate situation) do (or 
say) X, unless you have reason not to. This principle can be extended to 
include any number of ordered options: do X, unless you have reason not 
to, in which case do Y, unless you have reason not to, in which case do 
Z, and so forth. The o ther aspect manifests itself in the recognition that 
the existence of such rules of order is a basis for members ' inferences. It 
is when the rules of order are used by members to make such inferences 
that we can speak of preference in the technical sense. 
Bilmes (op.cit., 163-5) distinguished two types of preference, estab-
lishing a type U (unusual, unexpected) preference and a type R (relevant 
absence) preference. 
Type U preference is based on a rule of the following form: if A 
is speaking to В on some subject, and A knows something unusual or 
unexpected about the subject which might be of significance to B, then 
A should mention it to В. Our inference is based on the assumption that 
the speaker follows the ride: if nothing unusual is mentioned, then we may 
conclude tha t the speaker knows of nothing unusual tha t might warrant 
mention.3 If the preferred alternative is not mentioned, it is not present. 
The operative notion of type R preference is relevant absence. As 
mentioned in section 2.1 above, certain contexts make relevant some pre-
ferred action. When t h a t action is not taken, it is relevantly absent. Its 
absence is noticeable and a basis for inference.4 (Type U preference is 
3
 Bilmes (op.cit., 164) illustrates this point with the following example: if we are 
invited to a party, we do not go wearing a costume unless we are specifically 
advised that it is a costume party, and it is ordinarily the responsibility of the one 
issuing the invitation to volunteer such information on his or her own initiative. 
When we arrive in ordinary dress and discover that it is a costume party, this 
may be the basis for recriminations and apologies. 
4
 Dinner was not mentioned in the invitation because no dinner will be served. 
Our work was not praised because it was not felt to be worthy of praise by our 
audience. 
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also, in a way, a matter of relevant absence, tha t is, the absence of a 
preferred item is meaningful, but not necessarily noticeable.)5 
The rule generalized by Bilmes {op.cit., 165) is formulated as follows: 
preference operates with three (or more) alternatives: a preferred (X), a 
nonpreferred (Y),(' and no mention of X or Y (N). ' The principle is tha t , if 
X is preferred, N implies Y; conversely, if N implies Y, then X is preferred. 
This rule has been extended primarily in the terms of type R preference 
over analysing adjacency pairs and alternative sequences as well. 
2.3. A (social) psychological dimension of preference 
According to Bilmes (1988), the loss of the purely formal character of 
preference is due, in part, to confusion between preference in its everyday 
usage and preference as a technical notion. The standard psychological 
sense of preference has a precedent in a lecture by Sacks (1987), first 
presented in 1973.8 
Following Sacks, Pomerantz (1984) added to the original criterion 
of preference ( that is, relevant absence) the notion of markedness. Hav-
ing observed tha t dispreferred responses are routinely associated with 
features that delay the production of the relevant response, for example, 
gaps, hesitations, qualifiers, weak agreements,9 side sequences, and so on, 
Pomerantz assumed that these features, called dispreference markers, cor-
relate to dispreferred responses. Thereafter, it has been suggested in the 
CA literature tha t some features of turn/sequence organization operate 
with respect to the preference/dispreference s tatus of actions: preferred 
' Bilmes {op.cit., 164-5) demonstrates interesting ways in which type U and type R 
preferences may interact. 
f>
 Y may include a set of nonpreferred actions. 
' Bilmes {ibid.) illustrates the rule regarding both types: with type U preference, 
we can mention tha t something unexpected will occur, for example, that it will be 
a costume party (X); we can mention that nothing unexpected will occur, for ex-
ample, that it will be an ordinary party, with no special dress (Y); or we may omit 
any mention (N). Likewise, with type R preference, we can mention something 
preferred, for example, that dinner will be served; we can mention something 
nonpreferred, for example, that dinner will not be served; or mention neither. 
8
 The everyday usage is discussed in Atkinson Drew (1979) and Owen (1983) 
as well. 
9
 Weak agreements preface disagreements by agreeing with the prior speaker's po-
sition. 
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responses are direct, often abbreviated, structurally simple, and typically 
immediate, dispreferred ones are typically indirect, structurally elabo-
rated, and delayed. In explaining the phenomenon, Pomerantz (1984, 77) 
refers to sociability, support, and solidarity, t ha t is, to psychological mo-
tivation. 
Bilmes (1988, 173-4; 1991, 464-6) suggested that , although dispref-
erence markers are associated with preference, they are part of a different, 
par t ly independent, phenomenon. Delays are, in fact, expressive of the 
speaker's reluctance to produce the response which should follow, conse-
quently Bilmes refers to them as reluctance markers. He pointed out that 
reluctance markers do not necessarily accompany dispreferred utterances 
and may equally occur with preferred alternatives. 
Accounts occurring very frequently in dispreferred actions are care-
fully formulated explanations for disagreements and refusals (Levinson 
1983, 334). Considering that preferred actions do not include accounts, 
in the occurrence or absence of accounts we could at first sight expect 
a criterion of preference in a psychological sense. Bilmes (1991, 466) 
pointed out t ha t it is inappropriate to correlate accounts with prefer-
ence, because accounts regularly occur with disagreements and refusals, 
whether or not they are preferred.10 
According to Taylor and Cameron (1987, 113-4), there is an ob-
vious functional connection between some dispreferred second parts to 
adjacency pairs and the formal features of delay, mitigation, apology, 
etc., with which they are characteristically produced; namely, tha t their 
speakers would prefer (in the ordinary sense of the term) not to have been 
pu t in the position where they have to decline to produce the second pair 
par t , which the first speakers obviously would have preferred (again, in 
its ordinary sense) to hear. Taylor and Cameron are of the opinion that 
it is inappropriate to a t tempt to maintain the early ethnomethodological 
claim that the differences between preferred and dispreferred actions are 
purely formal, with no basis in the truly psychological sense of prefer-
ence: to say t ha t one of two alternative acts is preferred to another is 
not to imply anything about the relevant speakers' own wishes, desires 
or motives. Others, Levinson (1983), Owen (1983), and Heritage (1984) 
among them, have acknowledged the psychological function of preference 
organization, too, by tying it to the notion of interactional "face work" 
established by Goffman (1955). 
1 0
 For further details regarding preferred disagreements, see section 3. 
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Toolan (1989) agrees wi th Taylor and Cameron (1987) to the ex-
tent that they emphasize the psychological and evaluative dimension of 
preference. At the same time, he criticizes them for a t t r ibut ing the psy-
chological preferences to individual speakers. Toolan (op.cit., 264) argues 
t h a t the psychological "tenor" carried by the preference organization is a 
collective normative protocol and may have little to do with the partic-
ular preferences of particular speakers in specific contexts. Interactants 
know that the collective social preference for example for invitations is to 
be met with acceptance, bu t tha t the collective preference pattern may 
not reflect the preferences of specific interactants. Preference organiza-
tion is rooted in the norms and psychological preferences of the society 
and not the individual, as Toolan suggests (ibid.). 
Concerning preference, Jacobs and Jackson (Jacobs-Jackson 1982; 
Jacobs 1987), emphasize the importance of such psychological notions as 
conventional desires or intentions accompanying speech acts (a request 
is conventionally recognized to express a desire that the other will com-
ply to; the conventional desire expressed by an invitation is to accept it). 
Thus, a preferred response is one that fulfills the conventional desire or 
intention of the speech act, whether or not tha t conventional desire coin-
cides with the speaker's actual desire. It is obvious that the conventions 
constituting speech acts have their roots in the norms of society. 
The psychological interpretation of preference is striking also in es-
says which discuss the manifestation of preference in ranking alternative 
sequences. In their research on the organization of repair, Schegloff et al. 
(1977) revealed the following set of preferences (from the most preferred 
to the least preferred): preference 1 is for self-initiated self-repair in own 
tu rn (or in the transition space); preference 2 is for other-initiated self-
repair in the thi rd turn; preference 3 is for other-initiated other-repair 
in the fourth turn ; and, finally, preference 4 is for other-initiated other-
repair in the second turn, wi thout inviting self-repair. Thus, the handling 
of repair coincides with the choice among alternative sequences. 
Jefferson (1983) suggested that preference 4 above should be ranked 
higher (as preference 2) in the hierarchy if a speaker's error is replaced by 
the addressee within an ut terance which includes important information 
besides repair. Jefferson accounts for the high ranking of this solution 
(called embedded correction) by pointing out that it avoids the risk of 
overtly challenging the speaker 's competence. 
11
 Investigating verbal interaction, Jacobs and Jackson unify the concepts and meth-
ods of CA and speech act theory. 
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Investigating the initial turns of telephone calls, Schegloff (1979) set 
up a hierarchy of preferences in a similar way. He found tha t for telephone 
recognitions between known parties the preference is for both caller and 
recipient to provide the minimal cues (at best only greetings) they judge 
sufficient for the other to recognize the speaker. Overt self-identification 
is dispreferred because it challenges the familiarity of friendship. 
Reviewing the CA literature in connection with requests, Levinson 
(1983, 360-1) suggests t h a t after a pre-request there may be a preference 
for the avoidance of requests altogether. He sets up the following prefer-
ence ranking operating over three kinds of sequences: most preferred is 
a pre-request - response to a non-overt request sequence; next preferred 
is a pre-request - offer - acceptance of an offer sequence; finally, the least 
preferred alternative is a pre-request - go ahead - request - compliance/ 
refusal sequence. 
To invite an offer seems to be preferred to a request sequence because 
explicit requests risk refusal (Schegloff 1979, 49), which is a face threat-
ening act (FTA). A motivation for applying pre-requests is avoiding an 
action (the request) that could obtain a dispreferred response (a rejection) 
and hence the checking of the most likely grounds for refusal (Levinson 
1983, 356-64). In addition, requests threaten the addressee's negative 
face wants intrinsically by indicating (potentially) t h a t the speaker does 
not intend to avoid impeding the addressee's freedom of action, as Brown 
and Levinson (1987, 65) point out. 
To summarize the approaches mentioned before, Schegloff (1979), 
Jefferson (1983) and Levinson (1983) at t r ibute the preference ranking 
operating over alternative sequences and sequence types to social psycho-
logical motivation: by choosing a preferred alternative, the speaker can 
avoid an action threatening his/her own face or the face of the addressee. 
With reference to Heritage (1984, 268), Brown and Levinson (1987, 
38-40) argue that face considerations seem to determine which kinds 
of responses are preferred vs. dispreferred. In their eyes, agreement is 
preferred because disagreement is an FTA; self-repair is preferred because 
correction by other may imply that self is incompetent; acceptances of 
offers or requests are preferred because the alternative refusals would 
imply lack of consideration; and so on. Similarly, they take many kinds 
of pre-sequences to be motivated by face considerations. 
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2.4. A statistical approach to preference 
Several conversation analysts — Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977), 
Sacks and Schegloff (1979), Levinson (1983), among others — tried to 
account for preference organization relying on frequency distribution. Ar-
guing tha t people do what they prefer to do, and, so, if people overwhelm-
ingly do a certain thing, this indicates a massive preference, they arrived 
at the conclusion tha t more frequently occurring alternatives must have a 
preferred status. Resisting the temptat ion to regard frequency of occur-
rence as a criterion of preference, most authors have used a more careful 
phrasing claiming tha t frequency distribution is evidence of preference or-
ganization. Schegloff et al. (1977, 362) found the fact that self-correction 
is "vastly more common than other-correction" to be "gross, pr ima facie 
evidence" of the preference for self-correction. 
Bilmes (1988, 192) disapproved of the statistical approach to prefer-
ence for two reasons. On the one hand, he criticized it because of the in-
fluence of the psychological sense of preference. On the other, he pointed 
out t ha t the authors mentioned above have turned from the concept of 
preference to emphasizing ordering;12 that is, they were trying to account 
for what people do rather than for the inferences t ha t people draw. Bilmes 
emphasized that preference governs interpretation, not production. How-
ever, if, contrary to him, we accept the social psychological motivation 
of preference, we can suppose with good reason tha t production corre-
sponds to the expectations evoked by the preference/dispreference status 
of actions, because people follow the norms of society whenever possible. 
2.5. A complex interpretation of preference 
The latest interpretation of preference has been provided by Boyle (2000), 
after the publication of Sacks's lectures and building on them. Boyle 
gives an interpretation of preference that both accommodates the varied 
interpretations and provides a clear and simple account of the notion. He 
emphasizes that the clear and all-encompassing criterion of preference, 
in a Sacksian approach, is noticeable absence and accountability. At the 
same time, unlike Bilmes (1988), he does not consider connecting the 
12
 Moreover, since a prescribed alternative may be unavailable, there is still a ques-
tion of whether frequency of occurrence is strong evidence even of a principle of 
ordering (Bilmes 1988, 172). 
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notion of preference with markedness, frequency distribution and face 
work as a false interpretation of preference bu t regards them as valid 
aspects of preference. 
Boyle (2000, 586-7) accepts as valid the correlation of preference 
with markedness and frequency distribution to a limited degree (i.e., in 
the case of some sequences) and attr ibutes the generalization of such 
correlations to the widely known work of Levinson (1983). Comparing 
views on the relationship of preference and face work, Boyle (2000, 588) 
points out, following Czyzewski (1989), tha t regarding preference as a 
consequence of social solidarity raises the question why actions are con-
st i tuted as preferred or dispreferred. True to its ethnomethodological 
origins, however, CA is interested in finding out how speakers produce 
and understand preferred or dispreferred actions.1 '5 
According to Czyzewski (1989, 52-3), preferred actions contribute 
to the maintenance of social solidarity directly, while dispreferred actions 
do so indirectly; tha t is, the "social solidarity" argument is important, 
but it is not an adequate account of the phenomenon of preference. Nev-
ertheless, Boyle states that in order to fully understand the concept of 
preference it is necessary to ally the issue of why individuals act as they 
do to the question of how they construct preferred and dispreferred turns. 
Boyle considers social solidarity strengthening face work, marked-
ness, and frequency distribution as such aspects of preference which do 
not constitute criteria of preference. Referring to Sacks's analyses along 
these lines, he argues that the criteria of preference, as demonstrated 
by Bilmes (1988) already, are noticeable absence and its (normative) 
accountability. The occurrence of a dispreferred action, that is, the non-
occurrence of a preferred, conditionally relevant action, calls for explana-
tion. Here, Boyle (2000, 590) is the first to make a distinction between 
two types of dispreferred actions. One of them invokes no negative con-
sequence or sanction. In this case, from air individual's failure to offer a 
greeting, for example, one might infer that the other person is deep in 
thought or does not recognize one, etc. These are acceptable accounts 
from which no sanctions should follow. In the other case, in a quite con-
trary fashion, the noticeable absence of an expected action gives rise to 
negative inferences and to sanctions: when another person fails to offer 
a greeting, one might account for the absence of the greeting by deciding 
tha t the action was deliberate and make negative inferences about the 
other person's character and behaviour. 
13
 Bilmes (1988) called attention to this distinction as well. 
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This distinction was not recognized before, and only the deliberate 
and sanctionable type of dispreferred actions was discussed in the lit-
erature. According to Boyle, this tendency might be a consequence of 
the implicit overgeneralization of the principle "trying to avoid the dis-
preferred action", at work in speakers' competence and recognized by 
Levinson (1983, 333). From this it follows tha t if one does not t ry to 
avoid a dispreferred action, this will be considered deliberate. However, 
it is clearly impossible, and not necessarily desirable, to avoid actions 
tha t are merely noticeable and accountable but not sanctionable. 
The question t ha t arises is tha t , if there is no explicit explanation, 
how does the co-conversant choose between the two possible accounts 
of the dispreferred action? Boyle answers this question only indirectly: 
the choice between the accounts is greatly influenced (even in the case 
of an explicit explanation) by the indexicai knowledge of the situation 
and the co-conversant, the importance of which factors is stressed by 
Boyle (2000, 594-7) when, following Sacks, he points out how greatly 
these influence the speaker's decision in what is a preferred and what is 
a dispreferred answer to the question "How are you?" (from the point 
of view of the person asking it) .1 4 
Taking into account indexicai knowledge does not question the sig-
nificant role of normative accountability in interpersonal understanding 
but calls attention to the dangers of applying the norms automatically. 
2.6. Conclusion 
Considering the above, we can agree with Boyle tha t a complex inter-
pretation of the concept of preference is necessary. But all approaches 
are equally important, none can be left out at the expense of the others, 
since they all grasp the essence of preference on different levels. Boyle 
fails to clarify this; he accepts the validity of the various interpretations, 
but , regarding the structural aspect most significant, he considers the 
others secondary. 
Preference as a structural notion provides the descriptive inference 
rule of the mechanism of interpretation. The psychological approach 
stresses the reason of the preferred/dispreferred nature of actions. Pref-
14
 Throughout Sacks's discussion in 'Everyone has to lie' (1995a, 549 66) one is 
reminded of how close the everyday meaning of preference comes to the technical 
meaning of the concept. 
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erence, from this aspect, is the expression of the social norm. This norm 
is described in the literature as interpersonality principles — principles 
which regulate interpersonal relations in communication and the self-
projection of the communicative partners (Németh T. 2003; 2004). Such 
principles are the politeness principle (Leech 1983; minimize the expres-
sion of impolite beliefs, and maximize the expression of polite beliefs, all 
other things being equal); the principle of face saving (Goffman 1959; save 
your own and your partner 's face in communication); politeness strate-
gies (Brown-Levinson 1987; strategies creating and maintaining negative 
and positive face, where negative face is people's desire tha t other people 
do not prevent them in their actions, while positive face is people's de-
sire that their wishes, aims, a t t i tudes etc. would be desirable for others 
as well). Finally, the statistical définition of preference is an empirical 
generalization. 
In order to fully understand the concept of preference it is necessary 
but , as we will see in section 3, not sufficient to take into account the 
inference rule and the interpersonality principles. 
3. Preference in verbal conflict 
3.1. The notion of verbal conflict 
Verbal conflict is a specific speech activity (Gumperz 1982, 166) or activ-
ity type (Levinson 1992) the recognition and differentiation of which is 
par t of the pragmatic competence of all the participants and the analyst. 
In verbal conflict the participants take turns attacking each other's ut-
terances, actions or selves. The misunderstanding can conclude with one 
party 's victory (and the other par ty 's defeat), the voluntary acceptance 
of the opponent's position, a compromise, a stand-off, a withdrawal, or 
the intervention of a dominant third party. Verbal conflicts often remain 
unconcluded: in such cases the participants give up the opposition and 
s tar t another (speech) activity (Vuchinich 1990). 
All speech activities where these characteristics can be identified 
(naturally, only one of the possible conclusion types can occur in each 
situation) belong to the category of verbal conflicts, which range from 
a single episode to a confrontation encompassing an entire conversation. 
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The critical discussion is a more strictly ordered type of verbal confronta-
tion (see Eemeren-Grootendorst 1992, Eemeren et al. 1996).15 
Conflict episodes are entities which comprise more than two turns 
and display structural properties which constrain the functions and in-
terpretations of verbal contributions occurring in their course (Gruber 
1998, 476) (see section 3.2). One piece of discourse can contain more 
than one conflict episode. 
The manifestation of preference organization in verbal conflicts is 
important and even necessary to investigate, on the one hand, because in 
this speech activity preference structure of the statement — agreement/ 
disagreement sequence changes (see section 3.2), and this makes it neces-
sary to interpret the concept of preference in such a way that it would be 
adequate for this context as well. On the other hand, arriving at a care-
fully argued conclusion on the issue of the correlation of preference and 
markedness requires an investigation of the manifestations of markedness 
in verbal conflicts. I a t tempt to do so in section 3.4 below. 
3.2. The preferred status of disagreement 
One of the long standing theses of CA is the preference of agreement 
over disagreement. This thesis is the generalization of the statement 
made by Pomerantz (1984) in an analysis of an adjacency pair consisting 
of an assessment and a response. The fact tha t this finding became con-
sidered generally valid for conversation is most likely due to the social 
psychological interpretation of preference. At the same time, Pomerantz 
(op.cit., 77-94) demonstrates that disagreement is preferred in response 
to self-deprecation: if it is lacking, dispreferred agreement is inferred. 
Elsewhere, Pomerantz (1978) states that agreement (especially in its un-
mitigated form) is dispreferred as a response to praise.16 
There are clearly situations where disagreement is preferred. Accu-
sations also operate contrary to the preference for agreement. With ref-
15
 The main par ts of the critical discussion are the following: confrontation, debate 
opening, argumentation, and concluding decision. All of these can be character-
ized through the basic or complex speech acts typically realized in them, and, 
in addition to this, the argumentation part, can also be described through the 
relevant argument schemata (Eemeren - Grootendorst, 1992). 
1(>
 Expressing or not expressing agreement and disagreement seems to be culturally 
specific (Clarke Argyle 1982). The behaviour forms suggested by Pomerantz are 
valid only in European cultures and cultures similar to them. 
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erence to Atkinson-Drew (1979) and Heritage (1984), Garcia (1991, 821) 
called attention to the fact tha t after accusations preference for agree-
ment would lead to an admission of guilt as the preferred response to an 
accusation; for accusations, however, denials are the preferred response 
because the absence or delay of a denial may be interpreted as an admis-
sion of/evidence of guilt.1 ' Furthermore, Garcia (op.cit., 828) pointed out 
tha t denials in ordinary conversation tend to be placed immediately after 
the accusation, without delay, accounts, or other mitigating techniques. 
Accusations therefore make disagreement relevant and thus provide an 
interactional environment for escalation into disputes and arguments. 
Bilmes (1988) investigated the preference status of the second part 
of adjacency pairs in the first part of which A at tr ibutes some action, 
thought, or a t t i tude to В in B's presence: here, following the inference 
rule, there is a preference for В to contradict A. 
The nucleus of the verbal conflict, which can become the start ing 
point for a single episode or a longer critical discussion, is a three-step 
introductory sequence (Gruber 1998, 477; Muntigl-Turnbull 1998, 227; 
Gruber 2001, 1822): 
1. A: statement 
2. B: counterstatement (i.e., disagreement with A) 
3. A: counterstatement to В (i.e., disagreement with В and possibly insisting on 1) 
Gruber (1998) argues that the occurrence of the third move by A is cru-
cial for establishing a conflict episode, because if A reacts with any other 
action than a counterstatement to В (e.g., giving up his/her position, 
apologizing, or just being silent) in step 3, no conflict develops front the 
disagreement sequence (i.e., steps 1 and 2). The counterstatement pro-
duced in step 2 opens up the possibility of moving on to argumentation, 
11
 According to Dersley-Wootton (2000, 387-8), Gareia's claim is overly general. 
Analysing sequences immediately following complaints and accusations, they dif-
ferentiate between two types of denials, "didn't do" denials and "not at fault" 
denials. Denials of the "didn't do" type are characterized by features of preferred 
actions both in their form and their interpretation: the typical manifestation of 
this type of denial is not delayed, it is short and direct, and its lack (or delay) 
implies the admission of guilt. Denials of the "not at fault" type, which are often 
delayed, typically have two components: the complainee implicitly acknowledges 
some element of t ru th in the original complaint, but he or she overwhelmingly 
rejects any culpability for the action in question. The delay of a "not at fault" 
denial does not create a basis for participants to infer that the complainee accepts 
blame or guilt for the complained-of action. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
P R E F E R E N C E A N D HUNGARIAN CONFLICT S E Q U E N C E S 5 5 
but it is only at step 3 tha t it will become clear whether the conversation 
can continue in a new context of developing the conflict or not. 
Disagreement is preferred in the speech activity type of verbal con-
flicts—both in longer, argumentative discourse and in shorter sequences 
of verbal conflict (Bilmes 1991; Kotthoff 1993; Gruber 1996; 1998). Ac-
cording to the rule of preference, if a s tatement is not followed by dis-
agreement, the inference tha t is made is t h a t the statement is agreed with 
(or at least accepted). If, however, open agreement is not expressed, no 
inference of disagreement is made. 
One of the findings of the investigation of verbal conflicts is the 
realization tha t preference structure is sensitive to context: unspecific 
friendly conversations are performed with an orientation toward consen-
sus and agreement is preferred. However, as soon as a counterstatement 
occurs following disagreement during a conversation, the context speci-
fications change: they become conflict-oriented, which, in turn, triggers 
a change in the preference structure. The participants orient each other 
to the expectation of disagreement, and disagreement will be the pre-
ferred interpretation (Bilmes 1991, 465-6; Kotthoff 1993, 194-5; Gruber 
1998, 471-6). In the case of institutional debate, the context is conflict-
oriented from the start. 
3.3. The data 
The corpus of da ta consists of audio cassette recorded and transcribed 
conversations from one radio and two television series of debate programs. 
All conversations occurred in spontaneously occurring argumentative dis-
course in live broadcasts. The corpus contains a total of 644 turns or 
17,582 words. 
Discourse produced in the media has been widely investigated (Her-
itage 1985; Hutchby 1992; Liddicoat et al. 1994; Gruber 1996; Hutchby 
1996; Gruber 1998; Bilmes 1999; Gruber 2001; Lerch 2002), sometimes 
with this specific goal in mind, at other times in order to avoid the dif-
ficulties of collecting conversation da ta containing naturally occurring 
conflicts. 
I investigated 10 dialogues, containing a total of 401 turns or 9,724 
words, from the Hungarian call-in radio program Beszéljük meg! 'Let 's 
discuss it ' (by György Bolgár).18 (Below, the dialogues are referred to 
18
 The length of each conversation is given in the Appendix. 
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with the abbreviation LDI for the name of the program and the number of 
the dialogue.) According to the script of this program, a t the beginning 
of each program the host introduces 3 or 4 topical issues of public interest, 
and then he takes telephone calls from the listeners. Callers are invited 
to reflect on one or more of the given topics but can introduce new topics 
only with the approval of the host. The aim of the conversation, according 
to the script of the program, is for the caller to fully explicate h is /her 
position. In order to aid this, the host usually takes a point of view 
opposite with the caller and argues for i t—thus , in most cases, a verbal 
confrontation develops between them, although it very rarely becomes 
confrontational (see LDI 7). Several politeness strategies occur in the 
conversations (Lerch 2002). The participation of the two participants 
in the conversation is more or less balanced. All ten dialogues follow a 
similar structure: it contains a loose flow of arguments for and against 
possible positions on one main topic (or one main topic and a side topic, in 
the case of two conversations, LDI 6 and 10), framed with and interrupted 
by sequences and episodes not containing verbal conflict. 
In Aktuális 'Topical' (referred to with the abbreviation TOP below), 
a television debate program, the presenter carries on a longer conversa-
tion in the studio with one public personality (or sometimes two) abou t 
the leading news story of the day and other topical issues. The aim in this 
program is also tha t the guests expound on their positions and defend 
them. I used a stretch of discourse of 122 turns, or 3,475 words, from 
this program in my investigation. The participants use equal amounts 
of time in this program as well, and the extent of the confrontation de-
pends on the topic (and the identity of the guest). In the stretch of 
discourse used for the present investigation a confrontational dispute de-
veloped: its structure is more pointed than those of the radio programs, 
and touches on three topics, from which three episodes containing verbal 
conflict develop. 
In the television program Pro és kontra 'Pros and cons' (referred to 
with P&C below), according to the script, a moderator leads a dispute 
between two parties representing two opposing positions on an issue. In 
the stretch of discourse used for this investigation (of 121 turns, or 4,383 
words), however, the confrontation is so sharp that the moderator almost 
has no chance to interrupt the conversation, and, thus, the participants 
of the dispute carry on a dialogue most of the time. This conversation 
follows the normative rules of critical discussion. 
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Besides allowing to investigate markedness in both milder and sharper 
confrontations, the corpus also has the advantage of containing mostly 
semi-institutional conversations (LDI 1-10). Semi-institutional discourse 
is close to everyday conversation and is characterized by several of its 
features (Ilie 2001). In the discourse from the two television programs I 
analyse the institutional character is more dominant,, but it is still not a 
typical example of institutional debate, especially as far as the linguistic 
manifestation of the confrontation is concerned. Thus, the observations 
made on the basis of the corpus will not be alien to everyday linguistic 
behaviour. T h e interpretation of preference would have to apply to the 
type of discourse investigated in this paper in any case. 
3.4. Markedness 
The corpus contains the following means of delay, called dispreference 
markers in the literature. 
In turns realizing agreement, at the s tar ts of turns speakers used 
hesitation, t u rn introducing prefaces (e.g., hát 'well', nézze 'look', na most 
'well, now'), qualifiers (e.g., szerintem 'in my opinion', én úgy gondolom 
'what I think is t h a t . . . '), or a combination of these. 
In turns realizing disagreement, turns also start with hesitation, pref-
aces, qualifiers, and also pauses, initiations of side sequences instead of 
disagreement (in order to delay disagreement), turn introducing agree-
ment components, pro forma agreements, apologies, or a combination of 
these. 
Next, in section 3.4.1,1 will bring examples to the use of each of these 
markers. All the examples will be illustrated in turns realizing disagree-
ment, partly because all of the markers can occur in this utterance type 
(while not all do in turns realizing agreement), and part ly because, due 
to the preferred status of disagreement in this context, their occurrence 
is unexpected in these utterances (if we uphold the thesis of the existence 
of a correlation between preference and markedness). Following the ex-
amples, I demonstrate in tables the distribution of unmarked and marked 
realizations of agreement vs. disagreement in the corpus (section 3.4.2). 
3.4.1. Markers in turns realizing disagreement 
Abbreviations used in the identification of examples are as follows: letters 
(and, in some cases, numbers) before colons identify the source of the dis-
course (see the Appendix), letters after the colon identify the speaker(s) 
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(also see the Appendix), while the letter identifying the speaker is fol-
lowed by numbers which refer to the number of the first turn of the 
example within the stretch of discourse. (For other transcription conven-
tions, see the Appendix.) 
(i) Hesitation. Various forms of hesitation (including self-editing) have 
been identified in the literature (Levinson 1983, 334) as markers of dis-
preference (I give such markers in boldface in the examples). Hesitation 
signals the reluctance of the speaker to take a s tand or his/her wish to 
delay it, in the case of both agreement and disagreement. 
(1) (TOP: GYT10) 
(Topic: erecting a s ta tue to János Kádár) 
GYT: Én azt gondolom, nem olyan lehetetlen. Hát ü tnünk kell persze a vasat, 
és még nagyon sokat kell ebben az ügyben politizálni, de megmondom, 
hogy (.) szóval (.) két szempontot lehet mérlegelni. Az egyik, hogy ki 
volt Kádár János. Szóval azért Orbán Viktor is meg az ország minden 
vezetője tudja , hogy a közvélemény-kutatások mit mutatnak. Azok pe-
dig azt mutat ják, hogy Kádár Jánost a magyar nép ügy élte meg és úgy 
emlékezik rá, mint a század legkiemelkedőbb egyéniségére. 
JB: De hát így - ezt így nem t u d o m - j a hogy vannak olyan közvélemény-
kutatások, amelyek (.) ö (.) hogy ha azt kérik, ez nem is vélemény, hanem 
hogy azt kérik, hogy kire emlékeznek hát h . . . hogy ez nagyon 
sokáig volt ,= 
GYT: Persze! 
JB: =ez nem kétséges, de - hát - először i s . . . 
GYT: 
JB: 
GYT: 
W h a t I think is tha t it's not impossible. We have to strike the iron, yes, 
and have to do a lot of politics on the issue, but I tell you that (.) well (.) 
two aspects can be weighed. One is who János Kádár was. Well, Viktor 
Orbán and all the leaders of the country know what public opinion polls 
show. They show that János Kádár was experienced and is known to 
the Hungarian people as one of t he most outstanding personalities of the 
century. 
But this way I don't know about t h a t - o h , you mean that there are polls 
t ha t (.) er (.) t ha t if you ask, this is not an opinion, that if you ask 
people who they remember well t h a t . . . that this lasted a long time,= 
Of course! 
JB: = n o doubt, but - well - first of all. . . 
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(ii) Prefaces. Whether they introduce agreement or disagreement, a pref-
ace signals tha t the part icipant does not find the previous position com-
pletely convincing. 
(2) (TOP: JB100) 
(Topic: the relationship of the Workers' Par ty and the Hungarian Socialist Party, 
HSP) 
•IB: A (.) kongresszuson mondott beszédében Elnök Úr (.) beszélt is erről 
az MSZP és a Munkáspár t viszonyáról, hogy ö - h o g y (2.0) azt mondta , 
hogy az MSZP ne akadályozza a Munkáspártot, és hogy ne tegyenek 
olyan nyilatkozatokat, miszerint a Munkáspárt (2.0) ööö a mai arcu-
latával nem alkalmas arra, hogy együttműködjön vele az MSZP. Tehát 
tudja , hogy miről van szó többek között? Hát például hogy a (.) a 
(.) az iraki Bath-pár t ta l kötött együttműködési megállapodás az még 
érvényben van? Hát ilyesmiről. 
GYT: Nézze, nem erről van szó. Arról arról arról van szó, kilencvennyolcban 
is ez történt és azóta is ez van, az MSZP az SZDSZ-szel akar együt t 
menni. 
JB: In (.) yonr speech at the congress, Mr. President, you spoke about 
this, the relationship of the HSP and the Workers' Party, that er 
that (2.0) you said tha t the HSP shouldn't hinder the Workers' Party, 
and they shouldn't make announcements to the effect tha t the Workers' 
Party (2.0) errr with its current image is not sui table for the HSP to 
cooperate with. You know what it 's all about? For instance, is the (.) 
the (.) the cooperation agreement signed with the Iraqi Bath Party still 
in effect? These kinds of things. 
GYT: Look, that ' s not it at all. What what what it 's all about is t ha t this 
is what happened in ninety-eight, and this is what has been happening 
since, that the HSP wants to go with the AFD. 1 9 
(iii) Qualifiers. Qualifiers limit the validity of the position (of agreement 
or disagreement) expressed in the turn to the speaker. 
(3) (P&C: IKol5) 
(Topic: dividing the media.) 
IKo: Nem, azt gondolom, hogy ez piacgazdaság m a Magyarországon, 
demokrácia van, piacgazdaság van, a tulajdon szentségét tiszteletben 
t a r t j a az állam, itt egy csomó magánlap jött létre, magánemberek pénzt 
fektettek be egy bizonyos áruba, mert a az újság is áru, ezt nem lehet 
már befolyásolni. Befolyásolni lehet a közmédiát, o t t viszont elég erőtel-
jes szerep várhat a mostani politikai szereplőkre, de szerintern egészen 
más szerep, mint amit a Kerényi Imréék ezen és más demonstrációkon el-
19
 AFD: Alliance of Free Democrats. 
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mondtak, én azt gondolom, hogy egy tisztességes, kiegyensúlyozott köz-
szolgálati televíziót kell teremteni. 
IKe: Nem hiszek benne, hogy ezt most meg lehet valósítani, szóval megbuk-
tunk ezzel, Ilona. Egy olyan idegen modellt, akar tunk honosítani, ami 
ebben az országban nem honosí tható. . . 
IKo: No, I think t h a t this is a market economy now in Hungary, we have 
democracy and a market economy, the sanctity of private property is 
respected by the state, a whole lot of private papers were established, 
private people invested money in a certain commodity, because news-
papers are a commodity as well, this cannot be influenced any more. 
You can influence public media, bu t there you can expect for the cur-
rent political personalities to have a pretty forceful role, but this role is, 
I think, very different from what Imre Kerényi and others were talking 
about in this and other demonstrations, and what I th ink is that a decent 
balanced public television should be created. 
IKe: I don't believe in the possibility of carrying this out now, I think we failed 
with this, Ilona. We wanted to import a foreign model which cannot be 
imported into this country. . . 
(iv) A turn introducing agreement component (weak agreement). It can 
be face saving as well as carry an important propositional meaning. 
(4) (LDI10: GYB23) 
(Topic: introducing a toll oil a highway) 
GYB: Igen, de ebből mégiscsak az a logikai következtetés vonható le, hogy 
aki használ valamit , aki bizonyos juttatásokhoz, örömhöz, nem tudom 
micsodához ju t azáltal, hogy kutyát tar t , vagy azáltal , hogy autót t a r t 
és autópályát használ, akkor az fizesse meg annak a költségét, nem? 
Tehát ne a kutyatulajdonos fizesse meg az autó tu la jdonos= 
C: =Ebben tökéletesen igaza van, Bolgár Úr, de végső soron azok az utak is 
romlanak, amik n e m az autópályához tartoznak, és ezt majd kinek kell 
karbantartani, ha áttevődik a forgalom? 
GYB: Yes, but from th is you can logically conclude tha t whoever uses some-
thing, whoever receives some kind of benefits, joy, whatever, from keep-
ing a dog or from having a car and using a highway should pay for the 
expenses, shouldn' t they? So, it shouldn't be the dog owner who pays 
for the car owner ' s= 
C: =You are perfectly right in this, Mr Bolgár, but those roads that are not 
par t of the highway system are damaged, too, and who will be maintain-
ing them if the traffic will move over to them? 
(v) Pro forma agreement: t he igen, de 'yes, but ' strategy. It serves more 
of a connecting function in a sharp conflict, whereas in milder disputes 
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the literal meaning of the phrase (agreement and face saving) plays a 
more important role in the interpretation. 
(5) (LDI9: GYB9) 
(Topic: whether the NATO ground forces will deploy in Kosovo) 
GYB: Szóval hogy kiürüljön a terület, hogy aztán szabadon mozoghassanak a 
csapatok. 
C: Pontosan, és pontosan ott, ahol a háborút lényegében a szerbek részéről 
is az az egyik állásfoglalás az ő részükről, hogy olyan helyen legyen a 
háború, ha már elkerülhetetlen, ahol lényegében nem szerb lakosság van. 
GYB: Igen, de mért lett volna érdeke ez a NATO-nak, hogy kiürüljön Koszovó, 
neki az lett volna feltételezésem szerint az érdeke, hogy bombázza a főbb 
célpontokat három napon keresztül, és Milosevics fö l tar t ja a kezét, azt 
mondja, hogy jó, egyezzünk meg így, ahogy akarjátok. 
GYB: Well, so that the area is cleared of people and the troops could move 
around freely. 
C: Exactly, and exactly where, from the point of view of the Serbs, the war 
is that ' s their standpoint, tha t the war, if it's unavoidable, should be 
happening where the population is largely not Serbian. 
GYB: GYB: Yes, but why would it have been in NATO's interest for Kosovo to 
be cleared of people, their interest would have been, I suppose, to bomb 
the major targets for three days, so Milosevic puts u p his hands and says 
all right, let's come to an agreement the way you want to. 
(vi) Apology (questioning one's competence). It can introduce agreement, 
too, even though I do not have an example of this in my corpus. 
(fi) (LDI6: GYB21) 
(Topic: the war in Kosovo, and the peace process) 
GYB: Talán a kormány abból indul ki, hogy mi csak egy tag vagyunk a ti-
zenkilenc közül, ráadásul nagyon frissen fölvett, és bár valóban a mi 
érdekeink nagyon sokban különböznek a többi NATO-tagállamétól, de 
azért illúzió volna azt hinni, hogy egy magyar javaslatra reagálva majd a 
NATO vezető hatalmai, elsősorban az Egyesült Államok megváltoztatják 
a politikájukat, nem? 
C: Megmondom őszintén, hogy én nagyon keveset értek a politikához, a ka-
tonáskodáshoz pedig végképp semmit, de úgy gondolom, hogy ebben a 
helyzetben minden eszközt meg kell ragadni arra, hogy Magyarországot 
valahogy kitereljük ebből a válságból. Nem afelé kell itt a dolgoknak 
haladni, hogy itt teljes jogú NATO-tagként, én nem tudom megérteni, 
hogy mért nem lehetett ezt megvétózni. . . 
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GYB: Maybe the government thinks t h a t we are only one of the nineteen mem-
bers, and a very new member at tha t , and even though our interests are 
really very different from those of the other NATO member states, it 
would be an illusion to think tha t in reaction to a suggestion from Hun-
gary the leading nations of NATO, especially the United States, will 
change their policy, wouldn't it? 
C: I'll tell you frankly, I know very little about politics and even less about 
army matters, but I think tha t in this situation all means should be 
used to stir Hungary out of this crisis. Things shouldn ' t be going in the 
direction where as a NATO member of full rights, I can't understand 
why it wasn't possible to veto t h i s . . . 
(vii) Pause and side sequence. I discuss these two markers together be-
cause in my corpus significant pauses affecting interpretation occur only 
before initiations of side sequences. The following example, thus, illus-
trates multiple marking (see section 3.4.2). 
(7) (LDI3: H22) 
(Topic: intelligence scandal) 
C: Na most - öö há t öö - ezek u tán tulajdonképpen mondjuk öö 
elképzelhetőnek tar tom, hogy - ööö a hírszerzés jól dolgozott, nem? 
(3.0) 
GYB: Hát nem ér tem az összefüggést. 
C: Oö mert tulajdonképpen ezerkilencszázötvenhat(.)bau tulajdonképpen 
Horn Gyula a-a-a ((coughs)) 
GYB: Karhatalmista volt. 
C: Karhatalmi 
GYB: Na de ezt nem kell titkosszolgálati módszerekkel vagy nem (.) olyan 
módszerekkel, de egy titkosszolgálati szervezetnek földerítenie, mert hát 
(.) ő is elismerte. 
C: Well, now - er - well errr - after all this I can actually say er t h a t I 
would consider it possible t h a t - e r - t h e intelligence did their job right, 
don' t you think? 
(3.0) 
GYB: Well I don't understand the connection. 
C: Er - because actually in (.) nineteen fifty-six Gyula Horn actually er 
((coughs)) 
GYB: was a member of t he special police squad. 
C: Police squad 
GYB: But this doesn' t have to be uncovered with the means of the intelli-
gence or not with their special means, but an intelligence organization, 
because well (.) he admitted this, too. 
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The pause and the side sequence initiated in the second turn signal the 
possibility of disagreement and, at the same time, delay its realization 
until the sixth turn. But the possibility of the realization of agreement 
is open until this sixth turn as well. 
Having demonstrated that both preferred disagreement and dispre-
ferred agreement can be introduced by so-called dispreference markers, 
in the following subsection I will discuss what the distribution is between 
unmarked and marked realizations of the two utterance types. 
3.4.2. Markedness and statistics 
In studying the realization of agreement and disagreement, I also took 
into consideration two other factors besides markedness: one is differen-
tiating between the main topic vs. the side topic, and the other is the 
degree of the intensity of the conflict. 
Both factors have been discussed in the literature, the former in con-
nection with the study of agreement. Kotthoff (1993, 210) differentiates 
between partial agreement and agreement regarding the main topic of 
the conflict. Partial agreement concerns an unimportant aspect of the 
conflict or a side topic and closes the argument only as far as tha t is 
concerned, leaving the basic opposition unsolved. Agreement concerning 
an important aspect of the main topic brings the argument to an end, 
whereby the side topics lose their significance. This is rather face threat-
ening because, if there is no compromise involved, it means that one of the 
parties was not able to defend his/her position. Such kind of agreement 
occurs in everyday conversations fairly rarely (Vuchinich 1990). 
Kotthoff (ibid.) points out another distinction as well which can be 
important in investigating verbal conflicts: namely, the distinction be-
tween aggravated vs. mitigated disputes. The characteristics of aggra-
vated disputes are as follows: a decrease of use or complete lack of de-
laying elements (the markers discussed above) and an increase of use of 
interruptions. Mitigated disputes are characterized by opposite tenden-
cies. My corpus is balanced in this respect: about half of it contains 
sharp conflicts (LDI7, T O P and P&C; a total of 296 turns, or 8,818 
words), while the other half (the rest of the LDI recordings; a total of 
348 turns, or 8,764 words) contains mild conflicts. 
The following table demonstrates the distribution of various realiza-
tions of agreement in the corpus as far as the above-mentioned aspects 
are concerned. (S: sharp conflict (aggravated dispute); M: mild conflict 
(mitigated dispute).) 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the realizations of agreement 
AGREEMENT 
MAIN TOPIC SIDE TOPIC 
S M S M 
Wi th no marker 1 (3%) 9 (26%) 9 (26%) 5 (14%) 
W i t h hesitation 1 (3%) 
Wi th preface 2 (6%) 
Wi th qualifier 1 (3%) 
W i t h multiple marking 4 (12%) 2 (6%) 
The corpus contains altogether 34 tu rns that realize agreement. In con-
flict-oriented discourse, as we have seen in section 3.2 above, agreement is 
a dispreferred response. Thus, if the markers were really markers of dis-
preference, marked cases should be in the majority. The da ta of the cor-
pus, however, show an opposite tendency: agreement is realized without 
markers in 24 cases and with one or more markers in 10 cases. A tendency 
of unmarkedness predominates in aggravated disputes (10 unmarked and 
3 marked), in mitigated disputes (14 unmarked and 7 marked), in agree-
ment regarding the main topic (10 unmarked and 5 marked), as well as 
in agreement regarding the side topic (14 unmarked and 5 marked). 
A tendency to avoid agreement regarding the main topic of the con-
flict is supported by the da t a for aggravated dispute but not for mitigated 
dispute. 
The following table (Table 2) shows the distribution of the realiza-
tions of disagreement. 
The corpus contains altogether 203 turns tha t realize disagreement. 
Of these, 71 are realized without markers, 132 with them. This also 
contradicts expectations in connection with preference status, since dis-
agreement is preferred, and, thus, most of the cases should be unmarked. 
A tendency towards markedness is manifested in aggravated dispute 
(41 unmarked and 58 marked), mitigated dispute (30 unmarked and 74 
marked), disagreement regarding the main topic (62 unmarked and 114 
marked), and disagreement regarding the side topic (9 unmarked and 18 
marked). This is the exact opposite of what we have seen in connection 
with agreement above. 
Due to the limited size of the corpus it uses, this investigation aims 
to form (and support) hypotheses ra ther than test them. The results, 
as far as markedness is concerned, are t ha t in conflict-oriented contexts 
marking works similarly to consensus-oriented contexts, i.e., agreement 
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Table 2 
Distribution of the realizations of disagreement 
DISAGREEMENT 
MAIN TOPIC SIDE TOPIC 
S M S M 
Wi th no marker 41 (20.2%) 21 (10.3%) 9 (4.5%) 
With hesitation 2 (1%) 
Wi th preface 10 (5%) 5 (2.5%) 2 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Wi th qualifier 4 (2%) 3 (1.5%) 1 (0.5%) 
With turn introducing 
agreement component 10 (5%) 20 (10%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 
With pro forma agreement 4 (2%) 12 (6%) 2 (1%) 1 (0.5%) 
Wi th apology 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 
Wi th insertion of 
side sequence 9 (4.5%) 8 (4%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.5%) 
Wi th multiple marking 11 (5.4%) 16 (8%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 
tends to be unmarked, while disagreement is more likely marked. The 
rule of interpretation of preference, as we have seen, does not allow the 
supposition that agreement is preferred in verbal conflicts. Markers, then, 
as Bilmes (1988) also believed, do not mark dispreference in the structural 
sense: their occurrence is motivated by some other factor. 
3.5. An attempt to explain 
In this section I will at tempt to answer the question of what motivation 
lies behind the preference of disagreement in verbal conflicts. 
According to Kotthoff (1993, 209), in a fully developed dispute, con-
cession (i.e., the acceptance, wi thout reservations, of the opposing posi-
tion of the other disputant) is a dispreferred act because it threatens the 
positive face of the speaker, while disagreement protects it, in the sense 
of Goffmann (1967) and Brown-Levinson (1987). As we have seen above, 
proponents of the psychological approach to preference also refer to the 
interpersonality principles of mutua l protection of face, the politeness 
principle, and politeness strategies. 
At this point, let us make a detour and take another look at the pref-
erence structure of adjacency pairs investigated by Bilmes (1988), where 
in the first pair par t the speaker at tr ibutes some kind of thought or ac-
tion to the co-conversant. In this kind of adjacency pair disagreement 
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is the preferred response while agreement is dispreferred, since a lack of 
utterance equals agreement and not disagreement. Let us notice, how-
ever, (and this is something Bilmes does not point out) that the thought 
or action at t r ibuted to the co-conversant can be of any kind — n o t only 
positive or negative but also neu t r a l—but this does not affect the pre-
ferred status of disagreement at all. In the case of a neutral s tatement it 
is not plausible to account for the preferred s ta tus of disagreement and 
the dispreferred s ta tus of agreement with face work. 
Bilmes (1991, 465) points out tha t many, perhaps most of the state-
ments we make tha t could potentially be agreed or disagreed with are 
made without an expectation of expressions of either agreement or dis-
agreement; in such cases it is agreement that is presumed (although not 
expected), and it is disagreement tha t is preferred (according to the in-
ference rule of preference). 
In my opinion, in the case of neutral s tatements, which do not di-
rectly affect the face of the participants, it is primarily the t ru th of the 
propositional content of the utterance which is a t stake. This, I believe, 
is largely t rue of disputes as well: we cannot accept as the only expla-
nation the claim tha t in disputes disagreement is triggered solely by the 
speaker's desire to defend his/her point of view (and, through it, his/ 
her face). Equally important , or perhaps even more important, is the 
motivation to uncover the t ru th in the course of the dispute. 
The main point I want to make with all of this is that in our inves-
tigations of norms and principles tha t explain preference, besides inter-
personality principles, we should not forget about rationality principles. 
Grice's Maxim of Quality (Grice 1975) — a classic rationality prin-
ciple— is of crucial importance in explaining the preferred s tatus of dis-
agreement in adjacency pairs involving a (counter)statement in their first 
part . The Maxim of Relevance (Grice, ibid.), too, contributes to explain-
ing the preference structure of adjacency pairs in verbal conflicts: the 
absence of an irrelevancy claim20 triggers the inference that the speaker 
agrees with his/her partner(s) in finding the previous claim to be relevant 
to the discussion a t hand. Further rationality principles which can be 
connected with preference organization are Levinson's (2000) I-Principle 
and Q-Principle. 
In his latest book about generalized conversational implicatures and 
the rationality principles underlying them, Levinson (2000) does not dis-
2 0
 For more details, see Muntigl Turnbull (1998). 
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cuss preference organization, nevertheless he makes remarkable obser-
vations on the level at which systematic pragmatic inferences must be 
explicated2 1 as well as on the manifestation of the I-Principle in a phe-
nomenon examined by conversation analysts. 
Exploring I-inferences generated by the operation of the Principle 
of Informativeness (the I-Principle for short), Levinson (2000, 112-5) 
cites the pattern of self-identifications over the telephone observed by 
Schegloff (see section 2.3), where intimates expect their identity to be 
conveyed just by the sample of voice quality in their first Hello, only 
escalating step by step, when overt recognition is withheld, with further 
examples of voice quality, then nicknames or firstnames. The I-Principle 
(a rendition of Grice's Q2 maxim: do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required) is formulated as follows: "Say as little as 
necessary, that is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient 
to achieve your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind)"2 2 (Levinson 
2000, 114). Schegloff (1979) a t t r ibuted the dispreferred s ta tus of overt 
self-identifications to social psychological motivation. In my opinion, face 
saving and a tendency towards economy, i.e., interpersonality and ratio-
nality principles, seem always to be at work simultaneously in the course 
of communication. 
Levinson's First (Q-) Heuristic (Levinson 2000, 3 5 ) — " w h a t isn't 
said, i sn ' t "—is related to Grice's first Maxim of Quantity, Q l : make 
your contribution as informative as is required. Levinson's Q-Principle 
(developed from the First Heuristic) is formulated as follows: "Do not 
provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge 
of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger state-
ment would contravene the I-Principle. Specifically, select the informa-
tionally strongest paradigmatic al ternate tha t is consistent with the facts" 
2 1
 In contrast, to the standard view, according to which there are only two levels 
of meaning, Levinson (2000, 22 3) assumes three levels of meaning: (i) sentence-
moaning, (ii) utterance-token-meaning, and (iii) a level of meaning between the 
first two, i.e., utterance-type-meaning. Sentence-meaning must be explicated by 
a theory of grammar, utterance-token-meaning (or speaker-meaning) is a mat-
ter of actual nonce inferences made in actual contexts by actual recipients. At 
t he level of utterance-type-meaning systematic pragmatic inferences independent 
of particular contexts can be captured. These systematic pragmatic inferences, 
such as preference organization, among others, are based not on direct computa-
tions about, speaker-intentions but on general expectations about how language 
is normally used. 
2 2
 See the definition of Q in the next paragraph. 
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(Levinson 2000, 76). Considering this, Sacks's classic "dinner" example 
(see section 2.2) and similar phenomena can obviously be analysed as 
generalized conversational implicatures induced by the Q-Principle. 
According to Németh T. (2003, 248; 2004, 410), the rationality prin-
ciples guide information transmission and interpretation with reference 
to the object. This kind of information, expressed explicitly or implic-
itly, is basically propositional in nature. Interpersonality principles reg-
ulate information transmission and processing on selves including the 
communicative partners ' desires, wishes, aims, etc. This kind of infor-
mation does not necessarily have a propositional form, sometimes it can 
hardly be propositionalized. Considering this, Gruber 's (1998) investi-
gations confirm the assumption t h a t rationality principles are crucial in 
explaining preference structure in verbal conflict sequences, inasmuch as 
he proves that the more vehement the dispute is, the more important the 
propositional content and the thematic cohesion of the turns are. 
We have now run a full circle. My answer to the question what we 
should understand by preference is, then, this: I understand preference 
as a phenomenon which is motivated by rationality and interpersonality 
principles and manifested in the norms of linguistic behaviour, and whose 
mechanism is described by an inference rule. 
From the perspective of the above argumentation it seems plausible 
to interpret the linguistic means called dispreference markers in the classic 
works of CA and reluctance markers since Bilmes (1988) on the basis of 
interpersonality and rationality principles together. Without any doubt, 
reluctance markers play a role in protecting the face of the partner. In the 
case of a critical discussion—especially a sharp one—it would be strange, 
however, to s tate tha t any one of the markers—for instance, the agree-
ment component as a preface of an utterance realizing disagreement— 
serves exclusively or even just primarily the purpose of expressing polite-
ness and protecting the face of the partner. In such cases it is equally (if 
not more) important to clash positions and arguments, and the proposi-
tional content of the agreement component is also important in addition 
to its interpersonal effect. In the use of all the discussed markers the 
weighing of the propositional content of the ut terance is most likely to 
play a role. The same is true for explanations and justifications provided 
in the same turn as a disagreement—these are also included among dis-
preference markers (although not among reluctance markers)—since an 
explanation or a justification used as an argument is an important ele-
ment of the content of the dispute. We can suppose, then, tha t on the 
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basis of the principles of communicative language use discussed a com-
prehensive description of general validity can be provided about the use 
of these markers. An at tempt a t providing such a description, however, 
is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
3.6. Statistical distribution 
In the course of dispute, due to the nature of the phenomenon, preferred 
disagreement is most likely to be more frequent than dispreferred agree-
ment is, since as soon as the opposite is the case, we can no longer speak of 
dispute. Frequency distribution agrees with preferential s t ructure in the 
case of verbal conflicts. The da ta of the investigated corpus support this: 
it contains 203 turns realizing disagreement and only 34 turns realizing 
agreement. This, however, does not mean that the frequency distribution 
correlates with preferential s ta tus in the case of every sequence type. 
4. Summary 
In the present paper I have a t tempted to clarify the nature of preference 
considering tha t the use of this classical concept of conversation analysis 
seems to have become confused in the course of time. 
After discussing the scope of preference in CA, I have first demon-
strated Sacks's original concept of preference. Then, rewieving changes 
in the interpretation of the concept, I have studied the a t tempts aimed at 
defining it, categorizing them as structural, social psychological, statis-
tical and complex approaches. I have argued for the complex approach, 
suggesting a new interpretation of preference which unifies the different 
views from the perspective of pragmatic principles. I have at t r ibuted 
the various aspects of preference to the joint manifestation of the in-
terpersonality principles regulating the interpersonal relationships of the 
speakers (such as the principle of saving face, the politeness principle and 
politeness strategies) and rationality principles directed at the object of 
the utterance (such as Grice's Maxim of Quality and Maxim of Rele-
vance, Levinson's Q-Principle and I-Principle). I have emphasized that 
the maxims of quality and relevance play a crucial role in understanding 
the preference structure of adjacency pairs involving a counterstatement 
in their first par t . 
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I have investigated preference structure and markedness in a corpus 
of transcribed conversations from debate programs on Hungarian radio 
and television in order to interpret the concept of preference with regard 
to its context sensitivity and to arrive at a carefully argued conclusion on 
the issue of the correlation of preference and markedness. After discussing 
examples, I have demonstrated in tables the distribution of unmarked and 
marked realizations of agreement vs. disagreement in the corpus. The 
results have confirmed the assumption known in the literature but not 
checked in a corpus tha t preference does not correlate with markedness, 
consequently the markers investigated are not dispreference markers but 
reluctance markers. 
Finally, I have proposed a new approach to reluctance markers to 
interpret them on the basis of interpersonality and rationality principles 
together. 
Appendix 
1. The data of the corpus 
Discourse transcribed from audiotapes: 
1. radio programs 
LDI1: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
26 March 1998. 
31 turns , 1061 words 
LDI2: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
26 March 1998. 
23 turns , 1032 words 
LDI3: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
26 March 1998. 
79 turns, 973 words 
LDI4: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
26 March 1998. 
48 turns, 779 words 
LDI5: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
7 April 1999. 
21 turns , 719 words 
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LDI6: Let 's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
7 April 1999. 
36 turns, 1058 words 
LDI7: Let 's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
22 April 1999. 
53 turns, 960 words 
LDI8: Let 's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
22 April 1999. 
43 turns, 1297 words 
LDI9: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
22 April 1999. 
27 turns, 830 words 
LDI10: Let's discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár. 
22 April 1999. 
40 turns, 1015 words 
In all conversations: GYB: György Bolgár; С: caller 
2. television programs 
T O P : Topical (Aktuális). 6 July, 2001. János Betlen talking to Gyu-
la Thürmer , President of the Workers' Party. 
122 turns, 3475 words 
JB: János Betlen; GYT: Gyula Thlirmer 
P&C: Pros and cons (Pro és kontra). Debate between Imre Kerényi 
and Ilona Kocsi. 5 September, 2002. 
121 turns, 4383 words 
IKe: Imre Kerényi; IKo: Ilona Kocsi 
2. Transcription conventions 
((coughs)) double parantheses: certain meaningful (mostly non-ver-
bal) details of the scene 
(.) micropause; potentially significant but very short pause, 
comparable to the duration of an average syllable 
(2.0) measured pause (in seconds) 
dash: a short unmeasured pause within an utterance 
lehet underline: emphasis 
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nem left-hand bracket: the point at which an ongoing utter-
ance is joined by another 
persze 
= equal signs are used to link different parts of a single 
speaker's ut terance when those parts constitute a con-
tinuous flow of speech that has been carried over to an-
other line, by transcript design, to accommodate an in-
tervening interruption when there is no interval between 
adjacent utterances; an equal sign also signals a lack of 
pause or overlap between two utterances 
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APOLOGY ROUTINE FORMULAE IN HUNGARIAN* 
MALGORZATA SUSZCZYNSKA 
This paper describes the forms and functions of Hungarian apology routine formulae 
(RF) used by Hungarian adults in a writ ten Discourse Completion Test. Five apology 
RF types are identified, their choices being influenced by such factors as the offence 
type and its severity, the social role of the interlocutor and the offender's gender. Two 
main apology RF types, Ne haragudj 'Don' t be angry' and Elnézést 'Excuse me' are 
shown to perform complementary communicative functions of restoring harmony in 
familiar vs. unfamiliar settings. Gender differences in the use of RF types present on 
various levels of analysis demonstrate tha t males and females choose different ways to 
restore social harmony and may attach importance to different aspects of the context. 
1. Introduction 
This s tudy is a contribution to cross-cultural apology studies, to stud-
ies on apology and gender and to sociopragmatic research on Central 
European languages. While research on apologies has paid relatively lit-
tle at tention to apology routine formulae (RF), focusing on identifying 
and classifying other apology strategies, the goal of the present paper 
is to demonstrate t ha t Hungarian apology RF, while bearing similarity 
to direct apology expressions in other languages, have language-specific 
forms1 and functions, performing distinct jobs in the process of restoring 
harmony between the offender and the offended party, and are sensitive 
to such contextual parameters as the social role of the offended par ty in 
relation to the offender, the type of offensive action, its severity and the 
offender's gender. 
In the following I will first review apology research (section 2) fo-
cusing on the relationship between apology, politeness and culture (2.1), 
apology and gender (2.2) and cross-cultural apology studies (2.3), then 
in section 3 I will present the study: its participants (3.1), methodology 
* I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on a 
previous draft . 
1
 Hungarian Ne haragudj 'Don't, be angry ' is quite unique as an apology RF. It, is 
also found as an apology RF in Polish {Nie gniewaj sie, Suszczynska 1999) but, 
as Wouk (to appear) notices, in no other language that has been so far researched 
for apology. 
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(3.2) and then proceed to a detailed analysis of the data from a number of 
perspectives (3.3). Finally, in section 4 I will summarize the conclusions. 
2. Research in apology: a review 
Within speech act theory, apology was assigned to the category of expres-
sives the illocutionary point of which was "to express the psychological 
s ta te specified in the sincerity conditions about the state of affairs spec-
ified in the propositional content" (Searle 1976, 12). Still, the approach 
at tempting to describe apology in terms of felicity conditions did not suc-
cessfully account for real life instances of apology (Owen 1983, 117-135)2 
and a more complex, functional view of apology was adopted. Under the 
influence of Goffman's (1971) concept of remedial work,3 apology was 
viewed not merely as an expression of S's emotions but as an act tha t 
remedies an offence and restores social equilibrium and harmony. This 
view on apology is present in the majority of apology studies (Fraser 1981; 
Edmondson 1981;4 Leech 1983;5 Owen 1983;6 Holmes 1989; 1990; 1995; 
Meier 19957) although with some differences in the terminology and in 
2
 Owen's (1983) a t tempt to apply Searlean felicity conditions to her examples of 
real life apologies, which in her s tudy meant ut terances that contained 'key' words 
or expressions such as apologize, sorry or I'm afraid, proved unsuccessful as not all 
the instances could be defined as sincere expressions of regret and the preparatory 
conditions became indeterminately complex and circular, being derived from the 
facts they were expected to account for. 
3
 In Goffman's (1971, 139) words, "The function of remedial work is to change the 
meaning tha t otherwise might be given to an act , transforming what could be 
seen as offensive into what can be seen as acceptable." 
4
 Defining apology, Edmondson (1981, 280) says: "the most predictable function 
of this illocution in discourse is that it counts as an attempt on the part of the 
speaker to cause the hearer t o withdraw a preceding complaint: it is an at tempt 
to restore social harmony." 
5
 Leech (1983, 124 125) resorts to a mercantile metaphor when he argues that "an 
apology implies a transaction, in that it is a bid to change the balance-sheet of 
the relation between S and H", from interpersonal imbalance to the restoration 
of equilibrium, or at least the reduction of disequilibrium, between S and H. 
6
 Owen (1983, 62) defines apology as a primary remedial move in a remedial ex-
change. 
' Meier (1995, 388) views apology as part of repair work, which remedies damage 
to S's image (incurred by S's behaviour which fell below the expected standard) 
and in this way leads to the convergence of S's and H's worlds, which in tu rn 
restores social harmony. 
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the conceptualizations of the restoration process. As Norrick (1978, 280) 
observes, "more is at stake in [...] an act of apologizing t h a n expressing 
regret; [...] apologies are made with the hope of being forgiven, or t h a t 
the addressee will dismiss the matter." 
2.1. Apology, politeness and culture 
The politeness aspect of apology has been central to apology studies, be-
ing approached in a number of ways. Holmes (1995, 155) defines apolo-
gies as "face supportive acts" focused on redressing face-threatening be-
haviour and this way restoring equilibrium between S and H. Within 
Brown and Levinson's framework, apologies first of all function as neg-
ative politeness strategies redressing H's negative face,8 or his/her want 
for non-imposition (Brown-Levinson 1987, 187). Still, there are clear in-
stances when apology redresses H's positive face as when apologizing for 
introducing H to a third par ty using a wrong title (Holmes 1990, 162). 
Further, Goffman's (1971, 144) definition of apology as representing "a 
splitting of the self into a blameworthy par t and the part t h a t stands back 
and sympathizes with the blame giving, and , by implication, is worthy of 
being brought back into the fold" clearly suggests that apology can re-
store S's own social image.9 Specifically, apologies that follow S's social 
gaffes are a t t empts to restore S's own face. Finally, in many contexts 
apologizing, being costly to S, may be perceived as a face-threatening ac t 
(Brown-Levinson op.cit., 68) tha t leads to face loss not face restoration. 
Another perspective on the issue of politeness is offered by Meier 
(1995, 387), who argues tha t politeness be be t te r conceptualized in terms 
of appropriateness judgments within a part icular speech community. She 
8
 To Goffman (1967, 5-10) the term face means the positive social value a person 
claims for himself/herself, or "an image of self delineated in terms of approved 
social a t t r ibutes" , "the most personal possession [. ..] on loan to him from society" 
tha t is sustained through ri tual and role management. In Brown and Levinson's 
(1987, 61) terms, face is the public self-image t h a t every member wants to claim 
for himself/herself, consisting of negative face, with its claims to freedom of action 
and freedom from imposition, and positive face, the positive self-image tha t is 
appreciated and approved of by others. 
0
 A view of apology as saving exclusively S's image when he / she behaves below 
the standard expected relative to a particular reference group is posited by Meier 
(1997, 197-8), who further s tates that "RW [repair work] repairs the damaged 
image by reaffirming shared values, thereby assuring the hearer tha t the speaker 
is a bona fide member of the group, who can be counted on to act appropriately 
in the future." 
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argues t h a t "what should be at issue [. . .] is not an absolute measure of 
[...] politeness, but ra ther the social interpretation of particular linguistic 
behavior within a part icular speech community." 
A culture-specific dimension of apology comes to the fore when we 
consider the fact that t he universality of the positive/negative concept 
of face, as defined by Brown and Levinson's (1987) model, has been 
challenged as not adequately representing speakers' communicative con-
cerns in different cultures.1 0 Many researchers s tudying politeness in 
non-Western cultures like Japan and China (Ide 1989; Ide 1998; Matsu-
moto 1988; 1989; Gu 1990; Mao 1994; Yu 2003) found that the concept 
of negative politeness wi th its emphasis on individual autonomy was not 
compatible with the collective orientation of Japanese or Chinese society. 
Also, culture-specific concepts of face often differed in content f rom the 
positive/negative face model (Gu 1990). Indeed, Coulmas (1981b, 89) 
found tha t "while thanks and apologies may exist as generic types of 
activities across cultures, it is obvious t h a t the pragmatic considerations 
of their implementation are culturally defined." Th i s means t h a t not 
only does Japanese have standardized apology expressions that differ in 
form from those found in Western societies,11 but t h a t their communica-
tive functions can only be understood when interpreted in terms of the 
Japanese ethics of indebtedness, a culture-specific concept that cannot 
be properly grasped in te rms of the positive/negative face dichotomy. 
Among the studies t ha t questioned the universality of Brown and 
Levinson's framework and investigated politeness phenomena in their 
cultural context,1 2 the major i ty of which focused on distant non-Western 
societies, there is little research that addresses such issues in relation to 
Central European languages. Wierzbicka's (1985; 1991) research on Pol-
ish and also Russian linguistic routines t ha t reflect a cultural "ethos" of 
those communities is such an exception. Meier (1992, 3), in her s tudy 
of Austrian German apologies, complained that "Austrian German suf-
fers from neglect [...], being subsumed [...] under an assumed generic 
German language, albeit erroneously so." 
111
 A detailed, critical review of politeness theories can be found in Kasper (1990). 
11
 For instance, sumimasen, translated according to context, either as 'Thank you' 
or as ' I 'm sorry', literally means 'this is not the end'. 
12
 At tempts to reconcile the universal and culture-specific aspects of politeness have 
been proposed (Mao 1994; O'Driscoll 1996; Spencer-Oatey 2000b; Spencer-Oatey 
Jiang 2003), although have not yet been generally applied in cross-cultural or 
intracultural studies. 
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In her analysis of apologies of Midwest American and Austrian 
German university students she found culture-specific differences in apol-
ogy strategies that could not be explained in terms of positive/negative 
politeness. For instance, Austrians, more often than Americans, used 
excuses and other "avoidance oriented" strategies, which were not in-
stances of negative politeness but, as Meier (1996b, 159) following Ringel 
(1991) argued, were motivated by a sense of reduced responsibility and 
lack of control, the feeling of personal helplessness, and the sense of in-
evitability, of Schicksal ( 'fate'), a t t i tudes that developed under the Hab-
sburg Monarchy. In my own research on Hungarian apology strategies 
I found a preference for self-denigration (I'm terribly clumsy/careless) 
both among Hungarian students, as compared with American and Polish 
students (Suszczynska 1999), and among Hungarian adults (Suszczynska 
2003). This behaviour is similar to expressions of negative feelings among 
Austrians (I hate it when I do that) observed by Meier (1996b, 160).14  
Such similarities may not be accidental although more research is needed 
to properly account for these phenomena.1 5 
2.2. Apology and gender 
The relationship between apology and gender was most systematically 
researched by Holmes (1989; 1990; 1995). Using an ethnographic ap-
Meier (1996a) uses the term repair work, which is equivalent to apology broadly 
understood, including apologetic illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs), 
excuses and other strategies that speakers use to remedy an offence. 
14
 Meier (1992), discussing Austrian German, refers to Clyne (1984, 120), who wrote 
t h a t "in many aspects, Austrians communicate in a way more similar to Czechs, 
Slovenians, Hungarians, and Northern Italians than to Germans (especially North 
Germans)." 
1
 ' As Meier (1996b, 153) observes, making assertions regarding the value and belief 
system of particular societies leads to a controvertible territory. Value systems 
are not monolithic but dynamic and variable. In practice culture-specific concepts 
are explained on the basis of researchers' own knowledge of a particular culture 
(Obeng 1999), supported by the works of recognized philosophers (for instance, 
Gil 's 1990, 2.38 reference to Confucius) or sociologists, bu t are also derived from 
interviews with community members (Bharuthram 2003) or arrived at with the 
help of procedures used in social psychology. Okumura and Wei (2000), who 
investigated apology strategies of British and Japanese women, asked the respon-
dents to provide 20 answers to the question "Who am I?", a procedure known as 
the Twenty Statements Test (TST), and demonstrated t h a t the women's s t ra t -
egy choices reflected important cultural differences tha t existed in their concepts 
of self. 
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proach, Holmes examined apologies of adul t Pakeha New Zealanders and 
found a great number of gender differences in the distribution of apolo-
gies in her corpus. New Zealand women, for example, both produced 
and received the majority of recorded apologies. Further, apologies were 
most frequent between women, while apologies between males were rare. 
While males apologized more for time and property offences, females 
used more apologies for space and talk offences, the differences reflecting 
gender-specific concerns a n d norms in interaction. Men often regarded 
apologies between equals as superfluous, apologizing more to strangers 
than to friends and colleagues (in accordance with Brown and Levinson's 
claim that politeness increases together with increasing distance) and 
giving more weight to s t a tu s difference and the seriousness of offence. 
On the other hand, women apologized as often to strangers as to friends 
(most often to their female friends), which is more in accordance with 
Wolfson's "bulge" model (1988), where more politeness can be found in 
less fixed relationships. Women also apologized more for lighter offences 
and regarded offences against female friends as more serious than those 
against strangers. 
Holmes (1995, 161) also examined the overall use of apology RF in 
her corpus and did not find any gender differences in the overall use of R F 
in her corpus. Still, New Zealand males tended to use more formal R F 
types like I apologize more often that women, which might indicate tha t 
men regard apologies as signals of social distance, more appropriate with 
strangers t h a n among close friends and in cases of more serious offences. 
On the whole, Holmes in her study suggests that women and men 
may regard apologies as doing different jobs. Men consider apologies 
mainly as admissions of inadequacy and thus as self-oriented face-threat-
ening acts, which, if possible, need to be avoided. On the other hand, 
women perceive apologizing as "other-oriented", as acts aimed at restor-
ing and maintaining relationships, and tokens of concern or solidarity. 
While Holmes's research reports considerable gender differences in 
the performance and conceptualizations of apology in adult Pakeha New 
Zealanders, studies examining apology in other languages mention only 
minor gender differences in t h e use of apology strategies (e.g., Meier 1992; 
1998; Márquez Reiter 2000). Also, many cross-cultural studies (Blum-
Kulka et al. 1989) did not examine gender differences a t all. Further 
cross-cultural studies using compatible research methods and investigat-
ing males' and females' perceptions of contextual factors are needed to 
describe and explain the effect gender may have on the choice of apology 
strategies. 
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2.3. Cross-cultural research in apology and apology RF 
A new chapter in cross-cultural, intercultural and interlanguage apol-
ogy studies opened with the launching of the CCSARP (Cross Cultural 
Speech Act Realization Project ) . Following Fraser's (1981) work on apol-
ogy strategies, cf. Cohen-Olshtain (1981), Olshtain-Cohen (1983) defined 
a "speech act set" of apology formulae, fu r ther developed by Blum-Kulka-
Olshtain (1984) and adopted by CCSARP (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989, 291 ff) 
as their coding manual.16 The strength of the C C S A R P speech act 
set as a universal unit of apology analysis was supported by Olshtain's 
(1989) findings, which revealed considerable similarity in the use of apol-
ogy strategies in Hebrew, Australian English, Canadian French and Ger-
man: IFID and Expression of responsibility were identified as all-purpose 
strategies, while Repair, Explanation and Concern were situation-specific. 
Olshtain also found that the same social and contextual factors and the 
same level of offence resulted in similar apologies in her da ta . 1 7 Trosborg 
(1987; 1995),18 comparing apologies of native British English and Danish 
speakers elicited by means of a role play found that there were no signif-
icant differences in the use of the main apology strategies and concluded 
tha t the two nations shared similar cultures. 
Examining the overall use of apology RF, Olshtain (1989, 165-8) 
found tha t , in spite of some differences, Hebrew, Australian English, 
Canadian French and German students tended to use apology RF in all 
situations to similar degrees. Also Meier (1996b), comparing apologies of 
American and Austrian German students, clid not find statistically signif-
icant differences in RF use between the two groups except for one context 
of time offence where American students used RF significantly more of-
ten than Austrians, which Meier a t t r ibuted to the high value placed on 
time in American society. 
Olshtain (1989) found t h a t RF use and its intensification correlated 
with social distance, s ta tus and severity of the violation. RF intensifi-
lf
' The main apology strategies used in these studies are (1) Illocutionary force indi-
cating devices (IFIDs), (2) Taking on responsibility, (3) Explanation or account, 
(4) Offer of repair, and (5) Promise of forbearance. 
ь
 Olshtain (1989, 171) adds an important caveat to her findings: the fact tha t very-
few culture-specific tendencies were found may be an artefact of the data collec-
tion instrument, a Discourse Completion Test, which contained cross-culturally 
similar situations, representing a student 's life on a campus in a Western society. 
18
 Trosborg used lier own, modified version of the CCSARP manual , although com-
patible with the original. 
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cation rose with higher severity of offence, but diminished as the apolo-
gizer's s ta tus became higher. Also, Hebrew speakers tended to prefer R F 
with strangers and in more formal si tuations than with friends and ac-
quaintances. Vollmer and Olshtain (1989), analysing German apologies, 
revealed tha t the choice of strong or weak forms of apology RF depended 
on the level of severity of offence and on the assumed expectation of an 
apology to take place. Contrary to expectations, they found that power 
did not correlate significantly with R F selection, al though intensification 
of RF did. On the other hand, Meier (1997) found t h a t in her Austr ian 
German da ta R F was most frequent in asymmetrical relations. 
Bergman and Kasper (1993, 95) showed that , especially for American 
English speakers, for some offences the relationship between the severity 
of offence and the use of R F was reverse, suggesting two possible expla-
nations for this phenomenon: either S may avoid admit t ing responsibility 
or, conversely, the offender may feel tha t a R F is not adequate for a m a j o r 
offence. Trosborg (1987; 1995) evinced the same phenomenon for British 
English and Danish speakers and provided the very same explanation. 
Regarding R F types, the CCSARP manual provided a list of cross-
culturally comparable illocutionary force indicating devices (Blum-Kulka 
et al. 1989, 290) that were earlier grouped into three R F types in Olshtain 
-Cohen (1983, 22) as (a) an expression of regret ( I ' m sorry), (b) an offer 
of apology (I apologize), (c) a request for forgiveness (Excuse me, Forgive 
me, Pardon me). This three-fold division has become accepted in m a n y 
subsequent studies. 
On the whole, many researchers (Owen 1983; Olshtain-Cohen 1983; 
Rintell-Mitchell 1989; Trosborg 1987; 1995) found great uniformity in 
the analysed da ta in using an expression of regret (sorry) as the main 
apology RF. I apologize was very rare in spoken English; for instance, 
Owen (1983, 63) in her corpus of British English apologies found only 
two such instances. Trosborg (1995, 399) also commented that this R F 
type was used only a few times by her nat ive subjects, while requests for 
forgiveness (Forgive me, Excuse me,19 Pardon me) were not found at all. 
Still, some studies provide enough information to conclude tha t in 
many languages more than one RF type are frequently used and t h a t 
19
 Excuse me, according to Borkin and Reinhar t (1978), functions as a ritualistic 
apology formula used for breaches of et iquette (e.g., small terri tory invasions) and 
not for personal offences, being used prior to an offence, so it is not surprising 
that it did not appear in the elicited data . For the same reason Excuse me does 
not appear in Owen's (1983) study which also focused on apologies following 
an offence. 
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RF forms may be sensitive to contextual parameters and gender. Holmes 
(1995) found t h a t both women and men used the same range of apology 
strategies and in similar proportion, a l though men tended to use formal 
sub-strategies (e.g., I must apologize) more often, which may mean, as 
discussed above, that they either regard apologies as signals of social dis-
tance or use them only in relatively serious offences. Hebrew examples 
found in Olshtain (1989) contain such R F types as 'I apologize' or 'For-
giveness', al though the details of their distribution in the data are not 
provided. 
Vollmer and Olshtain (1989), after first grouping German RF vari-
ants into eight categories according to thei r meaning, finally regrouped 
them for reasons of cross-cultural comparison into the three major groups. 
It turned out t h a t an expression of regret was frequent in all contexts, 
while an offer of apology was not. A request for forgiveness was used 
in a context when the offender was of lower status and there was social 
distance between the participants, which suggested t h a t this RF type 
made a more intense apology that the expression of regret. Still, Vollmer 
and Olshtain (1989) commented that t he range of variation in RF was 
considerably narrower than they had expected. 
Meier (1992; 1997), on the other hand, found tha t Austrians, a t 
least when compared to Americans, showed more variety regarding R F 
sub-strategies. While the American part icipants showed a strong prefer-
ence for the expression of regret, Austrians most often used two RF sub-
strategies, expression of regret (Es tut mir leid) and exoneration request 
(Entschädigung), without significant difference between the two. Both 
R F types occurred in relatively high frequencies in all the situations, dis-
playing no constraint on their use according to type of offense, its serious-
ness or interlocutor relationship. Still, when Meier (1997, 201) examined 
variants of exoneration request, she found tha t the form Entschuldigung 
('excuse') was used much more frequently than verzeihen ('forgive') and 
tha t the lat ter was used twice as often by females than by males. In 
Meier (1992) we also find the information that the two most common 
exoneration requests tended to appear in different situations. Summing 
up, Meier's research suggests that in Austr ian German there are some 
gender differences in the use of RF types and that some R F types may 
be sensitive to contextual parameters. 
My study (Suszczynska 1999) comparing apology strategies of Amer-
ican, Polish and Hungarian students suppor ted earlier findings that t he 
expression of regret (I'm sorry) was a dominant apology R F type used by 
Americans, while at the same time revealed that Polish and Hungarian 
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participants displayed a much greater variety of forms and showed pref-
erence for other apology R F than the expression of regret. The findings 
concerning Hungarian were further supported by another study exam-
ining apology strategies of Hungarian adults (Suszczynska 2003) where 
gender differences in apology RF use were observed. 
The following section will further explore the use of Hungarian apol-
ogy RF and its types, in a systematic way examining their overall dis-
tribution in the data, their sensitivity to contextual parameters such as 
the type and severity of offence and the social identity of the interlocutor 
and gender preferences in their choice. 
3. T h e s t u d y 
3.1. The participants 
While the majori ty of apology studies using elicited d a t a examined uni-
versity students, I decided to examine adul ts . Two groups of participants, 
all of them practising high school teachers, took par t in the study. T h e 
first group participated in a written D C T (Discourse Completion Test) 
questionnaire (see 3.2) and consisted of 102 teachers (52 females and 50 
males), the average age being 31.6 for the females, ranging from 22 to 
52, and 36.5 for the males, ranging between 23 and 55. Half of t h e m 
were the students of the upgrading program 2 0 offered by the Inst i tute of 
English and American Studies, University of Szeged, the other half were 
their colleagues at work, whom they recruited to participate.2 1 The tes t s 
were distributed to the group during their weekend classes in Szeged a n d 
were returned to me either personally or by mail. 
After I had received responses to the DCT, I planned to conduct 
the test assessing the offensiveness of t he examined D C T situations b u t 
unfortunately, by that t ime only part of the originally examined g roup 
was available and some new participants, all of them E F L teachers f rom 
the same schools, were recruited.22 T h e second group consisted of 80 
20
 The upgrading program is a two-year MA course for EFL teachers witli а В A 
degree. 
21
 This is an instance of snowball sampling (Scale Filmer 1998, 139), helpful in 
gaining access to people who would otherwise be out of reach for the researcher. 
22
 The fact tha t the DCT and the offence severity test were not filled by exact ly 
the same group of part icipants is of importance as we cannot be sure whether 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
A P O L O G Y ROUTINE FORMULAE IN HUNGARIAN 87 
participants (41 females and 39 males), the average age for the females 
being 31.8, ranging from 24 to 48, and for t he males 35.4, ranging from 
24 to 54. 
I chose the above-mentioned groups of E F L teachers mostly be-
cause of their accessibility. Besides, the groups could be said to repre-
sent "a community of practice", defined as "an aggregate of people who 
come together around mutual engagement, in some common endeavor" 
(Eckert-McConnell-Ginet 1998, 490) and who share a repertoire of verbal 
resources, ways of talking, beliefs and values, and are si tuated in similar 
power relations. Such relatively homogeneous groups of participants were 
bet ter suited for a small-scale convenience sample study. 
3.2. The data collecting instrument and procedure 
As mentioned above, two types of questionnaires were used: a pro-
duction DCT questionnaire2'® in an open i tem, free response format2 4  
(Kasper 2000, 327-8) to obtain the participants ' written responses (see 
Appendix 1) and a rating-scale questionnaire (5-point rating scale), where 
1 stood for 'not offensive' and 5 for 'very offensive', to elicit respondents' 
assessment of the severity of offence in the same contexts. 
I chose a wri t ten DCT for two reasons. First , the great majority of 
the participants lived in different parts of Hungary and in such circum-
stances a written D C T that could be taken home was a convenient option. 
Next, I felt t ha t this method was less intimidating for my participants 
than other elicitation techniques such as an oral DCT or a role-play. 
the respondents of the DCT actually perceived the seriousness of the offences in 
the same way as did those who filled the assessment test. Still, as both groups 
are EFL teachers working in the same schools, I believe that the results of the 
assessment test can be used for the present study. 
2 3
 Although production questionnaires do not elicit natural responses (Beebe-Cum-
inings 1996) and have been subject to criticism (Turnbull 2001), they enable 
researchers to collect large amounts of data quickly, to control contextual vari-
ables and to establish an initial set of strategies for a particular speech act. As 
Kasper (2000, 329) argues, "When carefully designed, production questionnaires 
are useful to inform about speakers' pragmalinguistic knowledge of strategies and 
linguistic forms by which communicative acts can be implemented, and about 
their sociopragmatic knowledge of the context factors under which particular 
strategic and linguistic choices are appropriate." 
2 4
 In my DCT I did not use rejoinders and the participants could opt out if they 
felt they would rather say nothing (Bonikowska 1988). 
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The DCT consisted of thirty situations, twenty-four of t h e m call-
ing for apology and six eliciting o ther speech acts like an invitation or a 
praise,25 which enabled the part icipants to produce responses o ther than 
apologies.20 The apology situations differed in the type and severity of of-
fence as well as in the nature of part icipants ' relationship and were partly 
versions of situations found in other apology studies, and partly adapted 
from oral interviews with 13 part icipants (9 females and 4 males) who 
shared with me their experiences concerning apologizing and who later 
also participated in the written D C T . As a result, the DCT contained 
many situations taken from the participants ' experiences at work and in 
relationships with their partners or spouses. 
The descriptive statistics and a t-test for equality of means were 
carried out with the help of the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). In order to investigate t he connection between the use of RF 
(and other strategies), the offence type and the S Ii relationship, the 
situations were grouped according to offence type and H's social role in 
relation to S (see Appendix 2). 
3.3. Data analysis 
3.3.1. Apology RF and its sub-categories in the da ta 
While in my earlier s tudy (Suszczynska 1999) I used the CCSARP cod-
ing categories, in my more recent research (Suszczynska 2003) I followed 
Meier's model of repair work,2 ' which views apologizing as a negotiation 
of the relationship between the offender and the offended party. In lier 
model, apology RF are the most explicit means used to bring abou t the 
convergence between S's and H's worlds. In the present study, based on 
new data , I follow the same perspective on RF. 
2
 ' Every fourth situation in the DCT was a non-apology situation. 
2,1
 In my earlier study (Suszczynska 2003) some participants complained t h a t they 
found the DCT monotonous and having to apologize all the time made them 
uncomfortable. 
2
' Meier (1992) groups RW strategies into three orientations according to the way in 
which they (at tempt to) bring about convergence between S and H. T h e S —> H 
orientation, where S accepts H's perspective on the offence, includes such strate-
gies like statements of violation, self-blame and an offer of redress; the S «— H 
orientation, where S presents his/her version of events, includes excuses, justifica-
tions and appeal to H's understanding; finally, the S —»<— H orientation, where S 
directly aims at reconciliation and absolution, contains apology RF and appeals 
for the restoration of the status quo between S and H. 
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The apology RF is the most straightforward and explicit way used to 
perform apology and the most frequently used strategy in my data, the 
females (17.00) using it significantly more often than the males (14.46) 
(p = 0.012). 
In Hungarian, apology R F is realized by five main RF sub-categories 
or types, glossed as Bocsánat ('Forgiveness-nom'), Ne haragudj ( 'Don't 
be angry'), Elnézést ('Excuse-acc'), Sajnálom ( ' I 'm sorry') and Bocs, 
a casual, abbreviated form of Bocsánat, which I posited as a separate 
Hungarian apology RF in Suszczynska (2003) due to its distinct commu-
nicative function. Although the present s tudy focuses on the Hungarian 
RF sub-categories as "units" for analysis, it needs to be mentioned that 
each of them has a variety of extended linguistic forms, can be internally 
intensified, and Bocsánat, Ne haragudj and Elnézést also have T- and 
V-variants. Bocsánat ('Forgiveness-nom') and Elnézést ('Excuse-acc') 
are themselves neutral in terms of T/V-distinction, while Bocsáss meg 
('Forgive-imp-T') and Elnézésedet kérem ('I ask your forgiveness-T-acc) 
and Bocsásson meg ('Forgive-imp-V') and Elnézését kérem ('I ask your 
forgiveness-V-acc) represent the T- and V-variants respectively. Regard-
ing Ne haragudj, it is itself a T-form, the V-form being Ne haragudjon. 
Such forms appeared in my da ta although with rather low frequency. 
Naturally, the above-listed apology RF could be, with some effort, 
grouped into the three CCSARP categories, tha t is, (a) an expression 
of regret (Sajnálom), (b) an offer of apology (Bocsánat), (с) a request 
for forgiveness (Elnézést, Ne haragudj. Bocsánat, Bocs). The expression 
of regret is least problematic, but an offer of apology is more so, as it 
requires a performative verb or expression (like I apologize in English or 
Przepraszam in Polish). In Hungarian the closest functional equivalent 
to I apologize is Bocsánat,2* although due to its meaning it could also be 
classified as a request of forgiveness. Still, it is the request for forgiveness 
category tha t I find the most problematic as it puts under the same 
heading three or even four functionally different Hungarian RF. For these 
reasons I follow Owen's (1983) "key word" approach. 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the main five apology RF 
types in the whole data, together with the t-test results concerning gender 
difference, while Figure 1 presents the same results visually. 
28
 Bocsánat appears as equivalent to I apologize and Przepraszam in dictionaries 
and in private communication with my Hungarian students this equivalence was 
supported. 
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Table 1 
Apology R F types in the da ta 
ROUTINE FORMULA SUM (N = 102) GENDER MEANS SIG. (2-TAILED) 
RF2 Ne haragudj 492.00 Male 3.6800 .001 
Female 5.9231 .001 
RF3 Elnézést 449.00 Male 4.4400 .884 
Female 4.3654 .885 
RF5 Bocs 260.00 Male 2.5400 .966 
Female 2.5577 .966 
RF1 Bocsánat 230.00 Male 2.3800 .614 
Female 2.1346 .616 
RF4 Sajnálom 159.00 Male 1.2200 .060 
Female 1.8846 .059 
Fig. 1 
Apology R F and gender 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, the distribution of apology RF 
types in the whole da ta is uneven, the most frequently used formulae 
being Elnézést and Ne haragudj, and the least frequently employed one 
being Sajnálom. Also, there are some interesting gender differences to be 
observed in the distribution of R F types in the data. First, Ne haragudj 
is used significantly more often by the females (p = 0.012) than by the 
males. Elnézést is used with the same frequency by both the men and 
the women, but for the females Elnézést remains only the second choice 
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due to their preference for Ne haragudj, while for the males Elnézést 
is the most frequently used RF type in the data. T h e second visible, 
although statistically not significant (p = 0.06) gender difference appears 
in the use of Sajnálom, the other R F type preferred by the females. 
As for the remaining RF types, Bocs is used practically with the same 
frequency by both genders, while the males use Bocsánat slightly more 
frequently than the females. The above-mentioned global-level differences 
and similarities concerning the frequencies of particular RF types and 
gender preferences in their distribution need to be fur ther explored on 
the level of individual situations. The following section will examine R F 
and its types in context. 
3.3.2. Apology RF in context: general observations 
In order to further disambiguate the use of apology R F and its types in 
the Hungarian data it is necessary to have a look at the distribution of 
RF across the DCT situations (see Figure 2). 
Fig. 2 
Apology RF use across situations 
In my da ta apology R F have been used in all the situations, forming an 
apology R F continuum, from very low to quite high R F means in indi-
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vidual contexts. A closer look at the situations at the two ends of the 
continuum reveals a fact observed elsewhere in apology studies, namely, 
tha t many situations at the "low" end of t he continuum represent much 
more severe offences29 t ha t those at the "high" end. Indeed, the relation-
ship between severity of offence and R F means in my da t a appears to 
be quite intricate. The negative correlation between the R F means and 
the offensiveness means calculated with the Excel program is rather weak 
(—.453), still it demonstrates that there is some tendency in the data to 
use less RF in some of more offensive contexts. It should be added tha t 
this tendency is compensated by the positive correlation (.689) between 
offence size and the overall strategy use, tha t is, as the offensiveness 
grows, so does the amount of employed strategies (but other than RF). 
It is also interesting to observe that among the individual RF types, 
Bocsánat, Elnézést and Bocs display weak negative correlation with of-
fence size, t ha t is, the part icipants are expected to use these RF types 
more readily with less serious offences. On the other hand, Ne haragudj 
and Sajnálom show weak positive correlation with severity of offence, 
which means tha t as the offensiveness grows, the two R F types are ex-
pected to be employed more often. This difference in correlation is in an 
intricate way related to gender, as Ne haragudj and Sajnálom are most 
often chosen by the females, while Elnézést is the first choice for the men. 
Another aspect of the R F continuum concerns gender difference on 
the level of individual situations. As Figure 2 demonstrates, in many 
situations the females used more RF than the males but altogether there 
are four situations were the difference is statistically significant: Sit. 24 
(Stranger/slight bumping), Sit. 8 (Students/ test results), Sit. 23 (Female 
colleague/argument) and Sit. 19 (Boss/late), while in Sit. 17 (Students/ 
late class) the level of significance is p = 0.075. All those situations indi-
cate contexts where gender difference will be relevant on a more global 
level. The situations where the males used more apology RF than the 
females did not produce statistically significant results, Sit. 18 (Stranger/ 
29
 It should be noted that in m y data there were hardly any gender differences in 
the offensiveness rankings. T h e only statistically significant difference was found 
in Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car), ranked as more offensive by females. The 
offensiveness means for all t he situations were 2.99 for males and 2.96 for females. 
The males ranked Respect offences, and offences against spouses and students 
slightly higher than the females, while the females found offences against the 
boss as slightly more serious, although the differences were not significant. Still, 
while both genders agreed as to the degree of offensiveness they chose different 
strategies when trying to amend the wrong. 
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unavoidable collision) showing the biggest — although statistically not 
significant (p = 0.07) — difference where t he males outdid the females. 
It should be added that in tha t particular context the males often re-
proached H for blocking the way so the R F itself might have a reproach-
ful rather t h a n conciliatory undertone. 
While significant gender differences in the use of apology RF indicate 
contexts where there was a difference in t he perception of the need to 
explicitly apologize for an offence, it should not be ignored that in many 
situations bo th the males and the females chose apology R F with almost 
the same frequency. In Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project), Sit. 5 (Child/ 
broken mug), Sit. 16 (Friend/damaged car), Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler), 
Sit. 20 (Spouse/late call) and Sit. 1 (Stranger/ train seat) there were no 
significant gender differences concerning the use of R F and its types, 
the exception being Sit. 4 (Friend/secret), where in spite of the almost 
identical RF means, there was significant gender difference concerning 
the use of Bocsánat and Bocs, the fact t h a t will be discussed below. 
3.3.2.1. Apology RF types in situations 
Besides differences in the apology RF use in context, there were differ-
ences in the use of RF types in particular situations. 
Bocsánat was used significantly more often by the males in Sit. 7 
(Stranger/severe bumping) and in Sit. 18 (Stranger/unavoidable colli-
sion), two si tuations ranked low for their offensiveness and at the same 
t ime having the highest frequency of Bocsánat in the whole data. T h e 
males also used this RF type more of ten than the females in Sit. 21 
(Spouse/argument) (p = 0.08), ranked high on the offensiveness scale, al-
though the frequency of Bocsánat in this situation was much lower than 
in the collision situations mentioned above. On the other hand, the fe-
males used Bocsánat significantly more of ten in Sit. 17 (Students/ la te 
class), ranked as little offensive, and in Sit. 4 (Friend/secret), perceived 
as highly offensive, the two contexts where the males did not use Bocsá-
nat at all. On the whole, Bocsánat was most often used, and particularly 
by the men, in collisions with strangers, although always as the second 
choice after Elnézést. In the remaining contexts this R F type was used 
much less frequently. 
As for Ne haragudj, it was always t he females who used it signifi-
cantly more of ten than the males and in numerous contexts: in Sit. 24 
(Stranger/slight, bumping), where the males did not use it at all, in Sit. 7 
(Stranger/severe bumping), Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee), Sit. 22 (Friend/ 
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birthday party), Sit. 11 (Private s tudent / la te) , Sit. 9 (Male colleague/ 
argument) and Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument). Besides, the females 
used Ne haragudj more than the males in Sit. 13 (Stranger/parking place) 
(p = 0.62). All in all, Ne haragudj was used with high frequency, a n d as 
the first choice, in the majori ty of contexts involving familiar, equal sta-
tus interlocutors. The participants, and in particular the males, used it 
definitely less frequently with students, the boss and strangers. 
Elnézést is a RF type that did not display many instances of sig-
nificant gender difference on the level of individual situations. Still, it 
was more often the males than the females who used it more. Thus, 
the males used significantly more Elnézést in Sit. 9 (Male colleague/ 
argument) and Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument), and also in Sit. 10 
(Colleague/cassette), the difference not being significant (p = 0.85). On 
the other hand, the females used Elnézést significantly more often jus t 
in Sit. 8 (Students / tes t results). The situations where Elnézést was used 
most, and often as the participants ' first choice, involve all the si tuations 
with strangers. It was used much less frequently with familiar, equal 
s tatus addressees. 
Interestingly, Sajnálom never displayed significant gender difference 
on the level of individual situations. The overall higher frequency of 
Sajnálom in the female responses seems to be due to the fact t ha t the 
males used it in a more limited range of contexts than the females. The 
situation where both genders used Sajnálom often, the females more 
than the males, was Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car), ranked as quite of-
fensive. Less frequently, Sajnálom was also used in Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt 
coffee), in Sit. 4 (Friend/secret), in Sit. 22 (Friend/birthday party) and 
in the personal Respect situations with colleagues. Neither the males 
nor the females used Sajnálom in Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) and Sit. 14 
(Colleague/desk). 
Finally, Bocs, used with the same frequency by both genders in the 
whole data, displayed significant gender differences on the level of part icu-
lar situations. The males used it significantly more often in two si tuations 
where the females did not use Bocs at all: in Sit. 10 (Colleague/cassette) 
and in Sit. 4 (Friend/secret), both ranked high for offensiveness. As for 
the females, there were many situations where they used Bocs more of ten 
than the males, for instance Sit. 14 (Colleague/desk), Sit. 15 (Colleague/ 
stapler) and Sit. 3 (Friend/late), al though the difference was never sig-
nificant. To sum, Bocs was used most of ten in less serious offences wi th 
familiar, equal s tatus addressees and sometimes as the participants' first 
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choice. Its use in the contexts of more serious offences is more typical 
for the males, and can be considered as an a t t emp t to play down the 
severity of the transgression. 
Table 2 and Table 3 below present the division of labour between the 
apology R F types across the D C T situations. 
Table 2 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y p r e f e r r e d a p o l o g y R F t y p e s in s i t u a t i o n s 
Ne haragudj Off. 
size Elnézést 
Off. 
size 
Sit . 22 (F r i end /b i r t hday p a r t y ) (F*) 3 .11 Sit. 24 (S t r ange r / s l i gh t bumping) 1.57 
Sit . 11 (Pr ivate s t u d e n t / l a t e ) (F*) 3.12 Sit. 1 ( S t r a n g e r / t r a i n seat) 1.98 
Sit. 5 (Ch i ld /b roken m u g ) (F) 3.22 Sit. 17 ( S t u d e n t s / l a t e class) 2 .33 
Sit . 9 (Male c o l l . / a r g u m e n t ) (F) 3.26 Sit. 8 ( S t u d e n t s / t e s t results) (F*) 2.85 
Sit. 23 (Feni. c o l l . / a r g u m e n t ) (F*) 3.32 Sit . 13 ( S t r a n g e r / p a r k , place) (M) 3.0.3 
Sit . 21 ( S p o u s e / a r g u m e n t ) 3.44 Sit. 19 (B oss / l a t e ) (F) 3 .38 
Sit . 10 (Col league /casse t t e ) 4 
Bocs 
Off. 
size Sit . 4 (Fr iend/secre t ) 4 .15 
Sit. 16 ( F r i e n d / d a m a g e d car ) (F) 4.47 Sit. 14 (Col l . /desk) (F) 1.94 
Sit. 3 ( F r i e n d / l a t e ) (F) 2.46 
Table 2 shows all the situational contexts (17) where the participants sig-
nificantly preferred one RF type over the others, t he choice being mainly 
between Ne haragudj and Elnézést, although in a couple of situations 
the first choice was Bocs. As it was observed earlier in this section, nei-
ther Bocsánat nor Sajnálom appeared as the significantly most frequently 
used R F type in any of the situations. Gender-wise, Table 2 indicates 
that a particular R F type, being the first choice for both the males and 
the females, was used significantly more often by the females (F*), while 
(F) or (M) mean tha t the females or the males used a particular R F type 
more often than the other gender, although the difference was not statis-
tically significant. The absence of any such indication means t ha t both 
genders applied a particular routine as their first choice and with roughly 
the same frequency. Table 2 also contains information concerning the 
participants ' estimations of offence size. 
As can be seen, Ne haragudj is chosen as a significantly most pre-
ferred strategy in nine situations, all of them being interactions with 
familiar or close social equals, their seriousness ranging from mildly to 
quite serious offences. In almost all of these si tuations the females used 
Ne haragudj more than the males. On the other hand, Elnézést was sig-
nificantly chosen for unequal s tatus interactions or for interactions with 
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strangers, the offensiveness ranging from trivial to mildly serious. In half 
of these contexts there is no gender difference in the use of Elnézést. 
Comparing the Ne haragudj and Elnézést 'lists', the situations in-
volving students and the child need a word of commentary. Sit. 11 (Pri-
vate s tudent / la te) belongs to the Ne haragudj group, which suggests that 
a private student as a recipient of apology is perceived more as a social 
familiar or even equal. On the other hand, while the si tuations involving 
students in class belong to t he Elnézést group, which means that this 
category of s tudents is viewed as socially more distant and unequal. The 
reason for this difference lies in the fact t ha t for the examined group of 
teachers private students are an important source of ext ra income, and 
infractions against them can be perceived as costly. Also, teachers meet 
their private students, many of them adults, in their homes, so familiarity 
naturally develops. Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) is also worth considera-
tion as it belongs to the Ne haragudj group although the offended party 
is in an unequal relationship with the offender. Still, emotional closeness 
and affect together with the young age of the offended pa r ty downplay 
or reduce, at least in this context , power difference. 
Finally, there are only two situations where the significantly first 
choice was Bocs. Both of t hem are non-serious offences against familiar 
addressees. 
Table 3 presents those si tuations where the choice of a R F type was 
either not statistically significant, or two R F types were selected with 
almost the same frequency, or the males and the females differed in their 
preferences. 
Table 3 
N o t s ignif icant ly p r e f e r r e d apology R F t y p e s in s i t u a t i o n s 
OFF. SIZE MALES FEMALES 
Sit. 18 (Stranger/unavoidable collision) 1.95 Elnézést/Bocsánat Elnézést 
Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) 2.14 Ne haragudj/Bocs Ne haragudj / Bocs 
Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe bumping) 2.44 Bocsánat/Elnézést Elnézést 
Sit. 20 (Spouse/late call) 2.62 Bocs/Ne haragudj Bocs/Ne haragudj 
Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee) 2.78 Elnézést/Bocsánat Ne haragudj 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) 3.77 Elnézést/Sajnálom Sajnálom 
Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) 4.08 Ne haragudj Elnézést/Sajnálom 
The RF choices presented in Table 3 provide some support for the pre-
vious findings summed up in Table 2. The choice of Elnézést in Sit. 18 
(Stranger/unavoidable collision), Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe bumping) and 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) corresponds to similar uses of this R F 
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type presented in Table 2. Also, Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) and Sit. 20 
(Spouse/late call) representing offences of medium severity committed 
against socially familiar addressees are good candidates for either Bocs or 
Ne haragudj. The presence of Sajnálom in Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) 
and in Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project), used more by the women, suggests 
tha t this R F type fits quite severe transgressions against addressees who 
are distant either in terms of familiarity or in terms of status and where 
not much can be done in terms of remedy. Bocsánat, used more readily 
by the males, appears to be an alternative to Elnézést in space collisions. 
The two situations where the male and female reactions clearly differ are 
Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee) and Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project). T h e fe-
males perceive this situation as belonging to the Ne haragudj group, t ha t 
is, as an offence against a socially close interlocutor, while the males seem 
to focus more on the offence itself, and probably on their own failure. The 
choice of Ne haragudj by the males in Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) is 
surprising considering the fact that in Sit. 19 (Boss/late) both genders 
used mainly Elnézést. The number of R F instances in this situation is 
very low, so any generalizations are difficult to make. Still, while Elnézést 
in this context recognizes s tatus difference between the interlocutors, Ne 
haragudj may be an a t t empt to reduce the distance and this way facil-
i tate the restoration process. Further investigation of the participants ' 
motives would be necessary to make more substantial claims. 
As the final level of analysis, I will examine the use of all R F and 
its sub-categories in the data , grouping the situations according to the 
social role of the offended party and according to offence type, as can be 
seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4 below. 
3.3.2.2. Apology RF in context: H's social role 
Figure 3 (overleaf) demonstrates a number of important and not acci-
dental regularities (see also Table 4). 
Both the males and the females use apology RF most frequently with 
strangers, the females using it more often than the males (p = 0.074). 
The high RF means with strangers are partly due to the fact that three 
stranger situations involve bodily collisions that are most easily manage-
able with a mere RF, although other situations with strangers (Space 
and Property offences) also evince more explicit R F use than si tuations 
with more familiar interlocutors. 
Friends received significantly more R F from the females than from 
the males (p = 0.022) and the same is t rue about s tudents (p = 0.003). On 
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M males, F females; В Bocsánat, Nh Ne haragudj, E Elnézést, S Sajnálom, b Bocs 
Fig. 3 
Apology R F types and H's social role 
t he other hand, both genders had the same R F means when apologizing 
to their spouses, displaying a kind of convergence in a relationship that is 
a t the same t ime most in t imate and at least theoretically equal. Finally, 
t he females used more RF wi th the colleagues and the boss, although the 
difference was not statistically significant. 
The low R F means wi th the boss look intriguing, especially t ha t 
bo th Sit. 19 (Boss/late) and Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) were assessed 
as quite offensive. The answer may part ly lie in the fact that apology 
R F are often found as not adequate for m a j o r failures. Also, both situa-
tions were instances of emergency, where immediate remedy was required 
ra ther than a performance of verbal routines. But then, perhaps, the par-
ticipants found apologizing in these contexts rather costly and decided 
not to denigrate themselves in front of their superior.'50 T h e participants' 
3 0
 The par t ic ipants revealed t o m e tha t their relat ionship with the i r boss was of ten 
informal and friendly and t h e y were more like colleagues. Still, friendliness and 
informality do not seem to b e salient in the t w o analysed contexts . 
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Table 4 
Distribution of apology R F types according to H's social role 
MALES OFF. SIZE RF в N h E S b 
Strangers 2.456 0.877 0.243 0.06 0.440 0.060 0.053 
Friends 3.395 0.588 0.06 0.216 0.052 0.076 0.184 
Spouses 3.032 0.62 0.07 0.32 0.03 0.03 0.17 
Colleagues 2.930 0.572 0.048 0.22 0.116 0.048 0.132 
Students 2.766 0.413 0.047 0.087 0.187 0.020 0.067 
Boss 3.728 0.31 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.02 
Child 3.215 0.3 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 
FEMALES OFF. SIZE RF в Nil E s Ii 
Strangers 2.456 0.981 0.205 0.173 0.465 0.106 0.019 
Friends 3.395 0.719 0.065 0.319 0.042 0.108 0.181 
Spouses 3.032 0.625 0.0192 0.365 0.0096 0.029 0.202 
Colleagues 2.930 0.65 0.054 0.35 0.027 0.058 0.162 
Students 2.766 0.603 0.064 0.160 0.244 0.045 0.077 
Boss 3.728 0.423 0.038 0.048 0.240 0.077 0.030 
Child 3.215 0.3654 0 0.2308 0 0.0769 0.0577 
own reflections and comments would be a good source of information in 
tha t matter . 
Both genders used apology RF least frequently with their own child, 
the qualification being tha t there was altogether one child situation in 
the DCT. Still, if we compare Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) with Sit. 2 
(Stranger/damaged car) and Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee), all of them prop-
erty offences, it turns out tha t RF means in the child situation are much 
lower than in the other two contexts. 
To summarize, the females used more apology RF than the males 
to all their interlocutors except their spouses. Also, the males clearly 
differentiated in the use of R F between their social equals like friends, 
spouses and colleagues and social minors, i.e., their students, while the 
females used R F as frequently with their students as with their colleagues, 
although with an important difference concerning the RF type. 
On the level of the R F types, Figure 3 shows a number of impor-
tan t tendencies. First, two dominating R F types are Ne haragudj and 
Elnézést and their distribution across interlocutors' categories appears 
to be complementary: whenever Ne haragudj use goes up, Elnézést goes 
down and vice versa. 
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Both genders used Ne haragudj most often when apologizing to in-
terlocutors who are socially equal and close, tha t is, to friends, spouses 
and colleagues. The females used Ne haragudj to the three groups of in-
terlocutors with almost the same frequency, while the men used it most 
often with spouses. Also, the females used this R F type more often than 
men with distant interlocutors, i.e., strangers and with social minors, the 
students and the child. It is worth noticing tha t both the males and 
the females hardly used Ne haragudj with their boss. On the whole, the 
women used Ne haragudj more frequently t h a n the men and more often 
to all types of interlocutors except the boss. 
As for Elnézést, it was a R F type used most often with strangers, with 
no gender difference regarding frequency. Both the men and the women 
also used Elnézést with socially unequal interlocutors, the students and 
the boss, in both contexts the females using more Elnézést than the males. 
On the other hand, the males used this apology R F type with colleagues, 
while the females hardly did. The females never used Elnézést with the 
child, and as for the males, there was just one instance of this RF type 
used in this context. 
Bocs appears as a RF used mostly with socially close equals: friends, 
spouses and colleagues, the women using it slightly more with colleagues 
and spouses. Both the men and the women hardly used Bocs with 
strangers, although the men used it more often than the women in t ha t 
context. The Bocs curve is similar to that of Ne haragudj. Still, Bocs, as 
observed earlier, seems to assume not only friendly relationship but also 
tha t the offence is not serious, so its occurrence is necessarily limited. 
Bocsánat is a R F used most often with strangers, the men using it 
slightly more often than the women. There are very few instances of this 
R F type used with the other types of interlocutors, although the men 
used it more than the women with their spouses. Also, the women never 
used Bocsánat with their child. 
Sajnálom, more frequent in the female responses, was used with low 
frequency with all types of interlocutors. The females used it slightly 
more often than the men with all the interlocutors except their spouse, 
where both the men and the women used it with the same low frequency. 
3.3.2.3. Apology RF in context: offence type 
Figure 4 presents the distribution of apology R F and its types according 
to the type of offence (see also Table 5). 
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M -males, F females; В Bocsánat, Nh Ne haragudj, E - Elnézést, S Sajnálom, b Bocs 
Fig. 4 
Apology RF types and offence type 
As can be seen, the RF is most frequently used in the Space/body 
offences, being the most efficient strategy to remedy such unintentional 
bodily collisions. The Space offences, which just like the Space/body 
transgressions were assessed as only mildly offensive, come second in RF 
use. Although in both contexts the females used more R F than the males, 
the difference is small and not significant statistically. 
On the other hand, in the Time offences the gender difference was 
significant, the females using RF more often than the males in all the time 
situations, especially when apologizing to students, to the friend and to 
the boss. This finding is interesting in the light of Holmes's research 
where it was males who apologized more for Time transgressions, which, 
as Holmes (1995, 185) observed, may suggest that men have different pri-
orities than women.'11 Still, it should be remembered tha t Holmes worked 
11
 Holmes (1995, 168) suggested t h a t it may be the case t h a t males more t h a n 
females perceive t ime as a very valuable commodity. 
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Table 5 
Distribution of apology R F types according to offence type 
MALES OFF. SIZE RF в Nil E S b 
Space/body 1.987 0.94 0.33 0.053 0.4 0.033 0.0733 
Space 2.312 0.707 0.113 0.067 0.413 0.007 0.107 
Time 2.781 0.58 0.044 0.148 0.172 0.024 0.188 
Respect 3.340 0.607 0.06 0.3 0.113 0.073 0.053 
Broken promise 3.755 0.64 0.02 0.3 0.04 0.107 0.173 
Property 3.276 0.508 0.108 0.132 0.116 0.076 0.076 
Prof, performance 3.462 0.17 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0 . 0 1 
FEMALES OFF. SIZE RF в Nil E S b 
Space/body 1.987 1.006 0.269 0.147 0.481 0.051 0.032 
Space 2.312 0.814 0.115 0.147 0.397 0.032 0.122 
Time 2.781 0.762 0.058 0.223 0.185 0.046 0.246 
Respect 3.340 0.705 0.058 0.487 0.013 0.083 0.064 
Broken promise 3.755 0.628 0.045 0.378 0.026 0.109 0.071 
Property 3.276 0.627 0.069 0.246 0.073 0.142 0.092 
Prof, performance 3.462 0.298 0.019 0.048 0.163 0.058 0.010 
with a different type of da ta and analysed whole apology responses (with 
or without RF) . 
The females also used more RF in the personal Respect offences, 
especially with their female colleague, although the difference was not 
statistically significant. As for the Broken promise offences, this offence 
category consists of situations that , compared to Time or Space offences, 
are less homogeneous in te rms of offence type and also vary in their 
offensiveness. On the whole, bo th the men and the women used RF with 
the same frequency in this context, although the males apologized more 
for forgetting to bring the cassette, while the females for not going to 
the birthday party. 
There is a significant gender difference in the Property offences, the 
females using more RF than the men in all property situations. Again, 
Holmes's research produced opposite results, which Holmes (1995, 170) 
found consistent with a popular belief tha t men value things more than 
women. Whether the Hungarian findings mean that the females find 
things more values than the males is a mat te r for further investigation. 
Finally, the Professional performance failures have lowest R F means, 
the females using more R F than the males, although not significantly. 
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This type of offence or failure is definitely face-threatening for the offender 
and this may be a reason for low RF frequency. 
On the level of apology R F types, it is interesting to observe t ha t 
certain offence types show preference for certain apology routines. Thus, 
Elnézést, with no gender difference, was the most preferred RF type in 
the Space offences and was also the first choice, especially for the females, 
in the Space/body failures. The females also used Elnézést more often 
than the males in the Professional performance failures, while the males, 
unlike the females, used it in the Respect offences. Ne haragudj was 
the most often used RF type in the personal Respect and the Broken 
promise offences, the females using it in these contexts definitely more 
often than the males. T h e females also favoured Ne haragudj in the 
Property offences. On the other hand, there was no preferred RF type 
in the Time offences, three different R F types clustering at the same 
frequency level. The Professional failure and Property infractions showed 
the same phenomenon in t he case of the male participants. 
Here also, just like in Figure 3, Ne haragudj and Elnézést show op-
posite tendencies in many contexts: high frequency of Ne haragudj goes 
together with low frequency of Elnézést. 
As for the remaining apology RF types, Bocsánat can be found rel-
atively frequently only in the Space/body offences, the males using it 
slightly more often than the females, the remaining offence contexts show-
ing low occurrence of this R F type. Bocs appears most frequently in the 
Time offences, where the females used it more often than the males, and 
in the Broken promise offences, where the males used it more than twice 
as often as the females. Finally, Sajnálom is most often used in the Bro-
ken promise offences and then, by the females, in the Proper ty offences, 
although the frequency of occurrence of this RF type in all the contexts 
is low. 
Concerning the relationship between the apology R F types and of-
fence size, Tables 4 and 5 show that the contexts assessed as least offen-
sive, i.e., the offences against strangers and the Space/body and Space 
transgressions show strong preference for Elnézést. On the other hand, 
the most serious offences are less predictable on the basis of mere offen-
siveness ranking. The transgressions against the boss take Elnézést, the 
Broken promise offences show preference for Ne haragudj, while in the 
Professional performance failures the females most of ten use Elnézést, 
the men, however, do not have a favourite RF type. Clearly, the choice 
of a particular RF is motivated simultaneously by a number of different 
factors, some of which have not been considered in the present study. 
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3.3.3. Apology RF types: what they convey 
In this section I will look a t the findings of the present study in the light 
of native speakers' own understandings of what the Hungarian R F con-
vey in interaction when used after an offence took place. It is important 
to mention that what was described were the particular apology forms 
and not types. Thus, the description of Ne haragudj referred to its most 
often used T-form and not to the V-form, Ne haragudjon. Those under-
standings were collected during an informal discussion in class with my 
university students and cannot be taken as complete and exhaustive de-
scriptions. Still, they may provide some basis for interpreting the results 
and may help define the different ' jobs ' Hungarian R F types perform in 
interaction. 
As for Ne haragudj, my students characterized it as personal and 
'other-oriented', conveying such emotions like remorse, a hope to Ire for-
given, considerateness for the offended party 's feelings and for the rela-
tionship itself, and as appropriate to use with friends and close acquain-
tances, especially in personal offences. My students also agreed tha t wha t 
Ne haragudj most centrally conveys, when contrasted with the other R F 
types, is tha t the offender wants the offended party to know it is impor-
tant for him/her, tha t the offended par ty think of h im/her as a friend 
again, tha t their good relationship be restored. As Ne haragudj was most 
often used in contexts where the relationship between the parties was 
close prior to the offence, the data supported the s tudents ' insights. T h e 
fact tha t the women used Ne haragudj more often t h a n the men suppor ts 
Holmes's claim that when apologizing women are more relationship and 
solidarity oriented than men. 
Elnézést was described as formal, reserved and implying V-form us-
age between the parties, appropriate to use with strangers and higher 
status addressees. My students made it clear that using Elnézést does 
not convey interpersonal closeness or friendly feelings and may sound 
distancing when used in close relationships or in personal offences. T h e 
distribution of Elnézést in the data seemed to fit the description as El-
nézést was most often used to restore relationships t h a t were socially 
distant and characterized by status difference. Thus, it seems tha t what 
Elnézést mostly conveys is that the offender recognizes the transgression 
and wants to amend the breach but does it from a distance, wi thout 
personal involvement. 
The above specifications throw some light on the gender differences 
observed in the use of Elnézést. Thus, while the females approached col-
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leagues the same way as friends, using Ne haragudj and almost never 
Elnézést, the males used more Elnézést with colleagues in all types of 
infractions, and especially in the personal Respect offences. Such a dif-
ference may suggest that the males did not consider colleagues as very 
close interlocutors or that they used Elnézést as a distancing device. As 
for the females, their more frequent use of Elnézést, when apologizing 
to the boss, especially in the delayed project context, and with students 
in class, in particular in the test results situation, suggests that the fe-
males may be more sensitive to status difference in interaction and more 
concerned about their professional performance. 
As for Bocs, my students characterized it as very informal and fa-
miliar, assuming the T-form usage and equal status between the parties, 
appropriate to use by young people, between familiar social equals a n d 
for small offences. They also confirmed tha t this RF type may sound 
playful, unserious, or even inconsiderate if used in the wrong context. 
My da ta supported part of the specification as Bocs was used mostly to 
friends, spouses and colleagues, and hardly ever to s trangers or to social 
un-equals. Still, as regards severity of offence, the male participants more 
often than the females used Bocs in the Broken promise offences, ranked 
as serious. In the cassette situation the males used it significantly more 
often than the females, and in the secret situation the females did not 
use Bocs a t all. Using Bocs in these contexts seems to imply that either 
the offender did not consider the offence as serious because it happened 
between good friends, or t ha t he chose Bocs in its 'playful ' function to 
lighten up the atmosphere or that he was inconsiderate towards the ad-
dressee. A further analysis of individual responses and the participants ' 
commentaries would be necessary to decide which was t he case. 
Sajnálom also received competing characterizations. On the one 
hand, it was described as expressing genuine sorrow, conveying S's non-
intentionality and empathy towards H, and as appropriate to use in con-
texts where little could be done to restore the damage. The contexts 
where Sajnálom was most probably used this way were t he damaged car 
and the spilt coffee situations, in both contexts the females using it more 
often than the males. The female tendency to use Sajnálom more fre-
quently in many other contexts may suggest they were more prone to 
view offences as irreversible. On the other hand, Sajnálom was charac-
terized as superficial, expressing indifference and lack of considerateness 
for the offended party. Although this aspect of Sajnálom has not been 
investigated in my analysis, some instances of Sajnálom in the secret a n d 
personal Respect situations suggest it was used with such an intention. 
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Finally, Bocsánat was characterized as a strong and unambiguous 
apology, polite but formal, impersonal and official, and not necessarily 
sincere. In my data th is RF type was mostly used with strangers in 
Space/body offences, where, indeed, wha t was required was a straight-
forward, unambiguous strategy that would efficiently repair the breach. 
Also, in this context the males used it more often t h a n the females. Boc-
sánat, with significant gender differences, was also used in other contexts 
involving familiar interlocutors and serious offences. Still, it seems t h a t 
the factors influencing those choices were more complex and at tha t stage 
are difficult to disambiguate. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The analysis of Hungarian R F and its types in context has demonstrated 
that the apology RF choices in the d a t a were influenced by such contex-
tual factors as the offence type and its seriousness, t h e social role of the 
interlocutor and the offender's gender. It has been further established 
that two dominating R F types were Ne haragudj a n d Elnézést, the re-
maining apology routines being used less frequently. The distribution 
of Ne haragudj and Elnézést as well as the remaining RF types across 
the examined contexts suggested that they performed distinct commu-
nicative jobs in the process of restoring social harmony. Ne haragudj 
was mostly used to remedy infractions with social equals and indicated 
involvement with the offended party, while Elnézést was employed to re-
store breaches with s trangers and in unequal encounters and indicated 
distance between interactional partners. 
The analysis of gender differences in the choices of apology R F re-
vealed similarities in the overall tendencies in RF use in context al though 
a number of statistically significant differences in R F choices suggested 
that the males and females had distinct interpretations and orientations 
to contextual factors. T h e females used more RF t h a n the males, which 
suggested t ha t in the same set of contexts they felt a greater need to 
apologize than the males. The differences in the choices of apology R F 
types, in particular more frequent use of Ne haragudj by the females 
and gender differences in the use of Elnézést, further suggested tha t the 
women were more other- and solidarity oriented, more sensitive to s t a tus 
difference and more concerned about their professional performance. On 
the other hand, in certain contexts the males more of ten used RF types 
to imply distance or downplay the severity of offence. 
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The politeness aspect of Hungarian apology RF types posits ques-
tions in need of investigation. Within Brown and Levinson's (1987) 
model of positive and negative politeness, Ne haragudj and Bocs could 
be classified as the former, Elnézést, Bocsánat and Sajnálom as the lat-
ter, although such a superficial division woidd conceal the culture-specific 
distinctions in conveyed meanings. Also, both the d a t a and the native 
speakers' insights suggest tha t there are subtle differences in politeness 
between Hungarian apology R F that need to be disambiguated. Further 
research, investigating such questions like the (degrees of) appropriate-
ness of particular apology R F types in different contexts, as perceived by 
males and females, and the reasons underlying such perceptions, would 
help reveal the underlying cultural assumptions informing apology be-
haviour (cf. Meier 1998, 215). 
The present study has a number of limitations tha t have their import 
on its findings. The scope of the analysis was limited to apology R F 
alone, analysed in isolation, independently of other apology strategies 
tha t accompanied RF and may have influenced the way they functioned. 
The results were also influenced by the d a t a collection instrument, which 
imposed certain contexts on the participants, although there was a choice 
to opt out. Supplementing the present s tudy with natural ly occurring 
conversational da ta would be the necessary next step to take. 
Appendix 1: Apology situations '2 
Sit. 1 (Stranger/train seat) 
A vonaton véletlenül nem a jegy által megadott helyet foglalja el. Nem-
sokára fölbukkan az igazi tulajdonos, mire On megnézi a jegyét, és rájön, 
hog}' rossz helyen ül. 
32
 Some of t he situations below were taken from other apology studies. Sit. 4 
(Friend/secret.) and Sit. 13 (Stranger/parking place) come from Meier (1!)!)2), 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) is found in Cohen Olshtain (1981) and in Blum-
Kulka et al. (1989), Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe bumping), Sit. 8 (Students/test re-
sults), Sit. 24 (Stranger/slight, bumping) were used by Cohen Olshtain (1981), 
while Sit. lfi (Friend/damaged car) appears in Bergman - Kasper (1993). Also, 
a situation describing personal conflict a t work, represented by Sit. 9 (Male 
colleague/argument) and Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument) in my DCT, ap-
pears in Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), Cohen Olshtain (1981) and Bergman 
Kasper (1993). Time offences and small property offences (like spilling food) 
are also found in the above-mentioned sources. 
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[You accidentally occupy someone else's seat on a train. Soon a passen-
ger comes to claim his/her seat and then you realize your mistake.] 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) 
Megállt parkolni. Ahogy tolatott kifelé, véletlenül nekimegy egy másik 
jó márkájú autónak, amelyik ezáltal megkarcolódik, és behorpad az üt-
közője. A tulajdonos kiszáll, és elég idegesnek látszik, majd Ön is ki-
száll, és odamegy hozzá. 
[When you are backing out of a parking place, you run into another, 
quite expensive car, scratching the side and denting the bumper. The 
driver gets out and looks quite angry. You also get out and walk towards 
him/her.] 
Sit. 3 (Friend/late) 
Egy közeli barátjával megbeszéltek egy találkozót, hogy egyszerűen csak 
leüljenek beszélgetni. Ön késve érkezik. Mire belép a kávézóba, a ba-
rátja már egy félig üres pohár üdítő mellett ül egy asztalnál. 
[You are late for a get-together with a friend at a coffee house. When 
you arrive, your friend is sitting over a half-empty glass of a soft drink.] 
Sit. 4 (Friend/secret) 
Egy közeli barátja elárulja Önnek, hogy válni készül, és már kialakuló-
ban van egy új kapcsolata. Arra kéri Önt, hogy senkinek se árulja el a 
dolgot, mert még egyelőre titok. Mégis, egy másik alkalommal, mikor 
egy közös ismerősükkel beszélget, kicsúszik a száján a hír. Ön nemso-
kára megtudja, hogy a barátja már tudomást szerzett arról, hogy Ön 
nem tar tot ta meg a szavát. Pár nappal később összefutnak egy közös 
ismerősnél, és a barát ja elég szemrehányóan néz Önre. 
[A close friend of yours tells you lie/she is going to get divorced and has 
already been seeing someone else but asks you to keep the news secret. 
Still, when you are talking to a mutual friend the news slips out of your 
mouth and the close friend soon learns you blabbed his/her secret out. 
A few days later, when you already know that your close friend has been 
informed about your indiscreetness, you run across him/her at someone 
else's place and he/she gives you a very reproachful look. 
Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) 
Egyik nap Ön véletlenül eltöri a gyermeke kedvenc bögréjét. Ahogy 
szedi össze az eltört darabkákat, a gyermeke éppen belép a konyhába, 
és meglátja, mi történt. 
[One day you accidentally break your child's favourite mug. The child 
just enters the kitchen and sees what has happened. 
Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee) 
Egyik nap vendégségbe megy ismerőseihez. Leülnek kávézni, és egy 
óvatlan pillanatban Ön kiönti kávéját a tiszta asztalterítőre. 
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[You are visiting your friends. You are having coffee together when you 
suddenly spill the contents of your cup over a clean tablecloth.] 
Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe bumping) 
Egy áruházban nekimegy egy másik vevőnek úgy, hogy az megtán-
torodik. 
[You so much bump into another customer at a department store that 
he/she staggers.] 
Sit. 8 (Students/test results) 
On a múlt órán dolgozatot íratott az osztállyal. Amikor ma kiosztotta 
a kijavított teszteket, panaszkodva, hogy az eredmények nem túl jók, 
a diákok hamar jelezték, hogy lehet, hogy hiba van a javításban. On 
megnézte, és látta, hogy bizony igazuk van. 
[Last week your students wrote a test. Now you distribute the corrected 
papers, complaining about poor results, when some of the students tell 
you there are mistakes in your corrections. You have a look at the tests 
again and realize they are right.] 
Sit. 9 (Male colleague/argument) 
A tanáriban kialakult egy vita és On felemelt hangon beszélt egy férfi 
kollégájával. Most már lecsillapodott, a kollégának viszont úgy látszik 
rosszul esett az egész. 
[There is a heated discussion in the teachers' room and you raise your 
voice when arguing with a male colleague. Now the discussion is over 
and emotions are down but the male colleague looks offended.] 
Sit. 10 (Colleague/cassette) 
Egy kolléga kölcsönadott Önnek egy kazettát (vagy egy másik tananya-
got) amit mára sürgősen visszakért, mert a mai órája erre az anyagra 
épül. Amikor a kolléga közeledik Önhöz, Ön rájön, hogy otthon fele-
jtette. 
[Your colleague lent you a cassette (or some other teaching material) 
and asked you to bring it back today because he/she absolutely needed 
it for his/her class. When you meet the colleague in the teachers' room 
you realize you have forgotten to bring the cassette.] 
Sit. 11 (Private student/late) 
Ön elkésett a magánórájáról. Amikor végre sikerül hazaérnie, a tanít-
vány már az aj tó előtt várakozik. 
[You arrive late for your private English lesson at home. The private 
student is waiting in front of your front door.] 
Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) 
Az igazgató(nő) megkérte Önt, hogy készítsen egy évzáró programter-
vet, vagy annak egy részét, és röviden mutassa be a megbeszélésen. A 
terv sajnos még nincs kész. A megbeszélés előtt Ön beszélni szeretne 
erről az igazgatóval/igazgatónővel. 
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[Your boss asked you to prepare a program for the end of the school 
year and present it at a teachers' meeting but the program is not ready 
yet. You want to talk to your boss before the meeting.] 
Sit. 13 (Stranger/parking place) 
On egy áruház előtti parkolóba akart beállni. Sajnos minden hely foglalt 
volt, kivéve egyet, amely az áruház dolgozóinak volt megjelölve. On mé-
gis úgy döntött, hogy beáll oda, és gyorsan igyekszik elintézni a vásár-
lást. Amikor húsz perc múlva kijött és a kocsihoz sietett, ott állt egy 
áruházi dolgozó kocsija és benne a vezető ingerültnek látszott. 
[You want to park your car in front of a department store but the only 
free space is the place reserved for the employees of the store. As 110 
other place is available you decide to park your car there. When twenty 
minutes later you hurry out of the store, you see an employee waiting 
in his car, looking quite irritated.] 
Sit. 14 (Colleague/desk) 
On az óra után a saját asztalához sietett, hogy lepakolja a könyveit, 
füzeteit, melyek egy része a szomszédos kolléga asztalára esett. A kol-
léga éppen hogy megérkezett és szeretné letenni a saját dolgait, amit 
most az Ön ott lévő holmija nehézzé tesz. 
[After class you rush to your desk to put down all your books and pa-
pers. Part of your stuff spills over the desk of your colleague who at 
that moment arrives and has nowhere to put his/her own things.] 
Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) 
Önnek szüksége volt a tűzőgépre és mivel a sa já t ja valahol eltűnt, kölc-
sönvette a kolléga tűzőgépét, amit elfelejtett visszatenni. A szünetben 
a kolléga keresi a tűzőgépét. 
[You need a stapler but cannot find your own so you borrow one belong-
ing to your colleague and then forget to put it back. During a break 
your colleague is looking for his/her stapler.] 
Sit. 16 (Friend/damaged car) 
On kölcsönkérte a barátja jó márkájú kocsiját. Sajnos, amikor hát-
rafelé tolatott, nem vett észre egy kis oszlopot és csúnyán meghúzta 
az aj tó oldalát. Most éppen találkozik a barátjával a lakásában, hogy 
visszaadja a kocsi kulcsait. 
[You borrowed your friend's expensive car. Unfortunately, when you 
were backing out of a parking place, you did not irotice a small post 
and badly dented the side door. Now you meet your friend to return 
the car keys.] 
Sit. 17 (Students/late class) 
Ön tíz percet késve érkezik az órára, mert váratlan megbeszélése volt 
előtte. Most éppen belép az osztályba. 
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[Due to an unplanned staff meeting you arrive ten minutes late for your 
class. Now you enter the classroom.] 
Sit. 18 (Stranger/unavoidable collision) 
Egy áruházban nekimegy egy másik vevőnek. Aligha tudta volna ezt 
elkerülni, mert a másik elállta az utat. 
[You bump into another customer at a department store. You hardly 
could have avoided doing so because he/she was blocking the way.] 
Sit. 19 (Boss/late) 
Úgy alakultak a dolgok, hogy végül elkésett az iskolából. Amikor a 
tanáriba belép, a szoba már teljesen üres, csak az igazgató(nő) tartóz-
kodik benn, és Önre néz. 
[It so happens that you arrive late at the school. When you enter the 
teachers' room there is nobody there except your boss, who is looking 
at you.] 
Sit. 20 (Spouse/late call) 
Megígérte a párjának (kedvesének), hogy hívni fogja egy megbeszélt 
időpontban, de ez csak egy fél órával később sikerül. A párja fölveszi a 
telefont. 
[You promised your spouse/partner to call him/her at a particular time 
but managed to do so only half an hour later. Your spouse/partner 
answers your call.] 
Sit. 21 (Spouse/argument) 
Amikor este munka után találkoztak a párjával/kedvesével, vita/szó-
váltás alakult ki a közös munkabeosztás és egyéb családi dolgok körül. 
Egy kicsit összecsaptak, On felhúzta magát, felemelt hangon beszélt. A 
párjának/kedvesének ez rosszul esett és most sértődöttnek látszik. 
[When you meet your spouse/partner at home after work you both have 
an argument concerning household duties and other family matters. 
The discussion becomes quite heated and you raise your voice. Now 
your spouse/partner looks hurt.] 
Sit. 22 (Friend/birthday party) 
Megígérte egy barátjának, hogy elmegy a születésnapi bulira, de végül 
nem tudott elmenni. A következő napon felhívja a barátját telefonon. 
[You promised your friend to come to his/her birthday party but finally 
you could not go. Next day you call your friend on the phone.] 
Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument) 
A tanáriban vita alakult ki, és On felemelt hangon beszélt egy kollé-
ganőjével. Most már lecsillapodott, a kolléganőn viszont látszik, hogy 
rosszul esett neki. 
[You are all having a heated discussion in the teachers' room and you 
raise your voice when arguing with a female colleague. Now the dis-
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cussion is over and emotions are down but the lemale colleague looks 
offended.] 
Sit. 24 (Stranger/slight bumping) 
Egy áruházban egy kicsit összeütközik egy másik vevővel. 
[You slightly bump into another customer at a department store.] 
Appendix 2: Situations grouped according to offence type and 
according to H's social role 
Offence Type 
Time offences 
Sit. 3 (Friend/late) 
Sit. 20 (Spouse/late call) 
Sit. 11 (Private student/late) 
Sit. 17 (Students/late class) 
Sit. 19 (Boss/late) 
Space offences 
Sit. 1 (Stranger/train seat) 
Sit. 13 (Stranger/parking place) 
Sit. 14 (Colleague/desk) 
Space/body offences 
Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe collision) 
Sit. 18 (Stranger/unavoidable collision) 
Sit. 24 (Stranger/slight collision) 
Property offences 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) 
Sit. 16 (Friend/damaged car) 
Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) 
Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee) 
Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) 
Respect offences 
Sit. 9 (Male colleague/argument) 
Sit. 21 (Spouse/argument) 
Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument) 
Broken promise offences 
Sit. 10 (Colleague/cassette) 
Sit. 22 (Friend/birthday party) 
Sit. 4 (Friend/secret) 
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Professional performance failures 
Sit. 8 (Students/test, results) 
Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) 
H's social role 
Intimates 
Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) 
Sit. 20 (Spouse/late call) 
Sit. 21 (Spouse/argument) 
Friends 
Sit. 3 (Friend/late) 
Sit. 4 (Friend/secret) 
Sit. 6 (Friend/spilt coffee) 
Sit. 16 (Friend/damaged car) 
Sit. 22 (Friend/birthday party) 
Colleagues 
Sit. 9 (Male colleague/argument) 
Sit. 23 (Female colleague/argument,) 
Sit. 10 (Colleague/cassette) 
Sit. 14 (Colleague/desk) 
Sit. 15 (Colleague/stapler) 
Students (S > H) 
Sit. 8 (Students/test results) 
Sit. 17 (Students/late class) 
Sit. 11 (Private student/late) 
Boss (S < H) 
Sit. 12 (Boss/delayed project) 
Sit. 19 (Boss/late) 
Strangers 
Sit. 1 (Stranger/train seat) 
Sit. 13 (Stranger/parking place) 
Sit. 2 (Stranger/damaged car) 
Sit. 7 (Stranger/severe collision) 
Sit. 18 (Stranger/unavoidable collision) 
Sit. 24 (Stranger/slight collision) 
Child 
Sit. 5 (Child/broken mug) 
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István Kecskes: Situation-bound utterances in LI and L2 (Studies on language acquisi-
tion, vol. 19). Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2003, x + 228 pp. 
The book under review is about highly conventionalized, prefabricated pragmatic uni t s 
whose occurrences are tied to standardized communicative situations, e.g., responses 
like Not at all, Vou are welcome or You bet to Thank you. These formulaic expressions 
are called situation-bound utterances (SBUs) by the author (p. 4), who prefers this 
term to other labels used in regard to similar phenomena (e.g., interaction rituals, 
routine formulae, situational utterances, bound utterances or institutionalized expres-
sions). István Kecskes discusses several important issues related not only to th is 
particular group of pragmatic units but also to lexical units in general. They include 
such timeless problems as the relationship between linguistic knowledge and encyclo-
pedic knowledge, the interplay of lexical units and context, the distinction between 
literal and figurative meaning and the role of creativity and formulaicity, as well as re-
cently raised ideas about salience or conceptual socialization. This complexity of issues 
presupposes an interdisciplinary perspective. In fact, reading the book we encounter 
results and hypotheses from several fields: theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, 
psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and second language acquisition. However, they all 
find their place in Kecskes's cognitive-pragmatic framework whose two key properties 
are "that 1) language research is bound to be concerned with the linguistic and concep-
tual dimensions at the same time, and that 2) language is a dynamic entity" (pp. 8 -9 ) . 
Another main characteristic feature of the approach applied in this book is its multi-
lingual (even multicultural) perspective. It is the analysis of the problems non-native 
speakers have during acquisition and use of SBUs that enables us to look into the 
interconnections of linguistic and socio-cultural factors in the use of these pragmat ic 
units. Thus, the endeavour carried out by the author yields, besides the analyses of 
(American) English, Hungarian, Russian, French, German, Turkish, Arabic, Chinese 
and Japanese SBUs, such a theoretical building the base of which is the Dynamic 
Meaning Model (DMM) in combination with the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH). 
DMM and GSH serve as components explaining contextual mechanisms of shaping 
meaning and interpretation in the dual language system, which is in turn responsible 
for conceptual socialization. 
In chapter 2 Kecskes offers the DMM as an alternative t o prototype theory, 
Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage conception and Bierwisch's two-level 
conceptual semantics. As we learn, the DMM describes the meaning of a lexical uni t , 
either a word or an SBU, in terms of coresense, consense, culture-specific concep-
tual properties and word-specific semantic properties (extending the model to SBUs, 
Kecskes calls the latter ones formula-specific pragmatic properties). Let us see t hem 
in some detail taking into consideration here the word from the set of lexical uni ts . 
Coresense is an abstraction from possible contextual occurrences of the word, while 
a contextual meaning of the word, consense, realizes a particular aspect or aspects of 
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the coresense. To put it the o t h e r way around, no t all core components are present 
all the time. If so, it hardly seems to be t rue t h a t "[cjoresense is t h e invariant while 
conseuse represents the possible variants" (p. 43). Below I will r e t u rn to problems of 
coresense. As t o culture-specific conceptual proper t ies , encoded in t h e word, they can 
be either ac t iva ted or cancelled by the context. Furthermore, word-specific semant ic 
properties are e i ther encoded in t h e word or charged by the context . Thus, the D M M 
can be characterized as expressing the two-way relat ionship between concept and word 
and as grasping the dynamic interact ion between meaning and context . 
Chapter 3 presents fu r ther details about t h e role of context in interpretat ion. 
The dynamism of relation between lexical unit a n d context is a two-way relationship as 
well: contexts no t only specify meanings of lexical uni ts , but are also created by lexical 
units. For instance, the SBU Bless you has the bui l t - in context of someone's sneezing. 
If this context does not match t h e actual context because someone coughs but does 
not sneeze, t h e SBU cannot be u t tered appropriately. It is here t h a t salience comes 
into play. T h e mos t conventional, frequent, famil iar or prototypical interpretat ion is 
t he most salient meaning of a given lexical u n i t . Primary consense appears t o he 
the most salient meaning, which can be either l i teral or figurative. Before tu rn ing t o 
the connection between salience and modes of interpretat ion, two remarks by Kecskes 
have to be ment ioned . First, salience can be a m a t t e r of lexical a n d not necessarily of 
conceptual representat ion, which also supports t h e legitimacy of differentiating lexical 
semantics f rom conceptual semant ics . Second, t h e literal figurative dichotomy makes 
sense for language analysis bu t no t for language processing. 
According t o the Graded Salience Hypothesis of Giora (1997), different linguistic 
expressions call for different interpretat ion processes. Direct processing applies when 
the most salient meaning is in tended. It is accessed directly, wi thout processing t h e less 
salient (even if l i teral) meaning. In the case of sequent ia l processing, the more salient 
meaning is processed first, before the intended one is derived. Paral lel processing is 
induced when m o r e than one mean ing is salient. In this case all t he equally salient 
meanings are accessed initially. Consequently, context affects comprehension af ter 
the highly salient meaning has been accessed or equally salient meanings have been 
activated. If t h e former is compat ib le with the context , no fu r the r effort is needed. 
However, if it is no t , a possible a l ternat ive is looked for. As for equally salient meanings, 
one of them should be selected o n the basis of context . 
At this poin t of my review I have to consider t h e notion of coresense once again. 
On p. 45 the a u t h o r modifies w h a t he means by core meaning. Let us recall t h a t a 
consense may realize some aspects of coresense. According to the modified version, t h e 
most salient m e a n i n g of a par t ic idar lexical unit , e.g., 'easy' of t h e expression piece of 
cake, is described as coresense. T h a t is, a full-fledged meaning is equa ted entirely wi th 
coresense. In addi t ion , the l i teral meaning of kick and its Hungar ian equivalent rúg 
( ' to strike out w i th the foot or fee t ' ) is indicated as equivalent coresense in example 
(17) on p. 50. Here in connect ion with examples (18) and (19) - i t is also claimed 
t h a t "contextual use shows t h a t t h e almost equivalent coresenses are added W S P s 
[word-specific s eman t i c properties] and CSCPs [culture-specific conceptual properties] 
which are very different in the two languages". Thus , there are a couple of notions 
of coresense which are not identical . Unfortunately, they are not kept systematically 
apar t throughout t h e book. 
Investigating SBUs, Kecskes regards not only native speakers bu t also non-nat ive 
speakers. This investigation res ts on the notions of dual language system (DLS) and 
Common Underlying Conceptual Base (CUCB) known from his previous work and 
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introduced briefly on pp. 10 1. Depending on several factors (e.g., proficiency, exposure 
to language and culture, motivation, age), bilinguals can have a unique competence 
referred to as the DLS in which neither of the participating languages can be compared 
to a monolingual system. In order for a DLS to develop, the conceptual s t ructure is 
to change from an Ll-dominated conceptual base into a CUCB which is responsible 
for the operation of both languages. The development of the CUCB goes together 
with what Kecskes calls conceptual socialization. Chapter 8 is devoted to this concept 
entirely. "Conceptual socialization refers to the transformation of conceptual system 
which undergoes characteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language 
and culture" (p. 157). This yields the gradual development of awareness of cultural 
differences and the emergence of a dynamic social identity which reflects dual culture. 
During the process of conceptual socialization L2 learners should be familiarized with 
the communication pat terns of the target language which are dependent on the culture 
and the structural organization of language. From the literature on parameters of 
differences between cultures, Kecskes mentions those frames which have some special 
bearing on the use of SBUs in different cultures. Cultures can be classified in terms 
of high and low context, directness and indirectness, doing and being, linearity and 
non-linearity of thought. The first difference, i.e., tha t of high-context and low-context 
cultures depends on how much meaning is encoded in the context and in the linguistic 
code. In the case of the second one, direct style of communication requires clarity, 
explicitness and accurate representation of facts. In contrast, indirectness is more 
ambiguous and emotionally rich. The third parameter concerns emphasis put either 
on activities which result in accomplishments, or on what the communicator is (the 
individual's birth, family background, age, rank). Finally, the linear cultural pat tern 
highlights beginnings and ends of events, is object-oriented while the message s t ructure 
of non-linear cultures has multiple themes, for it people and events are more important 
than t ime orientation. (American) English or German culture can be described as 
low-context, direct, doing and linear while cultures like Turkish and Arabic are high-
context, indirect, being and non-linear. Cultures such as French, Swedish or Dutch 
are closer to the former group, Japanese or Russian to the latter. What relation 
does this classification have to SBUs? Let, us take the first distinction as an example. 
In low-context cultures, the speaker is supposed to convey the meaning accurately 
and thoroughly. According to this idea, low-context cultures like American would 
require the use of less SBUs than high-context cultures. As Kecskes cautions, however, 
we must be careful here. There are two types of SBUs according to their content: 
situation-bound rituals and situation-bound routines. It is only the former t h a t are 
not characteristic of American culture. It seems to prefer routines to rituals while in 
high-context cultures it is the other way around. 
Since these two main groups of SBUs are introduced in chapter 5, which is about 
the distinguishing features of SBUs, let, us turn to a presentation of SBUs in detail. 
SBUs can be considered as pragmatic idioms that take a special place among idioms be-
cause they have some features along which they differ from other idiomatic expressions. 
First, SBUs create their own context, i.e., are strongly tied to standard situations and 
are not used outside their usual context. Second, when idioms are used it is rare that 
the whole sentence is idiomatic. In contrast, SBUs usually form one single unit which 
functions as an ut terance and no change is possible within the unit. Third, if SBUs 
derive from freely generated expressions (another possible way of their originating is 
from other types of fixed expressions), they may often keep their original composi-
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tional meaning. In certain cases expressions such as Give me a hand, I'll talk to you 
later, Don't go away can be processed both in a compositional and non-compositional 
way. In other words, they can have more than one salient meaning. However, this is 
usually not the case with idioms where the relation between compositional meaning 
and functional meaning is almost lost (for instance: wet blanket, spill the beans, touch 
base with, go Dutch, get down to the wire). Fourth, because of the above possibility of 
different consenses, SBUs are more context-sensitive than other idioms. 
As mentioned already, Kecskes distinguishes between situation-bound rituals 
(e.g., God bless you) and situation-bound routines (e.g., How are you doing?, Nice 
to meet you, Welcome aboard). This distinction lias to do with whether SBUs directly 
say something about the action and /o r participants or relate them to other situations 
or agents. T h e situation-bound rituals are especially frequent in tradition-oriented 
Turkish, Arabic, Japanese and Chinese cultures. Their use is almost obligatory and no 
freely-generated phrases are appropriate instead. The situations which require the use 
of SBUs in tradition-oriented cultures may not be even recognized by nat ive speakers 
of English as events demanding any verbal reaction. 
In chapter 6 an analysis of t he results of three tests conducted by Kecskes demon-
strates the differences between native and non-native speakers in the interpretation of 
(American) English SBUs. In Test 1 students were asked to describe the meaning of 
SBUs without context. Both the native speakers' and non-native speakers' responses 
support the Graded Salience Hypothesis. The major i ty of students found the most 
salient meaning. Where parallel processing was present because two meanings were 
equally salient (e.g., Get out of here, Give me a break), native speakers were divided 
in their decision since there were no contexts which could help in shaping meaning. 
However, noil-native speakers (who had studied English in their home country and 
had been in the USA for at least six months) preferred literal meaning to figurative 
meaning, which supported the author ' s hypothesis about non-native speakers' lan-
guage processing which usually prioritizes literal meaning. In Test 2 students were 
given dialogues with SBUs most of which have both a literal and a figurative meaning 
as salient. Context was biased for the figurative meaning and the experimentees had 
to recognize t h a t meaning in the given situation. There was no difference in how na-
tive speakers processed SBUs in context. When parallel processing had to be applied 
because both literal and figurative meanings were salient, context played a crucial role. 
This was not necessarily the case for non-native speakers and contextual cues did not 
always help them to find the correct salient meaning if the salient meaning was not 
the literal one. Finally, Test 3 consisted of SBUs which usually have the figurative 
meaning as the most salient. This test used them in their less salient meaning which 
was their original literal one. Responses of native speakers demonstrated tha t the less 
salient meaning was processed sequentially with no problem if the context was clear. 
In a few cases, however, where the situation was unclear, some native speakers and 
many non-native speakers directly processed the most salient meaning. 
On the basis of a thorough analysis of the test results Kecskes rightly states 
tha t language processing is difficult for non-native speakers because "they do not have 
direct access to the most accessible (for the native speakers) information in the target 
language since it is not stored or coded in their Ll-dominated mental lexicon. Wha t 
is stored and encoded there is wha t is salient in the native tongue and culture of 
language learners, and that usually does not work in the target language" (p. 133). 
Moreover, what can be salient in the L2 for a non-native speaker is the literal meaning 
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of the target language expression. That is why non-native speakers did not have any 
difficulty identifying the compositional meaning of SBUs but problems occurred when 
literal meaning was not the most salient meaning. 
In chapter !) Kecskes gives an account of investigating the use of SBUs by non-
native speakers of English (who -as with the above tests—had studied English in their 
home country and had been in the USA for at least six months). Subjects, among 
which there were also native speakers of English, were given three types of test: a 
Dialogue Interpretation Test, two Discourse Completion Tests and a Problem Solving 
Test. The Dialogue Interpretation Test aimed at determining the extent to which 
the interpretation of American English SBUs by non-native speakers was the same as 
that by native speakers. Like Test 2 above, items of this test contained a dialogue 
with an SBU tha t students were to interpret. In the first Discourse Completion Test 
participants had to give a response to questions such as: Can I talk to you after class? 
or How was the party last night? In the second Discourse Completion Test students 
were expected to supply the missing part of a short dialogue. For instance: 
Hi, John. How is it going? 
Listen, can I talk to you after class? 
OK, see you after class. 
The Problem Solving Test described a frequent situation in which an utterance should 
be made. This test needed more culture-specific knowledge than Discourse Completion 
Tests. For example: "You want to talk to your professor. You knock at his door, open 
it, and say what?" 
Like the general conclusion of the three interpretation tests above, one of the main 
findings of testing the use of SBUs by non-native speakers is t ha t they had difficulties 
with respect to language-specific principles of salience in the target language and their 
conceptual socialization had not been completed yet. This was especially true in cases 
where parallel processing emerged and non-native speakers had to decide whether the 
more salient meaning of an SBU was figurative or literal in the given situation. 
The use of SBUs demonstrated three developmental stages: (1) the period of 
strong Ll-cnl ture transfer, (2) false generalizations and (3) when things fall into place. 
The analysis of the results revealed that, length of stay in the USA was less important 
than distance of cultures and familiarity with English discourse patterns. 
As the last theoretical question to be discussed in the present review, I want to 
mention the topic of chapter 7, namely the dichotomy of creativity and formulaicity. 
Kecskes s tates that in comparison with generating a sentence—to construct a text 
or conversation needs a more complex type of creativity which has, on the one hand, 
grammatical and, on the other, logical and socio-cultural aspects. However, we do 
not only use our ability to create novel strings but also recall the prefabricated units 
that were stored in our mind from previous encounters with those units. Elsewhere 
in linguistic literature the question of what, is stored and what is computed online is 
seriously taken as well. Thus, Jackendoff (2002) proposes such a major reorganization 
of the theory of grammar which sets his framework apart from mainstream generative 
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linguistics bearing on, among others, connections between a theory of competence and 
a theory of performance. From those changes, here I want to pay attention only to a 
small segment. This is the recognition that lexical items include not just words but 
also productive morphological affixes and idioms. Idioms themselves are unanalysed 
wholes with regard to their semantics. Nevertheless, from a phonological and syntac-
tic point of view they consist of separable words, so constituting phrasal (syntactic) 
categories rather than lexical ones. As to language acquisition, what is interesting 
now is not issues of Universal Grammar but of extracting pat terns from stored items 
through generalization. Kecskes also notices the large-scale use of ready-made chunks 
or prefabricated units during LI acquisition. However, it turns out tha t they are meant 
very broadly because they include such an N P as cup of tea. The fact that it is initially 
learned as one unit is evidenced by the pluralized form cup of teas. Discussing the role 
of formulaic sequences (including SBUs) in L2 acquisition, Kecskes takes into consider-
ation the following factors: (a) difference between the L2 and LI acquisition process, 
(b) differences between naturalistic and classroom environment, (c) differences between 
child and adult L2 learning, (d) differences in individual learners and e) difference in 
tlie role of formulae. What is common in all studies is that they focus mainly on the 
structural features of memorized chunks and their role in the acquisition of syntax. 
Adult L2 learners often assume that an element in an expression may be varied ac-
cording to a phrase structure rule, when in fact no variation or some very restricted 
one is allowed in native-like usage. Kecskes, however, emphasizes tha t this assump-
tion of L2 learners depends on the type of fixed expressions, i.e., prefabricated chunks 
vs. SBUs. The former can support the development of syntactic rules by the learner 
breaking them down into their constituents. This can occur because these memorized 
chunks have a compositional s t ructure and most of them are seinantically transparent 
(e.g., What is this?, Can I have...?, I wanna. . ., There is no.. .). However, this is 
not tlie case witli the latter, i.e., SBUs that are pragmatic rather t han syntactic units. 
If broken down into constituents, they could do more harm than good to L2 learners 
because their functional meaning can hardly ire figured out from tlie elements they 
contain. Consequently, SBUs cannot be expected to take part in the development of 
grammatical competence in L2. 
As to typographical layout, some details should have been amended before pub-
lishing this book. There are redundant spaces between words and redundant hyphens 
between syllables. The use of quotation marks of different form ( " . . . " vs. ".. .") is 
unjustified and references to linguistic literature from which quotations are taken are 
in the wrong place, i.e., before tlie closing quotation mark. Typos also occur: e.g., 
dischronically (p. 19), it is use in a context (p. 37), coresense units the two levels 
(p. 43), it units the lexical and conceptual level (p. 48), human cognition trends to be 
geared (pp. 66, 79), In a attempt (p. 123), pervious experience (p. 180), c.f. (many 
times throughout the book). Some editorial effort could have co-ordinated references 
to linguistic literature in the main text and the list of references. Some of the former 
cannot be found in the latter (e.g., Kiefer 1997 p. 5, Nuyts 2001 p. 8, Vygotsky 
1962— p. 34, Cook 1997, Rosch 1977- both on p. 36, Chomsky 1997 - p. 55, Katz 
et al. 1998 p. 68, Mey 1993 p. 109). 
To conclude, Kecskes's book stimulates discussions on several general theoretical 
topics such as e.g., modelling the meaning of various lexical items including SBUs, the 
interaction between meaning and context, the reflection of the language and culture 
interplay in tlie process of conceptual socialization, issues of salience in interpretation 
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as well as problems of acquisition of SBUs by L2 learners. Despite the criticism con-
tained in the present review, Situation-bound, utterances in LI and L2 is well worth 
reading because it is a volume provoking further discussion and highlighting those areas 
where further research is needed. 
Károly Bibok 
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This multidisciplinary book brings together the current research of scholars with a 
variety of backgrounds but a common focus, the interaction between lexical semantics 
and pragmatics. The thirteen authors examine a range of specific linguistic phenom-
ena and theories and use a variety of frameworks, methodological approaches and 
languages in developing their arguments. There are, however, certain theories that, 
appear consistently throughout the book (i.e., conversational implicature, relevance 
theory, optimality theory and Bierwisch's two-level conceptual semantic approach). 
There is also a common theme: t h a t research in semantics and research in pragmatics 
complement each other and each may offer valuable insights that could enrich research 
in the other. 
Introduction by Enikő Németh T. and Károly Bibok 
The editors briefly discuss the emergence of lexical pragmatics as a new linguistic 
discipline which connects lexical semantics and pragmatics. They point out, that the 
papers in the book have a common aim of exploring this interaction, but each examines 
different phenomena and uses a variety of methods and frameworks. This is followed 
by a concise summary of each article. 
Two case studies in lexical pragmatics by Reinhard Blutner and Torgrim Solst.ad 
In this paper, Blutner and Solstad point, out, tha t the situated meanings of many 
words are combinations of their lexical meanings and superimposed conversational im-
plicature. They propose a bidirectional version of optimality theory which integrates 
expressive and interpretive optimization as a framework for investigating the inter-
actions between the (mental) lexicon and pragmatics. They use this framework to 
account for the effects of negative strengthening in connection with gradable adjec-
tives, typically antonyms such as happy - unhappy, good - bad, and to resolve the 
puzzles of dimensional designation of spatial adjectives such as long, high, broad, deep 
and thick. Throughout the article the authors use examples to support and/or justify 
their claims. Graphs and model diagrams have been created to make optimal pairs and 
spatial objects look more visual to readers and enable them to understand and find 
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connections between old versions of ОТ and newly created versions of ОТ by the au-
thors. However, they neglect to do this when they explain .lager's variant (2000) of the 
weak version of bidirectional ОТ (pp. 15-6), which is difficult to follow without proper 
illustrations. It is also not clear exactly why the authors consider the M-principle of 
Levinson (2000, 33) as an epiphenomenon t h a t results from the interaction of the Q-
and I-Principles. 
On the scales and implicatures of even by Igor Boguslavsky 
In his paper, Boguslavsky addresses some unusual phenomenon of the scales and ini-
plicatures of even, mostly in Russian. He presents rich da t a to discuss the opposition 
between two interpretations of even ut terances not X, not even Y but Z labeled as 
"diminuendo" and "crescendo" sentences and their conflict with the scalar implicature 
of even in the traditional approach. He argues that the difference in their interpreta-
tion derives from different strategies used by the addressees. Some of Boguslavsky's 
examples are, however, ra ther confusing and fail to make the point. This is especially 
true for example (22) on page 37: "The poem was not published and not even written." 
What the author probably wants to say is "The poem was not published and, in fact, 
was not even written." But the problem, as far as it sounds logical, is with the word 
written. To say it was not even written makes it sound like it never existed. 
The author concludes t h a t scalar implicature "belongs exactly to the intersection 
of pragmatics and linguistic semantics" (p. 49) because on the one hand it must be 
interpreted in the context based on the literal meaning, the context of the utterance, 
and background knowledge, and on the other hand it is language-specific. 
The flexibility of inference in triggers for inferable entities: Evidence for an interpretabil-
ity constraint by Sharon A. Cote 
Cote's paper discusses the complexity of inferable entities entities not yet directly 
introduced into the discourse context but having a relevant relationship to some other 
activated entity. She uses da ta from a corpus study to examine various types of 
inferable entities and the "triggers", referring expressions, used by speakers to lead 
hearers to make the intended inference in discourse, and argues that hearers determine 
reference according to an interpretability constraint: "[a] hearer must be able to assign 
as much meaning to a pronoun as is needed to avoid causing a speaker t o fail to 
achieve his discourse purpose" (p. 68). Cote provides examples of ways in which this 
constraint can be satisfied. 
In defence of mouosemy by Thorstein Fretheim 
Although Fretheim does not dispute the existence of lexical polysemy, he claims that 
often what would be taken as lexical polysemy should actually be considered mouosemy 
with the meaning being modified by context-driven inferences. He relies on Sperber 
and Wilson's (1986/1995) Relevance Theory as a guiding theory, accepting their ar-
gument tha t most concepts do not map onto words, only a fraction of a language 
user's conceptual repertoire is lexicalized. There is no doubt about the correctness 
of this statement; however, it is a bit lopsided. Several researchers have argued that 
the concept word relationship is a two-way street in which the word as a linguistic 
entity gains some independence and affects the concepts (e.g., Vygotsky 1962; Cruse 
1992; Kecskes Papp 2000). The reason for lexical polysemy should be sought in this 
unique relationship. 
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In his paper, Fretheim focuses discussion on four lexical entries of "function 
words": after all and at least in English, (al)likevel and med en gang / med det samme 
in Norwegian, from a monosomy-based relevance theory perspective. He points out that 
these function words are used as blueprints to engage the hearer in a specific kind of 
inferential activity. In all four cases, Fretheim argues tha t they can be bet ter defined 
not in terms of lexical polysemy but in terms of a single lexical definition tha t combines 
with substantial reliance on contextual enrichment in actual conversational dialogue. 
Pragmatics and the flexibility of theoretical terms in linguistics: Two case studies by 
András Kertész 
In this article, Kertész addresses what he sees as a three-part, problem involving theo-
retical terms in linguistics: 1. What is the structure of theoretical terms in generative 
linguistics? 2. How does the structure of theoretical terms influence the s t ruc ture of sci-
entific explanations in generative linguistics? 3. To what extent are the answers to the 
first, two questions related to semantic and pragmatic factors? Kertész adopts two the-
oretic frameworks: holism (cognitive theory of metaphor) and modularism (two-level 
approach) to exemplify the applicability of cognitive approaches to the investigation 
of concept formation in generative linguistics. Kertész demonstrates tha t the similar-
ities and differences between the two solutions to the above three questions produce 
important generalizations concerning the applicability of cognitive approaches in the 
analysis of scientific concept formation. 
The development of the grounding predication: Epistemic modals and cognitive pred-
icates by Péter Pelyvás 
In the paper Pelyvás addresses some factors that led to the emergence of the grounding 
predication (a device that relates sentences/utterances to the situation of their use, 
with special attention to the speaker's epistemic commitment) by examining two areas: 
modal auxiliaries (a grammatical category) and cognitive/modal predicates (a lexical 
category). Pelyvás discusses the general tendencies in the development of the epistemic 
senses of the modals from their root meanings, analyzing the changes in the image 
schémas of the modals that mark the development. He pays special at tention to 
changes within immediate scope responsible for the presence vs. absence of relations like 
permission or obligation, to the reference-point construction, and to subjectification, 
which is the critical step in the development of the grounding predication. Pelyvás 
demonstrates tha t the root and epistemic schémas developed from modals can be 
applied to modal predicates (e.g., permit, allow, oblige, forbid) as well as to cognitive 
predicates (e.g., seem, appear, think, assume). Although the author's approach is 
logical and interesting, lie relies mainly on Langacker's (1999) and Sweetser's (1990) 
studies and completely ignores other authors such as Bybee and Fleischman (1995), 
Papafragou (2000), and Nuyt.s (2000) who have made invaluable contribution to the 
understanding of epistemic modality. 
What is polysemy? — A survey of current research and results by Gergely Pe thő 
Pethő begins his comprehensive overview of polysemy by pointing out, t h a t the main 
problem for polysemy research is tha t there has been poor communication between 
the various strands of research in this area. This has resulted in fragmentation of 
research and has hindered progress. Using Paul Deane's (1987) dissertation on poly-
semy as a point of departure for a summary of the research done in polysemy from the 
early 1980's to the present, he presents findings from researchers in various linguistic 
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fields. He concludes tha t , despite the apparent incoherence of their terminology and 
methods of description and the fragmentation of the research, the various approaches 
generally seem to complement rather than contradict each other and suggests that 
the approaches be considered "pieces of a puzzle" t h a t all contribute to the under-
standing of polysemy. The author is right when he refers to the poor communication 
between the various s t rands in polysemy research. At the same time, however, he also 
contributes to the problem because his overview is ra ther fragmented and sometimes 
it is difficult to see what criteria Pethő used when he selected whose contribution he 
was going to discuss in his overview. His overview is done from a lexical semantics 
perspective rather t han from a lexical pragmatics perspective. 
Interpreting morphologically complex lexemes revisited by Tvrtko Prcic 
Prcic emphasizes the complementary nature of semantics and pragmatics. Using En-
glish agentive nouns as examples, he examines in detail first the role of semantics 
and then the role of pragmatics in interpreting them. In his discussion of seman-
tics, he focuses 011 morphoseinantic compositionality, binary processing and semantic 
underspecification. He concludes tha t a decontextualized, semantics-only interpreta-
tion leaves the sense of the lexeme insufficiently specified and requires information 
to be filled in during pragmatic specialization. In his discussion of the role of prag-
matics he addresses inferables, the transparency/opacity cline, explicit, implicit, and 
implied meaning, and pragmatic specialization. He concludes that "contextualized, 
pragmatics-enriched, interpretation of morphologically complex lexemes [...] results in 
a reading characterized by all information required for successful interpretation appro-
priately supplied" (p. 240). 
Cultural constraints on meaning extension: Derivational relations between actions and 
happenings by Raissa Rozina 
Rozina examines the pa t te rn of semantic derivation t h a t results in the development of 
general slang in Russian. She distinguishes general slang, which is spoken or at least 
understood by all adul t speakers of s tandard Russian, from slang that is associated 
with a particular social or age group. She examines what it is about general slang words 
tha t enables educated speakers of Russian to distinguish the slang meaning from the 
s tandard word meaning even though the words generally do not differ seniantically from 
standard Russian. She hypothesizes t h a t this is based 011 regular pat terns of semantic 
extension which are different for slang words and s tandard words. Her analysis focuses 
011 the bidirectional pa t terns of meaning extension in Russian verbs. She concludes 
tha t the derivation of happenings from action verbs results in standard meanings, while 
the derivation of actions from happenings results in slang meanings. The examples the 
author uses to justify her claims are overwhelming and without some knowledge of 
Russian the reader may miss the point. 
The communicative function of the Hungarian adverbial marker majd ' later on, some 
time' by Ildikó Vaskó 
In lier paper, Vaskó addresses the Hungarian adverbial marker majd t ha t can be para-
phrased as 'later on, some time' from a pragmatic perspective within the framework 
of relevance theory. She uses ample examples from Hungarian to show that majd 
consists of these two characteristic features: a certain s ta te of affairs will take place 
some time in the future, and for the successful realization of the events that majd is 
connected to, certain conditions have to be met. Vaskó argues that this adverb majd 
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encodes not only conceptual meaning (e.g., postpone of an event in the time flow) 
but also conveys procedural information (e.g., speakers' attitude) by instructing the 
hearer to constrain the temporal reference to a t ime in the future when interpreting 
the utterances with majd. 
How the lexicon and context interact in the meaning construction of utterances by 
Károly Bihok and Enikő Németh T . 
Bibok and Németh T. examine three types of Hungarian utterances: utterances with 
implicit arguments, ut terances with implicit predicates, and utterances in which the 
predicate and argument are connected to each other by "co-composition". They begin 
with descriptions of each type of ut terance and demonst ra te through a systematic and 
unified analysis that the meaning construction of these types of utterances can only be 
described through "an intensive interaction between the lexicon and context" (p. 317). 
They apply Sperber and Wilson's (1995) cognitive principle of relevance to the three 
types of utterances and argue tha t it explains the possibility that an argument or 
predicate can be lexically unrealized. If arguments and predicates can be identified by 
1. lexical conceptualization, 2. taking immediate context into consideration or 3. ex-
tending the context, then these arguments and predicates should be lexically unreal-
ized according to the principle of relevance. The cognitive principle of relevance also 
explains the possibility of composing larger units from predicates and arguments by 
"co-composition". 
Evaluation 
This book examines the interaction between lexical semantics and pragmatics by com-
bining insightful exploration of theories from a range of research perspectives in the 
field of linguistics. It makes the case for a new line in pragmatics research: lexical 
pragmatics. The diversity of topics explored and different methodologies and frame-
works used result in a collection of articles with little connection beyond a similar 
format and a few theories that seem to be a common thread. However, the editors 
explain that this collection of articles is meant to st imulate further work in the new 
field of lexical pragmatics rather than attempt to present ail integrated approach at 
this stage. This argument is completely acceptable although it would have made the 
volume more reader-friendly if those papers which have something in common had 
been placed one after the other in the book. First of all, we think of Frotheim and 
Pethő; Prcic and Bibok Németh T. 
The theoretical complexity of the book ranges from in-depth analysis of single 
lexical units (e.g., even, after all) to an examination of different views on a major 
theory: monosemy vs. polysemy. The majority of t he articles assume a great ileal 
of previous knowledge of linguistic theory, and some are quite complex and technical. 
However, examples in several languages (English, Russian, Hungarian, Norwegian) and 
diagrams in most articles make the complex theories more accessible to the reader. In 
spite of this, in some articles (e.g., Rozina, Vaskó) it is not easy to follow the arguments 
without any knowledge of the given languages. 
This collection of papers will function as a source book for those who are interested 
in lexical semantics and lexical pragmatics. Not many of the readers, however, will 
read all articles. Those whose interest is in lexical semantics will be more satisfied 
than their counterparts who take up the hook to learn more about lexical pragmatics. 
The fact of the mat te r is that there is little about pragmatics in any sense of the word 
in some of the articles (Fret.hoim, Kertész, Pelyvás, Pethő, Rozina). They are good 
and interesting studies on their own right in lexical semantics but do not have much 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
128 BOOK REVIEWS 128 
to do with lexical pragmatics as the discipline is presented in the introduction and 
the rest of the papers. 
The literature referred to and reviewed in most papers is rich and comprehen-
sive. It gives guidance to the readers in t h e relatively new field of lexical pragmatics. 
However, there is no mention about an important work t h a t also discusses lexical 
pragmatics in relation to cognitive semantics: Fischer (2000). 
In sum, the primary goal of this collection of papers is to inform readers about an 
emerging new field of research: lexical pragmatics. This goal is served well. Although 
the book is too advanced for use as a textbook in any but the most advanced linguistics 
class, it will serve as an excellent resource for students focusing on language-oriented 
research and for any linguists interested in lexical semantics and exploring the new 
linguistic discipline of lexical pragmatics. 
Julia Coryell - Saihua Xia 
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143 G U E S T E D I T O R S ' N O T E 
The present volume—which could be entitled Hungarian Studies in Cog-
nitive Semantics—is intended to give the reader at least a vague impres-
sion of the problems tackled by cognitive semantics research in Hungary. 
However, right at the outset the identification of what kind of approaches 
count as manifestations of cognitive semantics is anything but trivial. First, 
some commentators evaluate the latter as one of the most significant de-
velopments in the history of linguistics constituting a "revolution" (cf. for 
example Tomasello 1999, 478), while others—most notably formal sernan-
ticists — consider it to be a blind alley. Second, despite a series of well 
known attempts found in textbooks and companions, there have not been 
found firm criteria yielding a generally acceptable definition of "cognitive 
semantics" so far. Third, the impossibility of such a definition is closely 
connected to the fact that the theories which call themselves "cognitive se-
mantic" very often accept diametrically opposed empirical hypotheses and 
incompatible methodological principles. To mention just the most straight-
forward example, approaches conforming to the standards of the analytic 
philosophy of science may label themselves as "cognitive semantics" just as 
those which radically reject the latter—think of the well-known dichotomy 
between modular and holistic cognitive semantics (see Gardner 1985 and 
Müller 1991 on the historical roots of this dichotomy). Fourth, the links 
which irrespective of the differences are assumed to connect various ap-
proaches to the field are very often of a social nature rather than a matter 
of the rational content of the particular theories (see e.g., Tomasello 1999; 
Redeker-Janssen 1999; Eckardt 1993). 
Against the background of these difficulties, instead of relying on some 
generally accepted points of departure resulting in necessary and sufficient 
conditions of cognitive semantics research, in compiling the present special 
issue the editors made use of vague guiding principles only. According to 
these, the papers exhibit the following characteristics in different ways and 
to different degrees: 
(i) The acceptance of the methodological assumption that linguistics, 
whatever it may be, should be conducted as one of the subdisciplines of 
cognitive science. 
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(ii) Iii accordance with this, cognitive semantics is such that its object 
of investigation is "meaning" as part of cognition (whatever "meaning" 
means). 
(iii) As a result of the constitutive interdisciplinarity of cognitive sci-
ence, cognitive semantic approaches are also of an essentially interdiscipli-
nary nature. 
(iv) At least partly social aspects such as the reference to the "canon" 
that is a set of seminal monographs which motivated research (see for exam-
ple Fauconnier 1994; Jackendoff 1983; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff-Johnson 1980; 
Langacker 1987; 1991; Sweetser 1990, etc.)—together with introductory 
works and collections of papers popularizing the basic ideas and making 
the first results known for a relatively wide audience (Bierwisch-Lang 1989; 
Janssen-Redeker 1999; Allwood-Gärdenfors 1999; Ruclzka-Ostyn 1988; 
Schwarz 1992, etc.). 
(v) Clearly social aspects like the existence of institutions (research 
programmes, projects, journals, associations, university departments etc.) 
devoted to cognitive semantics research. 
Bearing in mind both the difficulties and the guiding principles thus 
mentioned, the present volume is structured as follows. The first part (Kö-
vecses, Benczes) includes papers which represent cognitive semantics as an 
established scientific enterprise in the sense of (i), (ii) and (iv) and (v) in so 
far as they further develop and apply approaches which are known as para-
digm examples of cognitive semantics. This part is entitled Intradisciplinary 
Approaches, because the papers clearly support the development of cogni-
tive semantics as a relatively autonomous discipline, although, like each of 
the approaches, they show interdisciplinary features as well. The papers in 
the second part entitled Methodological Issues (Győri, and Kertész-Rákosi) 
emphasize, along the lines of (i), (ii) and (iii), the flexibility of cognitive se-
mantic research: both of them are characterized by a rather extreme kind of 
interdisciplinarity, they seem to strive to transgress the boundaries of insti-
tutionalized cognitive semantic theories and even question some of the basic 
tenets and methodological background assumptions of the latter. Finally, 
in accordance with (ii) the two papers (Pethő, Vecsey) of the third part 
( Cognitive Aspects of Proper Names) exemplify how and to what extent 
cognitivist considerations may lead to the reinterpreation of the problem of 
"meaning" raised by the analytical philosophy of language. In this respect, 
they nicely illustrate the thesis according to which one of the objectives of 
cognitive semantics is the reformulation and empirical solution of philosph-
ical problems (see e.g., Gardner 1985). 
As this structure suggests, the present compilation differs from most 
special issues of Acta Linguistica Hungarica in that its aim is not to illus-
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träte applications of linguistic theories to Hungarian data, but rather, all 
the papers centre on deeply rooted theoretical, foundational and method-
ological problems of cognitive semantics research per se in a way in which 
these problems have been raised and discussed in Hungary today. 
In A Broad View of Cognitive Linguistics Zoltán Kövecses argues for 
one of the central assumptions of cognitive semantics according to which 
the latter, beside giving an insight into linguistic structure, may also tackle 
a wide variety of social and cultural phenomena. The author claims that hu-
man understanders and producers of language possess cognitive capacities 
which are independent of their ability to use language. Thus he demon-
strates that cognitive linguistics is far more than a theory of language. 
In particular, it may be interpreted as a theory of "meaning-making" in 
general in its innumerable linguistic, social and cultural facets. 
In the first part of her paper Metaphor- and Metonymy-based Com-
pounds in English: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach Réka Benczes puts 
forward two hypotheses. Firstly, metaphor and metonymy theory can ac-
count for the semantics of noun-noun compounds which is activated by 
metaphor and/or metonymy. Secondly, there are regular pat terns of meta-
phor* and metonymy-based compounds, depending on which constituent is 
affected by conceptual metaphor and/or metonymy. In the second part she 
examines metaphor- and metonymy-based noun-noun compounds whose 
meaning is affected by the simultaneous activation of both metaphor and 
metonymy. Finally, she analyzes the productive patterns tha t underlie this 
latter type. 
Gábor Győri (The Adaptive Nature of "Meaning as Understanding") 
discusses semantic change as a cognitive adaptation process. The author 
puts forward Iiis claim according to which such a process adjusts the cul-
turally shared conceptual category system of a language to changing condi-
tions in the environment. In this way the evolutionary function of cognition 
supports the adaptive orientation in a flexible way relative to the stability of 
environmental conditions. Consequently, the cognitive function of language 
is to promote social cognition in order to facilitate the sharing of knowledge 
that proves functional and adaptive in the given physical, social and cul-
tural environment of a group of individuals. From this finding the author 
draws a series of further conclusions concerning the nature of the adaptive 
construal of phenomena, semantic leaps in the form of metaphor, metonymy 
and other kinds of meaning extension, and the nature of semantic change. 
András Kertész and Csilla Rákosi ( Whole-part and Part-whole Infer-
ences in Generative and Cognitive Linguistics) raise methodological prob-
lems of theory formation in general and of cognitive semantics in particular. 
Their paper focuses on the relation between the analytical philosophy of 
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science on the one hand and modular and holistic approaches to cogni-
tive linguistics, on the other. It is argued that Chomsky's, Bierwisch and 
Lang's, and Lakoff and Johnson's approaches all apply non-demonstrative 
inferences which the analytical philosophy of science evaluates as fallacies. 
The authors outline a metatheoretical framework tha t centres on plausi-
ble inferences and they show that the inferences the theories mentioned 
make use of are plausible rather than fallacious. As a result, they draw 
far-reaching conclusions concerning basic aspects of theory formation in 
linguistics and thus they motivate the revaluation of the methodological 
foundations of linguistic inquiry. 
Gergely Pethő's paper (On Intuitions about Proper Names) presents 
a fierce criticism of an empirical experiment concerning the use of proper 
names. Machery et al. (2004) carried out an experiment which tested the 
intuition of US and Chinese students about the use of proper names and 
which was intended to be the empirical counterpart of one of Kripke's 
thought experiments. They arrived at the conclusion that the way most 
respondents used proper names is not compatible with the causal-historical 
theory of proper names suggested by Kripke. Pethő shows, firstly, tha t this 
experiment is burdened with a series of technical difficulties as a result of 
which this conclusion is untenable. Secondly, he also argues that there is 
a series of deep conceptual problems which question the acceptability of 
Machery et al.'s line of argumentation and confirm the legitimacy of the 
author's criticism. 
Zoltán Vecsey's contribution entitled The Semantic Content of Par-
tially Descriptive Names offers a critique of the approach developed by 
Scott Soames in his recent book Beyond Rigidity which puts forward a 
new version of millianism. Soames assumes that some linguistically com-
plex names such as Professor Saul Kripke or Princeton University have 
partially descriptive semantic content. According to Soames, in addition to 
their unique referents, these names are always associated with a special kind 
of description. However, Vecsey argues that Soames's theory of partially de-
scriptive names is unworkable. The author claims tha t descriptive contents 
can be found only in the background knowledge of competent speakers. 
Each paper was refereed by at least two reviewers. The editors are 
grateful to them for their contribution to the quality of this special issue. 
The papers were prepared and the issue itself was compiled within the 
project Empirical Foundations of Cognitive Semantic Theories conducted 
by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Acad-
emy of Sciences at the University of Debrecen. 
András Kertész, Péter Pelyvás 
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A BROAD VIEW OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS* 
ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES 
A b s t r a c t 
Cognitive linguistics can offer an account not only of linguistic structure but also of a 
wide variety of social and cultural phenomena. The comprehensive account presented 
in this paper is crucially based and dependent on cognitive capacities tha t human 
understanders and producers of language possess quite independently of their ability 
to use language. By discussing the cognitive processes and the various linguistic, social 
and cultural issues they help us describe and explain, the author demonstrates that 
cognitive linguistics is far more than a theory of language; one can think of it as a theory 
of "meaning-making" in general in its innumerable linguistic, social and cultural facets. 1. Introduction 
In this paper, I will show that cognitive linguistics can not only offer an 
account of linguistic structure bu t also that of a wide variety of social 
and cultural phenomena. In other words, I will suggest tha t cognitive 
linguistics is a much more comprehensive enterprise than it is commonly 
taken to be by many—both inside and outside the field. Furthermore, 
I will claim that the comprehensive account to be presented is crucially 
based and dependent on cognitive capacities tha t human understanders 
and producers of language possess independently of their ability to use 
language. 
In particular, I will discuss cognitive capacities in relation to the 
following linguistic, social and cultural phenomena: 
(1) Categorization: the nature of concepts and debates concerning art 
Knowledge organization: frame semantics and cultural issues 
Metonymie thought: metonymy in language and social thought 
* I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for several helpful comments on the 
draf t version of this paper. The publication of the paper was supported by the 
Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
at the University of Debrecen. 
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Metaphoric thought: metaphor in mind, language, and politics 
Image-schemas: understanding literature 
Figure-ground alignment: grammatical structure 
Mental spaces: semantic anomaly 
Conceptual integration: creativity in linguistic and conceptual structure, as well 
as in everyday activities 
By discussing the cognitive processes and the various linguistic, social and 
cultural issues, I want to highlight the wide scope of cognitive linguistics. 
By providing a discussion of such a wide variety of linguistic, social and 
cultural topics in terms of cognitive linguistics, I wish to demonstrate that 
cognitive linguistics is far more t han a theory of language; we can perhaps 
think of it as a theory of "meaning-making" in general in its innumerable 
linguistic, social and cultural facets, of which the above topics are just 
a handful of examples. 
But if cognitive linguistics is indeed such a comprehensive theory 
of meaning-making in general, why do we call it "cognitive linguistics" ? 
And in addition to the problem that the scope of cognitive linguistics 
is arguably much broader than language, we have another problem as 
regards the naming of the enterprise; namely, tha t the term "cognitive" 
seems tautological in relation to issues of meaning. Meaning-making as 
such can only be cognitive. For these two reasons, I believe tha t the term 
'cognitive linguistics' is indeed a misnomer and tha t it should be replaced 
by another term. At the end of the paper, I will propose some candidate 
names for the field. 
All in all, then, the general goal of the paper is theoretical rather 
than descriptive. Although I will describe several specific case studies 
taken either from my own work or that of others, my main intention is 
to show the wide scope of cognitive linguistics and the possibilities that 
this view can offer in the s tudy of the general meaning-making capacity 
of human beings. (Consequently, the references made in the paper are 
not intended to offer a complete bibliography of the field.) 
2. Categorization: the nature of concepts 
and debates concerning art 
Human meaning-making depends in part on how we categorize entities 
and events in the world; tha t is, on the nature of conceptual categories, 
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or concepts, we have concerning these entities and events. The classical 
view of categories is based on the idea of essential features. In order 
to have a conceptual category, the members of the category must share 
certain essential features. On this view, categories are defined by essen-
tial features, or, in more modern terminology, by necessary and sufficient 
conditions (Fillmore 1975). Based on empirical work in cognitive psy-
chology (see, e.g., Rosch 1978), a number of au thors began to criticize 
the classical view of categorization. Fillmore (1975), Lakoff (1987), Tay-
lor (1989), and others raised serious objections concerning the validity 
of such an approach to categories and offered a radically new alterna-
tive, which became known as "prototype categorization." In a way, the 
theory of prototype categorization became the cornerstone of cognitive 
linguistics. In the new rival view, categories are defined not in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, but with respect to prototypes and 
various family resemblance relations to these prototypes. 
Philosopher of language John Austin extended the notion of cate-
gories to the senses of words (see Lakoff 1987). T h a t is to say, Austin 
thought of the various senses of a word as a category of senses tha t is or-
ganized around a prototypical sense. He showed by way of analyzing the 
different senses of words that one of the senses is central, while others are 
non-central, or peripheral. As we know well today, it is very common for 
words to have a central prototypical sense with the other senses deriving 
from tha t sense either through metonymy or metaphor . 
The notion of prototype was extended to "linguistic categories" by 
cognitive linguists; t ha t is, to the terms we use to describe language. Lin-
guistic categories include noun, verb, modifier, phrase, clause, sentence, 
etc. The same question that can be raised in connection with everyday 
categories can also be raised in connection with grammatical categories: 
Are they defined by a set of essential properties or by certain prototypes? 
Recent work in this area suggests tha t it makes sense to think of these 
categories as prototype-based as well (Lakoff 1987; Taylor 2003). 
It seems reasonable to believe then that the notion of prototype-
based organization in categories applies to three distinct levels or areas: 
(2) Categories for everyday concepts 
Categories for senses of words 
Categories for linguistic concepts 
Work in cognitive linguistics and psychology has indeed shown tha t in all 
three of these areas the categories we possess have an internal s tructure 
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tha t is organized around prototypes (see, e.g., Gibbs et al. 1995; Taylor 
1989; 2003). 
What does all of this have to do with real-world issues in culture 
and society? We can suggest t h a t there is a close connection between the 
nature of our categories and many important cultural and social issues. 
More specifically, it seems reasonable to claim that the emergence, exis-
tence, and often the resolution of cultural and social issues arises from the 
nature of our categories. Simply put, the na ture of our categories (i.e., 
whether they are based on essential features or prototypes) does seem to 
play a role in the cultural and social issues involving these categories. 
As one such case, let us take the everyday concept of ar t and see 
whether it is defined according to the classical view or the prototype 
view. As a mat te r of fact, this is not the most important reason why we 
analyze the concept here; as can be expected, the concept of ar t cannot 
be defined by essential features. More importantly, the discussion of the 
structure of the concept of a r t can shed light on why ar t has been a 
debated category probably ever since its inception and particularly in 
the past two hundred years. 
Kövecses (in preparation) examines some of the history of the cate-
gory of art in the past two hundred years on the basis of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2003). What he finds in this history is that the category un-
dergoes constant redefinition in the 19th and 20th centuries. Diverse and 
rival conceptions of art challenge the "traditional" view — tha t is, the 
most prevalent "conservative" view. Impressionism, cubism, surrealism, 
pop art, and the like, are reactions to the traditional view and to each 
other. But what is the tradit ional view of ar t? 
The traditional conception of art can be arrived at by examining 
those features of art that are challenged, negated, or successfully canceled 
by the various movements of a r t such as the ones mentioned above. (3) 
is a summary of the assumed features of the traditional view and the art 
movements t h a t cancel them. 
(3) A work of art: 
Represents objective reality (canceled by impressionism, expressionism, surrealism); 
Should evoke objective and rational thoughts (canceled by symbolism, surrealism); 
Is representational, i.e., it consists of natural figures and forms (canceled by sym-
bolism, cubism, abstract art); 
Is made by means of certain canonical activities (canceled by constructivism); 
Uses certain canonical techniques (canceled by impressionism); 
Uses canonical materials (canceled by constructivism); 
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Uses canonical themes (canceled by constructivism, social realism, pop art); 
Uses objects that are elevated, that belong to "high" culture (canceled by pop art); 
Is for the elite of society (canceled by pop art); 
Is for display (canceled by conceptual art); 
Is a physical object (canceled by conceptual art). 
As can be seen, even those features of ar t that many would take to 
be definitional for all forms of art (such as the one t h a t art represents 
objective reality, the one tha t it is representational, and the one t h a t it 
is some kind of physical object) can be explicitly negated and effectively 
canceled. T h a t is, it is not simply the case that someone at some point 
challenged a feature of the definition, bu t tha t the challenge was actually 
successful to the degree tha t a new ar t movement was born out of t he 
successful new definition. 
Given the analysis of what these a r t movements challenge, negate, 
or cancel 011 the basis of the Encyclopedia Britannica, certain features of 
the traditional view of ar t emerge: 
- First, according to the traditional view, art imitates, represents, or 
models, objective reality. It is also an aspect of this view tha t the 
more faithful the resemblance is, t he better the work of art. 
Second, a work of ar t should evoke objective and rational thoughts. 
These come from the representations of objective reality. 
- Third, a work of art is representational in the sense that it mirrors 
reality by representations (e.g., painted objects and events) that the 
audience can recognize and understand (e.g., the object represented 
is a man, a tree, a clog). In other words, the figures and forms of a 
work of ar t are natural figures and forms. 
- Fourth, a work of ar t is such that certain canonical activities, tech-
niques, and materials are used t h a t lead to a final product — the 
work of ar t . For example, a painter paints a painting using certain 
materials and techniques, and a sculptor sculpts a sculpture using 
different materials and techniques. 
- Fifth, works of art are about something; they have a theme. In 
the tradit ional view, the theme is of ten something elevated, such as 
death, freedom, love. 
- Sixth, the themes typically belong to "high" culture, not "low" cul-
ture. In addition, the audience of works of art is generally the elite 
of society. 
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- Seventh, a work of ar t is typically for display or exhibition or sale 
in certain designated places, such as museums, galleries, auctions, 
concert halls, etc. 
- Eighth, a work of ar t is a physical ob j ec t—an object that can be 
seen, touched, read, or heard. 
Based on these features, we could say t h a t we have to do with art: 
(4) when someone models reality by means of certain natural representations of it 
by making use of certain activities, materials, techniques, and when the result-
ing physical product is about something important for especially those who are 
educated enough to understand it and who can experience the physical product 
in certain designated places. 
In a way, this sounds like a plausible definition of the traditional view 
of art. We could conservatively claim t h a t this is what "real" art i s— 
all the other forms of ar t being extensions from it. We can think of t he 
definition as providing a prototype of a r t for many people. 
But the main point of the previous sketchy survey of art history is 
that there are always people who clo not accept this definition. They 
can constantly challenge, undermine, or plainly negate every one of these 
features. In other words, the features given are not essential ones for 
art. If they were essential, they could not be so easily challenged and 
canceled. Without them, the category of art should collapse. But it 
does not seem to collapse; instead, it has been around for centuries. I t 
thrives as newer and newer definitions are given for it. In sum, we can 
suggest tha t for many people the concept of art has a central member— 
the traditional conception—and many non-central ones. The non-central 
ones may become the prototypes of ar t for some people, and then these 
new prototypes can be further challenged. 
We do not have space to present more of the analysis here, bu t it 
should be clear by now tha t the category of art is what philosophers of 
language call an "essentially contested concept". Such concepts assume 
a prototype-based organization, and it is their very s tructure that invites 
contestation. The nature of the widespread phenomenon of cultural and 
social debates can only be understood if we study and understand the 
nature of our categories tha t give rise to the phenomenon by virtue of 
their very structure. 
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3. Knowledge organization: 
frame semantics and cultural issues 
Much of our knowledge about the world comes from the categories we 
have. Categories are mentally represented as frames, schémas, or models 
(see, e.g., Schank-Abelson 1977; Fillmore 1982; Langacker 1987; Lakoff 
1987). The terminology is varied (see Andor 1985), but the idea behind 
it is roughly the same. We can use the following working definition of 
frames: A frame is a structured mental representation of a coherent or-
ganization of human experience. Perhaps the best known slogan for this 
idea is Fillmore's paradigm-setting statement: "Meanings are relativized 
to scenes [i.e., frames]." Additional characteristics of frames include that 
in most cases they are not defined by necessary and sufficient features 
and tha t they often consist of several entities related to particular ac-
tions or events. An early a t t empt to look at meaning in language in 
this light is Fillmore's case grammar, which he later developed into his 
"frame semantics". 
However, these ideas become important in the study of almost any 
facet of l i fe—and not just language. We are trying to make sense of 
the world even when we are not consciously aware of this, and the world 
as we experience it is always the product of some prior categorization 
and framing by ourselves and others. As a mat ter of fact, it is now a 
well established fact in cognitive linguistics and psychology t h a t different 
individuals can interpret the "same" reality in different ways. This is the 
idea tha t became known in cognitive linguistics as "alternative construal" 
(see, e.g., Langacker 1987). 
Below I present two brief case studies to show that t he notion of 
frame, or schema, or model takes us way beyond issues in grammar or 
language in general. (The case studies are discussed in more detail in 
Kövecses, in preparation.) I worked out the first example on the basis of 
Eve Sweetser's lecture notes to her "Language and Mind" course and used 
it in my own course when I taught the same course at UC Berkeley. Here 
is the basic issue: How do we categorize the various objects and events 
we encounter in the world? Clearly, most of our categories are based on 
similarity (especially family resemblance) among members of a category. 
Tha t is, many categories are held together by family resemblances among 
the items that belong to a particular category. In this sense, most of 
our conventional categories for objects and events are similarity-based 
ones. For example, the things t ha t one can buy in a store are commonly 
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categorized based on their similarity to each other; thus, we find various 
kinds of nails (short and long ones, thick and th in ones, etc.) in the 
same section of a hardware store. They form a similarity-based category. 
However, we can also find nails in other sections of the store. Some nails 
can occur in sections where, for example, things for hanging pictures are 
displayed. Clearly, a nail is not similar to any of the possible things 
(such as picture frames, rings, short strings, adhesive tapes, maybe even 
a special hammer) displayed in this section. How is it possible tha t 
certain nails appear in this section? Or, to put it in our terms, how is it 
possible tha t nails are put in the same category wi th these other things? 
The answer is that in addition to similarity-based categories, we also have 
"frame-based" ones. T h a t is to say, categories can be formed on the basis 
of which things go commonly and repeatedly together in our experience. 
If we put up pictures on the wall by first driving a nail into the wall 
and then hanging the picture frame on the nail by means of attaching a 
metal ring or a string on the frame, then all the things that we use for 
this purpose may be placed in a single category. But this category will 
be frame-based — not similarity-based. 
As my second example, consider a case that I read about in the San 
Francisco Chronicle in the spring of 2003. The example has to do with 
how framing plays a crucial role in seemingly straightforward matters, 
such as who should be considered one's mother in particular real-life 
situations. Let us take the story of a Hungarian-born couple living in the 
San Francisco Bay Area in California, whose story was reported in the San 
Francisco Chronicle (May 10, 2003). A 56-year-olcl woman, called Ilona, 
married a man called Istvan. This was her second marriage. She had two 
adult daughters from the previous marriage. They decided to have a child 
of their own, but their only option was for Ilona to conceive through in 
vitro fertilization by having viable eggs implanted in her uterus. The egg 
donor was Ilona's older daughter, Cecilia, aged 28. Nine months after the 
successful fertilization, Ilona gave bi r th to a healthy baby called Monica. 
The San Francisco Chronicle writes: 
(5) In the giddy af te rmath oi the birth, by cesarean section, Istvan looked at his wile 
cradling the newborn swathed in blankets, smiled a t his stepdaughter looking on 
írom alar, and asked the question tha t many still pose: "What is she, a mother 
or grandmother?" 
How come he wasn't sure? We have a situation here in which an adult 
man whose wife just gave birth to a child using his genetic materials does 
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not know whether his wife is a mother! How can th is be? In light of the 
present section, we can suspect wha t the answer is. The complex frame 
of motherhood contains five submodels (Lakoff 1987). The prototypical 
mother is the woman who gives bi r th to the child; who nurtures the 
child; who provides the genetic materials; who is the father's wife; and 
who is one generation older than the child. The doubt can arise for Istvan 
because Ilona did not provide the genetic materials of the child; it was 
provided by her own daughter, Cecilia. This shows that the lack of one 
feature characterizing prototypical mothers can be sufficient grounds for 
questioning motherhood. 
But there are fur ther puzzles t h a t emerge f rom the situation. How 
does Cecilia think of Monica? W h a t is the relationship between Ilona's 
adult daughter, Cecilia, and her new infant daughter, Monica? That 
this is not simply theoretical speculation can be gathered from the same 
article: 
(6) One look at Monica, and Cecilia's maternal feelings surfaced. She said she didn't 
expect such a reaction. Throughout the pregnancy, Cecilia referred to Monica as 
her sister. Afterward, she started feeling as if Monica were her daughter. 
Cecilia has real maternal feelings, although in many ways she is not 
the mother; she did not give birth to the child, she is not nurturing the 
baby, and she is not the father's wife. Is she entit led to such feelings? 
She can reasonably argue that she provided part of t he baby's genes, and 
so she is a mother. Would she also say that the baby has two mothers? 
We do not know, but it would not be an unreasonable idea either. 
Moreover, to complicate the si tuation further, Cecilia is expecting 
a new baby of her own. The bi r th of the baby will pose a question 
concerning the relationship between Cecilia's new baby and Ilona: Will 
Ilona become a grandmother for the first time or t he second time? This 
will depend on whether we categorize Monica as Ilona's or Cecilia's child. 
Finally, what will be the relationship between Cecilia's new baby and 
Ilona's baby, Monica? Will they be sisters, or will Monica be t he aunt 
of Cecilia's new baby? Again, this depends on whether we take Cecilia 
to be Monica's mother or not. 
As this example shows, categorization and framing can have other 
than a referential function and significance. How we categorize and f rame 
entities may determine how we feel and, conversely, the feelings we have 
toward entities may influence the way we categorize them. All of this 
is possible because we have a flexible conceptual system, which can give 
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rise to a number of different ways of conceptualizing the "same" situation. 
Categorization and framing are ways of th inking about the world, some 
of our most impor tant "construal operations". With their help, we make 
sense of the world, but, as the example indicates, at times they can also 
make this understanding difficult and puzzling. 
4. Metonymie thought: 
m e t o n y m y in language and social thought 
Cognitive linguists do not th ink of metonymy as a superfluous linguistic 
device whose only function is to avoid literalism and to make the ex-
pression of meaning more varied. Kövecses and Radden (1998) offer the 
definition of metonymy as follows: 
(7) Metonymy is a cognitive process in which a conceptual element, or entity (thing, 
event, property), the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity 
(thing, event, property), the target , within the same frame, or idealized cognitive 
model (юм) . 
Thus, for example, given the R E S T A U R A N T f rame, or idealized model, the 
speaker of the sentence "The ham sandwich spilled beer all over him-
self" directs at tention, or provides mental access, to the conceptual el-
ement P E R S O N E A T I N G T H E H A M S A N D W I C H (target) through the use 
of another conceptual element H A M S A N D W I C H (vehicle) t h a t belongs to 
the same frame. (There has been an upsurge in the cognitive linguistic 
study of metonymy in recent years; for extensive collections of papers, see 
Panther-Radden 1999; Barcelona 2000; Dirven-Pörings 2002; Pan ther -
Thornburg 2003. For research concentrated on metonymy, see, among 
others, Brdar-Brdar-Szabó 2003; Brdar-Szabó-Brdar 2003; Ruiz de Men-
cloza Ibanez 2000.) 
As we mentioned previously, our knowledge of the world comes in 
the form of s t ructured frames, schémas, or I C M S . These can be construed 
as wholes wi th parts. Since frames are conceptualized as wholes tha t 
have parts, there are two general configurations of wholes and parts tha t 
give rise to metonymy-producing relationships: the "whole and its parts" 
configuration and the "part and part" configuration. A variety of specific 
metonymy-producing relationships can be observed within both configu-
rations (for details, see Kövecses-Radden 1998; Radden-Kövecses 1999). 
We can th ink of categories themselves as having a part-whole struc-
ture. One example of this is the C A T E G O R Y - A N D - P R O P E R T Y I C M . In 
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the case of categories, the most important pa r t is the properties used to 
define the category. The category as a whole has properties as parts. 
In the sentence in (8), the first "boys" indicates the category of boys 
as a whole, while the second indicates the typical qualities, or features, 
of boys, such as 'being unruly' (i.e., we have the metonymy CATEGORY 
FOR PROPERTY). 
(8) Boys will be boys. 
Tha t is to say, a quality, or property, of boys ('being unruly') is made 
reference to by the second use of "boys" t ha t captures the category as a 
whole. Incidentally, this analysis shows tha t sentences like Boys will be 
boys do not represent empty tautologies, as would be the case in many 
other approaches to meaning. 
The reverse can also occur in the case of the category-and-property 
frame. A property can stand for the entire category. Consider a sentence 
like (9). 
(9) African-Americans were once called blacks. 
Here we have the metonymy PROPERTY FOR THE CATEGORY. As a mat-
ter of fact, the metonymy applies twice in t he sentence—both African-
Americans and blacks are instances of it. Euphemisms (as well as dis-
phemisms) are of ten based on this specific type of metonymy. As the 
example shows, the conceptual structure of the euphemism is the same 
in both cases (i.e., PROPERTY FOR THE CATEGORY). What changes are 
the connotations t ha t go together with the particular property that re-
places the old one (African-American does not , as yet, have the negative 
connotations of black). 
Another kind of metonymy involves a category and a member of 
the category. This works within the CATEGORY-AND-MEMBER ICM. The 
category itself is viewed as a whole, while the members are the parts. The 
relationship between the whole category and a member is often reversible, 
as can be seen in the examples to follow: 
(10) (a) She's on the pill. (CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER) 
( b ) D o y o u h a v e a n a s p i r i n ? (A MEMBER FOR T H E CATEGORY) 
In (10a), the whole category of pills stands for a particular member of 
the category, namely, contraceptive pills, whereas in (10b) a particular 
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member of a category (i.e., aspirin) stands for the entire category of 
pain-relievers. 
This type of metonymy plays an important role in accounting for not 
only certain linguistic phenomena b u t also for various aspects of human 
thought, such as which members of categories lead to prototype effects 
(i.e., the effect that some members of categories are judged to be better 
examples of a category than others), how we reason about the world, why 
we have the social expectations we do, and the like. The survey below 
is based on Lakoff's (1987) work. 
First , consider again the category of mother. We noted t h a t the 
prototype of mother is a woman who gave birth to you, who nurtures 
you, who provided your genetic materials, who is your father's wife, and 
who is one generation older than you are. In other words, when the 
basic models converge in a particular case to form a complex model for 
mother, we have a very good example of mother. Here the prototype 
effect is produced by the convergence of the basic models. Bu t let us 
assume tha t we have a large number of such mothers where t he basic 
models are all present and let us assume that some of these mothers have 
a job and go out to work, while some others do not have a job, they are 
housewives. If we ask a large number of people whether those mothers 
are bet ter examples of the category that go out to work or those who 
are housewives, the likely answer is going to be: the housewives. Why 
is this the case? 
The answer is t h a t stereotypical members tend to be looked at as 
bet ter examples of a category t h a n less or non-stereotypical members. 
The housewife mother is one such stereotype. Thus, we have an addi-
tional source of prototype effects. Among all the members of the mother 
category tha t are characterized by the five basic models, some category 
members are better examples t h a n others: this is the housewife mother 
stereotype. This stereotype is defined in relation to one of t he basic 
models tha t characterize the category: the nurturance model. Further-
more, this is an unnamed category member. There is no conventional 
name for housewife mothers; Lakoff simply used housewife mother to 
be able to talk about this part icular category member, but it is not a 
conventional way of referring to such mothers. However, the contrastive 
category member of mothers who go out to work does have a conven-
tional name: working mother. Working mother is defined in contrast to 
the housewife mother stereotype. I t is usually the case that more pro-
totypical members of a category do not have special, distinctive names, 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
A BROAD VIEW OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 147 
whereas category members that are considered less prototypical do. This 
is what happens in the case of housewife mother and working mother. 
In addition to being additional sources of prototype effects, stereo-
types also define many of our social expectations. This is why under 
normal circumstances we are more likely to use sentences such as She 's a 
mother, but she is not a housewife than She's a mother, but she is a house-
wife. The conjunction but is used to cancel our expectations concerning 
what we expect mothers to be like. The same applies to many other cat-
egories, such as husband, bachelor, mother-in-law, Italians, Jews, East 
Europeans, and so forth. Thus the analysis of metonymy may be an 
important diagnostic tool in discovering our social prejudices. 
Second, if a category has some very commonly occurring members, 
these can acquire special s tatus in tha t they can produce prototype ef-
fects. For example, in the case of the category of birds, such typical mem-
bers include robins, sparrows, swallows, etc. in North America. T h a t is 
to say, typical members can stand for the category as a whole. Moreover, 
typical members play an interesting role in reasoning. In one experiment, 
people were told tha t there is an island where there are some typical birds 
(like robins and sparrows) and some non-typical ones (like ducks). The 
subjects were asked: If the robins and sparrows have a disease, would the 
ducks get it? The answer was yes. They were also asked: If the ducks 
have a disease, would the robins and sparrows get it? The answer was 
no. In other words, there was an asymmetry in making inferences based 
on prototypical and non-prototypical members. This is metonymy-based 
reasoning. 
Third, ideal members within a category also have a special s ta tus . It 
is a common phenomenon that when we think of some category, we have 
in mind an ideal member of tha t category. When we think about who we 
want to marry, we have ideal husbands and wives in mind; when we are 
teenagers, we want to have a special kind of love: ideal love; when we are 
planning to buy a car, we often think (or daydream) about an ideal car; 
and so on. Tha t is to say, categories such as husband, wife, love, car, job, 
have ideal members and they can stand for the entire category. And as 
the examples show, we also use them to set goals. The ideal members of 
categories can often dictate how we act in the world and what emotions 
we have as a result of these actions. 
Fourth, a single individual member of a category can also s tand for 
the whole category. This happens in the case of paragons. A paragon 
is an individual tha t is an ideal. For example, in the US the paragon 
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of baseball players is still Babe Ruth or Joe DiMaggio for many people. 
Paragons also play an important cognitive role: We often imitate them 
and have a great deal of interest in them. Let it suffice to mention just 
a few additional examples of paragons like Diana, Prince Charles, and 
Madonna. It is this interest in paragons t h a t the business world often 
capitalizes on. Paragons can thus have a pervasive social effect and can 
be capitalized on for business purposes. 
Fifth, and finally, categories often have "salient members". Salient 
members commonly stand out among category members by virtue of a 
particular proper ty that they have. They can also determine how we 
think about other category members. If a particular type of airplane 
crashes (let us say a DC-10), people will avoid this type of airplane for 
a while as their means of travel, no mat ter how safe DC-10s in general 
are. In other words, salient members of a category are routinely used in 
thought: We generalize from salient examples to other examples of the 
category. Needles to say, this can also result in a variety of social and 
economic effects. 
In conclusion, métonymie thought pervades the way we think about 
the social and cultural world. In addition, it can have a variety of social, 
cultural and economic effects, and can influence what we take to be the 
real world. In other words, the importance and effect of the cognitive 
process of metonymy extends way beyond language and seems to be at 
the core of how we act in our social and cultural worlds. 
5. Metaplioric thought: 
metaphor in language, mind , and politics 
Beginning with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) seminal book, Metaphors 
we live by, cognitive linguistics opened up a new front in the study of 
language and the mind. This is perhaps t he best known chapter in the 
history of cognitive linguistics (for an overview, see Kövecses 2002). In 
essence, the theory maintains that metaphor is a cognitive process in 
which one domain of experience (A) is understood in terms of another 
domain of experience (в). Metaphor consists of a source (в) and target 
domain (A) such tha t the source is a more physical and the target a more 
abstract kind of domain. Examples of source and target domains include 
the following: Source domains: WARMTH, BUILDING, WAR, JOURNEY; 
target domains: AFFECTION, THEORY, ARGUMENT, LIFE. Thus we get 
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conceptual metaphors: AFFECTION IS WARMTH; THEORIES ARE BUILD-
INGS; A R G U M E N T is WAR, LIFE IS A J O U R N E Y . What this means is tha t 
the concepts of AFFECTION, THEORY, A R G U M E N T , and LIFE are com-
prehended via the concepts of WARMTH, BUILDING, WAR, and JOURNEY, 
respectively. 
Why do particular target concepts go together with particular source 
concepts? The traditional answer to this question is t ha t there is some 
kind of similarity between the two concepts; tha t is, concept A is similar 
to concept в in some respect. While cognitive linguists accept this kind 
of motivation for certain metaphors, they also take into account another 
kind of motivation for many other metaphors. The choice of a particular 
source to go with a particular target can also be motivated by some 
embodied experience. 
Consider as an example the metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH. We 
can suggest tha t we find this metaphor na tura l because the feeling of 
affection correlates with bodily warmth. We experience such embodied 
correlation very early on in life. To be hugged and to be close to our 
first caretaker produces this kind of warmth tha t gives us comfort and 
eventually the feeling of affection. This example shows t h a t the correla-
tion between the experience of affection and tha t of warmth need not be 
conscious. As a matter of fact, it is characteristic of such embodied expe-
riences that they are not conscious most of the time. We experience such 
correlations in bodily experience pre-conceptually and pre-linguistically. 
As another example, consider heat. Heat and warmth are of course 
related, in that they are both descriptions of temperature, but as far as 
bodily motivation for metaphor is concerned, they are quite different. 
Tha t is to say, they motivate very different conceptual metaphors. Imag-
ine the following situation. You are working hard, let us say sawing or 
chopping wood, or you are doing some vigorous exercise, like running or 
aerobics. After a while you're beginning to work up heat , you will feel 
hot, and maybe begin to sweat. We can say tha t the vigorous bodily 
activity produces an increase in body heat. Typically, when you engage 
in vigorous bodily activity, your body will respond in this way. Similarly, 
when you are very angry, or when you have strong sexual feelings, or 
when you are under strong psychological pressure, your body may also 
produce an increase in body heat that manifests itself physiologically in 
a variety of ways. In all of these cases, the increase in the intensity of an 
activity or s tate goes together with an increase in body heat , and your 
body responds this way automatically. The correlation between the in-
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crease in the intensity of the activity or the state, on the one hand, and 
the production of body heat, on the other , is inevitable for the kinds of 
bodies t h a t we have. We can't help undergoing the correlation between 
intensity (of these activities and states) and body heat . This correlation 
forms the basis of a linguistic and conceptual metaphor: INTENSITY IS 
HEAT. But the correlation is at the level of the body, and it is in this sense 
that metaphor is just as much in the body as it is in language or thought . 
Since INTENSITY is an aspect of many concepts, the source domain 
of heat will apply to many concepts, such as ANGER, LOVE, LUST, WORK, 
ARGUMENT, etc. In general, we suggest that many conceptual metaphors 
(i.e., source and target pairings) are motivated by such bodily correlations 
in experience. 
As was mentioned, in the tradit ional view of metaphor similarity is 
the main motivation for bringing together two concepts in a metaphori-
cal relationship. One frequently mentioned example in the l i terature to 
justify the view that metaphors are based on similarity is: "Achilles was 
a lion." It is proposed tha t Achilles and lions share a property, namely, 
that of being brave. This similarity gives rise to the metaphor. 
Let us look at some other examples where the basis of metaphor can 
be claimed to be some kind of similarity. Take a passage from the San 
Francisco Chronicle analyzed by Kövecses (in preparation): 
(11) Last fall, in a radio interview with a San Diego radio s ta t ion and later on CNN's 
Larry King Live, [singer Harry] Belafonte likened Secretary of State Colin Powell 
to a plantat ion hand who moves into t h e master 's house, in this case t h e Whi te 
House, and only suppor t s policies t h a t will please his mas ter , President Bush. 
In (11), one of the things tha t Belafonte knows about Powell is t ha t Powell 
is an African-American. Since slaves were also African-Americans, it is 
easy for Belafonte to set up the metaphor , or more exactly, metaphorical 
analogy. We can assume tha t this fea ture shared by Powell and the slaves 
helps trigger the particular analogy. In other words, a feature (being an 
African-American) tha t is shared by an element of the target (in this case, 
Powell) and an element of the source (the slaves) help the speaker arrive 
at an extensive set of analogical relationships between source and target. 
But in many other cases the shared element is not such an obvious 
feature. Often, the target and the source are characterized by similar 
structural relations—without any shared features of the communicative 
situation that might trigger the recognition of the shared relations (such 
as in the case above) (see, e.g., Gentner 1983; Holyoak-Thagard 1996; 
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Glucksberg-Keysar 1993). For example, we can find shared generic-
level structure in such domains as HUMAN LIFETIME and the LIFE-CYCLE 
OF PLANTS. This structure would include, for instance, something like: 
"living organisms have a period of their existence when they are most 
active" (whatever this means either for people or for plants) and "living 
organisms decline after this period". This case is of course a highly 
c o n v e n t i o n a l m e t a p h o r : THE HUMAN LIFETIME IS THE LIFE-CYCLE OF A 
PLANT. But the same kind of analogy accounts for any number of similar 
metaphors. Take, for instance, the metaphor used by Harry Belafonte. 
We would not need any explicit triggers to say of an especially servile 
secretary of s ta te or minister tha t he or she is a slave, thus evoking 
the GOVERNMENT IS A PLANTATION metaphor in which the president 
or prime minister is the master and the secretaries of state or ministers 
are the slaves. This is because we have the ability to recognize shared 
generic-level s tructure such as "inferiors are servile to superiors in order 
to please them" in distinct domains. 
In summary, we can think of embodiment and similarity as different 
kinds of constraint on the creation of metaphor. Embodiment seems 
to be a stronger kind of constraint, in tha t it works automatically and 
unconsciously. 
The idea tha t metaphors can be motivated by correlations in bodily 
experience has given rise to a "neural theory of metaphor". It is the 
brain that runs the body, and if metaphor is in the body it must also 
be in the brain. Embodied experience results in certain neural connec-
tions between areas of the brain (these areas corresponding to source 
and target). For example, it may be suggested that when the area of 
the brain corresponding to affection is activated, the area corresponding 
to warmth is also activated. The assumption in recent neuroscientific 
studies (see, for example, Gallese-Lakoff 2003) is that when we under-
stand abstract concepts metaphorically, two groups of neurons in the 
brain are activated at the same time; when one group of neurons fires 
(the source), another group of neurons fires as well (the target) . We 
can then assume that , for example, neurons corresponding to intensity 
and heat, respectively, are activated together in the brain when we think 
about the abstract concept of intensity in connection with certain events, 
activities, and states. Similarly, when we think about abstract amounts, 
such as prices, the neurons corresponding to amount and those corre-
sponding to verticality (up-down) are co-activatecl in the brain. These 
co-activations of groups of neurons yield what are known as primary con-
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ceptual metaphors INTENSITY is HEAT and MORE is UP (LESS IS DOWN). 
(On "primary metaphors", see Grady 1997.) 
In which parts of the brain are the two domains located? According 
to this paradigm of research, the source domain is located in the sensory-
motor system, whereas the target domain is found in higher cortical areas. 
This idea is the neuroscience version of the notion of the embodiment of 
metaphor, which s ta tes that source domains typically come from more 
concrete and physical sensory-motor experience, while target domains 
are less physical in nature. 
American discourse about morality often involves two foundational 
conceptual metaphors (Lakoff 1996): (i) MORALITY IS STRENGTH (cf. 
(12)) and (ii) MORALITY IS NURTURANCE (cf. (13)) . (This section is 
based on Kövecses 2002; in preparation.) 
( 1 2 ) BEING GOOD IS BEING UPRIGHT 
BEING BAD IS BEING LOW 
DOING EVIL IS FALLING 
EVIL IS A FORCE 
MORALITY IS STRENGTH 
According to this metaphorical system of morality, evil can act on an up-
right person who can either fall (become bad) or remain upright (remain 
good). The evil can be either an external or an internal force. External 
evil may be a dangerous situation tha t causes fear. Internal evil may be, 
for example, the seven deadly sins. In either case, a moral person would 
apply a counterforce in an effort to overcome the force of evil and would 
be successful in overcoming it. Thus, in this view, moral "strength" is 
based on the notion of physical strength. 
( 1 3 ) THE COMMUNITY IS A FAMILY 
MORAL AGENTS A R E NURTURING PARENTS 
PEOPLE NEEDING HELP ARE CHILDREN NEEDING NURTURANCE 
MORAL ACTION IS NURTURANCE 
In this second set of metaphors, morality appears to be more of an "other-
directed" issue t han a "self-directed" one. Whereas in the "strength" 
metaphor there is only a single moral agent, in the nurturance version 
there are two—people who need help and people who have a responsibil-
ity to provide tha t help. As Lakoff (1996) notes, it is not the case tha t 
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the two metaphors exclude each other in the actual practice of morality 
in everyday life. They are used together on most occasions, but different 
people may give different priorities to them. For some people, morality 
is primarily defined in terms of the MORALITY IS STRENGTH metaphor, 
whereas for others it is defined mostly in terms of MORALITY IS NUR-
TURANCE. 
In Lakoff's (1996) account, the different priorities t ha t people give 
to the two metaphors explain two conceptions of American politics — 
conserva t i sm a n d l iberal ism. If one considers t h e MORALITY IS STRENGTH 
metaphor as more important , this person is likely to be attracted to 
conservative ideas and ideals in politics. On the other hand, if someone 
considers the "nurturance" metaphor more important as regards morality, 
this person is more likely to be a liberal as far as political issues are 
concerned. Why? The link between one's moral and political views 
is provided by a metaphor for the concept of nation mentioned above: 
A NATION or SOCIETY IS A FAMILY. Society is conventionally viewed 
as a family with the state as a parent and citizens as children. The 
two views of morality that were briefly outlined above imply different 
conceptions of what a family is (Lakoff 1996). In the "moral strength" 
metaphor, the family consists of independent and self-reliant individuals 
and morality is taught and learned primarily through discipline (to resist 
evil). Lakoff characterizes this view of the family in an interview as 
follows (UCBerkeley News, October 27, 2003): 
(14) The conservative worldview, the strict fa ther model, assumes tha t the world is 
dangerous and difficult and t h a t children are born bad and must be made good. 
The strict fa ther is the moral authori ty who supports and defends the family, 
tells his wife what to do, and teaches his kids right from wrong. The only way 
to do tha t is through painful discipline—physical punishment t h a t by adul thood 
will become internal discipline. The good people are the disciplined people. Once 
grown, the self-reliant, disciplined children are on their own. Those children who 
remain dependent (who were spoiled, overly willful, or recalcitrant) should be 
forced to undergo further discipline or be cu t free with no suppor t to face the 
discipline of the outside world. 
By contrast, in the "nurturance" metaphor the family consists of people 
who have a moral obligation to help each other to begin with. In this 
view of the family, morality is taught and learned less through discipline 
than through nurturance. Again in Lakoff's words (UCBerkeley News, 
October 27, 2003): 
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(15) . . . the progressive worldview is modeled on a nur turant parent family. Briefly, 
it assumes tha t the world is basically good and can be made bet ter and t h a t one 
must work toward tha t . Children are born good; parents can make them bet te r . 
Nurtur ing involves empathy, and the responsibility to take care of oneself and 
others for whom we are responsible. On a larger scale, specific policies follow, 
such as governmental protection in form of a social safety net and government reg-
ulation, universal education (to ensure competence, fairness), civil liberties and 
equal t rea tment (fairness and freedom), accountability (derived from t rus t ) , pub-
lic service (from responsibility), open government (from open communication), 
and the promotion of an economy t h a t benefits all and funct ions to promote these 
values, which are t radi t ional progressive values in American politics. 
Now the priorities given to the two metaphors will have implications 
for one's political views because the two conceptions of the family and 
morality will influence one's view of the nation as a family. The metaphor-
based notion of morality will have different consequences for one's polit-
ical views. Morality and politics will fuse into moral politics; hence the 
title of Lakoff's book: Moral politics. 
This analysis of metaphor in American politics shows very clearly 
tha t metaphor is at the heart of society and culture. To think of metaphor 
as merely a linguistic device is to ignore its pervasive role in what we take 
to be core cultural and social phenomena. 
6. Image-schemas: understanding l iterature 
Much of our knowledge is not prepositional but image-schematic. John-
son defines image schémas in the following way: An image schema is 
"a recurring, dynamic pat tern of our perceptual interactions and motor 
programs that gives coherence to our experience" (Johnson 1987, xix). 
Image schémas function as the foundation of thought. To demonstrate 
what image schémas are, how they emerge, and how they perform their 
function in structuring thought, let us consider some examples. 
First, let us take the CONTAINER image schema (Lakoff 1987). The 
bodily experiences tha t motivate the existence of this schema are varied, 
but they can be reduced to two general types of experience. On the one 
hand, we have bodies tha t are containers (of body organs, fluids, etc.). 
On the other hand, not only are our bodies containers, bu t we function as 
container-objects in other larger objects. Thus, these larger objects, like 
buildings, rooms, contain us. The CONTAINER image schema has the fol-
lowing structural elements: INTERIOR, BOUNDARY, and EXTERIOR. The 
basic logic of the schema can be given as follows: Everything is either 
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inside the container or outside it. Moreover, if В is in A, and С is in 
B, then one can conclude tha t С is in A. Thus the CONTAINER schema 
imposes a certain logic on us. There are many metaphors that are based 
on the CONTAINER schema. For example, STATES ARE CONTAINERS, P E R -
SONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE CONTAINERS, a n d THE VISUAL FIELD IS A 
CONTAINER. This is why we can be in trouble, we are in love, and things 
come into view. 
Second, let us look at the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (Lakoff 1987). 
The bodily experience t ha t motivates the schema is the most common 
(and unconscious) type of experience: Whenever we move, we move from 
a place to another place along a sequence of continuous locations. The 
structural elements include SOURCE, PATH, GOAL (DESTINATION ) , and 
DIRECTION. The basic logic is hardly noticeable: If you go from A 
to B, then you must pass through each intermediate point connecting 
A and B. Again, several metaphors are based 011 this image schema. 
Take the complex metaphor of LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which assumes the 
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. A mapping (and a submetaphor) of this 
complex metaphor is PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, in which we also 
have a SOURCE, a PATH, and a GOAL. As a matter of fact, it is this 
second pr imary metaphor tha t provides some of the motivation for the 
more complex one. Complex events are also commonly viewed as involv-
ing an initial state—SOURCE, intermediate stages—PATHS, and a final 
state — GOAL. 
Third, consider now the image schema of FORCE, as studied exten-
sively by Talmy (1988; 2000). A large port ion of our utterances about the 
world can be accounted for by making reference to such notions as ago-
nist, antagonist, force tendency of agonist, etc. Kövecses (2000) applies 
this conceptual machinery to the study of the folk theory of the mind; in 
particular to such components of the mind as emotion, morality, and ra-
tional thought. Based on the study of the language we use to talk about 
the mind, he suggests tha t all three components can be described in force 
dynamic terms. In other words, the workings of the mind can be seen 
as interactions of forces. The rational "self-agonist" undergoes change in 
emotion, the rational "self-agonist" withstands change in morality, and 
the rational "self-antagonist" causes change in thought. What is of any 
interest in such a description? After all, everyone knows that emotion is 
different from morality and that rational thought is different from both. 
But this is not the point. Wha t is remarkable about the analysis in terms 
of force dynamics is that it shows that the basic cognitive "architecture" 
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of emotion, morality, and rational thought is so much alike. They are all 
constituted force dynamically, and this shows that "superficially" very 
different domains, or faculties, of the folk theory of the mind have a deep 
underlying similarity on which the many obvious differences are based. 
It is an interesting feature of thought tha t we can conceptualize do-
mains and situations by means of not jus t one but several image schémas. 
For example, force dynamic image schémas can interact with perceptual 
image schémas: We can have a FORCE inside a CONTAINER. Forces inside 
containers are fairly common as metaphorical ways of conceptualizing the 
mind. It was shown by Kövecses (1990) t ha t this was a major metaphor 
used by Sigmund Freud in his psychoanalytic theory. 
It is quite remarkable that we can find something similar in t he 
case of the image schematic understanding of stories. Tha t stories and 
discourse in general are commonly understood by means of image schémas 
was noticed in the cognitive linguistic literature, for example, by Palmer 
(1996). Much subsequent work also relies on this general idea (see, for 
example, Kimmel 2001). 
As a demonstration of the role of image schémas in understanding 
and remembering a plot, Michael Kimmel uses Joseph Conrad's novel 
Heart of Darkness. Kimmel describes the gist of the story as follows: 
(16) In the novel, Marlow, a seaman and wanderer , recounts a s teamboat expedit ion 
into deep African terr i tory in search of the enigmatic Mr. Kurtz who is t h e 
company 's agent at the ' Inner Station' , a t rad ing outpost . T h e story is s i tua ted 
around the tu rn from t h e 19th to the 20th century in the Congo, which was a t 
tha t t ime a private proper ty of the Belgian King Léopold and marked by r a m p a n t 
forced labor and vicious exploitation of t h e natives. The narra t ive 's thrus t goes 
quite literally towards Kur t z who is t he goal of the gradual penetration into a 
strange, dangerous and unfathomable terr i tory. Kurtz has imposed a surreal 
order of terror and char isma among the natives. He is a man of captivating and 
demonic force who has signed a Faustian pac t and is being worshipped as a god, 
yet t roubled. When Marlow finds him, he is on the verge of madness and d e a t h 
and experiencing great inner turmoil. Marlow himself is changed in the s t ruggle 
to comprehend his experience with this once exceptional and now tormented 
man who has looked into his own nature , t he dark side of his passions. Having 
succumbed to alien and yet strangely familiar forces in the zone of proximity 
between culturalized humani ty and an archaic 'Other ' , Kur tz dies with the words 
"The horror! The horror!" on his lips. Back from his experience Marlow visits 
Kur tz ' s fiancée in Brussels, bu t conceals t h e t ru th about his fall from grace and 
his last words from her. It is apparent t h a t while the ta le 's overall s t ruc ture is 
tha t of a literal journey, metaphorically it is a journey to the limits of the h u m a n 
soul, a double-entendre t h a t becomes evident in the very ti t le. 
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Kimmel suggests tha t "the most fundamental macrostructural function of 
image schémas is the creation by readers of a condensed representation 
for use in plot recall." Tha t is to say, as we read the text , we try to 
construct a network of image schémas tha t are based on the description 
of the literal journey, the various force metaphors used, and the many 
symbolic meanings that transpire from the novel. Kimmel proposes a 
diagrammatic representation of our global understanding of the text as 
in Fig. 1. 
F O R C E 
opposition • 
Fig. 1 
The line with an arrow image-schematically represents the literal journey 
into Africa. The circles image-schematically represent Europe and Africa, 
respectively. Europe is an "out-space" and Africa is an "in-space". Su-
perimposed on the image schémas of container and source—path-goal, we 
find a force-dynamic schema represented by opposing bold arrows. Mar-
low is both metaphorically driven and at t racted by certain forces: the 
forces of intellectual curiosity and knowledge, on the one hand, and the 
forces of sensuality and passion, on the other. 
We cannot present Kimmel's intricate system here. The main point 
of this brief demonstration was twofold: One is to show that image 
schémas may have an important function in remembering and compre-
hending story plots. The second is to indicate that image schémas may 
be superimposed on each other and may thus form complex structures 
t ha t we use to make sense of complex sets of events. 
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7. F igure-ground alignment: grammatical structure 
Figure-ground relations have been studied mostly by cognitive psychol-
ogists. Wha t is called "figure-ground alignment" here is important if 
we want to account for how we talk about spatial relations in language. 
Language about spatial relations is pervasive in communication. We talk 
about how one entity is positioned with respect to another entity, how an 
entity moves in relation to another entity, and so on. For example, when 
we say that "The bus is coming", we have a figure, the bus, tha t is pre-
sented by the sentence as moving in relation to the ground, the speaker. 
The cognitive linguist who studied this area of the interface between lan-
guage and cognition extensively was Leonard Talmy (see Talmy 2000). 
To begin with, we should first note that figure-ground alignment is 
an asymmetrical relation. Let us assume tha t we have bike as figure and 
house as ground in the sentences below. Whereas one can naturally say 
(17a), it is much less natural to say (17b): 
(17) (a) The bike is near the house, 
(b) ' 'The house is near the bike. 
This is because the figure should come first in the sentence, followed 
by the ground. The reversal of figure-ground alignment in the second 
sentence makes the sentence sound odd. 
The same applies to the following pair of sentences: 
(18) (a) The flv is on the ceiling. (figure-ground) 
(b) *The ceiling is above the fly. (ground-figure) 
Why are the bike and the fly the figure and the house and the ceiling 
the ground? Talmy (2000, 315-6) characterizes figure and ground in the 
following way: 
(19) Figure: Ground: 
smaller larger 
more mobile more stationary 
structurally simpler structurally more complex 
more salient more backgrounded 
more recently in awareness earlier on scene/in memory 
location less known location more known 
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These characteristics do not all have to be present in particular cases and 
we often decide on what the figure and ground will be on the basis of just 
one or two situationally important features. In t he examples above, it 
is clear t h a t the bike and the flea are smaller and more mobile t h a n the 
house and the ceiling, respectively. This makes them good figures in the 
given context. In other contexts, however, they may become grounds. 
The two examples we have seen so far involve static relations be-
tween two entities (bike-near-house and flea-on-ceiling). However, as our 
characterization of spatial relations above suggests, spatial relations also 
involve motion events, in which one entity moves in relation to another . 
This is exemplified by (20): 
(20) She went into the house. 
In this case, we have a motion event, where she is t he figure and house 
is the ground. The figure (she) moves in relation to t h e ground (house). 
In addition to its application to stat ic and dynamic spatial relations, 
figure-ground alignment can be seen a t work in grammatical s t ructure 
as well. Complex sentences can be construed in t e rms of figure-ground 
alignment; the main clause corresponds to the figure, while the subor-
dinate clause to the ground. Let us take the following sentences from 
Crof t -Cruse (2004, 57): 
(21) (a) I read while she sewed, 
(b) I read and she sewed. 
The main clause I read is the figure and the subordinate clause while she 
sewed is the ground. T h e relation between the two events is construed 
asymmetrically in the first sentence, bu t symmetrically in the second. 
This means that the reading event is viewed as occurring against the 
background of the sewing event. However, given t h e second sentence, 
no such relation is construed between the two events, which are seen as 
occurring independently of each other. This latter construal results in a 
coordinated syntactic construction (the two clauses connected by and). 
In other cases, the two events can only be construed as an asymmet-
rical figure-ground relation. Since dreaming is contingent on sleeping but 
sleeping is not contingent on dreaming (Talmy 2000, 325), we can have 
(22a) but not (22b): 
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(22) (a) He dreamed while he slept, 
(b) *He slept while he dreamed. 
Moreover, the two events cannot be conceived as being coextensive and 
coordinated, either. Thus t h e sentence in (23) sounds odd . 
(23) */?He dreamed and he slept 
This is because the two events are inherently causally related (dreaming 
being contingent on sleeping), and thus a non-causal conceptualization 
(i.e., as symmetrical figure and ground) is not possible in a natural way. 
8. Mentcil spaces: semantic anomaly 
The theory of mental spaces is a key idea in cognitive linguistic ap-
proaches to the understanding of how people make sense of utterances 
in the course of on-line communication. To get an idea of what mental 
spaces are, consider as an example the so-called "picture noun" context, 
as made explicit by the second sentence below (Fauconnier 1997): 
(24) (a) The girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
(b) In the picture, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
There are two mental spaces here: the menta l space of reality, as we rep-
resent it to ourselves and the mental space of the picture, as we perceive 
it. The mental space of reality is the base space and the mental space 
of the picture is a "model" space (or picture space). To understand the 
sentence, the mappings go from the base space to the picture space. If 
we represent the girl as x, t he eyes as y, and the blue color of the eyes 
as z, the mappings are as follows: 
(25) Base: -+ Picture: 
girl (ж) —> girl (x') 
eyes (у) —• eyes (y') 
However, the blue color (z) of x's eyes does not correspond to the green 
color of xhs eyes. In other words: 
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(26) blue (г) green (2') 
This says that the blue color of the girl's eyes in the base space does not 
correspond to the green color of the girl's eyes in the picture space. But 
it is precisely what the sentence states: tha t the girl who has blue eyes 
has green eyes in the picture. Thus we get a contradiction. How can we 
explain it by means of mental space theory? 
We can account for the apparent contradiction if we assume that 
there are two mental spaces here: a base space and a picture space. In 
the base space, we have the girl with blue eyes, and in the picture space 
we have the girl with green eyes. The girl with blue eyes in the base space 
can be said to have green eyes in the picture space because we can refer to 
a counterpart of an element by means of the description of t h a t element 
in another space (i.e., in the base space where the description is the girl 
with blue eyes) (Fauconnier 1997). This provides an elegant solution to a 
problem that would be difficult t o handle for formal theories of language. 
9. Conceptual integration: creativity in linguistic 
and conceptual s tructure and in everyday activit ies 
To see what conceptual integration, or blending, involves, we can take 
an example from a well known metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER (see Kövecses 1986; 1990; Lakoff-Kövecses 1987; Lakoff 1987). 
This metaphor is constituted by the mappings "container —* body" , "hot 
fluid —> anger", "degrees of heat —> degrees of intensity", etc. However, 
there is more going on than just having straightforward mappings from 
source to target in one of the examples of this metaphor: 
(27) God, he was so mad I could see the smoke coming out of his ears. 
The example was reanalyzed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), who point 
out t ha t in this case an element of the source is blended with an element 
of the target. There are no ears in the source and there is no smoke in 
the target , but in the blend both are present at the same time as smoke 
coming out of his ears. A frame is created with smoke and ears in it that 
is novel with respect to both the source frame and the target frame. 
W h a t happens here is tha t an angry person's head with the ears 
becomes the container in the source, and the smoke (steam) in the source 
will be seen as coming out of the ears (and not through the orifices of 
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the container). This is a true conceptual fusion of certain elements of 
both source and target in the blend. The blend goes beyond simply 
instantiating existing frame roles in the source wi th participants in the 
target frame, as is of ten the case with single-scope integration networks 
(Fauconnier-Turner 2002). 
Given the new emergent structure, the blend can be developed fur-
ther. One can say, for example: 
(28) God, was he ever mad. I could see the smoke coming out of his ears—I thought 
his hat would catch fire! 
To understand this sentence, we need the "smoke coming out of one's 
ears" frame, plus knowledge based on how intensity is conceptualized in 
the network (see Kövecses, in preparation). A submapping of the ANGER 
IS HEAT m e t a p h o r is INTENSITY O F EMOTION IS DEGREE OF HEAT. O n e 
of the entailments of this metaphor is that a high degree of heat may 
cause fire (corresponding to "intense anger may cause a dangerous social 
si tuation"). But how does "hat" get into the blend? The fact that it 
does shows the almost infinite creativity of blends: we can develop them 
further and further, bringing about new conceptualizations t h a t depend 
on old ones, as well as the application of systematic cognitive processes. 
In this particular case, the "hat" emerges as we run the previous blend 
with the "smoke coming out of one's ears". The head-container with the 
ears metonymically evokes the ha t , which is typically worn on the head. 
Due to the entailment of the INTENSITY IS HEAT metaphor ("high degree 
of heat may cause fire"), the hat can be seen as catching fire. This would 
indicate an overall increase in the intensity in the person's anger. We can 
represent all this diagrammatically as in Fig. 2 (taken from Kövecses, in 
preparation). 
Although this example may sound like a highly creative blend, Fau-
connier and Turner emphasize t h a t blending jus t as commonly involves 
conventionalized cases and can go into the heart of grammar (to use a 
theory-dependent metaphor). 
As another example of conceptual integration, let us now take what is 
known as the "caused motion" construction, analyzed in detail by Gold-
berg (1995) in a cognitive linguistic framework. A general characteriza-
tion of the caused motion construction can be given along the following 
lines. Semantically, the construction can be described in the following 
way: An agent does something, and as a result an object moves. As a 
prototypical example of this situation, we can take the sentence in (29): 
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Source Domain: 
(lnput-1) 
Hot fluid in a container 
Target Domain: 
(lnput-2) 
Angry person 
N 
V ч J 
Л 
/ 
The Blend Running the Blend 
I could see smoke coming out of his ears I thought his hat would catch fire! 
Fig. 2 
(29) Jack threw the ball over the fence. 
In this sentence, Jack is the agent tha t throws the ball (does something), 
and the action causes (produces a result) the ball t o move over the fence 
(the object moves). 
The form of the sentence can be given as N P - V - N P - P P , where Jack 
is the first NP, throw is the V, the ball is the second NP, and over the 
fence is the P P (prepositional phrase). 
It is clear that in the prototypical case the verb must be a transitive 
verb, such as throw, kick, toss, push, fling, flip, and many others. This 
is the characterization of the prototype of the construction. But there 
are many other cases, including: 
(30) (a) She sneezed the napkin off the table. 
(b) I walked him to the door. 
(c) I'll talk you through the procedure. 
(d) They teased him out of his senses. 
(e) I read him to sleep. 
(f) They let Bill into the room. 
(g) We ordered them out of the house. 
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The major difference between these examples and the prototype of the 
construction is t h a t the latter verbs are either not transitive (sneeze, talk) 
or they are not verbs that describe actions as a result of which objects 
are moved (sneeze, walk, talk, tease, read, let, order). 
Thus, we have the following problem: Which verbs can be used in 
this construction, and which ones cannot? Fauconnier (1997) proposes 
t h a t it is best to analyze the construction as a blend. On this view, the 
blend emerges from two input spaces: 
(31) (a) The basic construction t h a t is found in many languages: 
NP V NP P P 
a d b с 
John th rew ball to m e 
(b) A "causal sequence": 
[ [ a ' ACTS] CAUSES [B' MOVE t o c ' ] ] 
There is a straightforward set of cross-space mappings between the two 
input spaces t ha t can be given as follows: 
(32) Mappings between input 1 and input2: 
a —* a' 
6 - 6 ' 
c - c ' 
In the basic, t h a t is, prototypical, construction, the verb has all three 
elements in one: ACT, CAUSE, MOVE. For example, throwing involves a 
particular kind of action (ACT), the moving of an object (MOVE), and 
the causal link between the throwing action and the moving of the object 
(CAUSE). For this reason, d (e.g., throw) in the first input space may map 
to any one of these elements in the second input, which is represented 
as a set of mappings in (33): 
(33) d — ACT 
d -* MOVE 
d —* CAUSE 
Thus we get three different blends: d with ACT, d with MOVE, or d 
with CAUSE. Fauconnier (1997, 172-5) illustrates these blends with the 
following examples: 
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(34) d —» ACT: The sergeant waved the tanks into the compound. 
d —> MOVE: Junior sped the car around the Christmas tree. 
d —> CAUSE: The sergeant let the tanks into the compound. 
The three different blends inherit the syntactic structure of inputl . This 
means tha t we have the same syntactic pa t t e rn in all th ree cases: N P 
V NP PP. However, their conceptual s t ructure derives f rom input2, in 
which a' does something t h a t causes b' to move to d. As we saw, in the 
prototypical case the doing, the cause, and the moving are all present 
in one verb (such as throw), bu t in many non-prototypical cases (such 
as wave, speed, let) the complex d verb maps to and forms a blend with 
only a single element. 
Although there is no syntactic innovation in this part icular blended 
construction (the blend inherits the syntactic structure of input l ) , there 
can be semantic innovation. Verbs that can be mapped t o either ACT, 
MOVE, or CAUSE can appear in the construction. Fauconnier (1997, 176) 
mentions some innovative examples of the construction: 
(35) (a) The psychic will think your husband into another galaxy, 
(b) They prayed the boys home. 
They verbs think and pray m a p to the ACT element, but leave the CAUSE 
and MOVE elements unspecified. Which particular verbs can be used in 
the construction in novel ways is an open question. A factor that may 
play a role is the issue of which actions are situationally interpretable 
as causing the motion in question. For example, in the case of pray (de-
scribing missing boys in a news item) the action of praying is situationally 
interpretable as an immediate cause of the motion. 
But the construction of blended spaces does not occur only in the 
case of highly abstract domains such as anger and syntax. We routinely 
construct blended spaces in the most mundane activities we perform. As 
an example, consider one such mundane activity, "trashcan basketball", 
originally proposed and analyzed by Coulson (2000). Let us look at some 
of the features tha t make this game a blend. (The description below is 
based on Fauconnier-Turner 2002.) 
Imagine t ha t you are t i red and frustrated with s tudying and doing 
homework, and, to have some fun, instead of simply dropping a piece of 
waste paper into the trashcan you crumple up the paper into a spherical 
shape, take up a basketball player's position, carefully t ake aim of the 
trashcan, move your arm, wrist and hand like a basketball player in the 
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course of a shot, slowly release the crumpled up paper , which travels 
majestically through t h e air and lands in the t rashcan. Your roommate 
or friend sees this, gets u p from the chair, and does t he same thing with 
another piece of paper. He misses t he trashcan, and comments: "You're 
one up." Soon you have a game going. This is t rashcan basketball. 
It is clear that t he game is composed of two domains: basketball 
and the disposing of paper into a wastebasket. In th is case, the input 
spaces are structured by the frame (domain) of basketball and the f rame 
(domain) of disposing waste paper. There are some obvious mappings 
between the two domains: the person disposing the paper corresponds to 
a basketball player, t he crumpled up paper to the ball, the wastebasket to 
the basket, and so forth. This structure looks like a conceptual metaphor , 
in which we have the game of basketball structured by disposing paper 
into the wastebasket. B u t there is more than that t o trashcan basketball. 
First , how can we explain the mappings between the two domains? 
On what basis do the mappings emerge? In the theory of conceptual 
integration, in addition to the two input spaces (source and target) we 
used in metaphor theory we assume t h e existence of a generic space which 
contains what is shared by the source and target. In t he case of t rashcan 
basketball, it is the pu t t ing of a vaguely spherical objec t into a receptacle, 
or container. This generic-level s t ructure is shared by disposing paper 
and basketball. On the basis of this generic-level s t ructure, we can easily 
construct the mappings between the two activities. 
Second, in addition to the generic space and t h e two input spaces 
we have a blended space: This is t rashcan basketball. In it, we have a 
crumpled-up-paper-basketball, bored and frustrated students as basket-
ball players, a wastepaper-basketball basket, throwing the wastepaper-
basketball in basketball fashion, and so on. All of these emerge f rom the 
projection of certain elements in the input spaces to t h e blended space and 
the fusion of the elements in that space. Moreover, we also have elements 
in the blend that derive from one of the inputs bu t are not fused with 
other elements. One example of this is the counting of shots and keeping 
score t ha t comes from the basketball domain and is used in the blend. 
Third, it is not t he case that everything that we find counterpart for 
in the two inputs is projected into t h e blench Take placing wastepaper 
into the wastepaper basket and the corresponding element of placing 
the ball into the hoop in basketball. Although the two elements match 
each other perfectly, t hey are not projected into the blench In t rashcan 
basketball, we do not have the simple placing of the crumpled-up-paper-
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basketball into the wastebasket in the blended game. This action would 
be too easy for the purposes of playing the game. In other words, as 
soon as we begin to play the new game tha t is based on some of t h e 
mappings between the inputs, new structure emerges. This is called 
"emergent structure" in the blend. In this particular example, a certain 
move tha t has counterparts in the inputs is left out of the game. In other 
examples, the players in the blend will learn that they have to adjust t he 
nature, intensity, etc. of their movements due to the physical environment 
and the social interaction in the blend. For example, because of t h e 
lightness of the "new ball" in the blend, they have to ad jus t the s t rength 
of their arm movements in throwing the "ball" into the "basket". T h e 
structure of the network can be given as in Fig. 3 (taken from Kövecses, 
in preparation). 
Blended Space / 
• person disposing of 
trash playing basketball 
• crumpled wasteball 
• waste basket-hoop 
V- ' 
Waste Disposal domain 
lnput-1 
• disposer of trash I 
• crumpled waste 
• waste basket 
^ ) 
Í »agent 4 
I • roughly spherical object | 
^«container 
Generic Space 
Blending Model 
Fig. 3 
The main point of this example is that blends are not esoteric abstract 
structures. They can be found in how we make sense of our emotions and 
the structure of the sentences we use but also in how we construct mun-
dane activities such as trashcan basketball. The conceptual apparatus we 
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lnput-2 
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I • Basketball player 
» ball 
• basket hoop 
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need to account for all the examples is t he same; we need input spaces, 
generic and blended spaces, mappings between the spaces, projections 
from the input spaces to t he blend, and so forth. 
10. Conclusions 
In this paper , three general issues were examined. First , what cognitive 
processes play a role in making sense of t h e world around us? Second, how 
do these cognitive processes contribute to our understanding of issues in 
language? Third, how do the same cognitive processes provide an account 
of a wide range of social and cultural phenomena? 
To begin with, we have found t h a t we make use of a relatively 
small number of cognitive processes in making sense of our experience. 
We categorize the world, organize our knowledge into frames, we make 
use of within-frame mappings (metonymy) and cross-frame mappings 
(metaphor), build image schémas from bodily experience and apply these 
to what we experience, divide our experience into figures and grounds, 
set up menta l spaces and further mappings between them in the 011-line 
process of understanding, and have the ability to skillfully and creatively 
integrate conceptual materials from the mental spaces t ha t we set up. We 
do not do most of this in a conscious way; our cognitive system operates 
unconsciously most of the time. It is these and some additional cognitive 
processes not discussed in this paper t h a t participate in our unconscious 
meaning-making activity. 
With t h e help of these cognitive processes we can account for many 
(or perhaps most) of the phenomena of meaning in language in a coherent 
fashion. T h e theory tha t emerges from the application of these cognitive 
processes t o our understanding of meaning in language will be very dif-
ferent from other theories of language. Most importantly, the theory will 
be a theory of meaning, and not one of form. On this view, even highly 
abstract a n d schematic forms (such as N, V, NP V NP, or NP V NP 
PP) are seen as having meaning; as a mat te r of fact, the only justifica-
tion of the existence of such abstract and schematic forms is their role in 
the expression and understanding of meaning as being par t of "symbolic 
units", which consist of combinations of meaning and form (Langacker 
1987). On the cognitive linguistic view, the scientific study of language 
cannot be t he study of t h e manipulation of such abstract and schematic 
forms (i.e., syntax); the only legitimate and scientific goal in the s tudy of 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
A BROAD VIEW OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 169 
language is the study of meaning in language (including the meaning of 
abstract symbolic units) and how the cognitive processes discussed above 
play a role in this. 
But most importantly for the purposes of this paper, we have seen 
tha t the same cognitive processes help us make sense of a wide range 
of social and cultural phenomena. Understanding the nature of debates 
about art, the issue of motherhood, setting up ideals and stereotypes 
to function in the world, the structure of political thought, the under-
standing of literature, and others discussed in the paper are only some 
of the issues tha t we can make sense of by making use of such cognitive 
processes. The cognitive processes described by cognitive linguistics are 
not merely ways of accounting for language; they are ways of accounting 
for many aspects of our social and cultural reality. (Such a suggestion 
is in the spirit of Turner (2001), who discusses the issue in relation to 
conceptual integration, and Kövecses (2005), who discusses it in relation 
to conceptual metaphor.) 
As we have seen, our main meaning-making organ, the mind/brain, 
is shaped by both bodily and social/cultural experience. Image schémas, 
correlation-based metaphors, and the like arise from bodily functioning 
and are at the same time imbued by culture (e.g., by applying alternative 
frames to the "same" aspect of reality). Both the mind/brain and its 
product, meaning, are embodied and culture-dependent at the same time 
(see Kövecses (2005)). It is the goal of the cognitive linguistic enterprise 
to characterize the functioning of such an embodied and cultured mind 
in relation to language and beyond it. 
Given such a wide scope of the field, we need to ask whether the name 
"cognitive linguistics" is an appropriate one. For reasons mentioned in 
the introduction, I believe it is not. Perhaps terms such as "cognitive 
social science" or "cognitive semiotics" would be more appropriate. They 
would reflect more faithfully both the nature ("cognitive") and the scope 
of the enterprise ( "social", "semiotics" ). By accepting such designations 
for the field, we would indicate tha t the study of language, and especially 
meaning in language, is just a par t of a more general meaning-making 
activity that we as human beings are all engaged i n — n o matter which 
language we speak and which society we live in. In other words, after 
working out all the connections among the components of the meaning-
making process (including embodiment, language, mind, and culture) in 
a much more detailed and comprehensive way than I have been able to do 
in this paper, we might arrive at a "unified science" of meaning-making 
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tha t would allow us to make sense of, say, semantic anomaly and trashcan 
basketball by utilizing the same cognitive appara tus in human beings. 
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METAPHOR- AND METONYMY-BASED COMPOUNDS IN 
ENGLISH: A COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC APPROACH* 
RÉKA BENCZES 
Abstract 
The paper makes the following novel claims: (1) the semantics of noun-noun com-
pounds which is activated by metaphor a n d / o r metonymy (often termed as "exocen-
tric" compounds in linguistics and generally regarded as semantically opaque) can be 
accounted for with the help of conceptual metaphor and metonymy theory; (2) there are 
regular pa t t e rns of metaphor- and metonymy-based compounds, depending on which 
const i tuent is affected by conceptual metaphor and /or metonymy. In the second par t 
of the paper I look at a sub type of metaphor- and metonymy-based noun-noun com-
pounds, where the s imultaneous activation of both metaphor and metonymy affects 
the meaning, and give an account of the productive pa t te rns t h a t underlie this type. 
1. Introduction: the problematic nature of exocentric compounds 
Noun-noun compounds are a highly intriguing set of linguistic phenom-
ena. Not only do they form the largest group of compounds in English 
(Algeo 1991),1 but children learn to produce this type of compound the 
earliest, from around the age of two (Clark 1981). However, what is 
most remarkable about these compounds is the diversity of semantic re-
lationships that can exist between the two components on the one hand, 
and between the individual elements and the compound as a whole on 
the other. Nevertheless, however diverse the semantics of noun-noun 
* I wish to thank my reviewers for t he excellent remarks and observations. I am 
also grateful to Zoltán Kövecses, who has meticulously read through several ear-
lier versions of this paper . Needless t o say, all remaining errors are mine. T h e 
publication of the paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical 
Linguistics of the Hungar ian Academy of Sciences at the University of Debrecen. 
1
 A fiftv-year-long research into the emergence of new words in the United States 
(Algeo, op.cit.) has managed to shed some light on contemporary word forma-
tion pat terns . According to the da ta , compounding is the most productive word 
format ion process: 68% of the new expressions were grouped into tha t category. 
More interestingly, 90% of the compounds were nouns. 
1216-8076/$ 20.00 © 2005 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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combinations may be, many linguists have a t tempted to systematise the 
constraints tha t apply in their creation and interpretation (see for exam-
ple Adams 1973; Downing 1977; Jespersen 1954; Levi 1978; Marchand 
1960; Ryder 1994; Warren 1978). 
The most traditional and pervasive semantic classification of com-
pounds used in linguistics is based upon the work of Bloomfield (1933), 
who suggested that compounds fall into two main groups. In endocentric 
constructions, the compound is the hyponym of the head element: apple 
tree is a kind of tree. In the case of exocentric or "headless" constructions, 
however, the compound is not a hyponym of the head element, and in the 
majority of cases there is some sort of metaphor or metonymy at work 
in the meaning of the compound. For example, blue-stocking does not 
denote a kind of stocking bu t refers to a well-educated woman. While the 
terms endocentric and exocentric are often used in linguistics even today 
(see for e.g., Adams 2001; Kiefer 1998), there are two very general—and 
serious —problems regarding exocentric constructions: (1) linguists do 
not agree as to what sort of constructions fall under the umbrella term 
of "exocentric compounds" ; and (2) linguistic literature has a strong ten-
dency to mention exocentric combinations only peripherally (if they are 
mentioned a t all), and views these constructions as exceptional cases tha t 
do not follow normal and productive compound-forming patterns. 
1.1. What sort of compounds should we consider as exocentric? 
If one leafs through a number of works on English morphology, it be-
comes clear very quickly tha t there is no straightforward answer to this 
question. There is chaos in the literature regarding the definitional crite-
ria for semantically exocentric compounds; descriptivists such as Bloom-
field (1933), Jespersen (1954) and Marchand (1960), for example, lim-
ited their investigation to select classes of various kinds of metonymy-
based noun-noun combinations, and ignored metaphor-based construc-
tions completely. In her analysis of the semantics of noun-noun combi-
nations, Adams (1973) does make reference to "exocentric" compounds 
(though marginally); these are mostly constructions that are both meta-
phor- and metonymy-based, such as butterfingersr In her more recent 
2
 Adams (op.cit.) does not specifically claim that butterfingers is a compound based 
on both metaphor and metonymy, yet in my view, the simultaneous activation 
of both cognitive devices takes place in the interpretation of the compound's 
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work, Adams (2001) claims tha t semantically exocentric constructions are 
small in number and are formed on the basis of three patterns: (1) the 
relation between the elements is similar to that between a verb and its 
complement, as in pickpocket,3 (2) the elements are a combination of ad-
jective and noun as in highbrow, and (3) the elements are a combination 
of noun and noun, as in spoonbill. Adams' study can be regarded as a 
simplification of the problem: in her understanding, the various types of 
exocentric compounds can be distinguished on the basis of their syntax 
and no further explanation is provided on the semantics of these construc-
tions—which is in fact the most exciting question concerning exocentric 
compounds. 
To give a generativist example as well, Levi (1978) in her far-reaching 
work on nominal compounds, bases her theory4 upon endocentric com-
pounds, but takes a look a t exocentric compounds as well. In her view, 
exocentric compounds are defined as compounds where the referent does 
not denote a subset of the set of objects denoted by the head noun. She 
lists three types of exocentric constructions: (1) compounds based on 
synecdoche such as blockhead that describe people and cottontail t ha t 
describe animals; (2) those based on metaphor such as ladyfinger (a type 
of pastry) or foxglove (a type of flower); and (3) those which consti-
tu te coordinated structures (where neither noun can be taken as a head) 
such as secretary-treasurer or sofa-bed. Although Levi extended her in-
terpretat ion of exocentric compounds to include both métonymie and 
meaning: the fingers are like butter in the sense that everything slips out of one's 
hands (just as butter is a slippery substance), and the fingers on one's hand s tand 
metonymically for the whole person. 
3
 The chaos which exists among the classification of exocentric compounds is well 
demonstrated by the fact tha t Carstairs-McCarthy (1992) labels pickpocket as 
a prime example of a bahuvrihi type (synecdoche-based compound), which is 
analysed as a subcategory of exocentric compounds in Marchand (1960). Bauer 
(1983) also claims that bahuvrihi compounds are a type of exocentric com-
pounds—though he extends "exocentric" to include lexicalised metaphor-based 
compounds as well, such as monkshood or ladysmock (for various kinds of plants). 
4
 Levi claims that all complex nominale are derived by two syntactic processes: 
predicate nominalization and predicate deletion. In the lat ter case, the nominal 
compounds are a result of syntactic transformation in which phrases such as "cake 
with apples" surface as nominal compounds such as apple cake. The semantic 
relations between the member elements of the compound represent one of the 
nine recoverably deletable predicates. These predicates are deleted in the surface 
structure but the interpretation of the compound is made possible by using the 
reconstituted relative clause. 
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metaphorical ones, we are once again left with the feeling that such a 
categorisation (as the previous ones mentioned above) is over-generalised. 
Surely metaphor and/or metonymy can act upon compounds in a number 
of ways, depending on which constituent of the compound is affected (or 
whether the meaning of the compound as a whole is activated by either 
of the two conceptual devices). What I wish to emphasise here is that the 
term "exocentric" is not a good candidate to describe compounds whose 
meaning is based upon metaphor and/or metonymy—for the simple rea-
son that the term "exocentric" is used as a general, collective term to 
include diverse linguistic phenomena. 
1.2. "Exocentric" for exceptionality and quirkiness? 
The other major problem with the term "exocentric" is that it implies 
a degree of quirkiness—the word itself means that the head of the com-
pound falls outside of the construction (hence exo). This, naturally, is not 
the normal s ta te of affairs; it is a general assumption tha t the major i ty 
of English compounds follow the Right-Hand Head rule (Williams 1981)5 
and accordingly are endocentric from bo th a syntactic and a semantic 
point of view. There are, of course, exceptions that fail to abide by these 
suppositions, such as exocentric or left-headed constructions.5 
The fact tha t exocentric compounds do exist in English (even though 
endocentric ones are considered to be the default) might have prompted 
linguists to look into the nature of these constructions — yet linguistic 
literature has serious shortcomings on the subject. Ei ther there is u t te r 
5
 This defines the head of a morphologically complex construction as the right-hand 
member. 
6
 As Bauer and Renouf (2001) point out, exocentric or left-headed compounds are 
regarded as exceptional cases in the sense t h a t there are not too many of t h e m — 
and this is where many linguistic studies go wrong. Their corpus-based s tudy 
(coming from the British newspaper Independent over a period of ten years) has 
shown tha t English neologisms thrive with cases which were taken as border-
line formations, such as exocentric compounds. The case in point is that there 
are plenty of "unexpected trends" {op.cit., 120) in English word formation, and 
a proper analysis or description of the English language needs to fit these ex-
ceptional types in and provide an explanation for them. Bauer and Renouf 's 
observation is highly relevant for the present paper as well, since they address 
one of the most basic questions in word formation: if a pa t te rn is atypical, does 
it also mean that it is exceptional? Their paper suggests t h a t the answer to this 
question is negative. 
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neglect or exocentric compounds are considered to be special cases that 
cannot be fitted into a mainstream explanation of compounds. Examples 
are abundant . Authors such as Downing (1977) and Warren (1978),' both 
of whom have writ ten often-cited monographs on the possible semantic 
relationships between the constituents of noun-noun combinations, con-
sidered endocentric compounds the primary object of their respective 
studies.8 Linguists who have included exocentric compounds in their 
s tudy very often regarded them as exceptional in the sense tha t they 
cannot be treated within the same framework as endocentric compounds. 
Generativists, such as Selkirk (1982), argued for t he creation of separate 
semantic rules in the grammar by which exocentric compounds could be 
interpreted.9 Unfortunately no other reference is made to the nature of 
these rules.10 
In a textbook summary of generative morphology, Katamba (1993) 
criticises Selkirk (1982) for introducing the idea of separate semantic rules 
to interpret exocentric compounds. He argues instead for a simple listing 
of the meanings. In Katamba's view, both idioms and exocentric com-
pounds are listemes with regard to their semantics—which is opaque.1 1 
' Warren (op.cit), for example, describes metaphor- and /o r metonvmy-based com-
pounds as "idiosyncratic compounds" —constructions where the semantic relation 
between the component elements is neither explicit, nor in accordance with estab-
lished patterns. She claims that such expressions are opaque as to the semantic 
relation between the constituents, since the hearer cannot "fall back" upon al-
ready existing pa t te rns of English compounding. 
8
 Ryder (1994) analysed the semantics of noun-noun compounds in elaborate detail 
from a cognitive linguistic viewpoint—but her study also pertains exclusively to 
endocentric compounds. 
9
 Selkirk devotes only a couple of pages to the idiosyncratic nature of exocentric 
compounds—due most probably to the fact that the author looks upon these 
linguistic phenomena as exceptional when she expresses her intent to examine 
the "few cases of exocentric (nonheaded) compounds in English" {op.cit., 23). 
1()
 I would like to point out a positive example here as well. One of the strongest criti-
cisms of the transformationalist/generative approach is provided by Botha (1968), 
who calls attention to the relative abundance of "metaphorical compounds" in 
the Afrikaans language. The author claims that in constructing an Afrikaans 
transformational generative grammar of compounds, metaphorical constructions 
cannot be left unconsidered. Not only does Botha call for a proper linguistic 
description of such compounds, but he also provides a very compact classification 
of such constructions. 
11
 In his study, Kooij (1968) has also pointed out the existence of so-called idiomatic 
compounds (his term) whose meanings are very often based upon metaphor. How-
ever, he restricts his analysis of compounds to endocentric constructions, claiming 
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This is the reason why, according to the author, exocentric compound 
formation is used much less frequently than endocentric compounding in 
the creation of new words. However, if the semantics of exocentric com-
pounds is opaque then why bother with using them at all? It would be 
more sensible—following Katamba ' s line of reasoning—to denote things 
by using semantically endocentric compounds only. Yet the simple fact 
tha t English does have such constructions implies that either English 
speakers like to invent dim and murky terms when creating a new word 
for public access or that the meaning of exocentric compounds is not as 
opaque as it seems. 
2. The transparency of semantically "opaque" compounds 
Leaving behind the traditional notions of endo- and exocentricity, Dirven 
and Verspoor (1998) discuss the semantics of compounds from a more 
flexible perspective: the authors also argue for a cline of transparency 
on which compounds can be placed on the basis of the transparency of 
their meaning.1 2 At the fully productive (and transparent) end of the 
continuum, bo th parts of the compound and the semantic link between 
them "are unequivocally analysable and hence immediately transparent" 
tha t—even though idiomatic compounds did originally have the same structures 
as regular, non-idiomatic ones—these have undergone meaning specialisation to 
such a degree that they cannot be described by the same set of rules, they there-
fore represent a different type in grammar from non-idiomatic compounds. 
12
 The idea of placing compounds on a cline of transparency (instead of having two 
clear-cut classes of endocentric and exocentric constructions) is not new—see for 
example Cruse (1991); Fabb (1998); Spencer (2001). In fact, Levi (1978, 63), too, 
proposed a "continuum of derivational transparency" for compounds. Trans-
parency should not be confused with compositionality (see for instance Allan 
1986; Cruse 1991; Fabb 1998; Katamba 1993; Langacker 1987; Matthews 1974; 
for an overview of the topic see Benczes 2004a), which has been often used to 
differentiate among phrases and compounds (black bird versus blackbird). I agree 
with Langacker (1987; 2000) who claims tha t linguistic phenomena (including 
compounds) are more likely to show partial than full compositionality: black-
bird (meaning a bird species) is partially compositional because, even though the 
composite meaning is a combination of the meanings of the components, it has 
undergone a specification of meaning since it refers to a specific type of black 
bird. In Langacker's view, when a new linguistic expression is coined, it is inter-
preted with a quite rich contextual and specified meaning, therefore С ф [AB). 
As the form gets to be established, some of this extra meaning is retained and 
that is the reason why most composite expressions (including compounds) have 
a conventionalised meaning tha t is more specific than their compositional value. 
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(op.cit., 60), such as apple tree. In the case of partially transparent ex-
pressions, the components are still analysable but the semantic link is 
less apparent and insufficient to see which subcategory the meaning of 
the compound involves, such as blackbird, which does not denote a black 
type of bird but a bird species. At the other end of the continuum 
lie lion-transparent expressions, which Dirven and Verspoor call "dark-
ened compounds": in these cases, the authors claim, metaphorical or 
metonymical processes are involved in the meaning of the constructions, 
such as red tape, which does not describe a kind of t ape but refers to a 
long and irritating bureaucratic procedure. 
There are two main problems with Dirven and Verspoor's (1998) 
analysis. First, their definitions of the various degrees of transparency are 
very vague indeed. When is a semantic link "unequivocally analysable" 
in the case of transparent compounds? Are there certain semantic re-
lations which are more transparent than others? If so, what are these? 
Needless to say, the problem also arises in the case of partially transpar-
ent compounds. When does a transparent compound become partially 
t ransparent? 1 3 
However, the introductory purpose of Dirven and Verspoor's (1998) 
textbook might offer an excuse for the relative superficiality of their de-
finitions, as the limited space did not allow for in-depth elaborations on 
the various topics, including the transparency of compounds. Neverthe-
less, the second problem of their analysis is more serious. The authors 
state that non-transparent or darkened compounds are metaphorical or 
metonymical: yet such a claim is at odds with their explanation of in-
formation highway (metaphorically referring to the internet), which they 
see as "easily analysable" (op.cit., 60-1) on the basis t ha t the metaphor-
ical meaning of highway is linked to the source domain of traffic with the 
target domain information, and with the help of our cultural knowledge 
we know the cultural background to which the word refers. The juxta-
position is the following: if a metaphorical expression is easily analysable 
indeed, as the authors rightly say, then why should such a compound be 
placed at the non-transparent end of the continuum? The answer, in my 
1 !
 In my view, partial transparency might involve some sort of meaning speciali-
sation or generalisation, thus ashtray is not really a tray, nor a tray for ashes, 
but a specific kind of ' tray' for cigarette ashes. Attaché case, on the other hand, 
could be an example for a partially transparent compound where generalisation 
of meaning occurs: it is not a case used by attachés only, but by many people in 
all sorts of white-collar professions. 
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view, is t h a t there is no need for us to do so in the first place. If metaphor 
and metonymy are everyday processes of thought, as Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) say they are, then metaphorical and metonymical compounds are 
just as normal and everyday constructions as nonmetaphorical or non-
metonymical ones.14 
3. W h a t kinds of metaphor- and metonymy-based 
compounds are there? 
Figure l a (after Langacker 1991, figure 7) shows the highly schematised 
constructional schema for forming noun-noun compounds in English, 
where two nouns (denoting different concepts) can be combined into one 
semantic uni t . All the s tructures and categorizing relationships have t he 
status of units , which are indicated by t he boxes. Figure l b shows how 
we are able to arrive a t the composite expression of jar lid, the compos-
ite symbolic s tructure of the combination of [[JAR]/[C^O:]] and [[LID]/[lid]], 
with the application of the noun-noun constructional schema. T h e as-
sembly of this expression comes from a number of pre-existing units: t he 
constructional schema, the components jar and lid, and the categorisa-
tion of jar and lid as nouns. 
Fig. 1 
The constructional schema of noun-noun compounds (a); 
and the constructional schema of jar lid (b) 
(after Langacker 1991, fig. 7) 
14
 See also Benczes (2004a; b; forthcoming)—where I suggest using the term "cre-
ative compound" for metaphor- and/or metonymy-based compounds. 
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Jar lid is an example of a regular pa t t e rn in English compounding, a 
sequence also observable in e.g., milk carton, salad oil, door knob, pencil 
erasei to name but a few. Phonologically, both jar and lid are words, 
while at the semantic pole each is a noun profiling a thing. Jar profiles 
a specific kind of container, while lid designates the cover for a container 
of an unspecified nature. The composite structure jar lid consists phono-
logically of a two-word sequence, while semantically it profiles the cover 
for a jar in particular. In a construction, the component and composite 
structures are linked by correspondences—these specify how the compo-
nents are integrated to form the composite structure (e.g., the semantic 
correspondences of jar lid equate the unspecified container evoked by 
lid to the specific container profiled by jar). In a typical construction, 
one component is schematic with respect to the composite structure as a 
whole: while both the schematic component and the composite s t ructure 
construe the scene in the same fashion, particularly in regard to profiling, 
they differ in the level of specificity: the composite s t ructure is more spe-
cific with regard to the thing that it profiles ( jar lid is more specific t h a n 
lid). In the case of jar lid, lid will function as the profile determinant, 
as this is the constituent tha t construes the same scene as the composite 
structure (Langacker 2000, 16-8). 
Cognitive linguistics claims that the way we construe events or things 
can also be metaphorical or metonymical (Langacker 1987; 1991; 2000). 
This implies that profiling can also be affected by conceptual metaphor or 
metonymy. Therefore, in the case of a noun-noun constructional schema, 
the modifier element, the profile determinant or the semantic link between 
the two components can also be influenced by metaphor and metonymy. 
What this implies then is that there is an inventory of metaphor- and 
metonymy-based compounds, depending on where metaphor or metonymy 
acts upon the constructions: the modifier, the profile determinant, the re-
lation between the two constituents of the compound, or the compound 
as a whole. 
By identifying the place where conceptual metaphor or metonymy 
can act upon the meaning of a noun-noun compound, their systémati-
sation1 ' ' and the analysis of their meaning (within a cognitive linguistic 
framework) becomes possible. In the second part of the paper I wish 
to present one subtype of metaphor- and metonymy-based compounds: 
15
 For a full, systematic description of the possible pat terns underlying English 
metaphor- and/or metonymy-based noun-noun compounds, see Benczes (2004a). 
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those whose meaning is influenced by the simultaneous activation of bo th 
metaphor and metonymy. I claim tha t there are regular patterns by 
which such compounds are formed in English: I have identified four 
such pat terns. After providing a critical overview of previous analyses 
of metaphor- and metonymy-based compounds, I will give an account of 
the patterns I have uncovered—I will give examples for all four and will 
also provide full analyses of the meanings with the help of conceptual 
metaphor and metonymy theory.16 
4. T h e analysis of metaphor- and metonymy-based 
compounds in l inguistic literature 
Needless to say, the idea t ha t metaphor and metonymy can simultane-
ously act upon the meaning of a noun-noun combination is not new; 
Warren (1992), for instance, discusses (a couple of) compounds where 
"metaphors within metonymies" and "metonymies within metaphors" 
are at work. In her view, hammerhead ( 'a stubborn person') is ail exam-
ple of the former, where the hammer metaphorically refers to something 
hard, and the compound as a whole is a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy1 ' 
(the head is used to refer to the whole person). 
Warren (1992) also claims that the compound jellybean ('a s tupid 
person') is a further example of a metaphor in a metonymy. She argues 
that the motivation for this construction is based on the metonymy t h a t 
somebody has something t h a t is like a jellybean in that it "contains fluff 
and is egg-shaped" (op.cit., 95). There are numerous idiomatic expres-
sions in English which have a similar meaning as jellybean, for example 
be bone-headed from the neck up or be soft-headed, which are in some way 
related to t he head (Benczes 2002). It is probable t ha t jellybean also 
16
 Note t h a t conceptual me taphor and metonymy are not adequa te to account for 
all the various types of metaphor - and /or metonymy-based compounds—I have 
made extensive use of blending theory for example in the analysis of other types , 
which I a m unable to present here due to lack of space, but see Benczes (2004a;b; 
forthcoming) for plenty of examples. On t h e application of blending theory in t h e 
analysis of English compounds, see Coulson (2000); Fauconnier-Turner (2002); 
Sweetser (1999); for an overview see Benczes (2004a). For a concise overview 
on the cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy see 
Kövecses (2002). 
1
 ' As is cus tomary in cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphors and metonymies 
will be wr i t t en in SMALL CAPITALS. 
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refers to the head of a stupid person, as a jellybean does not contain any-
thing solid inside (the similarity is based on the conception tha t a stupid 
person does not have too many ideas in the head), and a head tha t is 
like a jellybean might imply tha t somebody lacks the usual intellectual 
capacities. Clockwork orange ( 'a person made into an automaton ' ) is a 
metonymy within a metaphor: the hero of the novel Clockwork Orange is 
in a metonymical relationship with the text itself (PLACE FOR P E R S O N ) , 
and there is also a metaphor at work, by which a person is likened to 
a machine. 
Reference should also be made to Goossens (1995), who created the 
term "metaphtonymy" to refer t o t he process when both metaphor and 
metonymy act upon an idiomatic expression. For example, to beat one's 
breasts ( ' to make an open noisy show of sorrow tha t may be par t ly pre-
tence') represents a case of metaphor from metonymy: the métonymie ba-
sis is the religious practice of beating one's breast while one confesses one's 
sins publicly. This image is then mapped through metaphor onto non-
religious situations as well. Goossens also identified a metonymy-within-
met aphor pattern, where there is a "built-in metonymy" (op.cit., 169) 
in the metaphor: in shoot one's mouth off ( ' talk foolishly about what 
one does not know about or should not talk about ' ) the source domain 
of firearms is mapped onto the ta rge t domain of unthoughtful linguistic 
action. Mouth, a t the same time, metonymically stands for a person's 
speech faculty. 
Geeraerts (2002) analysed the interaction of metaphor and metonymy 
in composite expressions, such as idioms and compounds. He claims that 
there are plenty of compounds t h a t are neither purely metaphorical, nor 
purely metonymical, but involve bo th types of meaning extension. Ac-
cording to Geeraerts, such cases can be classified into three main cat-
egories: metaphor and metonymy can occur in a compound expression 
(1) consecutively; (2) in parallel; and (3) interchangeably. 
An example of the first category is schapenkop ("sheep's head" , i.e., 
'dumb person'), where the analysis of the compound's meaning involves 
two steps: first, "sheep's head" is metaphorically extended towards the 
reading 'a human head like that of a sheep, a s tupid head', and second, 
a metonymical step leads to 'a person with a head like that of a sheep, a 
stupid person'. The compound droogkloot ("dry testicle" — 'boring per-
son, bore') exemplifies the second case, when metaphor and metonymy 
act upon the meaning in parallel. The compositional, literal reading "dry 
testicle" metonymically stands for "a person with dry testicles". This 
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reading, however, serves as the input for a fur ther metaphorical exten-
sion, leading to the boring person sense. Badmuts ("swimming cap" — 
'bald person') represents the thi rd category, i.e., the interchangeability 
of metaphor and metonymy. According to Geeraerts, the compound can 
be analysed in two ways: either "swimming cap" leads metonymically to 
'a person who looks as if he was wearing a swimming cap, a bald per-
son', or "swimming cap" is metaphorised as ' a head that looks as if it is 
covered by a swimming cap, a bald head', and from there metonymically 
extended to 'a bald-headed person' . As the author points out , the se-
mantic explanation can go either way, there is no principle by which one 
line of analysis can be favoured over the other . 
I could not agree more. In my view, it is very difficult—if not impos-
sible—to decide even in cases such as schapenkop which process acts upon 
the compound first, metaphor or metonymy. For this reason, I believe 
tha t forming categories on the basis of the metaphorical and metonymical 
sequence is pointless. Moreover, as badmuts also shows, whichever line of 
analysis we choose, the result is the same; and that is what counts. For 
these reasons I recommend an approach which concentrates on the vari-
ous ways metaphor and metonymy can act upon the various par ts of the 
compound expression, and not on the possible sequence of the cognitive 
processes involved. 
5. Typology and analysis of metaphor- and 
metonymy-based compounds 
In this section, I wish to go beyond the analyses proposed by Warren 
(1992), Goossens (1995) and Geeraerts (2002), and show tha t conceptual 
metaphor and conceptual metonymy can act upon the meaning of noun-
noun compounds in a remarkable variety of ways. I claim t h a t there are 
distinct pat terns of compounds t ha t are based upon conceptual metaphor 
and metonymy; these patterns seem to be productive. I have identified 
four such patterns, whereby conceptual metaphor and metonymy act si-
multaneously upon the compound in the following ways: (1) metaphor-
based semantic relationship between the constituents of the compound 
and metonymy-based modifier; (2) metaphor-based semantic relationship 
between the constituents of the compound and metonymy-based profile 
determinant; (3) metonymy-based modifier and metaphor-based profile 
determinant; and (4) metaphor-based modifier and metonymy-based pro-
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file determinant. These four main categories yield various subtypes, based 
on the type of conceptual metaphor and metonymy participating in the 
meaning of the compound. 
5.1. Metaphor-based semantic relationship between the constituents of 
the compound and metonymy-based modifier 
In this subsection, I will discuss those compounds that , apar t from a 
metaphorical relationship between Nj and N2, also involve metonymy, 
such as macarena page ('a webpage capitalising on a current fad, they are 
usually full of fluff and have a short life expectancy'; source: www.word-
spy. com). The meaning of the compound is based upon the activation of 
both metaphor and metonymy, since there is a metaphor t h a t provides 
the understanding of N2 in the terms of Nx on the one hand (a webpage 
that is like the macarena dance in the sense tha t the macarena was a 
dance tha t was immensely popular a couple of years ago, though this 
popularity lasted for only a couple of weeks), and a metonymy that is 
activated by the concept denoted by Ni on the other hand (macarena 
page does not contain information about the macarena—it is a webpage 
that holds information about a current fad, therefore macarena stands 
for any fad tha t has a short life expectancy but enjoys huge popularity). 
Figure 2 shows the structure of these constructions. There are two 
concepts, X and Y, which have corresponding phonological poles, [x] and 
[y] respectively. There is a perceived similarity between the two concepts 
denoted by the two constituents of the compound which provides the 
basis of the meaning of the whole. Moreover, there is a metonymy acting 
upon the meaning of the compound as well. The first constituent can 
be regarded as a unit whose semantic pole is embedded in an Idealised 
Cognitive Model (ICM for short) .1 8 Since X is A part of the ICM, it is 
related to it through a conceptual metonymy. 
l s
 The notion of idealised cognitive models, or ICMs, was introduced by Lakoff 
(1987). A very good explanation of what ICMs are is offered by Radden and 
Kövecses (1999, 20): "the ICM concept is meant to include not only people's 
encyclopaedic knowledge of a particular domain but also the cultural models 
they are part of. The ICM notion is not restricted to either the world of reality, 
the world of conceptualisation or the world of language but [...] may cut across 
these ontological realms." This understanding of ICMs will be used in this paper 
as well. 
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Fig. 2 
Model of a creative compound with a metaphor-based relationship 
between the two constituents and a metonymy-based modifier 
5.1.1. Sign metonymies 
According to Radden and Kövecses (1999, 24), the pairing of a concept 
with a form gives rise to the Sign ICM. The authors provide the exam-
ple of the word form dollar or the dollar sign $, which are linked with 
the 'currency denomination for dollar'. This relationship is based upon 
the rule that the form metonymically stands for the concept it denotes, 
which is expressed in the following metonymy: FORM FOR CONCEPT. As 
Radden and Kövecses argue, the very nature of language is based upon 
this métonymie principle, which is described by Lakoff and Turner (1989, 
108) a s WORDS STAND FOR THE CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS: "[s] ince w e 
have no other means of expressing and communicating our concepts than 
by using forms, language as well as other communication systems are of 
necessity métonymie. It is also for this reason tha t we fail to notice the 
métonymie character of language" (ibid.). 
Alpha geek ( ' the person with the most technological prowess in an 
office or a department ' ) and alpha girl ( ' the dominant member in a group 
of girls')19 exemplify typical cases of the Sign metonymy. First of all, we 
have a human being, a girl and a geek, who are likened to the first letter 
of the Greek alphabet. The meaning of the whole denotes girls and geeks 
19
 Both alpha geek and alpha girl come from an internet-based collection of English 
neologisms; http://www.wordspy.com. 
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who are the first in their group; this "prime position" is represented by 
the concept of the letter alpha. How is the concept of primariness linked 
to the letter a ? 
It is this metonymy, FORM FOR CONCEPT, which is at work in the 
first constituent of alpha geek and alpha girl: the form a stands for 
the concept it expresses—namely it being the first letter in the Greek 
alphabet. This concept of primariness is the shared similarity that exists 
between alpha and geek on the one hand, and alpha and girl on the 
other hand. However, there is a slight difference in meaning between 
the two alphas: in the former compound, it denotes the highest level 
of technological knowledge, while in the latter expression it is used to 
denote the quality of having the greatest influence and popularity within 
a group. How can alpha be used in these compounds while meaning 
different —- though—rela ted things? 
According to Langacker (1991), semantic relationships are based on 
the identification of an appropriate active zone of the elaborated con-
cept. This means tha t it is less probable for alpha geek to mean, for 
example, ' the most popular IT person in an office' because the meaning 
of geek brings into focus the frame of a person who is an expert with 
computers.2 0 Thus the active zone of geek is technological prowess (and 
not populari ty)—this quality is emphasised by alpha. In the case of al-
pha girl, however, the profile determinant has a more general meaning, 
and denotes a young female. Since the frame of girl is so general, alpha 
(denoting 'primariness') cannot bring into focus any sort of quality as 
in alpha geek for instance. The meaning negotiation between the two 
constituents of the compound results in the meaning of 'a girl who is the 
first among other girls'. 
5.1.2. Concept metonymies 
As Radden and Kövecses (1999) argue, concept metonymies involve a 
shift from ConceptA to Concepts, where the two concepts are part of 
the same ICA I and are related to each other in some specific way. The 
two major types of metonymy-producing relationships can be subsumed 
under two general conceptual configurations: (1) whole ICAI and its par t s 
(e.g., PART OF A THING FOR A WHOLE THING, as in England for 'Great 
2 0
 According to the C C E D , geek means "[somebody] who is skilled with computers 
and who seems more interested in them than in people". 
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Britain'); and (2) parts of an ICM (e.g., PLACE FOR PRODUCT MADE 
THERE, as in champagne). 
5.1.2.1. M E M B E R OF A C A T E G O R Y F O R T H E C A T E G O R Y 
There are numerous compound expressions where one entity (denoted by 
N2) is compared to another entity (N/) tha t is an instantiation of the 
MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY m e t o n y m y . A s s t a t e d 
by Radden and Kövecses (1999, 34), a category and its members form 
an ICM, the Category-and-Member ICM, which can be analysed as an 
instance of the whole-part configuration, more precisely as an instance of 
t h e PART FOR WHOLE m e t o n y m y . 
Waitress mom ('a woman who is married, has children, works in a 
low-income job, and has little formal education')2 1 is a compound tha t 
can be regarded as a type of metonymical construction of the MEMBER OF 
A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY conceptual metonymy. The mother, 
denoted by the second constituent, is likened to a waitress, as denoted by 
the first constituent of the compound. However, the concept of waitress 
metonymically stands for t he whole social class of married women working 
in low-income jobs. 
Why is waitress selected to stand in the place of the modifying el-
ement, as opposed to e.g., hairdresser, secretary or saleswoman? The 
answer I believe lies in what Lakoff (1987, 79; after Rosch 1978) calls 
"prototype effect": a subcategory or a member of a subcategory is se-
lected to comprehend the category as a whole because it possesses all 
the prototypical at tr ibutes of the category. This does not mean tha t 
all waitresses are married, have children and are badly paid, but rather 
that our culture takes the waitress as a social stereotype of her category 
(mothers who work in a badly paid job and have little formal education). 
According to Lakoff (ibid.), "[sjocial stereotypes are cases of metonymy— 
where a subcategory has a socially recognized status as standing for the 
category as a whole, usually for the purpose of making quick judgments 
about other people." 
However, the meaning of waitress mom would never have arisen with-
out a fur ther social stereotype: that of the housewife mother (Lakoff 
1987, 77-84). Lakoff claims that the category of mother has a central, 
prototypical case, with a mother who is married to the father of her 
natural child and stays at home all day with her children. Thus the ex-
21
 Source: www.wordspy.com. 
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pression of working mother does not simply mean a mother who happens 
to be working, but the category of working mother is defined in contrast 
to t he stereotypical housewife mother . As Lakoff argues, the stereotypical 
view is that mothers who do not stay at home all day with their children 
cannot properly care for them and bring them up. There is also the 
stereotypical image of work, which is something that is done away from 
home, and housework and child-rearing do not count. This stereotype 
is fought against with the bumper sticker "Every mother is a working 
mother" (op.cit., 80). Thus, similarly to working mother, waitress mom 
is also defined on the background of the housewife mother stereotype, as 
a less prototypical member of the mother category, as she does not stay at 
home with her children but goes out to work instead. However, similarly 
to housewife mother, waitress mom also functions as a stereotype, namely 
tha t of the category of low-paid, under-educated working mothers. 
5 . 1 . 2 . 2 . P R O D U C E R FOR P R O D U C T 
This metonymy is an instantiation of the Production ICM (Radden-
Kövecses 1999, 39-40), which involves actions in which one of the partici-
pants is a product created by the action. The PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, 
or more specifically the ARTIST FOR HIS WORK, is at play in picasso 
porn ( ' the scrambled signal of a pornographic cable channel as seen by 
a nonsubscriber ') .2 2 What we have is porn (denoted by N2) tha t is like 
the work of Picasso (denoted by Nj) : the nonsubscriber sees only very 
scrambled images of naked women that resemble the work of the cubist 
ar t is t . As Radden and Kövecses argue (ibid.), it is the very close asso-
ciation that exists between an art ist and his work in our culture that 
provides the immediate understanding of the metonymical character of 
N t . The shape of paintings—usually rectangular—is similar to the shape 
of a television set; the frame of t he painting maps onto the television box, 
while the painting tha t is contained on the canvas (in between the frames) 
corresponds to t he television screen. These mappings imply tha t there 
is a one-shot image metaphor involved between the source domain of a 
painting and the target domain of a television set. 
A very relevant question to ask about picasso porn is why it is Picasso 
who is selected to metonymically stand for his work, why not some other 
cubist or expressionist painter, such as Braque, Matisse or Kandinksy? I 
believe that there are two main reasons for choosing Picasso. First, he 
2 2
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was the artist who established abstract painting in the form of cubism, 
and became famous for depicting quite a few women on his canvas within 
this new style of painting which greatly distorted t he original shapes and 
figures. The name of Picasso is thus intricately linked with paintings 
of distorted women (and it should not be overlooked that it is his Les 
Demoiselles d'Avignon, which can be considered to be one of his most 
well-known paintings), more than e.g., Kandinsky or Matisse. Second, 
Picasso alliterates with porn—which is further evidence for the significant 
role that phonological considerations play in the formation of metaphor-
and metonymy-based compounds. 
5.2. Metaphor-based semantic relationship between the constituents of 
the compound and metonymy-based profile determinant 
This section focuses on metaphor- and metonymy-based compounds where 
there is a metaphorical relationship between the modifier and the profile 
determinant; at the same time there is also a conceptual metonymy act-
ing upon the head element (Figure 3). I believe tha t it is this type of 
creative compounding pat tern tha t underlies hammerhead ( 'a stubborn 
person').2 3 Wha t happens here is tha t the profile determinant, head, 
stands in a metaphorical relationship to the modifier, hammer. Thus we 
have a head tha t is like a hammer: hard, clumsy and unyielding. At 
the same time, head metonymically stands for the person via a PART 
FOR WHOLE conceptualisation, more specifically HEAD FOR THE PER-
SON. This latter metonymy underlies several compounds and idiomatic 
expressions in English, such as hothead ('a person who is easily aroused 
to anger'), heads will roll ( 'those responsible for the blunder will be dis-
missed'), to fling oneself at someone's head ( ' to pursue someone in the 
spirit of infatuation') .2 4 It is important to note t ha t the sequence of the 
metaphor and the metonymy acting upon the compound in this case is 
definitely relevant to the meaning of the expression: hammerhead cannot 
be analysed by taking the metonymy first, as t ha t would yield hammer 
person—a compound tha t could mean e.g., a person who prefers to work 
23
 Hammerhead emerges in both Ryder 's (1994) and Warren ' s (1992) writings, al-
though they use it t o refer to two different entities. In Ryder's case, it means 
'a type of shark ' , while in Warren 's usage it denotes ' a s tubborn person ' . In the 
paper I will use Warren ' s definition of the compound. 
2 4
 All the examples are f rom PDEI . 
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with a hammer as opposed to working with a drill (as in the following 
comment: "Oh, I 'm a hammer person when it comes t o DIY"). 
Fig. 3 
Model of a creative compound with a metaphor-based relationship 
between the two constituents and a metonymy-based profile determinant 
A further compound I wish to analyse in th is section, bell-bottoms ( ' t rou-
sers that are very wide at the bottom of the leg'), is based upon an image 
metaphor (Figure 4). 
Source domain Target domain 
Fig. 4 
Representation of the image schema of bell-bottoms 
Image metaphors map relatively little from source to ta rge t . In the case 
of bell-bottoms, the skeletal shape of a bell is mapped onto the shape of 
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the bot tom part of a pair of trousers. The profile determinant of the 
compound, bottoms, serves as a metonymical cue by which the complete 
garment, i.e., the pair of trousers can b e accessed through the PART FOR 
WHOLE conceptual metonymy. I would like to emphasise that my analy-
sis does not wish to take a stand on t h e sequence of metaphorical and 
metonymical processing: for instance, bell-bottoms can just as well be ac-
counted for by claiming t h a t metonymy acts upon the whole compound, 
i.e., ' the bell-shaped bo t toms ' metonymically stand for 'a pair of t rousers 
which has bell-shaped bot toms' . Whichever line of approach is chosen, 
conceptual metaphor and metonymy t a k e centre stage in the semantics 
of the construction. 
5.3. Metonymy-based modifier and metaphor-based profile determinant 
In this section, I will discuss compound expressions t ha t have a metaphor-
ical profile determinant and whose modifying element is based upon some 
sort of conceptual metonymy. In the case of alpha geek and alpha girl it 
has already been shown t h a t the meaning of the first constituent is un-
derstood via the FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymy, where the form (in this 
case the let ter "a") s tands for the concept it denotes—that is, it being 
the first le t ter of the Greek alphabet. I t is this concept of "primariness" 
that is understood by the word alpha in these constructions. Alpha pup 
('market research jargon for the kid who is deemed by his or her peers 
to be the "coolest" in their school, neighbourhood or town')25 is more 
similar in meaning to alpha girl than alpha geek, where the expression 
denotes ' a girl who is t he first among other girls'. In both alpha girl 
and alpha pup, the profile determinant has a general meaning, and thus 
alpha (denoting 'primariness') cannot br ing into focus any sort of quali ty 
as in alpha geek for instance. The meaning negotiation between the two 
constituents of alpha and pup results in the meaning of a kid who is the 
"coolest" of all, i.e., the child with the largest influence in his/her group. 
The metaphorical profile determinants of the alpha pup can be ac-
counted for by the everyday conceptualisation of humans as animals, 
based upon The Great Chain of Being metaphor system (Lakoff-John-
son 1980). In the case of alpha pup, humans are understood as dogs, 
with the "help" of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS conceptual metaphor (which 
25
 Source: www.wordspy.com. 
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is a submetaphor of the more general PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS conceptual 
metaphor).2 6 
In the case of gutter bunny ( 'mountain biker slang for a person who 
commutes to work on a bicycle'),2 ' the modifier is rooted in our cultural 
knowledge of cycling in the city. In urban neighbourhoods, the edges of 
the roads are created so as to form gutters where the water can collect 
and flow away. If there is no cycle path, then cyclists use the side of 
the road for riding (where the gutter is located). All this information is 
packed into gutter, through which we can access the Cycling in the City 
ICM.2 8 The metaphorical profile determinant, bunny, activates mappings 
between a person who cycles to work and a rabbit. In my opinion, the 
quality of swiftness tha t we associate with rabbits (as opposed to the 
slowness of a tortoise) is mapped onto the cyclist: once again it is a par t 
of our cultural knowledge (and part of the Cycling in the City ICM) tha t 
getting about with a bicycle in a city is very often a much faster means 
of travel than doing so with a car or public transportation. As a last note 
I wish to add that the constituents of gutter bunny exhibit a LOCATION 
schema (i.e., a location-located semantic structure), similarly to plenty 
of other compounds of English (such as belly button for instance). 
5.4. Metaphor-based modifier and metonymy-based profile determinant 
Aeidhead ( 'an LSD user')2 9 represents a compound where the modifier is 
metaphor-based, while the profile determinant is metonymy-based. The 
compound can be paraphrased as 'a head tha t is full of acid', where the 
LSD IS ACID conceptual metaphor provides the understanding of acid as 
the drug in question. The compound evokes an image of a head full of 
acid—this CONTAINMENT schema can be accounted for by THE HEAD IS A 
CONTAINER conceptual metaphor, which is very prevalent in English and 
underlies numerous idiomatic expressions. For instance, Benczes (2002) 
2 b
 It needs t o be emphasised tha t puppy does t u r n up in a number of English id-
ioms, denot ing a young person: a puppy/young puppy—'an arrogant or conceited 
young man ' , puppy fat — 'plumpness t h a t the boy or girl will shed when reach-
ing matur i ty ' , puppy love—'the love of a very young, immature person' (all t he 
examples are from PDEI) . 
2
' Source: www.wordspy.com. 
28
 This ICM is of course different to the Cycling in the Countryside ICM, where 
there are no gutters for instance. 
2 9
 Source: LDOCE. 
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analyses idioms tha t contain the word head in them and shows tha t basic 
m e t a p h o r s s u c h as THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER a n d IDEAS ARE PHYSICAL 
OBJECTS motivate idioms such as need to have one's head examined and 
have rocks in one's head. In fact, the image of a head full of acid also 
suggests t h a t there is no place left in t he container /head for other "ob-
jects", such as ideas. Therefore, somebody who uses LSD on a regular 
basis runs the danger of losing the abili ty to think rational thoughts. 
Needless to say, the metonymical profile determinant provides ac-
cess to LSD addicts through the HEAD FOR THE PERSON conceptual 
metonymy. The question can of course be raised why head is used as the 
reference point in order to access the whole person, instead of some other 
body par t . I believe t h a t two arguments can be put forward in favour of 
head. First , the HEAD FOR THE PERSON conceptual metonymy is highly 
conventional and crops up often in English, both in compounds and in id-
iomatic expressions (see section 5.2). Second, the effects of LSD—which 
is a hallucinogenic d r u g — a r e felt pr imari ly in the head. 
It is quite interesting about the semantics of this compound tha t , 
although the meaning of the overall expression is somebody who is ad-
dicted to LSD and uses it regularly, neither acid nor head implies this 
habituality. This, I believe, can be accounted for by a further conceptual 
metonymy acting upon the compound as a whole. Being on LSD can be 
construed with the help of the Event I C M (Radden-Kövecses 1999, 32), 
which can be metaphorically viewed as containing subparts, or ra ther 
subevents. In the case of acidhead, the habi tual s ta te of being under the 
influence of LSD s tands for the present s ta te (even if the person denoted 
by the compound is not taking drugs a t a given moment) . Therefore, a 
PART FOR WHOLE m e t o n y m y — H A B I T U A L FOR PRESENT — a c c o u n t s fo r 
the aspect of regularity t h a t is implied by the compound. 
6. Conclus ion 
Traditionally, noun-noun combinations were classified into two semantic 
groups: endocentric and exocentric compounds. In the case of endocen-
tric compounds, the concept designated by the compound represents a 
subcategory of the enti ty expressed by the head noun (thus apple tree is 
an endocentric compound because it is a type of tree). Most compounds 
of English are endocentric. Since the class of exocentric or headless com-
pounds is much smaller, they have been generally regarded as exceptional 
cases, which fail to abide by normal compound formation rules, and for 
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this reason they have been excluded f rom a systematic linguistic analy-
sis. Cognitive linguistics adopts a different approach, claiming tha t the 
analysability of nominal constructions is not a yes-no question but an 
issue of degree: thus there are transparent expressions such as apple tree 
on the one end of the spectrum, and semantically opaque cases like red 
tape on the other end. 
The paper has argued that metaphor- (and/or metonymy-) based 
compounds such as red tape are not semantically opaque, but can be 
systematically analysed with the help of cognitive linguistic tools such 
as conceptual metaphor and metonymy. To prove this point, the pa-
per focused on noun-noun compounds where the meaning is affected 
by conceptual metaphor and metonymy. Although bo th Warren (1992) 
and Goossens (1995) have noticed t h a t the meaning of compounds can 
be based upon metaphor and metonymy, their analyses were restricted 
to a couple of examples. Geeraerts (2002) a t tempted to systematise 
metaphorical and metonymical compounds (it should be emphasised t ha t 
his analyses were based upon Du tch—not English—examples), bu t he 
concentrated on the sequence by which metaphor and metonymy is ac-
tivated in the meaning of the compound expression. The problem with 
this line of analysis is tha t it is often very difficult to decide which process 
acts upon the meaning of the compound first—metaphor or metonymy? 
The present paper a t tempted to go beyond previous analyses by 
systematically mapping the various pa t te rns by which metaphor- and 
metonymy-based compounds are formed in English. I have claimed t h a t 
there are distinct pat terns of compounds that are based upon concep-
tual metaphor and metonymy; these pat terns seem to be productive. 
I have identified four such patterns, whereby conceptual metaphor and 
metonymy act simultaneously upon the compound in the following ways: 
(1) metaphor-based semantic relationship between the constituents of the 
compound and metonymy-based modifier; (2) metaphor-based semantic 
relationship between the constituents of the compound and metonymy-
based profile determinant; (3) metonymy-based modifier and metaphor-
based profile determinant; and (4) metaphor-based modifier and meto-
nymy-based profile determinant. 
I wish to emphasise t ha t my analyses do not wish to take a stand on 
the sequence of metaphor and metonymy acting upon the meaning of the 
noun-noun combination: as I have pointed out with respect to acidhead, 
for instance, there are several ways of proceeding with the analysis. Nev-
ertheless, whichever line of enquiry is chosen, the result is the same: with 
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the help of cognitive linguistic tools, the meaning of such compounds 
can be explained. This implies that a cognitive linguistic theory can in 
fact account for a class of compounds t ha t have been mostly regarded as 
peripheral members of the English language. 
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THE ADAPTIVE NATURE OF 
MEANING AS UNDERSTANDING"* 
GÁBOR GYŐRI 
Abstract 
In the paper I discuss semantic change as a cognitive adaptation process which flexibly 
adjusts the culturally shared conceptual category system of a language to changing 
conditions in the environment. I back up this view with the claim that the evolution-
ary function of cognition is to provide the organism with functional "knowledge" of 
its environment for the sake of adaptive orientation in a flexible way relative to the 
stability of environmental conditions. Hence, the cognitive function of language is to 
promote social cognition in order to facilitate the sharing of knowledge tha t proves 
functional and adaptive in the given physical, social and cultural environment of a 
group of individuals. In this light the cognitive function of the mental machinery of 
conceptualization and imagery — as the basis of meaning as understanding — is the 
adaptive construal of phenomena. Semantic leaps in the form of metaphor, metonymy 
and other kinds of meaning extension create new adaptive perspectives on the environ-
ment. When the circumstances triggering such novel usage persist, these perspectives 
will become conventionalized in the process of semantic change, leading to new estab-
lished forms of functional and adaptive imagery. 
1. Introduction 
Contrary to approaches to meaning based on the doctrine of philosophical 
rationalism, according to which cognition is "the convergence of our ideas 
and the t ru th about the world" (Chomsky 1988, 158), cognitive semantics 
claims that meaning is based on mental imagery and conceptualizations 
of reality which do not objectively correspond to it but reflect a charac-
teristic human way of understanding. Thus, one of the basic axioms of 
cognitive semantics is that linguistic meaning originates in the human in-
terpretation of reality. This involves conceptual mappings from familiar 
domains of experience to unfamiliar or less well-understood domains in 
* The publication of the paper was supported by the Research Group for Theo-
retical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the University of 
Debrecen. 
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the form of metaphor, image schema projections, and blending of mental 
spaces, among others (Lakoff-Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987; Fauconnier 
1994; 1997). 
Since meaning derives from the way human beings make sense of 
the world, the conceptualizations which underlie meaning are not gov-
erned by autonomous linguistic processes but their operation is based 
on cognitive mechanisms at any level of cognitive functioning — from 
perception to complex conceptual structures (Langacker 1987, 98; 1991, 
2). Although this involves a great deal of subjectivity due to the fact 
tha t cognitive processes occur in individual human minds, meaning is 
"shared, public, and 'objective,' in an appropriate sense of objectivity" 
due to common human ways of embodied understanding of a shared re-
ality (Johnson 1987, 175), and also a common conceptualizing capacity 
(Lakoff 1987, 280). 
However, an account of the social nature of linguistic meaning re-
quires an even more functional and practical explanation in terms of so-
cial interaction because of the dynamic nature of language. The system of 
a language is never in a motionless state. Changes are continuously going 
on in all of its par ts , meaning being the most unstable area in this re-
spect. Changes in the meanings of otherwise established expressions tend 
to occur relatively easily, often within the lifetime of one generation (cf. 
McMahon 1994, 174-5). This is made possible by the fact tha t meaning 
relies on rather malleable conceptual structures (in the minds of individu-
als). Categories are relatively easily stretched or reshaped owing to their 
prototypical nature and fuzzy boundaries, and the encyclopedic nature of 
meaning even allows the prototypical center t o shift and thereby give rise 
to a new category (Győri 2002, 152). The cognitive operations underlying 
these linguistic processes can obviously occur only in the minds of individ-
ual speakers and reflect their individual perspectives and understanding 
of the world. However, such individual conceptualizations are constrained 
not only by the common conceptualizing capacity and the shared real-
ity but also by the requirement of intelligibility between interlocutors. 
Mutual intelligibility demands some common ground which is achieved 
through the interlocutors coordinating their expectations of each other's 
intentions on the basis of all those various commonalities tha t consti-
tu te their culture (Clark 1996, 325). Thus, the social nature of meaning 
actually evolves through the conventionalization of individual conceptual-
izations during speaker-hearer interaction in the communicative process. 
In other words, the conceptualizations constituting the semantic poles of 
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expressions will be continuously "shaped for symbolic purposes according 
to the dictates of linguistic convention" (Langacker 1987, 98). 
Thus, making sense of the world actually happens at two levels. On 
the one hand, the malleability of conceptual structures allows their re-
shaping by way of various cognitive mechanisms, which is good strategy 
for making sense of the world at the level of the individual. However, 
when individual conceptualizations are put into linguistic form for com-
municative purposes, the interlocutors partake in a social cognitive ac-
tivity. They share the contents of their minds: mental representations, 
mental states, beliefs, etc. Wi th the specific conceptualizations becom-
ing conventionalized as meanings of particular linguistic expressions, a 
collective or social level of sense making is achieved. 
Below I will look at these levels of sense making from a wider perspec-
tive. Specifically I will consider how they relate to the cognitive function 
of language in general, the relationship between cognition and language, 
and the evolutionary function of cognition. My aim is to provide a func-
tional explanation of meaning as understanding at both the individual 
and social levels and of the interactive processes between them. 
2. Meaning as creative and conventionalized understanding 
The lexicon of every language codes a relatively well-defined and fi-
nite system of conceptual categories, i.e., established conceptualizations, 
which are available to speakers for communicating their mental contents 
and their perspectives of the world in conventionalized ways. In spite of 
this, speakers often take a particular expression (or word) and employ 
it in an unconventional or figurative way in some novel context. This 
section will look at how meaning as understanding reveals itself in this 
dynamic character of the semantic structure of language. I will discuss 
how and why speakers diverge from conventional ways of expression and 
how and why such divergence affects the category system of language in 
the long run. 
2.1. Milking sense through semantic leaps 
There are various sociocultural and psychological factors due to which 
speakers may occasionally judge the entrenched meanings provided by 
the conventional expressions of their language unsuitable or insufficient 
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for conveying their ideas. When none of the available expressions seem 
to match their momentary conceptualization of some aspect of reality, 
speakers may resort to some novel figurative usage which deviates from 
conventional modes of expression. In this way they temporarily mod-
ify the conventional meaning of a particular expression with the purpose 
of getting some novel conceptualization across. Speakers resort to such 
context dependent temporary semantic modifications of conventional ex-
pressions in order to comply with some immediate communicative expec-
tat ion (Tomasello 2002 [1999], 168). 
Geeraerts (1997) has claimed tha t novel usage is governed primarily 
by two basic communicative principles: expressivity and efficiency, where 
"expressivity is always the primary cause of change, whereas efficiency in-
volves the choice of the linguistic means realizing the expressive intention" 
(Geeraerts op.cit., 105). The semantic extension which occurs during the 
creative-innovative usage of an otherwise established expression is possi-
ble due to the malleability of the underlying conceptual structures. Based 
on these, speakers employ various cognitive mechanisms in the form of 
metaphor, metonymy, narrowing or broadening of meaning, blending, etc. 
for the sake of immediate expressiveness in their communicative interac-
tions. Thus, a speaker trying to comply with communicative needs also 
faces a cognitive challenge. Phenomena of reality are designated not only 
for the sake of discourse, but also because conceptualizations fixed in 
this way are essential for economical and effective thought. As Anderson 
(1988, 93) pointed out, language stabilizes conceptual s tructure against 
fragmentation. 
Some two decades ago Carroll (1985) conducted a s tudy which offers 
some indication as to how novel expressions might do the job. In Carroll's 
s tudy subjects were askecl to make up names for various things, either 
unfamiliar or only lacking a conventional name. It was observed tha t the 
names generated tended to describe and categorize because they referred 
in some degree to properties of the name's referent. When the subjects 
were asked to rate the names they produced according to quality, the 
names tha t were easy to learn and remember (i.e., descriptive, natural, 
etc.) and easy to use (i.e., distinctive, brief, etc.) were rated as "good 
names" (Carroll op.cit., 5). As the criteria for easy remembering and 
easy usage indicate, names are the better the more unambiguously they 
highlight a category. This is obviously due to what Rosch (1978, 30) 
called the cue validity of features, which is the degree to which a particular 
feature of a category has the capacity to cue the complete category, i.e., 
the total set of its features. 
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Therefore, when initiating innovative usage in an effort to commu-
nicate some unconventional conceptualization, a speaker must search for 
an expression with a semantic s t ructure that is appropriate to be modi-
fied in the desired way, and must also make a choice as to the cognitive 
mechanism to implement the modification in the most effective manner. 
This procedure is affected by the salience of features of phenomena to 
be conceptualized, which is functionally determined by specific cogni-
tive factors (Győri 2002). Basically, this functionally determined salience 
influences the possible construals of phenomena and through this the 
choice of an expression to be used in a non-conventional way. For exam-
ple, Common Germanic *huson meaning 'covering for the legs' developed 
through metonymical extension f rom Proto-Indo-European *(s)keu- ' to 
cover' obviously due to the conceptualization of t he garment as 'a thing 
covering (the legs)' on the basis of the most salient feature. As later de-
velopment in English testifies, the expression with the sense 'leg covering' 
(cf. German Hose 'pants ' ) gave rise through metaphorical extension to 
the word hose with a completely independent meaning, i.e., a hose was 
conceptualized as 'a thing similar to the leg of a pair of trousers.' 
Thus, in the process of semantic change new categories are created 
(cf. Győri 1996), since language is obviously a device for the categoriza-
tion of experience (e.g., Geeraerts 1997, 7-8, 20; Taylor 1989). Content 
words clearly name categories but the fact tha t language is a system 
of categories is apparent not only in the case of content words. Func-
tional elements (e.g., articles, prepositions, suffixes, etc.) also categorize 
reality, as they are very general categorizations of relations between non-
linguistic phenomena as humans perceive them. Many prepositions, for 
instance, are linguistic instantiations of various image schemata, i.e., they 
categorize recurring pat terns in our experience, like in and out in the case 
of the CONTAINER schema, up and down in the case of the VERTICALITY 
schema, or from and to in the case of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema 
(Johnson 1987, 30ff.; Lakoff 1987, 271ÍL). 
Speakers' linguistic behavior is influenced by various communicative 
maxims pertaining to successful communication in the widest sense, from 
getting one's ideas across efficiently to achieving social success (Keller 
1994). In order to comply with such maxims, speakers often construct 
meaning in creative ways and produce semantic leaps in the form of 
occasional wordings with a figurative meaning (Coulson 2001). If writ-
ten, these would often require quotat ion marks to indicate their unusual-
ness and to draw the reader's a t tent ion to the fact tha t the conventional 
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meaning has been altered. Most of the time, however, the modification of 
conventional linguistic forms happens spontaneously and unconsciously 
in the course of communicative interaction between speakers and hearers 
(Anttila 1989, 408). Therefore, spontaneous and intuitive mutual intel-
ligibility between the interlocutors is a basic requirement in the case of 
newly introduced expressions with no established conventional meanings 
in the language (Palmer 1978, 309; Fritz 1998, 21). 
Thus, the communicative principles and the cognitive factors do not 
just guide creative mental processing in the production of novel meaning 
through semantic leaps, but they must also facilitate intelligibility, i.e., 
the comprehension side of meaning construction (Coulson 2001, 2). Mu-
tual intelligibility derives from various sources, from the common human 
ways of embodied understanding of a shared reality and a common con-
ceptualizing capacity, involving various universal cognitive mechanisms 
and operations, to the perceptual and functional salience of phenomena 
and the context-dependence of unconventional expressions, all of which is 
based on the shared knowledge of the interlocutors. All of these together 
will provide the basis for the proper interpretation of occasion-bound 
meanings. 
However, one of the best possible grounds for mutual intelligibility 
is the analogical character of human mental processing. It is a basic 
characteristic of human thought that all new phenomena are mentally 
grasped via an analogy to already familiar cognitive structures (e.g., Heit 
1997; Gentner-Markman 1997; Holyoak-Thagard 1997). Antt i la (1989, 
141) has even claimed that language is part of the human innate capac-
ity for analogy. In fact, we utilize familiar knowledge through analogical 
thinking when we categorize, make inferences and create and learn new 
abstractions. Analogy is crucial in making sense of the world by recogniz-
ing similarities, i.e., by noticing that certain new experiences are similar 
to old ones in specific ways. However, similarity is not just 'out there' 
but is to a large extent in the eye of the beholder. According to Holyoak 
(1984, 204), "[a]nalogy [...] is structured similarity with functional im-
port." Holyoak and Thagard (1997, 36) have identified three constraints 
in analogical reasoning. First , the analogy rests on perception of direct 
similarity. Second, structural parallels are sought for. And third, the 
analogy has a certain purpose, i.e., it is guided by what the reasoner 
intends to achieve by it. 
This functionality is crucial to the mechanism of innovative usage 
and the construction of novel meaning. The choice of a conventional 
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expression from which the speaker 'takes a semantic leap' in order to 
get some new conceptualization across depends on what familiar cogni-
tive structure that expression designates and the way this s tructure can 
be utilized by processing it through various cognitive mechanisms like 
metaphor, metonymy, blending, etc. This ensures bo th the adaptabili ty 
of meaning to new experience and the intelligibility of meaning exten-
sion. Furthermore, as Geeraerts (1997, 113-4) has shown, the flexibility 
and dynamism of the prototypical character of semantic structure also 
restricts the range and direction of such extensions, which serves as an 
additional aid for interpretation. 
The basis of cognitive semantics is akin to t he above insights in 
cognitive psychology, as Langacker's (1987, 105) formulation testifies: 
"Our mental experience is coherent by virtue of the s t ruc ture we impose on 
it. A pivotal aspect of this structuring capacity is the interpretation of novel 
experience with reference to previous experience, [...]." 
Johnson (1987, 174) has also stressed the importance of familiar infor-
mation in making sense of new experience, and Lakoff (1987, 346) has 
pointed out that mot ivat ion—in the sense of relatively easy cognitive 
processing due to certain clues providing mental support , like iconicity 
(cf. Antt i la 1989, 152) — is crucial t o our understanding, learning and 
storing of new information. It is also this analogical character of human 
thinking that gains expression in figurative language. Our minds under-
stand and interpret the world around us with the help of metaphorical and 
metonymical processes, image schematic projections, and idealized cogni-
tive models (Lakoff-Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Kövecses 
- R a d d e n 1998; Gibbs-Colston 1995). 
The fundamental cognitive processes, mostly metaphor and meto-
nymy, t ha t are universally employed by humans to comprehend the vari-
ous phenomena of reality, i.e., "to make sense of t he world," are manifest 
not only in the innovative though context-dependent spontaneous usage 
of established expressions, but actually they are also the ones t h a t his-
torical semantics has established as the basic linguistic mechanisms of 
historical change of meaning and according to which the larger portion 
of individual semantic changes can be classified. T h e well-definedness and 
finiteness of linguistically coded cultural categories, mentioned at t he be-
ginning of this section, is thus only theoretically t rue , since the category 
system coded in the lexicon of a language can never be captured in a com-
pletely motionless s ta te . New expressions (words) continuously emerge in 
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the lexicon and existing expressions tend to acquire new meanings giving 
rise through this to new conceptual categories. 
The conceptualizations reflected in innovative usage will first become 
temporarily coded in the language in the form of non-conventional expres-
sions. Although most of t hem fade away quickly, some will spread and 
find their way into the system of the language. Coding in language evi-
dently facilitates the activation of the appropriate cognitive routines and 
thus contributes to a category reaching a degree of entrenchment through 
which it achieves unit s tatus (Langacker 1987, 100). Thus, Anderson's 
(1988, 93) claim, made from the perspective of cognitive psychology, that 
language stabilizes concept s t ructure against fragmentation appears to be 
valid in this special historical sense, too, because it is obviously a lexical 
item through which a conceptual category can exist most explicitly at 
the social-cultural level. 
Thus, we can look at the results of semantic changes in t h e lexicon as 
"fossilized" conceptualizations of previous generations. These conceptu-
alizations have outlived the period of their spontaneous appearance and 
have become culturally established. In this way they later on impose par-
ticular conceptualizations of t he world on fu ture generations, but at the 
same time also provide the source for creative novel usage in the future. 
Since it is a historical linguistic fact that "words come from other words" 
(Hopper 1990, 151), the inventory of established expressions will con-
strain possible novel conceptualizations in t he communicative-cognitive 
activity of interlocutors. Thus, linguistically coded categories will canal-
ize the utilization of familiar knowledge in innovative usage because the 
larger portion of culturally shared knowledge is obviously manifest in the 
semantic s t ructure of the available conventional expressions. 
In sum, semantic change is the result of two different processes at 
two interconnected levels. T h e first level is tha t of innovative usage in 
everyday linguistic activity. The second level consists in t h e spreading 
and conventionalization of innovations. The two levels are organically 
interconnected not only because the ou tpu t of the first level serves as 
input for the second level, bu t also because in turn the o u t p u t of the sec-
ond level furnishes the material on which the processes of t h e first level 
operate. Tha t is, the source for new semantic extensions (or leaps) is pro-
vided by one-time innovations t ha t have become established expressions. 
In the following I will examine the significance of the interdependence of 
this interconnection with regard to the cognitive functioning of language. 
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2.2. Semantic extension and semantic change: on-line and long-term 
cognitive adaptation 
Whenever we use language, we a t t emp t to use it in a way that it repre-
sents our conceptualizations of the world as faithfully as possible for the 
purpose of communicating them to others. As already mentioned, there 
are several pressures on effective communication. These include immedi-
ate representing ancl referring needs, communicative expectations, adher-
ence to communicative maxims, striving for expressivity and efficiency in 
communicative interaction, clarity and precision of expression, and the 
faithful rendering of one's own perspective, among others. Beside these 
internal factors external ones like variations and transitions of our every-
day environment may also pose cognitive-communicative challenges for 
the interlocutors, who are thus often induced to resort to linguistic inno-
vations, usually in the form of meaning extensions, novel compounds and 
derivations, or by initiating metaphorical, metonymical and other indi-
rect references. These linguistic operations are the direct manifestation 
of the cognitive-communicative function of language and are the result of 
flexible adaptive linguistic behavior in the effort to effectively cope with 
the communicative and cognitive challenges. 
As Palmer (1996) eloquently argues, the human capacity for imagery 
"is adaptive if it guides or promotes adaptive behaviors," and language 
must have evolved to provide "a means by which speakers can evoke and 
reinforce adaptive imagery in one another" (Palmer op.cit., 52). The 
ad hoc innovative usages in the everyday linguistic activity of speakers 
serve this evoking and reinforcing of adaptive imagery and they function 
as the mechanism of continuous or "on-line" adjustment of language to 
novel conditions. Depending on the persistence of such conditions, speak-
ers may tailor their language repeatedly to the same circumstances in the 
same way. Obviously, the conceptualizations and semantic leaps—mani-
fest in these innovative unconventional expressions—that best serve this 
adaptive purpose are the ones that are most likely to get conventional-
ized and fixed in the semantic structure of the language through semantic 
change in the long run. In this way the semantic structure of t he lan-
guage becomes adapted to the cognitive-communicative conditions which 
have originally triggered the innovative usages but have become stable 
and culturally salient. 
For any change to qualify as true adaptat ion in an evolutionary sense, 
it must come about by way of a selection mechanism (Plotkin 1994, 51). 
In fact, several authors have proposed that the spreading of linguistic 
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innovations is actually a selection process. Thus , the conventionalization 
of novel expressions is a sociocultural process tha t is based on selection 
from a pool of linguistic variation (cf. Fritz 1998, 73; Keller 1985, 234; 
McMahon 1994, 225). According to Croft 's Theory of Utterance Selec-
tion, variation comes about through altered replication of linguistic forms 
as "a result of speakers adjust ing the mapping from language structure to 
external function [...], that is, meaning in context" (Croft 2000, 8). When 
speakers select such non-conventional variants, they gradually establish 
a convention through the use of these variants in appropriate contexts 
(Croft op.cit., 7 and 30). However, most au thors claim tha t , contrary to 
biological evolutionary changes, linguistic changes appear to be teleolog-
ical processes because in language change it is not a spontaneously given 
variability upon which selection acts in order to adapt the system to the 
challenges of changed conditions. This non-predetermined bu t seemingly 
still goal-directed character of language change is described by Keller 
(1985, 235) in t he following way (cf. also Crof t op.cit., 31): 
"[...] whereas, in nature, the variations evolve according to chance, with 
regard to communicating we create variation already in anticipation of the 
selection to be expected." 
Though language does not change in a predetermined direction, on the 
above grounds it seems to be undeniable t h a t language is inherently a 
goal-directed system (Anttila 1989, 194). This appears to be especially 
obvious in semantic change where the u l t imate source of variation is the 
speakers' creative and innovative usage of their language. Particular vari-
ants are created in response to communicative and cognitive challenges, 
i.e., the emergence of the variability of linguistic expressions is condi-
tioned by changing circumstances because they arise as the result of an 
immediate problem-solving behavior first. This communicative behavior 
is triggered by various "phenomena of cul ture [...] [which] elicit various 
responses to nomination, for example, metaphor, metonymy, or other 
figures of speech, and, as a result, synchronic variation increases. This 
variation is t he basis of semantic change [. . .]" (Anttila op.cit., 153). 
Thus, semantic change is inherently functional. The innovations t ha t 
prove to be adaptive conceptualizations of given phenomena will be se-
lected from the variation of t he available innovations through an (uncon-
scious) preference by the speech community, which preference is actually 
the manifestation of an adaptive linguistic behavior. In other words, 
when a particular innovative usage comes under a lasting selection pres-
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sure in the form of communicative needs of a wide sociocultural range, 
change will occur in the language system. 
3. The nature of cognition: an evolutionary explanation of 
adaptive processes in language 
Above I argued tha t semantic change is basically a cognitive adaptat ion 
process in language. However, this claim is somewhat vague unless it can 
be embedded in an evolutionary theory of cognition and is supported by 
what is known about the adaptive function of cognition in general. There-
fore, my aim in this section is to supplement and strengthen my point by 
presenting an evolutionary biological view of cognition and showing how 
the cognitive functioning of language, including the processes of cognitive 
adaptation, derives from the general biological functions of cognition. 
3.1. The functions of cognition 
According to an old definition by Neisser (1976, 1), "[cjognition is the 
activity of knowing: the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge." 
This definition — as Neisser also indicated — does not apply to human 
beings alone but also to non-human animals. The activity of knowing 
is primarily of a biological nature and is an evolutionary adaptation be-
cause the acquisition, organization and application of knowledge about 
the environment is in general the fundamental basis of any organism's 
contact and interaction with the environment it inhabits (Plotkin 1994). 
Cognition has an adaptive role because all this functioning has one 
aim: to enhance the organism's average probability of survival in its 
environment by adjusting its behavior to expected situations (Csányi 
1989, 205; Plotkin op.cit., 120). Consequently, not all information tha t 
can be picked up from the environment will count as relevant for an 
organism in its interactive behavior with the environment. Only the in-
formation the processing of which contributes to the organism's adaptive 
behavior will be utilized. In other words, the function of cognition is 
knowing the world in a way tha t is required for an organism's adap-
tive interaction with its environment. The cognitive mechanisms of any 
organism have been adapted to this interaction and permit therefore a 
species-specific perception of the environment and processing of incom-
ing information. Hence, cognition appears to be of a relativistic nature. 
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On the one hand, the same environment will require different functional 
interactions, thus different "views" of it, in different species. On the 
other hand, the same environment may require different interactions on 
different occasions of the same individual, depending on a mult i tude of 
various internal and external factors. Rosch (1978, 29) formulates this 
idea very clearly: 
"[T]he perceived world [...] [is] not a metaphysical world without a knower. 
What kinds of attributes can be perceived are [...] species-specific. [...] 
What at t r ibutes will be perceived [...] is undoubtedly determined by many 
factors having to do with the functional needs of the knower interacting with 
the physical and social environment." 
The biological mechanisms for acquiring, organizing and applying knowl-
edge operate primarily within an individual organism. Thus, the function 
of cognition is t o construct and operate a dynamic internal model of the 
environment which controls the organism's behavior for the sake of adap-
tive interaction with that environment (cf. Csányi 1992). The proportion 
of genetically determined knowledge of the environment and of the nec-
essary behavior therein on the one hand and individual experience and 
learned behavior on the other within that model is a function of both the 
complexity of the organism and of its environment (Bonner 1980, 138; 
Csányi 1988; Plotkin 1994, 149). The notion of environment, though, in-
cludes not only the natural and material environment but , relative to the 
complexity of the behavioral organization of a species, also their social 
and cultural environment. Therefore, in proportion to the complexity of 
social relationships in the lifestyle of a species, individually acquired and 
organized knowledge must be made collective within a group of individu-
als, i.e., cognition must take on social dimensions. Quiatt and Reynolds 
(1993, 141) define social cognition as "]t]he application of intelligence to 
the review of social information and the exploitation and management 
of social relationships toward at ta inment of short- and long-term goals." 
Thus, different species participate in social cognition to the extent that 
they rely on social interaction for their survival. This must be matched 
by the complexity of the different forms and mechanisms of communica-
tion through which the necessary sharing of information is achieved for 
the operation of a collective model. 
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3.2. Language as a tool for individual and social cognition 
Human cognition derives from and shows evolutionary continuity with 
cognitive functioning in non-human pr imates in general (cf. Tomasello 
2002, 32). Due to the extraordinary complexity of the human environ-
ment, however, which includes socially and culturally determined com-
ponents to an exceptionally large extent, the adaptive function of hu-
man cognition pertains to functional behavior and appropriate orienta-
tion mostly in the human sociocultural environment ra ther than just to 
survival in the strict biological sense. To match this behavioral com-
plexity, humans possess the most powerful device for sharing knowledge. 
Thus, human cognition is unique with regard to the fact t h a t it is supple-
mented by a special device, language. Language is the evolutionary inno-
vation of combining the interindividual function of communication and 
the individual function of cognition in one system, creating the capacity 
to manipulate symbols, which are used bo th externally in communica-
tion and internally in mental representation simultaneously (Győri 1999; 
2001; Tomasello 2003). As a result, language is a tool not only for indi-
vidual cognition, but due to its symbolic nature it enormously enhances 
the possibilities for social cognition (cf. Palmer 1996, 53). 
An effective communicative system of a symbolic kind will enhance 
the power of a mental model of reality by lending it a social charac-
ter. As a consequence, human mental models do not remain confined 
to knowledge gained from direct and personal experience, and individu-
als will be able to partake of and benefit from the experience of others 
in extreme proportions (cf. Plotkin 1994, 10). By facilitating the repre-
sentation and distribution of individually acquired knowledge, language 
creates a culturally shared mental model of reality for the advantage of 
the whole community. Such a model of reality is more powerful and less 
subjective t han any individual model because the adequacy of the model 
is constantly controlled by being compared to other individual models. 
In other words, the conceptual structures constituting the model are con-
tinuously coordinated and harmonized in the communicative interactions 
of interlocutors. In this way individuals sharing a language will also be 
able to share the same model of reality, which is qualitatively superior t o 
any individual (i.e., private) model in range, accuracy, flexibility, etc. 
Thus, the basic cognitive function of language builds on the general 
biological function of cognition in individual organisms bu t differs from 
it with regard to the fact t ha t it serves as the basis for a culturally 
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shared model of reality on which every individual in a community can 
rely for the construction and operation of their own mental models of 
the environment in coordination with those of others. The power of 
this model derives from the fact that the basis of the knowledge shared 
through it is neither some common genetic endowment nor necessarily 
the same experience, but its symbolic nature. This symbolic mode l— 
with the help of the components (grammatical rules and linguistic signs) 
constituting i t—can be operated creatively in various ways for processing 
information about the environment. New cognitive structures can be 
constructed actively and subjectively by any one individual and then 
conveyed to other individuals in order to substi tute direct experience 
for them or to provide them with abstract conceptual constructions for 
understanding various relations between phenomena of reality. 
In order for this social cognitive process to function correctly, lan-
guage—as a social instrument for cognizing the environment—must al-
ways suit the cognitive needs of a speech community. This means t h a t 
it must be able to encode all the necessary information about reality 
and model it in a way tha t facilitates optimal accommodation to a given 
environment. In other words, any particular language has to be such 
that it adaptively serves the acquisition, organization and application of 
knowledge in a community for interaction with the speakers' environment, 
exactly the things tha t make up the function of cognition in general (cf. 
Neisser 1976, 1). 
4. Adapt ing language to cognit ion 
In section 2 I described how semantic change occurs in language and 
claimed tha t it is an adaptat ion process. Here, armed with the wisdom 
of the previous section about the evolutionary function of cognition, I will 
discuss the broader relevance of semantic change for human cognition. 
4.1. The adaptedness of language 
Human cognition is characterized by its strong reliance on symbolic struc-
tures in the form of language. Therefore, language must inherently be 
designed to serve cognition. Even though the symbolic power of language 
is employed for creating a sociocultural cognitive model and not for the 
sake of individual cognitive processes, the cognitive function of language 
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is in line with the general biological function of cogni t ion—though in 
a much more complex maimer. As described above, the general biolog-
ical function of cognition is knowing one's "world" for the purpose of 
interacting with it in optimally functional ways. This cognitive function-
ing does not simply depend on objective characteristics of reality but on 
the ways a given organism adapts to its environment due to its biology. 
Therefore, language — as an instrument of adaptive cognitive function-
ing— is obviously not structured as influenced by reality itself in some 
objective fashion. Language provides us with a special human perspec-
tive of reality (Tomasello 2002 [1999]; Lakoff 1987), manifest in "[t]he 
perspectival nature of linguistic meaning [, which] implies that the world 
is not objectively reflected in language" (Geeraerts 1997, 8). The specific 
cognitive perspective language provides of reality facilitates our adaptive 
interpretation of our environment. 
Thus, a particular language—as a cognitive model of cultural va-
lidity in a human community —will function as an efficient cognitive 
device only if it provides an interpretation of the world that proves to be 
adaptive in the given natura l and sociocultural environment of its speak-
ers. In other words, for an adequate cognitive functioning any particular 
language must be adapted to the specific physical, social, cultural, histor-
ical, etc. environment which it is to model and in which it is to be used. 
Therefore, the system of conceptual categories defined in the lexicon of a 
language and manifest in a common repertoire of conventionalized con-
ceptualizations in the minds of individual speakers provides ready-made 
functional knowledge abou t reality. These conceptual categories, stored 
in a linguistic form, furnish the "building blocks" of a speech community's 
social model of the environment, which constitutes an essential part of the 
culture of the community and also serves the cultural inheritance of ex-
perience and knowledge across generations (cf. Tomasello op.cit., 180-1). 
If the socially shared category system is to be an adaptive inter-
pretation of reality, there must be good reasons why meanings of a lan-
guage specify the categories they do and not others (cf. Clark 1996, 340). 
Comparing the semantic structures of languages, it becomes immediately 
apparent tha t different languages impose different categorizations on the 
world. This obviously results from the way languages are adapted to their 
environments—in line with the general function of cognition and the cog-
nitive function of language (cf. Tomasello op.cit., 127). An adequate ori-
entation in a given sociocultural environment requires a specific category 
system and appropriate construals of particular phenomena. Thus, for 
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instance, languages of different peoples and cultures often construe the 
same phenomena of reality in different ways because their different envi-
ronments demand different ways of adapting to them. Because of this, 
linguistic categorization very often reflects a rather intricate and complex 
social and cultural environment. This can be seen among others in the 
case of various classifiers in many aboriginal languages (e.g., Lakoff 1987, 
chapter 6; Palmer 1996, 126-41; Palmer-Woodman 2000). For instance, 
from the ten noun classes found in the Australian aboriginal language 
Nangikúrungurr and marked with separate prefixes, one contains only 
names of weapons, and another exclusively names of spears (Wierzbicka 
1984, 314). This should be clue to the fact that weapons (and among 
them spears especially) play a special role in the lifestyle of this people. 
4.2. Semantic change as adaptat ion process 
The ready-made knowledge about the environment the speakers of a lan-
guage live in is functional and adaptive only relative to t he stability of 
conditions over time (Palmer 1996, 52). Most of the t ime a language 
is relatively well adapted t o this environment and facilitates the proper 
exchange of beliefs, ideas, knowledge, etc. about it by providing appro-
priate perspectives on reality in the form of different categorizations. 
However, the environment is never a stable metaphysical reality, but a 
changing one, and particularly our interpretation of it does not remain 
stable through time. Therefore, when cognizing reality, our conceptual 
system continuously exhibits an interplay between stability and flexibility 
in order to fit stable conditions, but at the same time also to be able to 
adapt to novel ones (Meclin-Barsalou 1987, 468). This cognitive function-
ing must also have its effect on language. More precisely, t he environment 
will exert its effect on language filtered through cognition, and cognition 
will shape linguistic s t ructure to its needs (though natural ly within the 
boundaries of the general structural properties of natural language). 
It follows from the cognitive function of language t h a t it should not 
only provide a means to adaptively model, bo th socially and individually, 
the given environment, but t ha t it must also function as a flexible device 
for cognition to accommodate to any enduring change of cultural rele-
vance in the environment and—given the human cultural and intellectual 
complexity—also in the perspectives and at t i tudes the community collec-
tively takes on it. Thus, in order to remain a functional communicative 
and cognitive system, it is crucial that language be continuously suited to 
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cognition in a proper way. As Antt i la (1989, 179) says, "[l]anguage serves 
the sociocultural ends and its task is thus to keep itself in an enduring 
state, to keep functioning, adapting itself to new environments." 
Therefore, language must incorporate a mechanism which can opti-
mally handle its adaptation to new circumstances. As far as the cate-
gorization function of language is concerned, the continuous adaptat ion 
of language to the changing conditions of and social at t i tudes to the 
particular environment in which it is used happens — as already indi-
ca ted—through semantic-lexical change (Győri 2002). Thus, it may be 
argued tha t the differences in the semantic s tructure of different lan-
guages are due to the formation of culturally adaptive categories, which 
happens in the process of lexicalization, i.e., through semantic and lexical 
changes (accompanied by the morphological mechanisms of compounding 
and derivation) in the course of the history of a language. Etymologies re-
veal a great deal about how reality can be construed in alternate ways to 
facilitate this adaptation. For instance, the nouns skin and hide are syn-
onymous expressions but their etymologies suggest totally different con-
ceptualizations. Skin derives from Proto-Indo-European *sek- ' cu t ' via 
the extended root *skend- ' to peel off' (though via Scandinavian trans-
mission), while hide derives from Proto-Indo-European *(s)keu- 'cover, 
conceal.' Thus, skin was conceptualized as 'something that can be cut 
or peeled off the body of an animal, ' while hide was conceptualized as 
'something covering the body'. Consider further the English words crab, 
lobster and shrimp, the etymologies of which suggest conceptualizations 
as ' the carving one', 'spider-like', and 'curved', respectively. These words 
have no conventional everyday cover term in English, only the Latin crus-
tacean, which, however, also covers wood lice, water fleas and barnacles. 
Hungarian rák, on the contrary, is a conventional everyday expression in 
the language and is not considered a genuine cover term even though it 
covers the former three from the above categories as one kind, but not 
the latter three, as it is not a biological technical term as crustacean is. 
As we have seen in section 2, the historical linguistic mechanism 
of semantic change does not simply lag behind independently occurring 
conceptual changes as some kind of labeling process but relies on and 
reflects the conceptualizations emerging from the conceptual mappings 
and the process of meaning construction in innovative language use. In 
other words, our cognitive processes will necessarily tailor language to the 
needs of cognition: the way we see the world and think about it in non-
symbolic ways clearly affects the form of language (cf. Clark 1996, 342). 
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As Rosch (1978, 27) has claimed, the specific categories of the human 
mind that get coded in any particular language are not the "arbitrary 
product of historical accident or of whimsy" b u t the product of functional 
principles of categorization, and working with those categories should be 
the most efficient way to deal with the environment. Consequently, the 
two basic psychological principles, "cognitive economy" and "perceived 
world structure" (Rosch op.cit., 28-9), also influence what conceptual 
categories will be socially adaptive and will as a result achieve cultural 
significance to become coded in a language. Thus, the process of cultural 
category formation is functional in nature since it is based on a speech 
community's social cognitive adaptation to situations its members are 
likely to encounter in their environment and which they have to handle 
by thinking, reasoning and communicating about them. 
The social validity of these structures is achieved in the process of 
"conventionalization" through "sanctioning" by a speech community in 
speaker-hearer interaction (Langacker 1987, 65-6 and 156). This is of 
course not to deny that due to the complexity of design, language will 
necessarily also possess ultimately arbitrary structural features, i.e., ones 
without any functional relevance, and which are derived effects of other 
structures or effects of general structural constraints. Such phenomena 
will inevitably also leave their mark on the way language is. 
5. Conclusion 
Emergent meaning originating in creative meaning extensions (often cou-
pled with compounding and derivation) can most of the t ime not be ac-
counted for in purely algorithmic terms. Our capacity for the flexible 
use of meanings — manifest in non-rule-governed meaning creations — 
serves the purpose of adjust ing our perspectives on our world in commu-
nicatively and cognitively functional ways, especially in accordance with 
fluctuations and variations of our environment. The human capacity for 
construal, conceptualization and imagery is adaptive in several ways. It 
enables the flexible communication of various cognitive perspectives we 
may take on the environment as influenced by the various ways we in-
teract with its diverse phenomena, or by the role they play in our social, 
cultural or na tura l lives, bu t it also enables the communication of individ-
ual idiosyncratic perspectives versus established ones that we collectively 
take on things when unexpected circumstances so require. 
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Though the above cognitive functioning is par t of our linguistic ca-
pacity, it is rooted in the general evolutionary function of cognition, which 
we share with other species. This function is to provide an organism with 
functional knowledge about its environment in the form of an internal 
model tha t is operated by the organism in order to adjust its behav-
ior in a way that enhances its chances of survival. The adaptiveness of 
knowledge in these terms does not imply cognizing the environment in an 
objective fashion but refers to the fact tha t an organism has the capacity 
to "understand" the world—through operating its internal model of i t— 
in exactly the way tha t promotes its survival, orientation and general 
success in concord with its biological make-up and needs, its individual 
experience with idiosyncratic factors of its environment, and also any 
unforeseen challenges posed by transitions of the environment. 
Cognition is thus primarily an adaptive biological function in in-
dividual organisms. Its coupling with the function of communication 
makes cognition socially adaptive because information about the envi-
ronment and the knowledge of appropriate interaction with it can be 
shared among individuals. Such interaction can then be harmonized and 
organized to the benefit of a whole group. Human language promotes 
social cognition to an exceptionally high extent due to its symbolic na-
ture, i.e., the sophisticated combination of cognition and communication 
in one system. Symbols can not only be used to activate similar (or the 
same) mental representations in others, but also to create such. They 
can substi tute personal experience and enable the sharing of knowledge 
even across generations. 
The symbols of language provide us economically with ready-made 
knowledge about predictable conditions of our human environment, bo th 
natural and cultural, by constituting the building blocks of a socially 
shared cognitive model of this environment. Established expressions of 
the language supply conventional perspectives tha t have in some way 
proved useful and functional in the long run. However, social and cul-
tural conditions and environmental circumstances will vary and change 
with t ime engendering changes also in the perspectives and att i tudes the 
community collectively takes on them. The cognitive function of lan-
guage requires that language as a social cognitive model be adjusted to 
these changes. Cognitive and communicative challenges ensuing f rom 
such changes are handled by innovative usage of expressions in the form 
of semantic extensions or leaps, which is possible due to the malleable 
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structures of meaning. These spontaneous novel conceptualizations re-
flect adaptive ways of understanding in novel situations. 
Speakers' new adaptive conceptualizations of reality may also engen-
der a long-term cognitive adaptat ion process in language. Novel expres-
sions based on conceptualizations and imagery which prove functional 
and adaptive on a wide social basis will be selected for and will become 
conventionalized to provide new useful ready-made and thus cognitively 
economical ways to conceptually deal with our physical, social and cul-
tural reality. Thus, the historical linguistic process of semantic change 
has the long-term adaptive function of adjust ing the conceptual cate-
gory system of the language to changing conditions by coding workable 
perspectives on them. 
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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the relation between the analytical philosophy of science and 
modular and holistic approaches to cognitive linguistics, respectively. The authors 
show that Chomsky's as well as Bierwisch к Lang's and Lakoff к Johnson's approaches 
make substantial use of non-demonstrative inferences which the standard view of the 
analytical philosophy of science evaluates as fallacies. By outlining a metatheoretical 
framework focusing on plausible inferences, the authors argue tha t the inferences the 
theories mentioned make use of are plausible rather than fallacious. This finding illu-
minates basic aspects of theory formation in linguistics and motivates the revaluation 
of the methodological foundations of linguistic theories. 
"Zwischen der Philosophie und den Wissenschaften herrschen seit gerau-
mer Zeit gestörte Verhältnisse; die Wissenschaftstheorie ist der moderne 
Versuch, sie wieder ins Reine zu bringen. Das findet in der Regel weder 
den Beifall der Wissenschaften, die ihren Abschied von der Philoso-
phie als Abschied von einer spekulativen Vergangenheit zu stilisieren 
pflegen, noch den Beifall der Philosophie, sofern diese angesichts ihres 
reichen klassischen Erbes dazu neigt, der wissenschaftstheoretischen As-
kese philosophische Armut zu bescheinigen. [...] Gegen diese Auffassung 
wendet sich heute die Wisseuschaftstheorie. In Form einer das wissen-
schaftliche Wissen analysierenden [...] Bemühung wird Wissenschaft 
wieder zu einem philosophischen Thema und Philosophie wieder zu ei-
nem Element wissenschaftlichen Selbstverständnisses." 
(Mittelstraß 2004, 5-6; emphasis added) 
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1. Introduction1 
As Hilary P u t n a m showed in one of his seminal papers (Putnam 1962), 
however diverse the analytical philosophy of science in the first half of 
the twentieth century was, there was a set of assumptions which most 
approaches shared. P u t n a m called this set of assumptions the "received 
view" of the analytical philosophy of science. To put it in a very simplified 
manner, some basic characteristics of t he latter can be summarized as 
follows: 
(RV) The "received view" assumes, among other things, that 
(a) scientific theories have to meet the standards of "rationality"; 
(b) scientific theories have to be "deductive", "empirical" and "explanatory" ; 
and 
(c) there is a clear distinction between the process of scientific discovery (called 
"the context of discovery") and the form in which the results of discovery, 
tha t is scientific theories, are presented (cf. "the context of justification").2 
It is the "received view" tha t has served as the basic methodological 
standard in mainstream theoretical linguistics since t he late fifties (see 
e.g., Ringen 1975) and t h a t has influenced the development of current 
theoretical linguistics to a substantial extent. The best-known example 
1
 In the paper we will make extensive use of quotations. This is, admittedly, not a 
very elegant way of arguing. Nevertheless, quotations will serve three impor tan t 
purposes. Firstly, the scope of our paper does not permit a detailed presentation 
of the theories it focuses on. Therefore, quotations will document our claims con-
cerning those aspects of the theories which are relevant from our point of view 
but which cannot be introduced systematically. In such cases the quotations will 
appear in the footnotes. Secondly, they simply summarize pieces of background 
information which we will have to make use of as relevant steps within our line of 
argumentation; in such cases they will be par t of the main text. Thirdly, we will 
argue against deeply rooted prejudices which most theoretical linguists share and 
this undermines the picture most linguistic theories draw of themselves. This is, 
of course, a risky enterprise. Thus, the quotations also serve the legitimization of 
our approach in that they witness that our claims are well-motivated by the logi-
cal and argumentation-theoretical l i terature which, unfortunately, most linguists 
are not familiar with. 
Let us also remark tha t the present paper focuses on a possible application 
of plausibility theory to the analysis of argumentation in linguistics. However, 
plausibility theory is characterized, among other things, by a very vague termi-
nology (see also Walton 2001 on this). Therefore, basically we will use all notions 
preexplicatively. 
2
 For a detailed discussion of the "received view" cf. Suppe (1977). 
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of the impact of the "received view" on linguistics is, of course, generative 
grammar. However, the proponents of most current linguistic theories 
failed to notice the fact t h a t the "received view" is anything but up 
to date. Although, as well-known developments in the philosophy of 
science witness, it has been " o u t " for several decades and 110 longer counts 
as a serious alternative to current trends, the majority of theoretical 
linguists still assumes its validity. For example, even the latest version 
of generative linguistics accepts the scientific standards of the received 
view.3 In this respect, the methodology of linguistics is far behind the 
current state of the art in t he philosophy of science. Th i s situation is 
especially interesting with respect to the so-called "cognitive turn" in 
linguistics.4 
It is instructive to observe t ha t proponents of dominating approaches 
to cognitive linguistics consider it important to characterize their ap-
proach by relating it to the "received view". Accordingly, this relation 
is t reated as a relevant component of the definition of t he approach a t 
issue. Basically, there are two extreme attitudes. On t h e one hand, 
modular approaches to cognitive linguistics—for example Bierwisch and 
Lang's two-level model—explicitly conform to the analytical tradition 
and, what is more, consider this as a major achievement.5 In addition, 
3
 "[...] a 'naturalistic approach' to the mind investigates mental aspects of the 
world as we do any others, seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories, 
with the hope of eventual integration with the 'core' natural sciences." (Chomsky 
2000, 76; emphasis added) 
4
 The notions "cognitive linguistics" and "cognitive semantics" will be used preex-
plicatively, too. For a possible explication of these notions, see Kertész (2004a). 
r>
 See the following quotation as an illustration: 
"Was besagt die angedeutete Perspektive der kognitiven Wissenschaften 
für das Verständnis linguistischer Fragestellungen? Der entscheidende 
Punkt ist, daß die Linguistik von der im wesentlichen deskriptiven Ana-
lyse natürlicher Sprachen zur Formulierung erklärender Theorien über 
ihren Gegenstandsbereich gelangt. Dieser Ubergang von einer beschrei-
benden zu einer erklärenden Wissenschaft ist ein fundamentaler Wech-
sel in der Orientierung, auch wenn er sich schrittweise und nicht immer 
leicht erkennbar vollzieht. Er verlangt die Aufdeckung und kontrollier-
bare Formulierung von Gesetzmäßigkeiten oder Prinzipien, denen die 
Sprachkenntnis unterliegt, aus denen also ihre charakteristischen Eigen-
schaften abgeleitet werden können. In dem Maß, in dem solche Gesetz-
mäßigkeiten formuliert und begründet werden können, wird die kognitiv 
orientierte Linguistik zu einer Disziplin, in der die in der Naturwissen-
schaft geltenden Grundsätze der Theoriebildung und Erklärung wirksam 
werden." (Bierwisch 1987, 646; emphasis added) 
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this assumed progress is claimed to be inseparable from the success of 
generative grammar/ ' On the other hand, holistic approaches such as 
the "second generation cognitive science" advocated by Lakoff and John-
son's cognitive theory of metaphor fiercely reject the analytical s tandards 
of scientific theory formation. ' This rejection of analytical philosophy is, 
of course, accompanied by the rejection of generative grammar. 
The fact that (i) the "received view" is an outworn conception within 
the philosophy of science and (ii) many current linguistic theories still 
accept it as a major methodological evaluation s tandard , suggests the 
question whether these linguistic theories really behave in the ways they 
declare. Do, for example, Chomsky's generative linguistics or Bierwisch 
and Lang's two-level approach really meet the s tandards of the so-called 
"received view" of the analytical philosophy of science, and, in turn , do 
Lakoff and Johnson or Langacker really follow a scientific at t i tude t ha t 
radically differs from the methodology of the analytical tradition? This 
is the question which the present paper centres around. However, such a 
general and vaguely raised question is difficult to grasp. Therefore, so as 
to obtain a more precise and more specific problem whose discussion may 
lead to instructive findings, we will narrow it down in several respects. 
Firstly, we will focus on the s t ruc ture of inferences. The motivation 
for this decision is t h a t the "received view" presupposes the rationality 
of scientific inquiry. Although within the analytical philosophy of science 
there are different views concerning the question of what rationality is, 
there seems to be agreement on the fact that one th ing that rationality 
involves is that the theses of a theory must be connected by valid log-
ical inferences, also known as demonstrative inferences.8 Consequently, 
whether cognitive linguistic theories conform to t he analytical t radi t ion 
ü
 For example: 
"Es liegt mithin in der Natur der Sache, daß die Entwicklung der Linguis-
tik als kognitive Wissenschaft nicht von der der generativen Grammatik 
zu trennen ist." (Bierwisch 1987, 646) 
' "Philosophy is so much an implicit, though not always recognized, part of all intel-
lectual disciplines t h a t it has determined, for many investigators, the conception 
of what cognitive science is. There are a t least two approaches to cognitive science 
defined by different philosophical commitments: a first-generation cognitive sci-
ence tha t assumed most of the fundamental tenets of tradit ional Anglo-American 
philosophy and a second generation tha t called most of those tenets into question 
on empirical grounds." (Lakoff-Johnson 1999, 75) 
8
 In accordance with the literature, we will treat the notions "demonstrative", 
"deductive" and "conclusive" as synonyms. 
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or not, may be tested, among other things, by examining to what extent 
they make use of demonstrative inferences. 
Secondly, since both modular and holistic approaches to cognitive 
linguistics define themselves relative to generative linguistics, we are jus-
tified in discussing the latter as well. Thus, we will examine three exam-
ples so as to give an idea of how inferences in cognitive linguistics work: 
Chomsky's generative linguistics, Bierwisch and Lang's two-level model 
as an example of modular cognitive linguistics compatible with gener-
ativism, and Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive theory of metaphor as an 
illustration of holistic cognitive linguistics which rejects generative gram-
mar in particular and the analytical philosophy of science in general. 
Thirdly, in order to make our argumentation even more specific, we 
will choose two problematic patterns of inference as instructive points 
of departure. In particular, we will analyze applications of part-whole 
and whole-part inferences. The question of how to reconstruct these pat-
terns of inference is controversial (see, e.g., van Eemeren-Grootendorst 
1994; Kienpointner 1992, 277ff.; Woods-Walton 1989; Walton 1996 on 
this problem). Nevertheless, for the present purposes and as a first ap-
proximation, the following simplified outline of their structure will be 
sufficient. 
(1) Part-whole inference 
Premises: 
(a) x is par t of y 
(b) x has the property P 
Conclusion: 
(c) y has the property P 
(2) Whole-part inference 
Premises: 
(a) x is par t of y 
(b) y has the property P 
Conclusion: 
(c) x has the property P 
Now the question arises as to how the "received view" of the analyti-
cal philosophy of science evaluates part-whole and whole-part inferences. 
The reason the analysis of (1) and/or (2) may be instructive is that they 
are non-demonstrative inferences. In the case of demonstrative inferences 
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it is impossible tha t the conclusion is false while the premises are true. 
Non-demonstrative inferences, however, do not guarantee the t ru th of the 
conclusion on the basis of the premises. It is either the case that the con-
clusion need not be t rue although the premises are true,9 or the premises 
are uncertain themselves and therefore the conclusion is uncertain, too.1 0 
As we have already indicated, the "received view" presupposes what 
Ralph H. Johnson calls "deductive chauvinism": 
"[...] validity is made the standard against which arguments are to be mea-
sured. [...] a serious problem with this conception is the underlying assump-
tion it makes about argumentation: tha t all argumentation is deductive in 
nature." (Johnson 1995, 111; emphasis added) 
Consequently, according to the "received view", all non-demonstrative 
inferences should be evaluated as fallacies. See, for example, the following 
definition of the notion of fallacy: 
"An argument whose premises do not imply its conclusion is one whose con-
clusion could be false even if all of its premises are true. An argument tha t 
fails in this [...] way is said to be fallacious, or to be a fallacy."11 
(Copi-Burgess-Jackson 1996, 96; emphasis as in the original and added) 
Thus, from the fact t ha t (i) (1) and (2) are non-demonstrative inferences 
and (ii) all non-demonstrative inferences are considered to be fallacies, 
it follows that these two patterns are to be considered as fallacious in-
ferences, too. Therefore, according to the s tandards of rationality which 
the "received view" of the analytical philosophy of science assumes, they 
must not play a significant role in the structure of scientific theories. 
However, what makes this finding especially interesting is t h a t — a s 
we will show in section 2 — Chomsky's generative linguistics, Bierwisch 
and Lang's two-level approach and Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive theory 
of metaphor do make use of (1) and (2) irrespective of how these theories 
9
 Let us illustrate this with respect to pat tern (1). If (a) David Beckham's head is 
round, and (b) David Beckham's head is part of his body, then (c) David Beck-
ham's body is round. Obviously, (a) and (b) are true, while (c) need not be true. 
10
 Cf. for example shaded modus tollens in Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5. 
11
 "This criterion, in effect, means tha t any argument that is not deductively valid 
[...] is a fallacious argument. It would mean, for example, that all arguments 
tha t are inductively strong but not deductively valid are fallacious. And it would 
mean that all arguments that have a weight of presumption in their favor, but 
are not deductively valid [...] arguments, are fallacious arguments." (Walton 
1992a, 236) 
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define their own relation to the "received view" of the analytical philos-
ophy of science. This finding leads to a highly problematic conclusion. 
Namely, on the one hand, all of the three theories violate the commonly 
accepted standards of the "received view" of the analytical philosophy 
of science which during the past five decades or so have been used as 
the basic methodological evaluation s tandard of linguistic theories. Tha t 
this is so is quite natural with respect to holistic cognitive linguistics, bu t 
definitively counterintuitive in the case of the other two theories. Since 
the latter implicitly presuppose the s tandards of rationality advocated 
by the "received view" of the analytical philosophy of science, it follows 
that they violate their own standards. Therefore, if we accept the prin-
ciples of rationality that the "received view" of the analytical philosophy 
of science maintains, all three theories should be rejected. However, such 
a decision would be fatal, because it leads to destructive consequences: 
in fact, there is no doubt tha t all three theories are successful enterprises 
widely applied by scientific communities, although, of course, different 
ones. Thus we obtain a dilemma:12 
(D) We either maintain three linguistic theories which seem to violate the commonly 
accepted standards of rationality in the sense of (RV), or we reject them, although 
they are workable and successful. 
Accordingly, we may reduce the problem outlined to the following more 
specific one: 
(P) How can the dilemma (D) be solved? 
The aim of the paper is to give an answer to (P) by arguing for the 
tenability of the hypothesis (H): 
12
 In the present paper it would be beside the point to take sides between the 
three theories. We simply consider it to be a fact (in whatever sense) that all 
three theories are maintained by certain scientific communities and do not ask 
the question which of them is "better" or "true". Our task is to capture this 
fact, among others by trying to resolve (D), and not to compare the theories. 
Moreover, by "successful" and "workable" we mean the heuristic potential of 
theories: namely, their capability of solving the problems they tackle by using 
their own means and/or their capability of raising new problems which can be 
captured by the same means or which, alternatively, give rise to approaches going 
beyond the scope of the theory at issue. 
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(H) (a) On the one hand, the account of inferences that the "received view" of the 
analytical philosophy of science presupposes can be replaced by another ap-
proach which considers (1) and (2) as legitimate tools of scientific theorizing. 
(b) On the other hand, this approach does not result in the strict rejection of 
the standards of rationality in the sense of (RV); rather, it extends them in 
so far as it distinguishes between two kinds of non-demonstrative inferences, 
namely, plausible and fallacious ones. 
We will proceed as follows. In section 2 we will briefly present a very sim-
ple analysis of the way basic notions of Chomsky's theory of language, the 
central empirical hypothesis of the two-level approach and that of the cog-
nitive theory of metaphor can be inferred from the premises they assume 
via (1) and (2). In section 3 we will outline some of the main tenets of a 
theory of plausible reasoning. We will show that the difference between 
plausible inferences and fallacies is basically context-dependent: whereas 
plausible inferences are effective tools of scientific problem solving in a 
given context of argumentation, fallacies are ineffective or even destruc-
tive. Therefore, in section 4 we will argue that the application of (1) 
and (2) is effective in the context of the three theories at issue, and tha t , 
consequently, these pat terns are not to be seen as fallacies, but rather , 
as plausible inferences fulfilling important heuristic functions. Finally, in 
section 5 the findings will be summarized and far reaching conclusions 
concerning the nature of theory formation in linguistics will be drawn. 
Already at this point it should be clear for the reader that we will be 
discussing inferences not from the point of view of logic, but from tha t 
of argumentation theory. 
2. On the use of (1) and (2) 
2.1. The problem 
So as to make our line of thought as clear as possible, we will subdivide 
our main problem (P) into a series of sub-problems corresponding to 
the steps we summarized at the end of the previous section. We expect 
that through solving these sub-problems eventually we will be capable of 
arriving at (H). Accordingly, the first question we have to ask is this: 
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(PI ) Do Chomsky's generative linguistics, the two-level approach and Lakoff and 
Johnson' cognitive theory of metaphor make use of (1) and (2)?13 
2.2. Generative linguistics 
In an ingenious paper Forrai puts forward the claim tha t Chomsky's phi-
losophy of man is rooted in the notions of creativity, freedom and con-
straints (Forrai 1987, 50).14 This means that Chomsky considers man to 
act freely within the constraints of his biological constitution. Moreover, 
Chomsky infers basic claims of his theory of language from this view of 
man by the use of a specific kind of non-demonstrative inference: 
"How does this view of human nature connect to the s tudy of language? The 
connection might have been set up by Chomsky's definition of the subject of 
linguistics. Linguistics is assumed to be the science of the idealized native 
speaker's linguistic competence. This definition may give rise to a very 
special kind of analogical reasoning, which can be schematically described 
as follows: Premise 1: P is a part of w. Premise 2: w has the property 
A. Conclusion: P has property Ai, which is similar to property A. It is 
a non-demonstrative inference from a property of the whole to the property 
of the part. Chomsky's definition of the subject of linguistics establishes 
whole-part relationship between man and his linguistic competence. As a 
result, it facilitates inference from the properties of human nature to the 
properties of linguistic competence. Consequently, ideas about human nature 
may infiltrate into linguistic theory. Wha t I will try to show is that the bir th 
of some of Chomsky's linguistic ideas might be explained in this way." 
(Ibid.; emphasis added) 
13
 We deliberately chose the examples to be discussed along the lines of the following 
considerations. Firstly, precise analyses of reasoning are highly complex and 
lengthy; therefore, to keep our own line of thought within the frames of the 
present paper, we chose very simple examples which serve illustrative purposes 
and are not claimed to be precise argumentation analyses. For detailed case 
studies of plausible reasoning in linguistics, see e.g., Kertész (2004b), Ker tész -
Rákosi (2005a;b), Rákosi (2005). Secondly, it is also important to exemplify that 
the reasoning patterns we are examining can be used for very different purposes in 
the three theories—e.g., for connecting the philosophical foundations of a given 
theory with its central notions, or for inferring the main empirical hypothesis 
of the theory, or for carrying out analyses of linguistic data. In this respect, 
our examples are deliberately heterogeneous. Thirdly, contrasting the two-level 
approach and generative linguistics (which accept the modularity hypothesis) 
on the one hand with the cognitive theory of metaphor (which pleads for the 
holistic hypothesis) on the other hand, exemplifies that even opposing empirical 
hypotheses may be built on the same pat terns of inference. 
14
 Forrai's paper is also discussed in Kertész (2004b), although in a different meta-
theoretical framework. 
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Obviously, the structure of this inference corresponds to (2). Forrai shows 
tha t the application of the non-demonstrative inference mentioned leads 
to a series of notions which are in the centre of Chomsky's theory of 
language. The reconstruction of this inference is as follows: 
(3) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is par t of human nature . 
(b) Human nature has the property P. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Linguistic competence has the property P', where P' is similar to P (or even 
identical with it). 
Depending on what properties P and P' s tand for, a series of further 
inferences are carried out. Firstly, the property at issue is regularity. 
Accordingly, t h e particular inference is this: 
(4) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature. 
(b) In human behaviour regularity prevails. 
Conclusion: 
(c) In linguistic competence regularity prevails. 
Secondly, creativity is considered to be a ma jo r property of human nature 
as well as of linguistic competence. Now we can reconstruct the structure 
of the inference as follows: 
(5) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature. 
(b) Creativity is a fundamental property of human nature. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Creativity is a fundamental property of linguistic competence. 
Thirdly, since creativity presupposes rules, t he following inference presents 
itself: 
(6) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature. 
(b) Human nature is governed by rules. 
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Conclusion: 
(c) Linguistic competence is governed by rules. 
The fourth case concerns constraints. That is: 
(7) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature. 
(b) Human nature is characterized by biological constraints. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Linguistic competence is characterized by biological constraints. 
Fifthly, the s tructure of the inference underlying Chomsky's views of 
language acquisition can be reconstructed in this way: 
(8) Premises: 
(a) Language acquisition is part of human nature. 
(b) Human nature is characterized by the fact t ha t man creates freely within 
the constraints of his biological nature. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Language acquisition is characterized by the fact that man creates freely 
within the constraints of his biological nature. 
Finally, Forrai mentions the evaluation measure of grammars. The re-
construction of the inference Forrai refers to is as follows: 
(9) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature. 
(b) Human nature is characterized by systematicity. 
(c) Systematicity is similar to simplicity. 
Conclusion: 
(d) Linguistic competence is characterized by simplicity. 
So, relying on Forrai's considerations, we have seen tha t some of the major 
ideas which govern Chomsky's theory of language can be reconstructed 
as the conclusions of whole-part inferences in the sense of (2). 
However, the situation is more intricate than we have assumed so 
far. In particular, Forrai starts his paper with the remark that although 
Chomsky himself never appeals to his political views so as to jus t i fy his 
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linguistic theory, it may be assumed that there is an indirect relationship 
between his political philosophy and his linguistic programme. In fact, 
it seems to be the case that bo th his linguistic and his political ideas are 
rooted in his views of man. Tha t this assumption is not totally mistaken, 
can be documented by many passages in Chomsky's writings. For ex-
ample, his reply to Mitsou Rona t ' s question concerning the relationship 
between his political and linguistic objectives is as follows: 
"If there is a connection, it is on a rather abstract level. [...] There is no 
very direct connection between ray political activities, writing and others, 
and the work bearing on language structure, though in some measure they 
perhaps derive from certain common assumptions and attitudes with regard 
to basic aspects of human nature." (Chomsky 1979, 3; emphasis added) 
Interestingly enough, we may assume that this relation rests on a part-
whole inference which is the inverse of the whole-part inference discussed 
so far and which corresponds to the pattern introduced in (1). That is, 
man is part of society and Chomsky infers basic properties of society 
from basic properties of human nature: 
(10) Premises: 
(a) Man is par t of society. 
(b) Man has the property P. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Society has the property P', where P' is similar to or identical with P. 
This general pa t t e rn is realized in the following specific inferences: 
(11) Premises: 
(a) Man is pa r t of society. 
(b) Man is characterized by creativity. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Society is characterized by creativity. 
(12) Premises: 
(a) Man is par t of society. 
(b) Man is characterized by biological constraints. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Society is characterized by biological constraints. 
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(13) Premises: 
(a) Man is part of society. 
(b) Man is characterized by freedom within constraints. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Society is characterized by freedom within constraints. 
society 
man 
linguistic competence 
Fig. 1 
In sum, we have seen two things. Firstly, Chomsky's views of man consti-
tu te the premises of two inferences pointing in opposite directions; the re-
lationship between these two kinds of inferences is visualized in Figure 1. 
Secondly, both the philosophical foundations of his theory of language 
and his theory of society are closely related to the use of (1) and (2). 
2.3. The two-level approach 
The modularity hypothesis was introduced into linguistic theories in 
many different ways. The core of these diverse accounts is the follow-
ing assumption: 
(14) Knowledge of language is organized in a modular way. 
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The relevance of (14) is rooted, among other things, in the fact tha t it 
constitutes one premise of the central argument for the assumption tha t 
cognition as a whole is modularly organized (see also Kertész 2004a).15 
This inference leads to a very strong empirical hypothesis, but is, nev-
ertheless, in most cases only applied implicitly. Then from (14) we can 
infer (15c) on the basis of (1): 
(15) Premises: 
(a) Knowledge of language is part of human cognitive behaviour. 
(b) Knowledge of language is organized in a modular way. 
1S
 The argument, which leads from (14) to the modularity of cognition, is concisely 
summarized in the following quotation: 
"Historisch gesehen, entwickelte sich die entscheidende Argumentation 
von der Autonomie zur Modularität. Chomsky zeigte zunächst, daß na-
türliche Sprachen über Eigenschaften verfügen, die ein Kind nur dann 
unter den üblichen Bedingungen erwerben kann, wenn bestimmte die-
sen Eigenschaften zugrundeliegende Prinzipien nicht erlernt werden 
müssen, sondern bereits in der Struktur des Kognitionssvstems ver-
ankert sind [...]. Da diese Prinzipien in keiner erkennbaren Weise auf 
Prinzipien anderer kognitiver Bereiche, wie etwa Perzeption oder Be-
griffsbildung zurückgeführt werden können [...], müssen sie in ihrer 
sprachspezifischen Form kognitiv verankert sein. Wenn dies so ist, folgt 
logischerweise die Modularitätsthese, d.h. unser Kognitionssystem muß 
zumindest zwei autonome Module enthalten, und zwar das Grammatik-
modul und ein Modul, das alle übrigen kognitiven Funktionen umfaßt. 
Da weiterhin Evidenz dafür vorliegt, daß auch für die (visuelle) Wahr-
nehmung ein eigenes autonomes Modul anzusetzen ist [...], gewinnt die 
Modularitätsliypothese zunehmend an Plausibilität." 
(Fanselow - Felix 1987, 174; emphasis added) 
Fodor's (1983) argument seems to have a similar structure: 
"Unabhängig von der Bewertung der einzelnen Beobachtung ist Fodor 
sicher zuzugestehen, daß er an einer Fülle von Beispielen erfolgreich de-
monstriert hat , daß perzeptuelle und sprachliche Prozesse im Kontext 
der Gesamtkognition des Menschen eine Sonderstellung einnehmen. Sie 
weisen Gesetzmäßigkeiten und Eigenschaften auf, die in anderen kogni-
tiven Domänen nicht auftreten. Unter diesem Aspekt scheint die Auffas-
sung eines globalen, alles umfassenden Kognitionssvstems, das visuelle 
Perzeption und sprachliche Kodierung mit den gleichen Mechanismen 
und Strategien bewältigt wie das Lösen einer Mathematikaufgabe oder 
den Zusammenbau einer Maschine, wenig plausibel zu sein." 
(Fanselow - Felix op.cit., 273) 
Clearly, in both quotations the argument rests on a part-whole inference corre-
sponding to (1) which is a frequently used problem-solving strategy in cognitive 
science. 
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Conclusion: 
(c) Human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular way. 
As illustrated in the last footnote, in the literature (15c) is inferred not 
only from (14) by using (1), but from (16) and (1) as well: 
(16) Visual perception is organized in a modular way. 
(15c) is the main empirical hypothesis of modularism in general and the 
two-level approach in particular.1 0 Nevertheless, Bierwisch and Lang 
use this conclusion as one of the premises of further inferences which 
are expected to yield the existence of specific autonomous subsystems. 
They focus on "semantic form" which is assumed to be the interface 
between the grammatical and the conceptual module. Thus they argue 
by making use of (2): 
(17) Premises: 
(a) The grammatical system/the conceptual system/semantic form is part of 
human cognitive behaviour. 
(b) Human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular way. 
Conclusion: 
(c) The grammatical system/the conceptual system/semantic form is organized 
in a modular way. 
By way of summary, (1) and (2) constitute the means of inferring the 
central empirical hypotheses of the two-level-approach. 
16
 "Basically, all human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular fashion. The 
structure formation underlying any concrete behaviour performance is based upon 
the integration of various relatively autonomous, task-specifically interacting sys-
tems and subsystems (MODULES). Language, the different modes of perception, 
and the conceptual organisation of experience make up such systems, which for 
their part are again structured in a modular way. The aim to be derived from this 
assumption is to identify systems, to analyze their structure and organisation in 
the a t tempt to capture the rationale behind their interaction." (Lang et al. 1991; 
emphasis added) 
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2.4. The cognitive theory of metaphor1' 
Unlike (14), the holistic hypothesis assumes tha t knowledge of language 
cannot be subdivided into relatively autonomous systems and subsys-
tems: 
(18) Knowledge of language is a unified (holistic) system. 
Among other things, holistic cognitive linguistics aims at the empirical 
reformulation, solution or elimination of classic philosophical questions 
concerning the nature of mind and knowledge (see e.g., Lakoff-Johnson 
1999, 8). Against this background Lakoff and Johnson raise a series of 
classic philosophical problems to which they propose empirical solutions 
within the framework of their embodied realism. For example, they touch 
on the problem of Zeno's Arrow (Lakoff-Johnson op.cit., 157). As is 
well-known, the problem of the Arrow is rooted in Zeno's assumption 
according to which t ime is a sequence constituting a t ime line. Now, if 
we imagine the flight of an arrow, then at any point in time, the arrow 
is assumed to be at some fixed location. At a later point, its location 
is at another fixed point. Tha t is, the arrow is located at a single fixed 
point each time. Thus, Zeno concludes tha t there is no motion and time 
is not divided up into instants. 
In the light of this formulation, Zeno's classic standpoint is this: 
(19) (a) Classic philosophical problem: Is there motion? 
(b) Classic philosophical solution: There is no motion, because at any point of 
t ime the arrow is a t some fixed location. 
Lakoff and Johnson specify the task of their own version of cognitive 
linguistics as follows: 
"The meaning of any philosophical question depends on what conceptual sys-
tem is being used to comprehend the question. That is an empirical issue, 
an issue to be taken up by cognitive science in general and cognitive seman-
tics in particular. [...] The same is the case for any proposed answer. An 
answer to a question like 'What is time?' is given relative to a philosoph-
ical conceptual system in which that answer is a meaningful answer. Such 
a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the 
philosophers doing the inquiry. The conceptual systems of philosophers are 
1
 ' The following considerations are also discussed in Kertész (2004a) in a different 
context. 
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no more consciously accessible t h a n those of anyone else. To understand 
what counts as a meaningful answer, one must s tudy the conceptual sys-
tems of the philosophers engaged in that inquiry. T h a t too is an empirical 
question for cognitive science and cognitive semantics." 
(op.cit., 136; italics as in the original and bold emphasis added) 
The implicit argumentation underlying this quotat ion can be reconstruc-
ted in the following way: 
(20) Premises: 
(a) "a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the 
philosophers doing the inquiry," and 
(b) the conceptual system of the philosophers doing the inquiry belongs to the 
subject mat te r of cognitive semantics. 
Conclusion: 
(c) A philosophical conceptual system belongs to the subject mat ter of cognitive 
semantics. 
Lakoff and Johnson's solution to Zeno's problem uses a second inference 
as well: 
(21) Premises: 
(a) "a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the 
philosophers doing the inquiry," 
(b) the conceptual system of the philosophers doing the inquiry is a human 
conceptual system, and 
(c) "the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured" (Lakoff-Johnson 
1980, 6). 
Conclusion: 
(d) A philosophical conceptual system is metaphorically structured. 
Thus, these inferences clearly rest on (2). From (20c) and (21d) it follows 
that it is the metaphorical s t ructure of Zeno's conceptual system which 
is responsible for the problem of the Arrow. Therefore, this metaphor-
ical structure needs to be revealed. The conceptual metaphor which is 
assumed to play a constitutive role in the structure of such a conceptual 
system is one that may be called the Moving Observer Metaphor (Lakoff 
- J o h n s o n 1999, 146): 
( 2 2 ) LOCATIONS ON OBSERVER'S PATH O F MOTION ARE TIMES 
T H E MOTION OF T H E OBSERVER IS T H E "PASSAGE" O F TIME 
THE DISTANCE M O V E D BY THE OBSERVER IS THE A M O U N T OF TIME "PASSED" 
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This metaphor implies that "what we will encounter in the future is what 
we are moving towards", "what we are encountering now is what we are 
moving by", and "what we encountered in the past is what we moved 
past" (Lakoff-Johnson op.cit., 152). It is the identification of the Moving 
Observer Metaphor t h a t yields the empirical solution to the problem of 
the Arrow.18 
Tha t is: 
(23) (a) Empirical reformulation of the classic philosophical problem: 
Is there motion, if 
- there is a par t in the brain tha t detects motion, and 
- our motion detectors identify the arrow as moving? 
(b) Empirical solution to the empirical problem: 
There is motion, because 
- o u r brains give us multiple ways of perceiving and conceptualizing the 
world and, within the latter, motion as well, 
- we have a literal and a metaphorical way of conceptualizing motion, 
- ( 19b ) is false, because Zeno made the mistake of taking the Moving Ob-
server metaphor to be literal. 
18
 "[...] In our terms, the idea tha t t ime is a linear sequence of points is metaphor-
ical, a consequence of times seen as locations in the Moving Observer metaphor. 
The mistake, once again, is to take what is metaphorical as literal. Incidentally, 
a cognitive response to Zeno's paradox of the arrow is simple. There is a part 
of the brain tha t detects motion. Our motion detectors identify the arrow as 
moving. That is, our brains give us multiple ways of perceiving and conceptu-
alizing the world. Motion is not a metaphorical concept. The idea tha t time a 
linear sequence of finite points is [sic]. Our direct nonmetaphorically structured 
experience provides a simple response: Of course the arrow is moving. But in 
addition, we have an unconscious metaphorical conceptualization of instants of 
time as locations in space. We use this, for example, when we comprehend a pic-
ture of a moving object at a time: 'This is Sam driving by directly in front of our 
house at 10:06 p.m. ' In other words, we have more than one way to conceptualize 
motion—one literal and one metaphorical. We can conceptualize motion directly, 
as when we think of Sam driving by and the hands of the clock moving. We can 
also conceptualize motion using a metaphorical conceptualization of time as a 
line with point locations on it. In the metaphor, and only in the metaphor, there 
is temporal location. Relative to the metaphor, we can fix a point location in 
time. Within the metaphor, at t h a t point location, there can be no motion, since 
motion can only occur over regions of time in the metaphor. The appearance of 
paradox comes from attributing real existence to metaphorical point locations. 
Zeno's brilliance was to concoct an example tha t forced a contradiction upon us: 
literal motion and motion metaphorically conceptualized as a sequence of fixed 
locations at fixed points in time." (Lakoff-Johnson op.cit., 157-8; emphasis as 
in the original) 
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Thus we have seen how the use of (2) facilitates the solution of a problem 
raised in Lakoff and Johnson's approach. 
2.5. Summary 
The considerations put forward and illustrated by the above examples boil 
down to the following claim to be considered as an auxiliary hypothesis 
which is the answer to (PI) and which corresponds to one of the stages 
in the argumentation whose result will be (H): 
(HI) Chomsky's generative linguistics, the two-level approach and Lakoff and John-
son's theory do make use of (1) and (2). 
As already mentioned, (HI) clearly motivates the dilemma (D) we raised 
in section 1. One way to handle (HI) would be, of course, to reject all 
of the three approaches, because they make substantial use of pat terns 
of inference which the "received view" of the analytical philosophy of 
science considers to be invalid. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned, such 
a decision would be unreasonable, because it would lead to the rejection 
of theories which otherwise are undoubtedly workable and successful. 
So, let us consider another possible solution already pu t forward in 
(H): namely, the claim tha t it is not the theories at issue which are ille-
gitimate, but rather, it is the principles of rationality presupposed by the 
"received view" of the analytical philosophy of science t h a t may be ques-
tioned. This second way of treating the problem is not unmotivated a t 
all: in fact, recent investigations into the na tu re of scientific inquiry have 
shown that although strict logical validity may be a reasonable require-
ment in certain contexts, in many relevant cases it cannot be realized in 
scientific practice. 
Accordingly, we will outline an approach whose a im is to capture 
certain aspects of this state of affairs. We will have to show three things: 
(i) In contrast to (RV) (see section 1), not all non-demonstrative 
inferences are fallacies. 
(ii) In the context of the theories a t issue (1) and (2) are non-
fallacious non-demonstrative inferences. 
(iii) In particular, it is possible to distinguish between two sorts of 
noil-demonstrative inferences, namely, plausible inferences and fallacies. 
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3. Preliminaries to a theory of plausible reasoning 
3.1. The problem 
As is well known, the "received view" of the analytical philosophy of sci-
ence maintains that the "context of d iscovery"—that is the process of 
problem solving—is beyond the scope of rationality and cannot therefore 
be captured by the philosophy of science (see (RVc)). In contrast, it is 
the "context of just i f icat ion"—that is the reconstruction of the logical 
structure of well-developed theories—which constitutes the subject ma t -
ter of the philosophy of science, because it is only the presentation of fully 
developed theories tha t is expected to follow the principles of rationality. 
However, during the 1970's the distinction between the "context of 
discovery" and the "context of justification" was seriously questioned 
(Nickles 1980; 2001). T h e focus of interest changed gradually for philoso-
phers of science: the processes of theory development also became an 
interesting research topic beside the justification of theories. In fact, the 
distinction between the two phases has been largely given up. This shift 
of emphasis had several independent sources. 
Firstly, in many empirical disciplines the exposition of the results 
of research also reflects t he way the corresponding problems were solved 
and remains strongly argumentative in nature. In th is case very often 
even the final form in which the results are presented makes substantial 
use of non-demonstrative rather than demonstrative inferences. Mainly 
due to t he pioneering work of Polya and Rescher, t he assumption was 
formulated that in empirical disciplines it is plausibility considerations 
rather t h a n strict logical validity tha t play a central role. Accordingly, the 
philosopher of science has to go beyond those purely formal considerations 
which demonstrative inferences permit and enter the realm of plausible 
reasoning. 
Secondly, the role which inconsistency plays in scientific inquiry was 
acknowledged. From the seventies on different a t t empt s to handle incon-
sistency by developing different approaches to paraconsistent logics were 
made (for recent overviews, see e.g., Meheus 2002 and Bremer 2005). 
Thirdly, the development of artificial intelligence research gave rise to 
views which considered scientific inquiry as a process of problem-solving 
to be modelled by heuristics based on computer programmes. 
In spite of the fact tha t these tendencies emerged independently of 
each other , they point in the same direction: some basic tenets of the 
"received view" of the analytical philosophy of science with respect to in-
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ferences in scientific theories are no longer acceptable. The central notions 
which may outline a new perspective are "problem solving", "discovery", 
"plausible inferences" and "inconsistency". On this background, it is 
fully legitimate to hypothesize t ha t it is plausible inferences that might 
provide us the key to capturing these phenomena. 
Although the pioneering activity of George Polya and Nicholas Re-
seller showed convincingly the relevance of plausible inferences and re-
vealed basic aspects of their s tructure and functioning, and although 
these achievements have been unquestionably acknowledged, the individ-
ual sciences have not paid as much attention to them as they deserve:1" 
"Plausible reasoning is pervasive in daily life as well as in scientific activity. 
While inductive reasoning and probabilistic thinking have been the object 
of much interest among psychologists for a long time, the frequent case where 
people process uncertain premises and draw an uncertain conclusion [...] has 
remained relatively neglected. This is so despite the recognition of its impor-
tance by logicians and mathematicians [...] (Rescher 1976) and by philoso-
phers [...] and the development of non-monotonic reasoning formalisms in 
Artificial Intelligence." (Politzer-Bourmaud 2002, 346; emphasis added) 
According to the literature, non-demonstrative inferences include, for 
instance, inductive, analogical, abductive, defeasible, presumptive and 
plausible inferences. However, there is no generally accepted interpreta-
tion of these terms. This results in a kind of terminological vagueness 
which we have to live with. For example, in certain cases the term "plausi-
ble inferences" is t reated as the genus proximum of inductive, analogical 
and other sorts of non-clemonstrative inferences and excludes only fal-
lacies from plausible reasoning. In other cases plausible inferences are 
considered to form a special class within non-demonstrative inferences as 
alternatives to inductive, analogical and abductive inferences. Following 
Polya and Rescher, we will maintain the standpoint mentioned first.20 
Since the scope of the present paper does not permit the discussion of 
the arguments for this decision, let us mention that D. Walton, J. R. Jo-
sephson and S. G. Josephson seem to argue for the same view as well.21 
In what follows we will show tha t Polya's and Reseller's ideas can be 
developed into a coherent approach to plausible inferences and fallacies 
19
 Although Polya's and Rescher's ideas were published a couple of decades ago, they 
are still up to date. See e.g., Woods et al. (2000, 258), Walton (2001; 1992b), 
Chesnevar et al. (2000), etc. 
2 0
 Cf. Polya (1954, Preface), Rescher (1976). 
2 1
 Cf. Walton (2001). 
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which differs from the "received view" in several respects. So as to put 
forward our approach, we will focus on the following question: 
(P2) What are plausible inferences, that is, how can they be distinguished from 
(a) demonstrative inferences on the one hand, 
and 
(b) fallacies on the other hand? 
It is worth illustrating the nature of the problem by an instructive ex-
ample. Traditionally it is assumed that one of the classical fallacies is 
"affirming the consequent" which can be contrasted with the valid in-
ference form of modus tollens on the left. The main difference between 
the two inference patterns, in this view, is that while modus tollens is 
deductively valid, the inference pattern on the right is invalid although 
it seems to be correct, because it resembles modus tollens. 
A implies В A implies В 
В false В t rue 
A false A t rue 
It is instructive to observe tha t the very same pat tern on the right is 
considered by Polya (1948, 221) not as a fallacy, but as the paradigm 
example of plausible inferences called "reduction" which he treats as the 
simplest and most frequently used pa t te rn of plausible reasoning. Let us 
compare the traditional characterization of the pat tern on the right side 
of the above table with Polya's considerations:— 
"[...] let us consider the 'modus tollens' of the 'hypothetical syllogism' [...]: 
A implies В 
В false 
A false 
Even from a quite primitive standpoint, we can see various remarkable fea-
tures in this pattern of reasoning: it is impersonal, universal, self-sufficient, 
and definitive. [...] Let us compare the pa t te rn of demonstrative reasoning 
(the 'modus tollens') [...] with the pat tern of plausible reasoning [...]: 
22
 The si tuation is even more complex. For example, just to mention one aspect, 
because the pattern at issue is also held to be a typical example of abduction. We 
cannot go into a discussion of the relationship between abductive and plausible 
inferences. See Walton (2001) for a concise overview. 
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A implies В 
В true 
A more credible 
Between these two patterns, the 'demonstrative' and the 'plausible', there 
is a certain outward similarity. (The demonstrative is traditional, and the 
other has been fashioned after it, of course.) Yet let us compare them more 
thoroughly. 
Both pa t te rns have the same first premise 
A implies В 
The second premises 
В false В true 
are just opposite, but they are equally clear and definite; they are on the 
same logical level. Yet there is a great difference between the two conclusions 
A false A more credible 
[...] The conclusion of the demonstrative pa t te rn is on the same level as 
the premises, but the conclusion of our pa t t e rn of plausible reasoning is of 
different nature, less sharp, less fully expressed." 
(Polya 1954, 112-3; emphasis as in the original) 
The comparison shows tha t Polya's (and following him, Rescher's) main 
idea is that although in certain non-demonstrative inferences it is not 
the case tha t the conclusion is true whenever the premises are true, the 
latter may contribute to the credibility of t he former. T h a t is, the pa t te rn 
called "affirming the consequent" is traditionally considered as a fallacy, 
because it is deductively not valid. Polya claims that the same pat tern 
leads to a credible conclusion and therefore, although not deductively 
valid, it is fully legitimate. 
In a similar vein, Walton argues t h a t purely formal considerations 
are not enough to differentiate between correct and fallacious arguments: 
"Many of the so-called fallacies, on closer inspection, turn out to be instances 
of argumentation that are defeasible, or opinion-based cases of presumptive 
reasoning, bu t inherently reasonable." (Walton 1991, 216; emphasis added) 
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Accordingly, if it is only the form of inferences that is focused on, then one 
excludes inferences from the legitimate tools of reasoning which are (in 
whatever sense) "inherently reasonable" in spite of being non-demonstra-
tive. Therefore, one of the difficulties of answering the questions in (P2) 
is that the distinction between demonstrative, plausible and fallacious 
inferences cannot rest solely on the form of inferences. Consequently, in 
what follows we will show how (P2) can be solved if t he examination of 
inferences is not restricted to their formal aspects. 
3.2. On (P2a): plausible and demonstrative inferences2 1 
Comparing the demonstrative inference wi th the plausible one mentioned 
in the last quotation by Polya, we may observe that while with demon-
strative inferences the t r u t h of the conclusion follows f rom the truth of t he 
premises with certainty, the premises of plausible inferences contribute 
only to the credibility of the conclusion. Tha t is, firstly, as opposed to the 
certainty of demonstrative inferences, plausible inferences are uncertain 
and fallible (Polya 1948, 221; Walton 2001, 159, etc.). 
Secondly, demonstrative (i.e., logically valid) inferences cannot lead 
to knowledge that goes beyond the information content of the premises. 
In contrast to this, plausible inferences are frequently used effective tools 
of acquiring new knowledge in mathematics, scientific inquiry and every-
day life (Polya ibid.), because their conclusion may contain information 
not included in the premises.24 
Thirdly, this kind of effectivity is closely connected to their heurist ic 
function. As is well-known, demonstrative inferences are not suitable for 
bringing about decisions between alternative solutions to a given problem 
2,i
 For more detailed discussions of our approach to plausible inferences with special 
focus on inconsistency, see Kertész (2004b), Kertész - Rákosi (2005b), Rákosi 
(2005). The following considerations are a brief summary of section 2 in K e r t é s z -
Rákosi (2005c). 
2 4
 Cf. Rúzsa (2000, 17): 
"Knowledge obtained by logical inference is only relatively new: it must 
have been hidden in the premises, because otherwise it could not be 
the strict logical consequence of our premises. [.. .] It is impossible to 
gain totally new knowledge by logical inference." 
However, it is important to remark tha t although the information content of the 
conclusion of a demonstrative inference cannot go beyond t h a t of the premises, it 
makes implicit information explicit. This is one of the reasons why demonstrative 
inferences may be used for the solution of problems. 
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which mutually exclude each other, but each of which is motivated by 
certain considerations with respect to the information available.25 In this 
respect, too, they differ significantly from plausible inferences, because 
the latter help us make decisions between alternatives on the basis of 
plausibility considerations. Accordingly, plausible inferences contribute 
to the solution of the problems raised (Polya 1948, 102f; Polya 1954, 140f; 
Walton 2001, 164).26 
Fourthly, they are dynamic, because the conclusion of a plausible 
inference changes monotonically whenever one of i ts premises changes 
monotonically, and because such a change is continuous as well (Polya 
1954, 26, 41; cf. also Walton 2001, 161). Therefore, there is a close 
relationship between plausible and demonstrative inferences:2 ' 
"[...] our pattern of plausible inference has a 'limiting form', which is a 
pattern of demonstrative inference. As the premises of the plausible infer-
ence ' tend' to the corresponding premises of the limiting form, the plau-
sible conclusion 'approaches' its extreme limiting s t rength. Still shorter: 
there is a continuous transition from the heuristic pattern to a demonstrative 
pattern." (Polya 1954, 42; emphasis added) 
Fifthly, the premises of demonstrative inferences consti tute a "complete 
basis", because "[i]f we receive some new information that does not 
change our belief in the premises, it cannot change our belief in the 
conclusion" (Polya 1948, 223). In contrast, the premises of plausible in-
ferences make up only a "partial basis". This means that the complete 
basis has a part which is not expressed through the premises and which 
is, in this sense, "invisible".28 
2 5
 Cf. Rescher -Brandom (1979, 160). 
2<>
 The most renowned Hungarian logician characterizes the nature of deductive logic 
as follows: 
"Logic in most cases cannot provide an exhaustive answer to the question 
'What conclusion can be drawn from it?,' as a certain aggregate of 
premises may support an infinite number of conclusions. What usually 
lies behind the question just quoted is the problem of what should be 
the next appropriate and desirable step during the relevant reasoning, 
demonstration or argumentation. Logic sometimes presents a basis for 
the answer, it delineates alternatives, but it cannot provide a universally 
valid method. It can only give an answer to the question of whether 
another proposition is a logical consequence of t he given propositions 
or not." (Ruzsa 2000, 17; emphasis added) 
2
' See Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5 for illustrations. 
28
 Let us illustrate this by a longer quotation, to which we will continuously refer 
in the sequel: 
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Accordingly, sixthly, the conclusions of plausible inferences are con-
text-dependent in a substantial and non-trivial way. The reason is that 
the credibility of conclusions cannot be established "absolutely", but de-
pends significantly 011 the "strength" or "weight" (Polya's terms) of the 
premises. How credible a conclusion is can be judged only relative to the 
premises in particular and the properties of the partial basis in general 
(Polya 1954, 115f; Rescher 1976, l l l f f ; Wal ton 2001, 164). 
Seventhly, while demonstrative inferences are formal in t ha t they tell 
us that the conclusion is t rue if the premises are true, plausible inferences 
also take the content of the premises into consideration. 
3.3. On (P2b): plausible inferences and fallacies 
After we have differentiated between demonstrative and plausible infer-
ences, the next question to be answered is how to distinguish between 
plausible inferences and fallacies, because both are non-demonstrative 
inferences. According to the classical view, a fallacious argument seems 
to be deductively valid whereas it is not (see e.g., Hamblin 1970, 224; cf. 
Woods-Walton 1989; Hansen-Pinto 1995). However, in t he literature a 
couple of problems have arisen which undermine the acceptability of the 
classical view (see also van Eemeren-Grootendorst 2004, 158): 
(i) In many cases the fallacy does not have a form which is similar to 
a valid inference pattern. For example, fallacies of the type "argumentum 
ad baculum" rely on the threatening of the opponent which is an ethical 
fault rather t h a n a logical one. 
"[...] the premises const i tute only one par t of the basis on which the 
conclusion rests, the fully expressed, the 'visible' part of the basis; there 
is an unexpressed, invisible part, formed by something else, by inartic-
ulate feelings perhaps, or by unstated reasons. In fact, it can happen 
that we receive some new information tha t leaves our belief in both 
premises completely intact , but influences the trust we put in A 
in a way just opposite to that expressed in the conclusion. To find A 
more plausible on the ground of the premises of our heuristic syllogism 
is only reasonable. Yet tomorrow I may find grounds, not interfering at 
all with these premises tha t make A appear less plausible, or even de-
finitively refute it. The conclusion may be shaken and even overturned 
completely by commotions in the invisible parts of its foundation, al-
though the premises, t he visible part, s tand quite firm." 
(Polya op.cit., 223f; emphasis added) 
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(ii) In other cases the fallacy has a valid form. For example, the 
inference of the form "A, therefore A" is trivially valid but commits the 
fallacy of petitio principii. 
(iii) There is a large group of fallacies which contain a premise the 
acceptability of which can be questioned. For example, the fallacy "ar-
gumentum ad populum" relies on the argument tha t a statement is true 
because most people agree with it. 
(iv) The classical view is too restrictive, because it considers non-
clemonstrative inferences as fallacies although both in scientific and every-
day argumentation different kinds of non-demonstrative inferences are 
made use of. 
Owing to these developments, the classical definition of "fallacy" 
has to be given up. There is wide agreement about this in argumentation 
theory; nevertheless, it is also clear tha t in connection with fallacies "most 
new theories are still in an embryotic stage, so it is too early to make any 
balanced judgements" (van Eemeren et al. 1996, 74). Therefore, we are in 
no position to find a satisfactory definition in the literature. Nevertheless, 
in the literature there are clear shifts of emphasis which we can use as 
points of departure. 
Firstly, one of the objections raised against the classical definition 
of a fallacy is that " 'validity' is incorrectly presented as an absolute and 
conclusive criterion" (van Eemeren-Grootendorst 2004, 158). Correct-
ness has a much wider scope t han deductive validity, because not only 
deductive but other kinds of inferences may be correct in some sense as 
well: "[...] fallacy is an inference t ha t falls short of some s tandard of cor-
rect inference (deductive, inductive, or whatever)" (Walton 1997, 212; 
emphasis added). 
Secondly, in connection with this, what mat ters is not the valid vs. 
invalid form of an inference, but rather, the way a certain inference has 
been used in a given context of reasoning: 
"If an argument is an instance of an invalid form of inference, it does not follow 
that the argument must be invalid. Whether the argument is fallacious or 
not depends on whether and how tha t form of inference has been used in 
the context of a dialogue." (Walton op.cit., 213; emphasis added) 
Thirdly, this kind of context-dependency of fallacies seems to be par-
ticularly interesting with respect to the fact tha t , as we have seen in 
the previous subsection, plausible inferences are context-dependent, too. 
Therefore, at this point we may refine the question asked at the beginning 
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of the present subsection: How can we distinguish between plausible in-
ferences and fallacies, if both are (a) non-demonstrative and (b) context 
dependent? 
The answer seems to follow immediately f rom our approach to plau-
sible inferences. As mentioned in the previous subsection, Polya con-
siders plausible inferences to be indispensable heuristic tools of gaining 
new knowledge abou t the world. For Polya, the heuristic potential of 
inferences necessarily means their effectivity, or, to use an alternative 
expression in the same sense, constructivity: t h a t is, their capability of 
bringing us nearer to the solution of a given problem in a given informa-
tional state. This boils down to t he claim that the context-dependency of 
plausible inferences amounts to their effective use for the solution of the 
problems raised on the basis of the information available. Consequently, 
a fallacy arises if t he use of a given pattern of inference is ineffective with 
respect to the heuristic tasks it is expected to fulfil. Thus, the answer 
to the question of how to draw the dividing line between plausible infer-
ences and fallacies is that what primarily mat te rs is effectivity: whereas 
plausible inferences are effective tools of acquiring new information in a 
certain context of argumentat ion, fallacies are ineffective and sometimes 
even destructive. This distinction is not specific to the framework we 
have outlined by relying on Polya's and Rescher's classical views. For 
example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst pu t forward a similar stand-
point, although the argumentation theoretical framework they developed 
differs from ours: 
"[...] fallacies are not 'absolute' mistakes that can simply be at t r ibuted to 
discussants by an analyst who penetrates the 'essence' of reasonableness, 
but moves in an argumentative discourse or text tha t can be characterized 
as less than constructive, or even destructive [...]." 
(van Eemeren-Grootendors t 2004, 175; emphasis added) 
To avoid misunderstandings and unmotivated generalizations, at this 
point three remarks have to be made. The first is that effectivity in 
the sense just mentioned is not an absolute property of inferences. Even 
if in one context of reasoning an inference seems to be effective—be-
cause it appears to further the solution of some problem—in the light of 
new information, with respect t o the new context thus modified it may 
turn out to be ineffective. Secondly, it is important to emphasize once 
more that the distinction we have just drawn reveals a shaded and subtle 
characterization of fallacies, bu t it does not provide us with a universal 
and in all situations clearly applicable criterion for judging whether a 
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certain inference is fallacious or plausible. For example, an inference may 
have multiple effects: while it solves a particular problem, it may give 
rise to another one which perhaps cannot be solved on the basis of the 
information given. Or, it may generate a contradiction between such a 
solution and previously accepted theses of the theory which may either 
undermine the theory or, in contrast, further its development. Moreover, 
the evaluation of such reasoning itself is rooted in a partial basis, too. 
Accordingly, the evaluation of scientific reasoning itself is a process of 
plausible (meta)reasoning, which does not lead to final results, either. 
Rather, all this provides us only with fallible, uncertain findings which 
may seem plausible at a certain point of reasoning but can be rejected or 
revised in the light of later considerations.29 Thirdly, it is important to 
emphasize that although our approach shares many features with other 
approaches to argumentation theory, there are significant differences be-
tween our standpoint and that of other authors.3 0 
29
 The notion of "context" within our approach to plausible reasoning will be ex-
plained in the next section. 
3 0
 Without an a t tempt to present a detailed discussion of the literature, we only 
wish to indicate briefly in what aspects our approach is different from other s tand-
points. 
For example, although in the present paper we have cited Walton approv-
ingly several t imes and used quotations from his works to support our claims, 
there are also clear differences between our approach and his. To illustrate this, 
let us mention tha t Walton seems to agree with the "received view" of the analyt-
ical philosophy of science in so far as he accepts the substantial difference between 
"the context of discovery" and "the context of justification". This distinction is 
reflected in his view of the argumentation structure of these two phases of inquiry. 
He assumes that in "the context of discovery" the use of non-demonstrative in-
ferences is permitted, whereas—because of their uncertainty—in the "context 
of justification" they must not be applied and only deductive and inductive in-
ferences are justified (Walton 1992a, 207f; 2001, 157ff, 164f). Cf. Rákosi (2005) 
on this. 
Or, to mention another example, we highly appreciate van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 's seminal contribution to argumentation theory and often agree 
with their conclusions. However, we do not share their idea that the analysis 
of fallacies should be based on normative models of argumentation which are 
nothing else but "well-defined systems of rules for the resolution of differences 
of opinion that the discussants intersubjectively accept" (cf. e.g., van Eemeren -
Grootendorst 2004, 175). 
From Polya's work our approach differs mainly in that we extend his basic 
ideas to the handling of inconsistency (Kertész-Rákosi 2005b) and fallacies. The 
main difference between Rescher's and our approach is that while Rescher focuses 
on plausibility metrics, our approach centres on patterns of plausible inference. 
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What we have just said applies to (1) and (2) as well. They are non-
demonstrative inferences which may be fallacious in one context, but 
correct in another: "Inference from a property of the part to a property 
of the whole is warranted only in some cases." (Walton 1997, 213)31 
3.4. On the episteinological framework of plausible reasoning 
The way plausible inferences work cannot be understood without outlin-
ing the overall epistemological framework which interprets the technique 
we sketched in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
Let us remember tha t plausible inferences are rooted in a partial 
basis. Start ing from such a partial basis, we apply certain methods so 
as to arrive at new pieces of information, while we cannot make sure 
that the lat ter will really result in claims consistent with our initial as-
sumptions. In such cases we reason cyclically. Tha t is, we start off from 
a partial basis; then we return to the problems in question again and 
again, and supplementing the partial basis with different latent back-
ground assumptions we transform the set of information at our disposal 
by drawing additional plausible inferences, and re-evaluate the credibility 
of the respective hypotheses. During these cyclic returns we aim to fil-
ter out hypotheses unacceptable for some reason gradually, according to 
different—possibly contradictory—considerations (Rescher 1976, l l l f , 
118; Rescher 1987, 304). In this way it becomes possible to compare 
one's cycles and to assess one's progress. 
From this starting point four very important consequences follow. 
The first is t h a t , according both to Rescher and Polya, scientific inquiry 
proceeds not only cyclically, but also prismatically. This means tha t 
inasmuch as one tries to approach the given problem from several points 
of view during the cycles of reassessing what is known (Rescher 1987, 
306f, 313; Polya 1981, 68), the cycles continuously change the point of 
view from which the information at our disposal is evaluated. 
Secondly, due to its prismatic nature, the cyclic process of continuous 
retrospective revalidation does not yield vicious circularity, because cyclic 
reasoning never returns to the same stage.3 2 
3 1
 Of course, t he same applies to inferences from properties of the whole to properties 
of the par t . 
32
 "The sort of 'self-criticism' at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circu-
larity, bu t in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more 
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The third consequence is that the cyclic and prismatic procedure of 
scientific inquiry can be best understood if we imagine it as a kind of 
double helix in the sense of Figure 2.33 
retrospect ive revalidation ( re t roval idat ion) 
THEORETICAL CYCLE 
PARTIAL 
BASIS 
REASONING 
PROCESS 
PUTATIVE 
RESULTS 
APPLICATIVE CYCLE 
re t rospect ive revalidation ( re t roval idat ion) 
control of internal 
coherence 
control of 
external 
coherence 
Fig. 2 
Starting from the information in the partial basis one obtains new in-
formation by drawing plausible inferences. These results are, however, 
only putative, that is, their credibility has increased during the reasoning 
process, but they are still only plausible and not certain. Since consis-
tency has to be established, it is unavoidable to control a t least two things. 
First, whether the putat ive results are consistent with all the other claims 
in the partial basis of the theory (control of internal coherence). Second, 
it has to be checked, too, if the putat ive results are consistent with the 
"empirical" (whatever this term means) data (control of external coher-
ence). If one or both of the two questions are answered negatively, it has 
to be decided—by the use of plausible inferences again—which par ts of 
the basis have to be given up or modified and which further background 
assumptions should be added. 
The aim of this cyclic and prismatic process of retrospective revali-
dation is primarily to rule out inconsistency and to arrive at a consistent 
set of assumptions. In this sense, the model we have just sketched, does 
not deny the basic values of rationality advocated by the "received view" 
refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials 
from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ' the same point ' but 
does so at a different cognitive level." (Rescher 1976, 119; emphasis as in the 
original and added) 
3 3
 Figure 2 is based on suggestions in Rescher (1977, 122) and Rescher (1979, 103), 
but the terminology has been adapted to the notions we introduced in section 3.2. 
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of the analytical philosophy of science; however, it considers them to be 
ideals which one should strive for but which normally cannot be realized. 
Thus, the fourth very important consequence of our approach to plau-
sible reasoning is that scientific rationality must not be reduced to the 
use of demonstrative inferences; rather, it should be extended to capture 
plausible inferences as well.34 It does not follow from the fact that the 
conclusion of plausible inferences is not certainly t rue—but only credible, 
fallible, context-dependent — that plausible inferences are not rational. 
This highly important aspect of our model is, of course, in sharp con-
trast with the "received view" which restricts "rationality" to deductive 
inferences (and probabilistically based inductive inferences, at best).3 5 
3 4
 "But in going beyond the purely formal considerations of logic [...] plausibility 
theory does not go beyond the limits of rationality. [...] it aims at rational 
alignment and coordination of inferences." (Reseller 1976, 5; emphasis added) 
35
 This a t t i tude is expressively characterized by Walton: 
"[...] it is very hard to get modern readers to come to accept plausible 
inference as having any hold on rational assent at all. We are so ac-
customed to the basing of our notion of rationality on knowledge and 
belief, we tend to automatically dismiss plausibility as 'subjective', and 
therefore of no worth as evidence of the kind required to rationally sup-
port a conclusion. The modern conventional wisdom is used to thinking 
of rationality as change of belief or knowledge guided by deductive rea-
soning and inductive probability. This modern way of thinking finds 
the notion of plausibility alien or even unintelligible, as an aspect of 
thinking." ~ (Walton 2001, 151) 
Such an anachronistic a t t i tude is one of the typical, unreflecting and outmoded 
methodological background assumptions underlying most linguistic theories, as 
already mentioned in section 1. In fact, most mainstream linguistic theories 
presuppose the concept of rationality associated with the "received view", while 
in doing linguistics they make substantial use of plausible reasoning. That is, in 
so far as they declare to accept the standards of the "received view", they have 
to be evaluated as irrational by their own standards. Consequently, this seems 
to be a contradiction which they cannot resolve by their own means within their 
own framework. Therefore, in this respect, such theories—and, among them, all 
the stages of generative linguistics and the two-level approach — are essentially 
paraconsistent. 
Nevertheless, the si tuation is, of course, much more complicated than the 
above quotat ion and our comment suggest. For example, the fact that plausible 
inferences may be considered to be rational, does not exclude the assumption tha t 
they correspond to different standards of rationality than deductive and inductive 
reasoning in scientific theories. Examining this problem would require a detailed 
comparison of Walton's, Rescher's and our view which would be beyond the limits 
of the present paper. 
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Finally, let u s—wi thou t defining i t—explain in what sense in our 
framework the notion of "context" will be used. In accordance with 
Rescher and Polya, by "context" we will mean the whole of the infor-
mation which is at one 's disposal in a certain moment . In other words, 
the context includes all the hypotheses which seem to be plausible at a 
given stage of reasoning. This means tha t not only empirical hypotheses, 
but also background assumptions of other sorts such as methodological 
norms, pat terns of inferences etc. are included in the context as well. Ac-
cordingly, in scientific theories the context changes continuously, because 
in the course of the cycles of reasoning one may obta in new information 
by the use of the method applied, or one may also give up some of the 
hypotheses accepted in one of the previous cycles, or one may assume 
new hypotheses, or the method can be changed, etc. For example, in 
Figure 2 the "context" of a certain assumption in the partial basis at a 
certain moment is t he rest of the part ial basis. Or, the context of the 
"putative results" includes the partial basis and the methods applied in 
this cycle — thus, in our case, the inferences (1) and (2). However, as 
soon as a cycle is closed, the context is supplemented by all the results 
provided by the whole cycle at issue. Because these results may contra-
dict certain elements of the partial basis, it may be the case tha t one 
has to revaluate the hypotheses accepted previously. Accordingly, in this 
way the context may change again. 
3.5. Summary 
In section 3 we sketched an approach to plausible reasoning by distin-
guishing between three kinds of inferences: demonstrative, plausible and 
fallacious ones. This means that we argued for giving up the dichotomy 
"fallacy vs. demonstrative inference". See Figure 3 for this dichotomy. 
valid inferences invalid inferences 
demonstrative inferences non-demonstrative inferences: 
— plausible inferences 
— fallacies 
Fig. 3 
Rather, we suggested treating both demonstrative and plausible infer-
ences as correct ones and assuming tha t non-demonstrative inferences 
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consist of at least two subgroups, namely, fallacies and plausible infer-
ences as illustrated in Figure 4. 
correct inferences I incorrect inferences 
demonstrative plausible fallacies 
inferences . inferences I • 
non-demonstrative inferences 
Fig. 4 
Consequently, we may summarize our next auxiliary hypothesis as follows 
which is an answer to the question (P2): 
(H2) (a) The distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative inferences 
rests on the certainty vs. uncertainty of the conclusion. 
(b) Within non-demonstrative inferences, the distinction between plausible and 
fallacious inferences depends on the particular context of reasoning. The 
criterion is the effectivity of the inference within the context given. 
However, the distinctions we have made do not mean t h a t there is no 
link between these kinds of inferences: 
(i) As we have shown in section 3.2, pat terns of plausible reasoning 
can be seen as tending to the corresponding patterns of demonstrative 
inference when the credibility of the premises tends to certainty. As far 
as the premises of plausible inferences approach certainty, so, too, does 
their conclusion. 
(ii) An analogous relation holds between plausible inferences and 
fallacies: the latter are nothing but plausible inferences deemed ineffective 
in a certain context of argumentation. If we give up the stat ic view of 
fallacies t h a t focuses on the form of inferences only, and t ry to consider 
the content of arguments by interpreting them dynamically, then fallacies 
are seen in a new light. They appear to be extreme cases on a scale: they 
are obtained from plausible inferences in t ha t one moves towards contexts 
of argumentation in which these structures work less and less effectively. 
In sum, we assume tha t reasoning centres on plausible inferences from 
which one can move towards two extremes: demonstrative and fallacious 
ones (Figure 5). From another point of view this means t h a t , since the 
form of an inference itself does not decide whether it is plausible, demon-
strative or fallacious, the dividing lines between these categories are not 
fixed either, bu t they are in constant motion depending on the particular 
context of reasoning. 
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I I 
1 1  
demonstrative | plausible inferences | fallacies 
inferences 
Fig. 5 
Let us illuminate this system of inferences by two further remarks. Firstly, 
for example, modus tollens or modus ponens are demonstrative, if the 
premises are certain and, consequently, the conclusion is certain, too. We 
obtain, however, different cases of what Polya (1954, 23ff) calls shaded 
modus tollens or shaded modus ponens as soon as—while the form 
of the inference is the same—the premises and via the premises the con-
clusion, too, are not certain, but only credible to a particular degree. 
Furthermore, if for example a premise is held to be t r ue although it is 
not because it overgeneralizes (i.e., when its plausibility is misjudged),36 
then the conclusion will be faulty and the inference has to be evaluated 
as a fallacy. That is, the transition between these categories is clearly 
context-dependent, while plausible inferences can approach two extremes 
continuously. See Tables 1 and 2 (overleaf) as illustrations of the t ran-
sition between the categories mentioned.3 ' 
Secondly, it is worth emphasizing tha t our model fits smoothly into 
current tendencies of inference research. For example, in summarizing the 
main findings of modern approaches to fallacies, Kienpointner emphasizes 
the following as one of the key points: 
"Der Übergang von plausibler zur trugschlüssigen Argumentation ist graduel-
ler Natur, wobei für die entsprechende Einstufung von Argumentation stets 
der [...] Kontext zu berücksichtigen ist. [...] Die Ermittlung von Trugschlüs-
sen ist nur im Rahmen einer umfassenden Theorie der 'fallacies' möglich, die 
festlegt, was als 'fallacy' zählt und was nicht." (Kienpointner 1992, 249-50) 
Since many further aspects of Kienpointner's approach to plausible in-
ferences differ substantially from Polya's, Rescher's and ours, the above 
statement serves as an independent argument for our model of fallacy. 
In section 4.4 we will discuss such a case. 
We have to remark three things. First, the second premise of each inference in 
the tables involves a comparison between the credibility of a piece of information 
[A resp. В) in a given moment and its credibility at a former informational s tate . 
Second, it is important to emphasize that there are many versions of each plausible 
inference pattern, because not only the second premise can be uncertain but the 
first one or both premises as well. Third, there are of course many different stages 
in the continuum and therefore, many different degrees of credibility/uncertainty. 
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Table 1 
demonstrative shaded plausible plausible fallacy 
Premises: 
It is certain 
that if A, 
then В 
В is certainly 
false 
Conclusion: 
A is certainly 
false 
Premises: 
It is certain 
tha t if A, 
then В 
В has become 
less credible 
Conclusion: 
A has become 
less credible 
Premises: 
It is certain 
t h a t if A, 
then В 
В has become 
more credible 
Conclusion: 
A has become some-
what more credible 
Premises: 
It is cer ta in 
that if A, 
then В 
В has t u r n e d out 
to be t r ue 
Conclusion: 
A has become 
more credible 
Premises: 
It is cer ta in 
tha t if A, 
then В 
В is certainly 
true 
Conclusion: 
A is certainly 
true 
modus 
tollens38 
shaded 
modus tollens 
shaded 
reduction 
reduction affirming the 
consequent 
Table 2 
demonstrative shaded plausible plausible fallacy 
Premises: 
It is certain 
that if A, 
then В 
A is certainly 
t rue 
Conclusion: 
В is certainly 
true 
Premises: 
It is certain 
t h a t if A, 
then В 
A has become 
more credible 
Conclusion: 
В has become 
more credible 
Premises: 
It is certain 
t h a t if A, 
t hen В 
A has become 
less credible 
Conclusion: 
В has become some-
what less credible 
Premises: 
It is cer ta in 
that if A, 
then В 
A has t u r n e d ou t 
to be false 
Conclusion: 
В has become 
less credible 
Premises: 
It is certain 
that if A, 
then В 
A is certainly-
false 
Conclusion: 
В is certainly 
false 
modus 
ponens 
shaded 
modus ponens 
shaded refuting 
the antecedent 
refuting the 
antecedent 
denying the 
antecedent49 
38
 One might ask why the premises and the conclusion claim the certainty of the 
propositions at issue. Firstly, the formal structure of modus tollens is of course 
(A D B; } =4> ~ A However, it is not sufficient to require formal validity 
only, because the inference has to be sound, too: "When an argument is valid, 
and all of its premises are t rue, we call it sound. The conclusion of a sound argu-
ment obviously must be t rue" (Copi-Burgess-Jackson 1996, 56). This means tha t 
(formal) validity alone is not enough to establish the t ru th of the conclusion — 
therefore, soundness, in other words, the certainty of the premises is required. 
Secondly, we must not forget that we are discussing inferences not (to quote 
Quine) "from a logical point of view," but rather, from an argumentation the-
oretical point of view. T h a t is, what we are focussing on is not pure logic, but 
reasoning which involves, among others, the way logic is used. The use of logic 
also means that it is not only the form of inferences that mat ters , but their con-
tent, too, even in the case of valid inferences. Therefore, f rom an argumentation 
theoretical point of view, the interpretation of modus tollens suggested in the 
first column of the table is, of course, fully justified. 
3 9
 The pa t te rn of refuting the antecedent is dynamic (in the sense of Polya, see 
section 3.2), whereas tha t of denying the antecedent is not. The reason is t ha t in 
the case of fallacies the second premise is not dynamic, because according to the 
traditional view inferences are static. 
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4. On the effectivity of (1) and (2) 
4.1. The problem 
After we have clarified the difference between fallacies and plausible in-
ferences, the question arises whether (1) and (2) are made a fallacious or 
a plausible use of in the three theories we are examining. By definition, 
this question should be reduced to the problem as to the effectivity of 
(1) and (2) in the given theoretical contexts. 
However, examining whole theories is a very complicated and lengthy 
matter , therefore the problem should be further specified. How can we 
test whether the use of (1) and (2) is effective or not? O n e — b u t cer-
tainly not the only—way is to argue as follows. Firstly, we will choose 
a well-known paradigm example of fallacies. Let this example be petitio 
principii, because it is known as a typically ineffective strategy which 
does not yield new insights and does not contribute to the solution of the 
problems raised. It is especially interesting that in the literature all three 
theories have been accused of committing the fallacy of petitio principii. 
Secondly, we will t ry to show that by the use of (1) and (2) this fallacy, 
which would occur otherwise, can be avoided. If we succeed in showing 
this, then we may conclude, thirdly, t h a t (1) and (2) have been used 
effectively, because with their help an ineffective s trategy of reasoning 
could be avoided and therefore the heuristic capacity of the theory has 
been restored. Accordingly, our next question is: 
(P3) Can by the use of (1) and (2) in the context of the three theories the fallacy of 
petitio principii be avoided?40 
If it can, then the theories we are examining may be — at least with 
respect to the use of (1) and (2), provisionally and partially—legitimized 
as scientific enterprises. If not, then one must conclude that they are 
false theories built on fallacious reasoning. 
4 0
 By petitio principii we mean in accordance with our characterization of fallacies 
ineffective or even destructive circularity which does not result in any new knowl-
edge and serves only as self-legitimization. 
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4.2. Generative linguistics 
As regards generative linguistics, according to one of Chomsky's initial 
hypotheses, language is governed by rules. However, since th is hypothesis 
cannot be tes ted by direct empirical evidence, the risk of circularity is 
relatively great: 
"Imagine a deba te between radical regularists, like Chomsky, and moderate 
ones who are convinced tha t there is no regularity in language over and 
above the obvious cases of agreement, comparison of adjectives, etc. The 
opposing par t ies would soon be involved in vicious circles. [...] In fact, the 
very acceptability of the da t a relevant to the question seems to depend on a 
prior decision concerning the degree of systematicitv of language. Hence the 
assumption of regularity cannot be regarded as a generalization from hard 
facts. I would like to suggest that it may be understood, partly, in terms of 
Chomsky's views on human nature. He thinks tha t creativity presupposes 
rules. So if language use is creative, it has to t ake place within a system of 
rules. Thus it might be the rules governing our creative activities where the 
principle of regularity comes from." (Forrai 1987, 51; emphasis added) 
This kind of circularity can be avoided by the use of (2). In particular, 
as we have shown in section 2.2, the principle which says tha t linguistic 
competence is governed by rules was inferred from the properties of hu-
man nature v ia (2). Therefore, the reasoning does not re turn to the same 
state, but to a qualitatively different informational state. Consequently, 
the reasoning is not viciously circular; ra ther , it is cyclic and rests on the 
retrospective revalidation of the partial basis. 
Nevertheless, in other contexts the circularity arises again from dif-
ferent "prismatic" points of view. For example, it is instructive to observe 
that in certain contexts of argumentation Chomsky reverses the inferen-
tial relationship between h u m a n nature and linguistic competence. It is 
not only the case that he infers properties of the latter from properties 
of the former, but also vice versa: 
"Given the role of language in human life and probably human evolution, and 
given its int imate relations t o what I have been calling 'common-sense un-
derstanding', it would not be very surprising to discover tha t other systems 
within cognitive capacity have something of t he character of the language 
faculty and its products. We should anticipate that these other cognitive 
systems too set limits on human intellectual achievement, by virtue of the 
very s t ruc ture that makes it possible to acquire rich and comprehensive sys-
tems of belief and knowledge, insight and understanding. I have already 
discussed this matter briefly in connection wi th the 'science-forming capac-
ity' (whatever it may be)." (Chomsky 1976, 123) 
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Moreover, on the same page he also claims tha t even visual perception 
could have been chosen as a point of departure: 
"I would like to stress again tha t these conjectures should not seem in any 
way surprising to the natural scientist. Rather, they conform reasonably 
well to what is known about how the brain works in other domains, say, the 
construction of visual space and the objects in it. Furthermore, as a number 
of biologists have pointed out, something of the sort is to be expected on 
simple evolutionary grounds." (Chomsky op.cit., 123f) 
At a later point in the same work he reverses the direction of argumen-
tat ion again: 
"If the approach to the study of cognitive capacity outlined earlier is a proper 
one, then we can hope to develop a theory of human nature in its psycho-
logical aspects. [...] No one would seriously argue today, for example, that 
our construction of perceptual space is guided by empiricist maxims. The 
same, I think, is true of the language faculty, which relates more closely to 
the essential nature of the human species." (ibid., 125f) 
Then he handles the study of linguistic competence and human cognition 
simultaneously: 
"Imagine a scientist, henceforth S, who is unencumbered by the ideological 
baggage that forms part of our intellectual tradition [...]. S might begin with 
the observation that people seem to act in systematic ways with respect to 
the objects around them and tha t they use and respond to expressions in 
organized ways. He might also conclude tha t humans, rather early in their 
lives, seem to arrive at steady states of development in these respects, states 
which provide a basis for human actions and responses. [...] S might now 
proceed to characterize these steady states, at t r ibuting to the organism two 
cognitive structures: (i) a system of beliefs and expectations about the na-
ture and behavior of objects, and (ii) a system of language. Suppose he calls 
the first system 'common sense' and the second 'grammar' ." (ibid., 139) 
Although these quotations suggest that Chomsky's argumentation still 
appears to be circular, the point is that the premises and the conclusions 
of the inferences of types (1) and (2) correspond to different informational 
stages and are thus "at a different cognitive level" (Rescher 1976, 119). 
The credibility of Chomsky's argumentation is significantly enhanced by 
the fact that inferences from the whole to the part and from the part 
to the whole are not restricted to single properties, but rather, affect a 
coherent network of properties. Accordingly, besides certain single prop-
erties, linguistic competence, human nature and society are related by 
structural similarities—that is by relations between corresponding ele-
ments—as well. Consequently, whole-part and part-whole inferences are 
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closely connected to a system of analogical inferences (see also the first 
quotat ion from Forrai in section 2.2). In a nutshell, linguistic competence, 
human nature and society are governed by regularities; these regularities 
presuppose the creative behaviour of people; creativity, however, can be 
manifested in behaviour characterized by regularities; the regularities are 
not arbitrary, but can operate only within man's biological constraints; 
it is, however, these constraints tha t enable human beings to act freely 
and creatively. See Figure 6 as the extension of Figure 1 with respect 
to these relations. 
society 
linguistic competence 
У 
У 
У 
У 
regularity 
creativity 
У 
rules 
У 
freedom 
Fig. 6 
These structural relationships facilitate the application of Chomsky's 
model of linguistic competence to other areas of cognition, and in doing 
so, he tests his hypotheses on the basis of continuously modified amounts 
of information. As long as his approach can be applied to other fields of 
human cognitive behaviour as well, all these assumptions clearly enhance 
each other's credibility. This means that as a result of drawing inferences 
along the lines of (1) and (2), a strong analogy between man, linguistic 
competence and society is established.41 
4 1
 As Gentner and Markman emphasize, it is this systematicity that is responsible 
for the effectivity of analogical reasoning: 
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Consequently, our considerations seem to support the assumption 
tha t Chomsky's reasoning is cyclic and prismatic (see section 3.4) rather 
than circular (Figure 7). 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
THEORETICAL CYCLE 
control of internal 
coherence 
P A R T I A L R E A S O N I N G 
BASIS PROCESS 
Chomsky's reasoning pat-
view of man terns of types 
(1) and ( 2 ) 
P U T A T I V E 
RESULTS 
hyptheses about 
linguistic compe-
tence, visual per-
ception and society 
APPLICATIVE CYCLE 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
control of external 
coherence 
Fig. 7 
This cycle can be supplemented by further pieces of information, for ex-
ample, the basic assumptions of a certain version of generative grammar: 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
THEORETICAL CYCLE 
control of internal 
coherence 
P A R T I A L R E A S O N I N G 
B A S I S P R O C E S S 
Chomsky's reasoning pat-
view of man; terns of types 
hypotheses (1) «nd ( 2 ) ; 
about linguis- analogical 
tic competence inferences 
APPLICATIVE CYCLE 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
control of external 
coherence 
Fig. 8 
"The defining characteristic of analogy is t h a t it involves an alignment of 
relational structure. [.. .] Analogies tend to match connected systems 
of relations [...]. A matching set of relations interconnected by higher 
order constraining relations makes a be t te r analogical match than an 
equal number of matching relations that are unconnected to each other. 
The systematicity principle captures a taci t preference for coherence 
and causal predictive power in analogical processing." 
(Gen tne r -Markman 1997, 47) 
Thus, the relationship between whole-part and part-whole inferences on the one 
hand and such a systematic use of analogies on the other hand, clearly increases 
the effectivity of the former. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
262 ANDRÁS KERTÉSZ - CSILLA RÁKOSI 
Thus, (1) and (2) play an important heuristic role, because the basic 
background assumptions of the theory are obtained with their help. 
So as to evaluate these findings, it is worth remarking tha t , how-
ever different the particular versions of Chomsky's generative g rammar 
are, they remain within the boundaries of the inferences reconstructed in 
(3)-(9). For example, both the Standard Theory and GB Theory make 
substantial use of (3), irrespective of the fact that the content of t he par-
ticular inferences is different. This means that although these versions 
focus on part ly differing ideas—for example the Standard Theory focuses 
on rules, while GB theory centres on freedom within constraints and in 
the case of minimalism it is constraints that are emphasized—, in this 
respect, too, (1) and (2) play an indispensable role in Chomsky's theory. 
The reason they do so is tha t the frequent use of inferences which are 
manifestations of the pat terns (1) and (2) belong to t he philosophical ba-
sis of Chomsky's work. One might object that this philosophical basis is 
not constitutive of Chomsky's linguistic theory that focuses on the tech-
nical innovations widely applied by linguists. However, this objection is 
clearly unmotivated. Unfortunately, we cannot go into a detailed proof of 
the latter claim, therefore, let us subst i tu te such a proof by the following 
quotation which nicely summarizes the main issue: 
"[...] many linguists (including many practicing generative linguists) seem 
not to take much interest in Noam Chomsky's general ('philosophical') writ-
ings on the nature of language. [...] Among such linguists, there appears 
to be a sense that Chomsky's more general thinking about the nature of 
human language (as opposed to his more specific work, for example, within 
the current Chomskyan model known as the Minimalist programme) rep-
resents merely ' the philosophical side of (Chomskyan) linguistics', an area 
that is viewed by many linguists as being, in some sense, an optional extra, 
distinct from, and not having any obvious direct bearing on, the business 
of getting on with doing linguistic analyses ('linguistics proper' as opposed 
to philosophy). This outlook is unfortunate , since foundational ideas a re 
surely what any significant linguistic theory is derived from. It is certainly 
the more general issues which drive Chomsky's thinking, and from which the 
Minimalist programme and all its predecessors are derived." 
(Carr 2003, 615; emphasis added) 
Thus our argument is simple: if the use of (1) and (2) is effective for the 
philosophical foundations of Chomsky's theory and these foundations are 
effective for all the versions of this theory, then (1) an (2) are effective 
not only for Chomsky's philosophy, but also for his "linguistics proper" . 
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4.3. The two-level approach 
According to Müller (1991) the fallacy of petitio principii characterizes 
modular approaches to cognition generally: 
"Ein logischer Fehlschluß, der sich immer wieder in modularistischen Theorien 
der Kognitiven Wissenschaften finden läßt, ist die Interpretation forschungs-
strategisch motivierter Abgrenzungen als realistische Aussagen über die Or-
ganisation von Geist und Gehirn. Daß wir die Welt oder unseren eigenen 
Geist vielleicht nur durch einen modularistischen 'Theoriefilter' erkennen 
können, bedeutet nicht, daß Welt und Geist modular sind." 
(Müller op.cit., 407; emphasis added) 
This applies to the two-level approach, too—al l the more so, because its 
main empirical hypothesis says that "all human cognitive behaviour is 
organized in a modular fashion". 
In the two-level approach very much depends on the assumption that 
there is a set of modules. However, proving the existence of relatively au-
tonomous systems and subsystems is one of the most difficult tasks of 
modularism, because there is a substantial lack of empirical evidence 
(whatever "empirical evidence" may mean). Therefore, t he two-level ap-
proach runs the risk of circularity as well. In particular, its proponents ac-
cept the empirical hypothesis t h a t knowledge of language is based on the 
interaction of relatively autonomous systems, because, for methodologi-
cal reasons, the object of investigation can be grasped only by systematic 
simplifications, namely, its subdivision into separate (sub)systems. At the 
same time, however, they accept the methodological principle that the 
object of investigation has to be subdivided into relatively autonomous 
systems, because they have accepted the empirical hypothesis, according 
to which knowledge of language consists of subsystems.42 This circular 
reasoning seems to be clearly formulated for example in the following 
passage from one of the seminal works by Bierwisch and Lang: 
"Singling out autonomous subsystems of mental organization and specify-
ing their content is based on the assumption tha t the structure and the 
functioning of cognitive systems do indeed have such a modular structure. 
Autonomous subsystems aud structural levels of the theory, from this factual 
point of view, correspond to autonomous subsystems in the actual structure 
of mental states aud processes. This actual s tructure, however, cannot be 
discovered directly but only in the form of explanatory theories. From this 
4 2
 See Müller (ibid.) and Kertész (2004a) for a detailed discussion of t he modularistic 
circle. 
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theoretical point of view, identifying subsystems and explaining their au-
tonomy, as well as finding out the na ture of their interaction, becomes au 
aspect of adequate theory formation. Autonomous components of the theory 
are then justified (a) by the independence of the basic concepts, (b) by the 
internal structure of the theoretical components which the basic concepts 
enter and (c) by the possibility of formulating regularities in the frame-
work of (a) and (b) which explain the facts on the appropriate level of 
abstraction." (Bierwisch-Lang 1989, 495; emphasis added) 
However, research within the two-level approach can be seen as a series 
of cyclically proceeding plausible inferences, rather t han being circular. 
Namely in section 2.3 we have shown that the two-level approach uses 
(1) and (2) as constitutive tools of theory-formation. Therefore, if one 
interprets the last quotat ion on the basis of the framework we introduced 
in section 3, then it follows immediately that (1) and (2) contribute to 
the resolution of the circularity and to the generation of a cyclic and 
prismatic reasoning mechanism. Figure 9 is intended to illustrate the 
cyclicity of reasoning within the two-level approach. 
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Although at every point of the argumentation proponents of the two-level 
approach try to identify the major premises and to argue clearly on their 
basis, evidently we must not exclude the possibility t h a t there is indeed an 
"invisible part" of the basis (see section 3.2). This invisible part involves 
those assumptions of the two-level approach which one does not make use 
of in the argumentation explicitly and whose indirect consequences one 
cannot realize—for example the "empirical evidence" (in whatever sense) 
supporting the autonomy of what the two-level approach calls "semantic 
form". We may conclude that it is the particular argumentative context 
within the two-level approach that decides whether the applications of (1) 
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and (2) are plausible or fallacious, because (a) the modules whose exis-
tence the argumentation hinges on are heuristically motivated theoretical 
constructs, and (b) apar t from the "visible basis" of the argumentation 
there is an "invisible basis" (in the sense of Polya 1948, 223f, quoted in 
section 3.2), whose implications may be different from those of the visible 
one—for instance, if the "empirical evidence" turned out to refute the 
autonomy of semantic form and that of the conceptual module. 
Therefore, the use of (1) is, due to t he cyclic na ture of the argument, 
clearly effective. Tha t is, the application of (1) is t o be interpreted as 
plausible rather than fallacious. This situation can be retained as long 
as the start ing hypotheses—that is, t he partial bas i s—are considered 
to be plausible. However, as soon as serious arguments arise against t he 
modularity of the knowledge of language to which the theory cannot react 
convincingly, the plausibility of (1) has to be subjected to revision. 
Moreover, as Figure 10 suggests, in later cycles the two level approach 
uses the assumption of modularity as a premise and thus applies (2), too 
(see also section 3.3). 
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4.4. The cognitive theory of metaphor 
Critics of Lakoff and Johnson's approach have recently argued tha t t he 
authors commit the fallacy of petitio principii. For example, Haser (2005, 
145ff) enumerates and analyzes such cases in great detail; see also Mur-
phy (1996, 183). To mention another source, McGlone accuses Lakoff 
and Johnson of the following fundamental error which he thinks clearly 
undermines their whole approach: 
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"[...] Lakoff 's claim that metaphors transcend their linguistic manifestations 
to influence conceptual s t ruc ture rests solely on these manifestations. How 
do we know that people think of theories in terms of buildings? Because 
people of ten talk about theories using building-related expressions. Why do 
people often talk about theories using building-related expressions? Because 
people think about theories in terms of buildings. Clearly, the conceptual 
metaphor view must go beyond circular reasoning of this sort and seek evi-
dence t h a t is independent of the linguistic evidence." 
(McGlone 2001, 95; emphasis added) 
That is, Lakoff and Johnson infer the existence of metaphorical con-
cepts from t h e use of metaphorical expressions, and they infer the use 
of metaphorical expressions from the existence of metaphorical concepts. 
It is important to emphasize right at t he outset that Lakoff and John-
son's reasoning is much more difficult to reconstruct than Chomsky's and 
Bierwisch and Lang's. Namely, the former argue simultaneously into two 
opposing directions (cf. (25) and (39)), while they do not differentiate 
between these two lines of argumentation systematically.43 
Let us begin with the first direction. From a methodological point 
of view, metaphorical expressions are primary, because the following is 
assumed:44 
(24) The cognitive theory of metaphor infers properties of metaphorical concepts f rom 
properties of metaphorical expressions. 
The problem of circularity is closely related to (24), because it concerns 
the methodological question of how to account for the inferential con-
nection between linguistic expressions and concepts. Therefore, before 
turning to t h e role (1) and (2) play in t he resolution of circularity, we 
have to discuss the chain of inferences which belong to t he methodolog-
ical line of reasoning summarized in (24).4 5 As we will see, (27)-(31) 
4 3
 Therefore, the whole of their reasoning is present simultaneously at every s tage 
and it is hard to reconstruct it as a linear sequence of inferences. What t he 
conclusion and what the premise is depends basically on the particular point a t 
which one interrupts the reasoning and begins with the reconstruction. 
44
 "Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts 
in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the 
nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical 
structure of our activities." (Lakoff-Johnson 1980, 7; emphasis added) 
45
 Please no te that the inferences discussed in the present section are plausible and 
not deductively valid. T h a t is, their conclusion is only credible to a certain 
extent and not true with certainty. For the precise structure of shaded modus 
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below increase the plausibility of (24), and with the help of (1) and (2) 
fur ther conclusions can be drawn. 
Lakoff and Johnson seem to accept the principle that "one can move 
freely and gradually from facts about language to facts about human 
cognition and further on to facts about human life generally [...]" (Harder 
1999, 196). However, the structure of such a "move" is anything but clear: 
"The trouble with Lakoff/Johnson's position is this: All tha t Lakoff/Johnson's 
da ta show is tha t we employ certain expressions (rather than concepts) tha t 
can—but need no t—be associated with the domain of WAR. Demonstrating 
the presence of metaphorical concepts is impossible on the basis of purely 
linguistic evidence (cf. Murphy 1996). How is the jump from language 
to thought justified? Lakoff/Johnson (1980: 5) do not tackle this question, 
merely repeating their principal claim again." 
(Haser 2005, 147; italics as in the original, bold emphasis added) 
Our model of plausible reasoning outlined in section 3 suggests the fol-
lowing reconstruction of the inference Harder and Haser refer to: 
(25) Premises: 
(a) Linguistic expressions associated with arguments are metaphorical. 
(b) (Between linguistic expressions and concepts there is such a relationship 
that from properties of linguistic expressions one may infer properties of 
concepts.) 
Conclusion: 
(c) The concept A R G U M E N T is metaphorically structured. 
Our model explains Haser's (2005, 147) criticism by interpreting (25b) 
as an "invisible" premise (in the sense of Polya, see section 3.2) whose 
particular content is not known.46 This is especially interesting, because, 
as we know, plausible reasoning proceeds, among other things, in such 
a way that the partial basis contains alternative assumptions between 
which one can choose only by examining "the credibility", "the weight", 
"the strength" of each of them in the light of the particular informational 
state. In the present case, the alternatives one of which should specify 
(25b) may be for example the following. 
tollens and shaded modus ponens see Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5. The reason 
for reconstructing the following inferences in a simplified form — i.e., for omit-
t ing the plausibility-indicators ( "possible", "less credible", "more credible", "cer-
tain", etc.) — is tha t otherwise our analyses would be too complex and difficult 
to capture for the reader. 
4I
' Invisible premises are marked by "(" and ")". 
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(26) Alternative premises in the partial basis: 
(a) Meanings and concepts are the same and "linguistic expression" is a short-
hand for "the meaning of a linguistic expression". 
(b) Meanings are part of the conceptual system and "linguistic expression" is 
shorthand for "the meaning of a linguistic expression". 
(c) Meanings and concepts are analogous and "linguistic expression' 
hand for "the meaning of a linguistic expression". 
(d) Meanings and concepts are isomorphic and "linguistic expression 
hand for "the meaning of a linguistic expression". 
(e) Linguistic expressions are indices of concepts. 
(f) etc. 
Nevertheless, one may argue t ha t both Haser's criticism and our recon-
struction of Lakoff and Johnson's reasoning in (25) and (26) are incorrect, 
because in the cognitive theory of metaphor the inferential connection be-
tween the metaphoricity of linguistic expressions and tha t of concepts is 
defined clearly: 
"If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, we would expect different 
linguistic expressions to be different metaphors. Thus, 'We've hit a dead-end 
street ' would constitute one metaphor. 'We can' t turn back now' would con-
sti tute another, entirely different metaphor. 'Their marriage is on the rocks' 
would involve still a different metaphor. And so on for dozens of examples. 
Yet we don't seem to have dozens of different metaphors here. We have one 
metaphor, in which love is conceptualized as a journey." (Lakoff 1993, 209) 
The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus tollens (cf. 3.5) 
which is a typical pat tern of plausible inference: 
(27) Premises: 
(a) If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, then different linguistic ex-
pressions would be different metaphors. 
(b) It is not the case that different linguistic expressions are different metaphors. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Metaphors are not merely linguistic expressions. 
Furthermore, the idea of systematicity also plays an important role: 
"The L O V E I S A J O U R N E Y metaphor and Reddy's Conduit Metaphor were 
the two examples that first convinced me that metaphor was not a figure 
of speech, but a mode of thought, defined by a systematic mapping from a 
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source to a target domain. Wha t convinced me were the three characteristics 
of metaphor that I have just discussed: 
1. The systematicity in the linguistic correspondences. 
2. The use of metaphor to govern reasoning and behavior based on that 
reasoning. 
3. The possibility for understanding novel extensions in terms of the con-
ventional correspondences." (Lakoff 1993, 210; emphasis added) 
This argumentation can be reconstructed the following way:4 ' 
(28) Premises: 
(a) If metaphors in connection with love were merely linguistic expressions, then 
there would be no systematicity among them. 
(b) There is systematicity among linguistic expressions in connection with love. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions. 
Lakoff (1993) uses (28c) as a premise supplemented by an analogy be-
tween metaphorical expressions associated with love:48 
(29) Premises: 
(a) If metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and 
we systematically speak about love as if it were a journey when metaphorical 
expressions associated with love are used, then there is a systematic mapping 
from the conceptual domain J O U R N E Y to the conceptual domain L O V E when 
we speak about love. 
(b) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and 
we systematically speak about love as if it were a journey when metaphorical 
expressions associated with love are used. 
Conclusion: 
(c) There is a systematic mapping from the conceptual domain J O U R N E Y to the 
conceptual domain L O V E when we speak about love. 
Similarly to (29), Lakoff (ibid.) obtains (30) as well:49 
4
' The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus tollens, too. 
4 8
 The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus ponens. 
4!l
 The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus ponens, too. 
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(30) Premises: 
(a) If metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and 
we systematically use patterns of inference about journeys to reason about 
love when metaphorical expressions associated with love are used, then there 
is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other when we 
reason about love. 
(b) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and 
we systematically use patterns of inference about journeys to reason about 
love when metaphorical expressions associated with love are used. 
Conclusion: 
(c) There is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other 
when we reason about love. 
The next link in the chain is an analogical inference which contains "in-
visible" premises as well: 
(31) Premises: 
(a) There is a systematic mapping from the conceptual domain J O U R N E Y to the 
conceptual domain L O V E when we speak about love. 
(b) There is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other 
when we reason about love. 
(c) The connection between the two conceptual domains is in both cases always 
metaphorical, i.e., a unidirectional mapping between the source domain and 
the target domain.5 0 
(d) (The conceptual domain L O V E as well as the conceptual domain J O U R N E Y 
are the same when we talk and when we reason about love.) 
(e) (There is no difference between the principles governing how we speak about 
love and the principles governing how we reason about love.) 
Conclusion: 
(f) There is only one set of principles governing speaking and reasoning about 
love, i.e., the concept L O V E is metaphorically structured.5 1 
50
 "[...] the metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the mathematical sense) 
from a source domain (in this case, journeys) to a target domain (in this case, 
love)." (Lakoff op.cit., 206) 
5 1
 "As a linguist and a cognitive scientist, I ask two commonplace questions: 
Is there a general principle governing how these linguistic expressions 
about journeys are used to characterize love? 
Is there a general principle governing how our pat terns of inference 
about journeys are used to reason about love when expressions such as 
these are used? 
The answer to both is yes. Indeed, there is a single general principle that answers 
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Just as in the case of (25), here it is also the very information specifying 
the connection between the metaphorical s tructure of linguistic expres-
sions and that of concepts that is missing from the "visible" part of the 
partial basis. 
After having explicated the inferential chain leading from metaphor-
ical expressions to metaphorical concepts, let us tu rn to the role (1) and 
(2) play in Lakoff and Johnson's reasoning. Chapters 1 and 2 of Lakoff-
Johnson (1980) witness that (1) and (2) undoubtedly assume a key po-
sition in the argumentative strategies the authors apply. For example 
this means that, af ter having analyzed a number of linguistic expressions 
and found that they are metaphorical, they conclude that language is 
metaphorical (see Figure 11): 
(32) Premises: 
(a) The concept of L O V E is part of the conceptual system underlying language. '2 
(b) The concept of L O V E is metaphorically structured.5 3 
Conclusion: 
(c) The conceptual system underlying language is metaphorically structured. 
re t rospect ive revalidation (retroval idat ion) 
THEORETICAL CYCLE 
control of internal 
coherence 
PARTIAL REASONING 
BASIS PROCESS 
the concept of 
LOVE is meta-
phorically reasoning pa t -
s t ructured in tern of type (1) 
the conceptual 
system under-
lying language 
PUTATIVE 
RESULTS 
hypothesis abou t 
the me taphor i c or-
ioniza t ion of t h e 
conceptual sys tem 
underlying 
language 
APPUCATIVE CYCLE 
re t rospect ive revalidation (re t roval idat ion) 
Fig. 11 
control of external 
coherence 
both questions. But it is a general principle that is neither part of the grammar 
of English, nor the English lexicon. Rather, it is part of the conceptual system 
underlying English: It is a principle for understanding the domain of love in terms 
of the domain of journeys." (Idem.\ emphasis added) 
52
 Cf. "The conceptual system underlying a language contains thousands of concep-
tual metaphors — conventional mappings from one domain to another, such as 
the Event Structure Metaphor." (Ibid., 239; emphasis added) 
5 3
 Cf. (31a) and (c). 
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In analogy to (32), from (30c) they obtain (33) via (1) (see Figure 12): 
(33) Premises: 
(a) The concept of LOVE is par t of the conceptual system underlying reasoning. 
(b) The concept of LOVE is metaphorically structured. '4 
Conclusion: 
(c) The conceptual system underlying reasoning is metaphorically structured. 
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Via (1) from (31d), (34) is obtained: 
(34) Premises: 
(a) The conceptual domain LOVE EIS well as the conceptual domain JOURNEY are 
the same when we talk and when we reason about love. 
(b) The concepts LOVE and JOURNEY are part of the conceptual system under-
lying language and of the conceptual system underlying reasoning. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Thinking and language rest on the same conceptual system, i.e., there is only 
one conceptual system underlying language and reasoning.5 ' 
Similarly, (31e) can be extended to the whole of the conceptual system 
as well (Figure 13): 
5 4
 Cf. (31b) and (c). 
55
 Cf. "[...] communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in 
thinking and acting." (Lakoff-Johnson 1980, 4; emphasis added) 
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(35) Premises: 
(a) The concept of LOVE is par t of the conceptual system. 
(b) The concept LOVE is metaphorically structured. 
Conclusion: 
(c) The conceptual system is metaphorically structured. 
(35c) is one of the central hypotheses of Lakoff and Johnson's theory.56 
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However, Lakoff and Johnson also postulate the inverse relationship be-
tween metaphorical expressions and metaphorical concepts. Whereas 
metaphorical expressions are, as we have seen in (24), methodologically 
primary with respect to metaphorical concepts, from an ontological point 
of view they are secondary, because the following is assumed: 
(36) Metaphorical expressions are the linguistic manifestations of metaphorical con-
cepts.57 
5 6
 "[...] the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured [...]." {Ibid., 6) 
" "Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are 
metaphors in a person's conceptual system." {Idem.) 
"Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic, in nature. Metaphorical 
language is a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor." (Lakoff 1993, 244) 
For example, the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY is manifested in the 
metaphorical expressions this relationship is foundering, we are going nowhere, 
this relationship is a dead-end street, we are at a crossroads, etc. 
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Accordingly, the authors also argue in the opposite direction t han (24) 
suggests, because they explain certain characteristics of metaphorical ex-
pressions on the basis of characteristics of metaphorical concepts. There-
fore, for each inference of the methodological cycles there can be an in-
verse inference in one of the ontological cycles. For example, by the use 
of (2), the following inferences are carried out: 
(37) Premises: 
(a) Abstract concepts are part of our conceptual system. 
(b) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured. 
Conclusion: 
(c) Abstract concepts are metaphorically structured. 
(38) Premises: 
(a) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured. 
(b) The concept ARGUMENT is par t of our conceptual system. 
Conclusion: 
(c) The concept ARGUMENT is metaphorically s tructured. 
(39) Premises: 
(a) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured. 
(b) (Between linguistic expressions and concepts there is such a relationship 
that from properties of concepts one may infer properties of linguistic ex-
pressions.) 
Conclusion: 
(c) Linguistic expressions are metaphorically structured. 
In the case of (39b) obviously the same problem of the invisible part of 
the partial basis arises as with (25), therefore the alternatives in (26) 
apply here, too. Thus we obtain the situation represented in Figure 14. 
At this point we may risk the following conclusions: 
Firstly, although the "jump" (Haser 2005) from linguistic expres-
sions to concepts seems to be unmotivated and circular at first sight, this 
circularity can be avoided. The reason is tha t by inferring the existence 
of metaphorical concepts from the use of metaphorical expressions and 
the use of metaphorical expressions from the existence of metaphorical 
concepts, "one indeed returns to ' the same point ' but does so a t a dif-
ferent cognitive level" (Rescher 1987, 119). In particular, the difference 
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between the two "cognitive levels" is t ha t whereas one is methodological, 
the other is ontological. This finding resolves the circularity: the " jump" 
is nothing but a process of cyclic and prismatic revalidation that makes 
extensive use of (1) and (2). Therefore, f rom this point of view, the la t ter 
are effective, rather than ineffective: the gap between the metaphorical 
structure of linguistic expressions and the metaphorical structure of con-
cepts can be filled only by the continuous retrospective revision of the 
basis, looking for the missing information in the hope tha t its invisible 
parts will eventually become visible. 
Secondly, in Lakoff and Johnson's approach (1) and (2) contribute 
to turning the potential circularity of the argumentation into cyclic and 
prismatic reasoning.58 Therefore, in this respect they are to be evaluated 
as effective. 
Thirdly, what Lakoff and Johnson failed to do is the plausibility 
analysis of the alternatives which should be expected to specify the "in-
visible premises" in (25), (31) and (39). 
Fourthly, in a series of cases even the plausibility of the "visible" 
premises can be seriously questioned. For example, several of the claims 
which Lakoff and Johnson use as premises clearly overgeneralize (see e.g., 
(28b), (30b)). 
5 8
 However, this must not mean that other par ts of Lakoff and Johnson's theory are 
not harmfully circular. For example, among the many passages whose circularity 
Haser (2005) reveals there may be several which are clear cases not of cyclical 
reasoning, but of petitio principii. See also Kertész - Rákosi (2005a). 
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In sum, although we t r ied to show the effective use of (1) and (2) in 
Lakoff and Johnson's reasoning, the question has to be left open whether 
the particular handling of the partial basis in a series of other infer-
ences remains within the realm of plausible reasoning or transgresses the 
boundary which divides t he latter from fallacies. 
4.5. Summary 
In section 4 we tried to show that in the case of all three theories the use 
of the pa t terns (1) and (2) plays an impor tant heuristic role. That is, we 
have obtained the following solution to (P3): 
(H3) (a) By t h e use of (1) and (2) the fallacy of petitio principii can be avoided in 
the given contexts in t h e three theories. 
(b) Therefore, the use of (1) and (2) is effective. 
(c) Therefore, they work as plausible ra ther than as fallacious inferences. 
5. T h e solut ion t o (D) 
In sections 2 - 4 we supported the auxiliary hypotheses (H1)-(H3). These, 
in turn, yield immediately (H) which is our solution to (P). (H) suggests 
the following further considerations: 
(i) On the one hand, our analyses imply that with respect to the 
structure of inferences we analyzed, a holistic cognitive semantic theory 
which explicitly rejects bo th generativism and modular cognitive linguis-
tics is in reality not as different from the lat ter as is commonly assumed, 
because it uses the same pa t te rns of inference (1) and (2). 
(ii) On t h e other hand, generative linguistics and modular cognitive 
linguistic theories compatible with the la t ter behave in a way radically 
different f rom the way they claim to opera te in, because the inferences 
they use to support their central hypotheses are far f rom the s tandards 
of the "received view" of t h e analytical philosophy of science. In partic-
ular, in opposition to (RVb), it is plausible rather t han demonstrative 
inferences t h a t these theories rest on. 
(iii) We have seen tha t the standards of rationality which these the-
ories do make use of are essentially different from what (RVa) requires. 
(iv) We have also seen tha t (RVc) is untenable in the case of the 
investigated linguistic theories. It is not possible to distinguish sharply 
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between "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification", 
because every stage of theory formation is substantially determined by 
the use of plausible reasoning. 
(v) Moreover, our considerations also witness that the heuristic strate-
gies applied in generative, modular cognitive and holistic cognitive lin-
guistics may make use of pat terns of inference which are borderline cases 
between plausible reasoning and fallacious inferences. One cannot ex-
clude at the outset that (1) and /or (2) seem to be plausible within one 
particular cycle of reasoning, while they tu rn out to be fallacious in the 
context of another cycle, or vice versa. This is a serious difficulty, because 
plausible and fallacious inferences differ substantially. In spite of their un-
certainty, plausible inferences are fruitful, progressive and effective tools 
of scientific problem solving, while fallacies are destructive. 
(vi) We chose very different examples to illustrate the wide applica-
bility of (1) and (2). Thus the problems which the three theories try to 
solve with the help of (1) and /o r (2) were very different in our analyses. 
In our example, Chomsky uses these patterns to establish the philosoph-
ical basis of his linguistic theory. Bierwisch and Lang infer their central 
empirical hypotheses via (1) and (2). Lakoff and Johnson make use of 
(1) and (2) in a large number of different theoretical contexts. 
In the light of these findings there is no doubt tha t (H) motivates 
the complete and comprehensive revaluation of central aspects of theory 
formation in linguistics in general and cognitive linguistics in particular. 
However, the strength of this insight is substantially weakened by the 
fact that we ourselves, too, argued by starting from a partial basis with 
invisible premises, and drew plausible inferences from this incomplete 
and uncertain informational base. Our own argumentation itself suggests 
tha t in applying the technique of plausible reasoning one is well-advised 
to remember Walton's warning: 
"It is vitally important for the user of plausible argument to be open-minded, 
steering a mid-path between respecting the facts of a case and asking crit-
ical questions. The two main faults are the extremes of being dogmatic 
and leaping too quickly or too firmly to a questionable conclusion. Being 
dogmatic is a failure to be open to further dialogue. Leaping too quickly or 
too firmly may be a failure to seek more evidence, or even a closure to new 
evidence." (Walton 2001, 164f) 
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ON INTUITIONS ABOUT PROPER NAMES* 
GERGELY P E T H Ő 
Abstract 
Machery et al. (2004) carried out an experiment which tests the intuition of US and 
Chinese students about the use of proper names. They arrived at the conclusion 
tha t the way most respondents used proper names is not compatible with the causal-
historical theory of proper names as advocated by Kripke. The author argues t h a t 
Machery et al. are wrong in their conclusions. The problem is not just that t he 
interpretation of the findings of their experiments does not take into account some 
variables that should have been considered, bu t rather that the experiment is faulty 
in several respects: their empirical hypothesis is arguably inconsistent, and the se tup 
of the experiment is flawed. 
Introduction 
Machery et al. (2004) report an experiment to test certain semantic intu-
itions that are employed by philosophers of language t o decide between 
two (at least prima facie) incompatible theories of the semantics of proper 
names. Among philosophers, it is widely accepted t ha t these intuitions 
clearly argue against the so-called descriptivist theory of names and in 
favor of what Machery et al. call the causal-historical theory of names. 
Although Machery and his co-authors do not explain this at length, 
it is clear tha t one aim of this experiment is to contribute to the case for 
a relativist view of human cognition: Those philosophers who assume the 
causal-historical theory of names to be more adequate t h a n the descrip-
tivist position base their opinion on intuitions that seem rather clear and 
* My research was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at t he University of Debrecen. I would like 
to thank László Nemes for drawing my at tent ion to Machery et al. (2004) and for 
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Radó and my colleagues at the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of t he 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the University of Debrecen and at the OTK A 
research project F42664 "Semantic intuitions as linguistic da t a " for comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
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unquestionable to themselves. However, according to Machery and his 
co-authors, a problem arises because such philosophers (like Kripke) do 
not only claim that the causal-historical theory captures their own way 
of using proper names, b u t assume this claim to be universally valid, not 
just for all speakers of English, but for all humans in general. 
However, one could assume that Kripke is wrong to extend the valid-
ity of his claim in this way: his relevant intuitions might not agree wi th 
the intuitions of other Westerners who are native speakers of English, 
and there could be even greater disparities with regard to the intuitions 
of representatives of other cultures. Machery et al. set out to demon-
strate tha t this is actually the case and not just a theoretical possibility. 
They conduct an experiment in which a statistically significant difference 
is found between answers (which are assumed to reflect relevant seman-
tic intuitions) of US and Chinese university students. This difference 
is supposed to show t h a t although some subjects in b o t h groups report 
intuitions which accord wi th the descriptivist theory of names, Chinese 
students even more of ten report such intuitions. And thus the assumed 
universal validity of the causal-historical theory is disproved. 
I will argue that t h e authors are wrong in their conclusions. The 
problem is not just tha t the interpretation of the findings of their exper-
iments does not take into account some variables t h a t should have been 
considered, but rather t h a t the experiment is faulty in several respects: 
their empirical hypothesis is arguably inconsistent, a n d the setup of the 
experiment is flawed. 
The structure of my paper is as follows: In section 1, I will summa-
rize the exact empirical hypothesis which Machery et al. examine in their 
experiment and present some details of the experiment itself which will 
be of relevance, as well as their findings. In section 2, I point out three 
technical problems in t he experiment setup. In section 3, conceptual 
problems regarding the hypothesis underlying the experiment are dis-
cussed. In section 4, I speculate on possible reasons for the statistically 
significant difference between the two groups, assuming tha t the authors ' 
explanation is invalid. Finally, section 5 contains my conclusions. 
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1. Summary of Machery et al. (2004) 
In philosophical circles, it is widely accepted (though not without ex-
ception) that the so-called causal-historical theory of names1 captures 
the way people use proper names more adequately than the so-called 
descriptivist theory. 
Essentially, the descriptivist theory (which is most prominently rep-
resented by Frege) claims that proper names like 'Aristotle' and 'London' 
are synonymous with definite descriptions like ' the teacher of Alexander 
the Great ' and ' the capital of Great Britain', respectively.2 This means 
tha t whenever we use the name 'Aristotle' (to refer to a specific person), 
we always have in mind the description that , for us individually, is syn-
onymous with this name. This could be ' the teacher of Alexander the 
Great ' , ' the greatest philosopher of antiquity', a conjunction of these, or 
anything else, as long as it is fixed which description is synonymous with 
a given proper name for us. The reference of a proper name is determined 
by this description: whatever is denoted by the description will be the 
referent of the name. 
The causal-historical theory, by contrast, claims tha t the relationship 
between the entity a proper name refers to and the name itself is direct, 
i.e., not mediated by a description. Names refer simply by virtue of an 
act of naming, where the reference of the name was fixed. All fur ther 
uses of the name following the naming act are connected to the naming 
act by a historical chain: all those who know what the name 'London' 
refers to know this because they have heard this name being used to refer 
to a particular city and therefore established a connection between the 
name and the referent. 
The reason why the causal-historical theory is regarded as more ad-
equate and the descriptivist theory practically as refuted is that Kripke 
(1972/1980) presented some very convincing arguments which demon-
1
 I will stick to the terminology used by Machery et al. (2004). Two alternative 
designations frequently chosen instead of 'causal-historical theory of names' are 
the 'Millian' theory and the 'direct reference' theory. The more or less subtle 
connotative and denotative differences between these designations need not con-
cern us here, since they should be irrelevant to the issue at hand. For two recent 
overviews discussing such differences, cf. Marti (2003) and Jackson (1998). 
2
 This is, of course a gross simplification, but finer qualifications of the exact rela-
tionship between the description and the proper name or of the exact nature of 
the description, for example, would be irrelevant with respect to what Machery 
et al. (2004) try to achieve in their experiment. 
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strated that the latter theory does not work. Some of these arguments 
were thought experiments whose outcomes were consistent with the caus-
al-historical but not with the descriptivist theory. As mentioned above, 
Machery et al. (2004) scrutinize this opinion by basically transforming 
Kripke's thought experiments into real experiments. 
One of Kripke's thought experiments, cited as well as adapted by 
Machery et al., is the following: 
"Suppose tha t Gödel was not in fact the author of [Gödel's] theorem. A man 
called 'Schmidt ' [...] actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel 
somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter at tr ibuted to 
Gödel. On the descriptivist view in question, then, when our ordinary man 
uses the name Gödel, he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt 
is the unique person satisfying the description ' the man who discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic'. [...] But it seems we are not." 
(Kripke 1972/1980, 83-4, as cited by Machery et al. 2004) 
The same story, reformulated by Machery et al. and used in their exper-
iment, reads as follows: 
"Suppose tha t John has learned in college tha t Gödel is the man who proved 
an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arith-
metic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate 
statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as 
the discoverer. But this is the only thing tha t he has heard about Gödel. 
Now suppose tha t Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A man called 
'Schmidt' whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances 
many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel some-
how got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was 
thereafter a t t r ibuted to Gödel. Thus he has been known as the man who 
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people who have heard the 
name 'Gödel' are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered the incomplete-
ness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When 
John uses the name 'Gödel', is he talking about: 
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? 
or 
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the 
work?" 
This text and three further ones (one of which is another version of the 
same Gödel story, and two are versions of Kripke's Jonah story) were 
presented to two groups of subjects: US and Hong Kong undergraduate 
students (the lat ter were all Chinese). For each text, they had to choose 
one of the two possible answers given. In the case of the text cited, 
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Machery et al. regarded answer (A) as a corroboration of the descriptivist 
view and answer (B) as one of the causal-historical view. 
The empirical hypothesis tha t the authors wanted to verify by the 
experiment is the following: Nisbett and his co-workers claim (see e.g., 
Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett-Norenzayan 2002; Nisbett 2003) tha t there are 
significant cognitive differences between people living in different cultures; 
they concentrate on comparing East Asians and Westerners. One such 
difference is tha t whereas "East Asians are more inclined t h a n Westerners 
to make categorical judgments on the basis of similarity, Westerners [...] 
are more disposed to focus on causation in describing the world and clas-
sifying things." According to Machery et al., we should therefore expect 
East Asians to choose the answer that corresponds to the descriptivist 
theory more often than Westerners, because of the following: 
"on a description theory, the referent has to satisfy the description, but it 
need not be causally related to the use of the term. In contrast, on Kripke's 
causal-historical theory, the referent need not satisfy the associated descrip-
tion. Rather, it need only figure in the causal history (and in the causal ex-
planation of) the speaker's current use of the word." (Machery et al. 2004, B5) 
The outcome of the experiment, as reported by Machery et al. (2004), 
seemed to confirm this hypothesis. There was a statistically significant 
difference between the two groups. On average, the Chinese participants 
chose an answer favoring the descriptivist view almost twice as often as 
the US participants. However, as the authors point out , the standard 
deviation even within these two groups was surprisingly high. 
2. Technical problems 
In this section, I would like to draw at tent ion to three problems con-
cerning the setup of the experiments conducted by Machery and his co-
workers. They all involve the phrasing of the texts presented to the 
participants of the experiments, and the questions asked. I hope I will be 
able to argue convincingly tha t these problems are serious enough if con-
sidered individually, and jointly render the published results thoroughly 
invalid. 
The problems are: 1. the appearance of the expression 'use the name' 
and 2. ' talk about ' in the texts, and 3. the fact that only a choice between 
two reacly-made answers is given to the participants. I will concentrate 
all of my remarks on the version of the Göclel text cited above. However, 
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they do in fact apply just as well to all the other texts that Machery 
et al. employed in their experiment. 
2.1. Using a name 
The notion of using a name in the sense as it is intended to be understood 
in the context of this text should be familiar to professional linguists and 
philosophers of language. However, it might be the case that the average 
person on the street does not quite know what is meant by this. The 
common use of the expression 'use a name' conveys something like ' to 
call yourself by a name tha t is not yours in order to keep your name 
secret' (this definition appears in the Longman Dictionary of Contempo-
rary English), like in 'Grant had checked into a Miami hotel using a false 
name.' Another, somewhat different context where it appears would be 
something like 'She usually uses her maiden name.' The way this expres-
sion appears in the familiar contexts is obviously different from the way 
it is to be understood in the Gödel text above. When Kripke writes t ha t 
someone 'uses the name Gödel', he is employing a quasi-technical te rm. 
The concept of using a name, for example, may or may not involve in 
such a context a contrast to just mentioning a name. These are philo-
sophical issues the participants of the experiment will never even have 
heard about . 
The way 'use the name' is to be understood in the text is not only 
unclear, but the way the utterance in question is described might be far 
too abstract to be of any use in an experiment like this.3 What should 
3
 Kripke's original text does include a fur ther complication tha t is not necessarily 
carried over to the experiment, since the authors do not mention Gödel's theo-
rem. The expression 'Gödel's theorem' is for several speakers, including myself, 
a proper name itself. To see this, suppose we learned tha t Peano had already 
proven the incompleteness of arithmetic a decade before Gödel, but had pub-
lished it in some obscure place, so it had been forgotten about. In such a case, 
the name 'Gödel's theorem' would lose some of its motivation, but it would not 
necessarily have to be changed to 'Peano's theorem' or whatever. So, for speakers 
whose lexicon contains this proper name, the appearance of 'Gödel' in 'Gödel 's 
theorem' does not consti tute a use of the name 'Gödel'. 'Gödel' is only par t of 
this expression etymologically speaking, but not semantically speaking, because 
in the latter sense, 'Gödel 's theorem' is, like any other proper name, not t rans-
parent. The problem with this is that when one's only information about Gödel 
is that he proved this theorem, a rather frequent "use" of the name 'Gödel' would 
likely be as part of the expression 'Gödel's theorem'. One has to read Kripke very 
carefully in order to be able to spot tha t this is a "use" of this name tha t has 
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appear in the text is a concrete situation where John is actually using 
the name.4 
2.2. Talking about 
The expression ' talking about' in the question a t the end of the text poses 
a significantly greater problem. This expression is ambiguous in a way 
that is relevant to the question t ha t is being examined by the authors. To 
see this, picture t he following situation: There is a party at which Norah 
is a guest. There are two important people a t the party in addition to 
her: Jonathan and Sebastian. Norah didn't know them before but was 
introduced to them at the party. However, Norah confuses their names: 
she thinks Jonathan is called Sebastian and Sebastian Jonathan. Later 
in the evening, Norah spots the person actually called Jonathan stealing 
her wallet from her handbag. She screams appropriately: "Sebastian is 
a thief. He has stolen my wallet." Now who is Norah talking about? 
Well, tha t depends on whose position you identify yourself with. If you 
consider Norah's position, she is talking about the man (i.e., trying to 
refer to the man) she saw stealing her wallet, who she thinks is called 
Sebastian. (This man is actually called Jonathan.) If you consider the 
position of all the others present who do get the names right, she is 
falsely accusing Sebastian of thef t , who has actually been drinking beer 
peacefully in the company of their host all along. 
It is plain to see that essentially the same consideration applies to 
the Gödel text cited above. Suppose John (the person in Machery et al.'s 
text) said (cf. 2.1.), "Gödel must be a very bright person. I sure would like 
to meet him." or asked someone "How old was Gödel when he discovered 
the incompleteness of arithmetic?". 
to be excluded for his thought experiment to work. For the subjects of the ex-
periment who know the expression 'Gödel's theorem' but are not aware of these 
philosophical problems, this issue could be a fur ther source of confusion, even 
though this expression does not appear in the text explicitly. 
4
 Several readers have indicated tha t they do not agree with my claim that the 
appearance of 'use a name' in this context constitutes a problem. I do not have 
any more convincing arguments for this than the above. But the really important 
point in my opinion is that it is much clearer to present an actual utterance where 
a name is being used (in the sense we would like 'use a name' to be understood). 
In this way, the problem simply does not arise, and since this does not cost 
anything, I think it would be just stubborn and pointless to insist on the original 
formulation. 
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If you identify yourself with John 's position, he is stating or asking 
something about (i.e., means to refer to) the person who, as far as he 
knows, really did discover the incompleteness of arithmetic and was called 
Gödel. He could not even consider referring to any other relevant person 
(especially not Schmidt). So the position of John comes rather close to 
answer (A) to the question, al though that is not quite right. I will come 
back to this in section 2.3. 
On the other hand, if you take the position of an external omniscient 
observer and do not care about what John does or does not know about 
Gödel, then he is talking about (i.e., mentioning the name of) K u r t Gödel 
the fraud. This comes rather close to answer (B), but that is not quite 
right in this case either. Again, this point will be discussed in section 2.3. 
There may, of course, be other notions connected to the expression 
' talk about ' as used in the relevant context for other speakers. Some 
may be simply the logical conjunction or alternation of the two (whether 
a speaker only has a more restricted or a "holistic" notion of 'talking 
about ' , respectively). Some may have a third notion I did not think 
about. For all we know about human cognition, some such notion may 
even be inconsistent. 
Anyway, if you could make sense of the Norah situation above (which, 
I assume, is the case for most competent speakers of English), you must 
be aware, whether consciously or unconsciously, tha t these two notions of 
'talking about ' are available normally to any speaker of English.5 This is 
true, of course, of the participants of the experiment as well, when they 
t ry to interpret the questions they are supposed to answer. The question 
is: How do they go about this? I can see only two possible answers: 
1. Assuming there is such a thing as an absolute (i.e., context-
insensitive) concept of prominence of word meanings,6 the reader could 
choose the strategy of favoring an interpretation of the ambiguous ques-
tion where the expression causing the ambiguity is interpreted in terms 
of its most prominent (i.e., first, basic, primary) meaning. Or the most 
prominent meaning may be the only one tha t comes to the reader 's mind 
in such a situation. ' The problem is that meaning prominence, even if 
we assume tha t it exists on an individual level, is not like word order or 
5
 I gloss over some qualifications of this claim, e.g., you should have an innate 
human theory of mind (or some equivalent of this), you should not be autistic etc. 
6
 For an exposition of this concept, cf. Csatár et al. (2002). 
' Or at least the only one she is able to consciously consider, disregarding the 
possible unconscious activation and immediate deactivation of unneeded word 
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declension: although there is significant agreement between speakers as 
to what they qualify as more and less prominent, there is also a patent 
variation to be observed. Also, in some cases, speakers can consciously or-
der word meanings according to prominence, whereas in other cases they 
cannot.8 We do not know as yet why this should be so. In any event, 
if speakers decide on this basis how to interpret the question, the out-
come might tell us something about which interpretation of 'talk about ' 
is more prominent for those individual speakers, but nothing whatsoever 
about the theories of the semantics of proper names. But normally, our 
interpretation is of course not driven by meaning prominence, but rather 
by the following. 
2. It is much more likely t ha t readers t ry to make sense of an am-
biguous utterance or a discourse that seems incoherent a t first sight by 
guessing the intentions of the writer. Suppose that you as the reader 
have no idea what the person in charge of the experiment would like to 
learn, but assume that they have something particular in mind. You 
have at your disposal the two above-mentioned possible interpretations 
of ' talk about ' which both make sense in t he discourse. If you interpret 
the question in one way, answer (A) seems somewhat more appropriate; 
if you do it the other way, answer (B) seems better. If you take the con-
junction of the two notions, neither is right. In case you take the logical 
alternation, both are. Trying to guess which answer you ought to give in 
such a situation is equivalent t o throwing a dime. 
To correct this problem, the question to be asked should be modified. 
You can either ask "Who is John thinking of?" or "Whose name does 
John mention/pronounce?", depending on what you would like to learn. 
Both should be much clearer t han the original question. 
2.3. Only two choices 
As mentioned above, if you carefully consider the two possible answers to 
the question asked in the Gödel text, neither of them seems quite right. 
For if you take the position of John and choose answer (A), you feel 
rather uneasy since this answer contains the word 'really', which is hard 
meanings, which is widely assumed in the psycholinguistics l i terature on the basis 
of Swinney (1979) and later experiments. 
s
 At least I do not have the slightest idea which of the two interpretations of 'talk 
about ' I should judge as more prominent than the other out of context. 
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to interpret relative to a given context (in this case, John 's thoughts). In 
other words, answer (A) would be a rather awkward way of expressing 
the idea tha t Göclel is ' the person who, according to the information 
John has access to, really discovered the incompleteness of ari thmetic ' 
(which would be the correct answer in my opinion). In philosophical 
terms, 'really' is an indexicai that wants to refer to t he actual world. To 
interpret it context-dependently, as suggested above, would be to create 
a case of Kaplan's monster .9 
On the other hand, answer (B) is not perfect either, if you interpret 
'talk about ' from the point of view of the external omniscient observer. 
Here, one finds oneself a t odds with the fact tha t one knows tha t John 
mistakenly attributes some property to the referent of the name Gödel. 
Furthermore, one should assume tha t if John knew exactly what the om-
niscient observer of the story knows abou t Gödel, he would have no reason 
to utter something like "Göclel must be a very bright person." or "How 
old was Gödel when he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic?". 
If one were to answer that when John says such things, he is talk-
ing about (in the sense of pronouncing the actual name of) the person 
who did not actually discover the theorem, but "got hold of the manu-
script and claimed credit for the work", one would definitely not be lying 
(from the omniscient observer's perspective). However, the answer seems 
to be pragmatically inappropriate, since one would withhold relevant10 
information and thereby violate Grice's maxim of quantity; namely, the 
information that John does not actually know this. So the correct an-
swer should be something along the lines of "the person who got hold 
of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, although John does 
not know this." 
If this is right, b o t h possible answers provided by Machery et al. 
are more or less inappropriate. Even if I am wrong about my own sug-
gested answers being the right ones, they seem to be surely appropriate 
9
 Cf. Kaplan (1989). 
10
 Why should this information be relevant? I think Blutner (1998)'s theory of lexi-
cal pragmatics or its reformulation in terms of bi-directional optimality theory in 
Blutner (2002) could help us formulate an acceptable explanation. 'Talk about ' 
is ambiguous as described above, and the speaker knows this. If the speaker 
provides the information that John does not know about the information men-
tioned, the hearer will be considerably more likely to correctly infer t h a t 'talk 
about ' is to be understood in its 'pronounce the name of ' sense than without this 
information. Although this is hard to quantify, the gain of being unequivocal will 
outweigh the cost associated with being more verbose. 
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to me, and obviously different from the ones the authors provide. Con-
sequently the two alternatives are without doubt insufficient. At least 
a third alternative should be provided, namely, "(C) none of the above, 
but rather:".1 1 It seems to me tha t this would even be much more in line 
with the ideology behind the experiment: after all, as a Westerner who 
conducts the experiment, how should one be able to tell how a person 
from another culture, who might think in a way markedly different from 
yourself, would answer a question like this? 
2.4. Interim conclusions 
From the three points made in the previous sections, it should have be-
come clear that although the text for the experiment was exactly modeled 
on Kripke's Gödel thought experiment, for someone who does not know 
what Kripke tried to prove with this story, the text makes hardly any 
sense at all. The essential difference between Machery et al.'s experiment 
and Kripke's original story is tha t the former is presented to the reader 
completely out of context, whereas the latter appears as a paragraph in 
Naming and necessity. On top of this, the audiences of the two texts , 
so to speak, are completely different. Kripke (1972/1980) is supposed to 
be read by philosophers. The participants in the experiment were un-
dergraduate students. One can assume (e.g., on the basis of personal 
experience) tha t some of these students would not have understood the 
point of the paragraph in question even if they had read the whole Naming 
and necessity, since they lacked the training, the conceptual foundations 
and possibly the appropriate mindset to comprehend the idea. 
For these technical reasons, the outcome of the experiment is impos-
sible to interpret.1 2 However, I contend tha t the experiment was doomed 
to failure right from the start for conceptual reasons which I will present 
in section 3. Before I get to this, let me present another story that could 
11
 There is a further serious problem in connection with the two choices: Elementary 
experimental methodology would require the order of the (A) and (B) answers be 
mixed, since some participants of the experiment would be reluctant to choose 
(A) or (B) consistently all the time, even if they thought that was the right 
answer. Machery et al. apparently neglected to do this. I am grateful to Jan ina 
Radó for this observation. 
12
 Carson Schütze (2004) discusses some interesting problems pertaining to experi-
mental methodology in linguistics (syntax, semantics and morphology) which are 
somewhat similar to those mentioned above. 
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be used in an experiment, which avoids the problems pointed out above 
with respect t o the Gödel story of Machery et al.: 
"Gerhard is a German person who sees the film 'Bram Stoker's Dracula' in 
the cinema. In Germany, if a film is shown tha t was directed by a very 
famous director, the director's name is often mentioned in the title of the 
film. Gerhard knows this and is therefore convinced that Bram Stoker was 
the director of this movie. He does not know anything else about Bram 
Stoker. 
But in fact , Bram Stoker was not the director. He was a British writer who 
wrote the novel about Dracula which the movie was based upon. He died 
in 1912. T h e film was actually directed by Francis Ford Coppola. 
After having seen the film, Gerhard says t o his friend Doris, 'This was a 
great movie. Bram Stoker is a terrific director. ' 
Question version 1: 'When he says this, who is Gerhard thinking of? 
(A) the person who wrote the novel 
(B) the person who directed the movie 
(C) none of the above, but rather: ' 
Question version 2: 'When he says this, whose name does Gerhard pro-
nounce? 
(A) the name of the person who wrote the novel 
(B) the name of the person who directed the movie 
(C) none of the above, but rather: '" 
The difference compared to the original text should be clear. Be tha t as 
it may, the answer to either of these questions tells us nothing interesting 
about the semantics of proper names, as I will argue in the next section. 
3. Conceptual problems 
In this section, I would like to point out two conceptual problems in con-
nection with the experiment. Both concern the empirical hypothesis tha t 
underlies the experiment, and are completely independent of each other. 
The first problem is what I think is an inconsistency between the empir-
ical hypothesis on the one hand and the very empirical generalizations 
Machery et al. base this hypothesis upon on the other hand. The second 
problem is t h a t Kripke's Gödel story, as it stands, arguably does not 
help us at all to empirically decide between the two competing theories 
of proper names. 
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3.1. Does the causal-historical view involve causation? Is the 
descriptivist view holistic? 
I have cited above, in section 1, the reason why Machery et al. assume 
tha t Westerners should choose the answer tha t corresponds to the causal-
historical theory. The most relevant part of the explanation is the fol-
lowing: "Westerners [...] are more disposed to focus on causation in 
describing the world and classifying things." 
I think it is a rather dubious claim tha t there should be any causal 
reasoning involved in our actual use of proper names. At least it could 
be argued tha t the assumption of a causal relationship is only necessary 
as a meta-semantic assumption (i.e., for explanations of semantic facts), 
bu t not as par t of the semantics of individual proper names, even if 
we assume tha t the causal-historical theory and particularly its direct 
reference claim is basically right. In other words, the statement that 
Gödel is called 'Gödel' because he got this name, however informative it 
may be, might only be needed when we t ry to explain how Gödel got to 
be called 'Gödel' . For us to be able to use this name to refer to Gödel, 
no notion of causation may be required at all, but a simple, primitive 
associative link between the mental representations of the name and the 
person may be sufficient.11 
Whereas I assume Machery et al. could defend their position to in-
clude the concept of causation in their account of the semantics of proper 
names, it is extremely puzzling why another claim tha t also appears in 
Nisbett and his co-workers' psychological theory of cognitive relativism 
and seems to be highly relevant to the issue under discussion is simply 
ignored. As Machery et al. (2004) themselves cite, the most significant 
difference between East Asian and Western thinking seems to be that 
East Asian thinking is holistic, whereas Western thinking is analytic. 
1 3
 Regarding the historical part of the causal-historical theory, Almog 1984 quite 
convincingly argues that the historical chain proposed by Kripke as part of the 
explanation definitely does not figure as a part of a proper name's semantics, but 
only of its meta-semantics in the above sense. Furthermore, the idea of a historical 
chain is not specific to proper names, and therefore this part of Kripke's theory is 
not particularly informative. To all intents and purposes, a historical chain plays 
exactly the same part in passing on the usage rules of other content words from 
one generation of speakers of a language to the next as it plays in the fixing of the 
reference of a proper name. The latter idea is, of course, not just a philosophical 
claim, but a fact of sociolinguistics and historical linguistics. 
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Western thinking involves "detachment of the object from its con-
text, [and] a tendency to focus on at t r ibutes of the object in order to 
assign it to categories [...]" (Nisbett et al. 2001, 293; cited by Mach-
ery et al. 2004, B5; emphasis added). It is not clear to me whether the 
causal-historical theory enters into a holistic-analytic dichotomy with the 
descriptivist theory in this respect, but the emboldened part of this cita-
tion surely is a par excellence characterization of the descriptivist view. 
Now if we approach the issue from this direction, the descriptivist view 
should be the perfect way to capture the use of proper names in Western 
societies. And we could take this idea even further. Consider that Frege, 
one of the most prominent representatives of the descriptivist view, was 
one of the fathers of Western logicism. Surely, this should be taken as 
strong evidence t ha t there is an intimate connection between Western 
thinking and descriptivism. Or should it? 
I think, in view of this dilemma, it would be grossly irresponsible 
to continue to construct empirical hypotheses for experiments on the ba-
sis of these ideas, as long as Nisbett and his co-workers' generalizations 
are formulated in such a general and elusive way (witness the hedge "a 
tendency to" in the above citation). This is not to say that these gen-
eralizations are not interesting; but they do not seem to constitute an 
empirically testable theory in their current state. 
To sum up the point of this section: Machery et al.'s empirical hy-
pothesis is arguably inconsistent with the very same theory of cognition 
that it is based upon: Whereas it can be deduced from that theory tha t 
Western reasoning should favor a descriptivist account of proper names, 
they assume that it favors a causal-historical one.14 
3.2. What does follow from the causal-historical theory? 
A puzzling aspect of Machery et al.'s paper is that their at t i tude about 
the role the semantic intuitions play in the proper names debate is rather 
peculiar. It is as if they thought tha t the debate revolves around the 
correctness of the intuitions themselves. Of course, this would be absurd: 
the puzzle that should be solved by the debate is not which answers to 
14
 It could of course be argued (bearing in mind the qualification above) tha t if 
anything, Nisbett et al.'s theory may allow us to formulate inconsistent empirical 
hypotheses regarding the semantics of proper names (i.e., Western thinking favors 
causal-historical and descriptivist theories at the same time). Obviously, this 
would not help to rescue the plausibility of Machery et al.'s empirical hypothesis. 
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which questions are right, but instead, what is a correct model of the 
mental representation of the semantics of proper names. We would like 
to learn something about the mental representation t h a t enables us to 
use a proper name, and, on a metalinguistic level, construct a model 
that explains why we use a proper name in the way we do. The thought 
experiments are just a way of testing the adequacy of the models by 
probing their predictions. 
However, some par ts of Macher y et al.'s paper certainly suggest an 
interpretation that they regard the role of intuitions in a different way 
than is usual, and, at least in the case of Kripke, obviously intended. 
Particularly, I cannot find any other reasonable explanation for the fact 
that they obviously regard the outcome of their experiment as the most 
natural thing on earth. For most philosophers of language, the fact tha t 
approximately half of the Western participants gave answers tha t cor-
responded with the causal-historical view, whereas t he other half gave 
answers of the other kind would probably have rung the alarm bells t ha t 
there is something wrong with the results. For it seems rather miracu-
lous how a linguistic community coulcl function if there were such huge 
differences even in as substantial issues as how to use a proper name to 
refer.15 The only obvious interpretation of the results of the experiment 
that is not contrary to common sense seems to me to take the answers 
to be no more than largely appropriate reactions to strange questions, 
and not evidence of differences in t he actual mental representations of 
the meanings of proper names in general (which is what such answers 
ought to be).1 6 Incidentally, as I argued in section 2, they would have 
been right to assume this with regard to the experiment reported. 
1
 Of course, the claim tha t such differences would cause problems in a linguistic 
community is an essentially empirical claim itself, and could well be wrong. I do 
not really see a way how we could test its validity (save using thought experi-
ments), but it seems to me very plausible. 
16
 The authors ' discussion about the role and reliability of semantic intuitions is 
similarly puzzling. They seem to have two philosophical views on intuitions in 
mind: One view would be interested in the intuitions themselves. And only 
the second view would be "a proto-scientific project modeled on the Chomskyan 
tradition in linguistics. Such a project would employ intuitions about reference 
to develop an empirically adequate account of the implicit theory that underlies 
ordinary uses of names." (Machery et al. 2004, B9). Of course, the second view 
is the way in which the thought experiments and the intuitions on them should 
be understood. In fact, I cannot imagine any other sensible way to construe these 
theories of proper names, and the authors unfortunately do not explain what the 
other alternative exactly is that they have in mind. 
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Nevertheless, the relevant question is if one can construct real ex-
periments t h a t can be employed as empirical evidence to argue for one 
or the other theory of proper names, or for or against t he universality of 
such a semantic theory, for tha t matter. The answer is, of course, yes. 
However, Kripke's Gödel thought experiment is unfortunately not suited 
for this purpose. It could be argued tha t Kripke got t he result of this 
thought experiment wrong. The ordinary man he mentions would, in 
fact, really mean to refer to the person who really formulated the the-
orem. This is much more apparent in t he Bram Stoker story than in 
Kripke's: Gerhard obviously does not mean to refer to (i.e., "is thinking 
of") the real Bram Stoker, the writer, bu t to the director of the movie, 
whatever his name is. On the other hand , it takes no genius to spot 
that Gerhard "pronounces" (i.e., mentions) the name of the writer, and 
not the director. It is just a simple reading comprehension exercise. In 
particular, it does not have anything to do with either theory of names 
whatsoever. I do not have the room to discuss this here, bu t I elaborate 
011 this proposition in Pe thő (2004). 
In fact, s tandard Fregean clescriptivist theories, which Machery et al. 
have in mind, could be tested experimentally by constructing very simple 
scenarios t ha t involve a change in the only known (or at least "defining" ) 
property of a certain individual.1 ' For example, imagine a situation where 
Frank's boss is called Paul and the only th ing that Frank's wife Catherine 
knows about Paul is that he is Frank's boss. One could ask participants 
in an experiment whether Frank's boss would still be called Paul if he 
moved 011 to some other position, and whether Frank's new boss would 
be called Paul as well. Or one could ask t h e m to judge whether it would 
be reasonable for Catherine to keep referring to Frank's new boss as Paul 
or not referring to his old boss as Paul anymore. This would be af ter 
all essentially what we would expect to happen if a speaker identifies the 
meaning of a proper name with a description. Furthermore, if one takes 
for granted t he conclusions of Machery et al. 's experiment, it should be 
fairly normal if Frank and Catherine disagreed about whether it is correct 
to call Frank's new boss Paul (since, according to these conclusions, there 
are lots of speakers in our society according to whom proper names work 
in the descriptivist way and equally lots who think i t 's the other way 
round). 
17
 This does not hold for non-standard theories, like e.g., quotational theories of 
proper names or ones involving temporal relativization of the defining property. 
I discuss this point in Pethő (2004). 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
ON INTUITIONS ABOUT PROPER NAMES 297 
There is yet another minor conceptual issue worth noting tha t ob-
viously escaped Machery et al.'s attention. Suppose the Chinese, the 
Bantu, the Hungarians or whoever gave answers in this latter experi-
ment tha t pointed consistently toward the conclusion that members of 
this speech community were using their proper names according to the 
descriptivist theory of names. Suppose further t h a t speakers of English 
and German gave answers of the inverse kind. Would it be a legitimate 
conclusion that proper names in those other languages functioned differ-
ently from proper names in English? Hardly. The only thing we could 
reasonably conclude is tha t the languages in question seemed to lack 
proper names in the sense English and German have them, but only had 
descriptions. If there were such a language, this would arguably be major 
news, but definitely not for the theory of proper names. 
3.3. Interim conclusions 
The aim of this section was to demonstrate t ha t the experiment had 
no chance to achieve what it was supposed to, because the hypothesis it 
tried to verify was not consistent with the theory it should have produced 
evidence for. Furthermore, it was suggested that Kripke's Gödel thought 
experiment was not the ideal way to test the validity of the descriptivist 
versus the causal-historical theory of names. Instead, another possible 
test was outlined. 
4. How to interpret the outcome of the experiment 
Whatever problems there were with the experiment, a statistically signifi-
cant difference was observed for the Gödel text between Western and East 
Asian participants: the East Asians tended to reply t ha t John is talking 
about the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. 
Since the groups tested were not particularly large, it would be in-
teresting if another control experiment could confirm these differences.18 
But assuming tha t this effect was not just due to a coincidence, I would 
18
 László Nemes actually did carry out basically the same experiments that Machery 
et al. report. Two groups of college students participated in these experiments: 
nurses-in-training and physiotherapists-in-training, all Hungarians. Much to his 
surprise, he found that there were similarly significant differences between the 
replies of the nurses vs the physiotherapists as between the Western and East 
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like to make an educated guess as to what might have caused the dif-
ference. 
If one accepts the characterization of East Asian vs. Western think-
ing by Nisbett which was apparently corroborated by Weinberg et al. 
(2001), the relevant difference in the results could possibly be attr ibuted 
to a difference in the strategies of comprehending texts employed by East 
Asians and Westerners: since Westerners detach objects f rom their con-
texts, as mentioned above, this may lead them to see the Gödel story 
jus t as a simple comprehension task, in which they are to find in the text 
who the name mentioned really applies to, independent of context. This 
would be Gödel the fraud, i.e., answer (B). Westerners gave this answer 
about 55% of the time, which is slightly above chance. 
On the other hand, East Asians characteristically seem to regard 
themselves as par t s of a community. This could involve empathy and 
willingness to identify oneself wi th the position of community members, 
in contrast to the individualism of the Westerners. And it would definitely 
involve a blind acceptance of widely held beliefs as truths, as emphasized 
by Weinberg et al. (2001). Empa thy would lead them to identify their 
position with tha t of John, which would compel them to accept answer 
(A) as more appropriate (since, as I argued, answer A is the better one 
from the perspective of John). In addition to this, as the text explicitly 
states, most other people are like John, i.e., would use the name in the 
same way as John, which would in effect make it the right way in the eye 
of a Chinese person. This could be a reason why the Chinese selected 
answer (A) about 68% of the t ime for the Gödel story. 
There is, however, no significant difference in the case of the Jonah 
stories between East Asians and Westerners, and in both groups, answer 
(B) occurs more often (ca. 60% of the time). If one continues the above 
line of thought, one notices t h a t on the one hand, in the Jonah stories 
the fact that the beliefs of t he community would suggest answer (A) is 
made just as clear as in the case of the Gödel stories. On the other hand, 
there is no actual person (just an anonymous average German high school 
student) to identify oneself wi th in one story, whereas in the other text, 
although there is such a person, her appearances at the beginning and the 
end of the text seem to be less salient subjectively, since the story is much 
longer and more complicated. So the fact tha t the previous effect is not 
observable in the Jonah cases may be at t r ibuted to the fact t ha t a person 
Asian groups of Machery et al. Let us not examine in detail wha t this probably 
means. I would like to thank László Nemes for sharing the results with me. 
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the reader could identify herself with is missing or less salient. If we 
compare the results of the Jonah cases with the Gödel cases, this would 
also mean that the presence of a person who one could identify oneself 
with would play a significantly more important role in East Asians' choice 
of answers than the presence of a community opinion. 
However, as I mentioned in section 3, this is all just irresponsible 
speculation and should not be taken seriously. 
5. Conclusions 
The main aim of this paper was to point out how important consider-
ations of experimental design turn out to be in connection with test ing 
the universality claim of the causal-historical theory of names. I hope to 
have shown that a much more straightforward experimental task could 
have produced far more plausible results. Although Stich and colleagues' 
idea, tha t classic thought experiments should be subjected to empirical 
testing in order to ascertain that they do not reflect the views of only a 
tiny minority of scholars but in fact of humans in general, does seem rea-
sonable at first sight, this experiment demonstrates the dangers of tearing 
individual thought experiments out of their context. Texts which may be 
fairly straightforward in their original context can t u r n out to be misun-
derstandable or even seemingly incoherent if this happens. Whether the 
results of an experiment confirm or contradict the accepted view(s) con-
cerning a thought experiment, the uncertainty remains that they might 
arise from the misinterpretation or simply lack of understanding of the 
problem at hand, rather than reflect what the participants really think 
about the thought experiment (if it makes sense to say this at all; cf. 
Weatherson 2003 for a deeper investigation of the philosophical conse-
quences of similar problems). 
The last thing I wanted to achieve was to create the impression tha t 
empirical investigations of semantic intuitions were useless or uninterest-
ing. I believe that exactly the opposite is the case, not just for epistemol-
ogy (cf. Weinberg et al. 2001) and questions concerning the philosophy 
of language (as in Machery et al. 2004), but just as importantly in lin-
guistic semantics (cf. Csatár et al. 2002 and Pafel 2001). However, the 
problems encountered by Machery et al. (2004) show that one has to 
be extremely careful when trying to adapt a philosophical thought ex-
periment and transform it into a real experiment. It seems that taking 
an actual situation that may even be quite likely to occur, and asking 
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subjects about how they would behave in such a situation (or how they 
would expect others to behave) seems the best way to choose. The less 
abstract the situation is and the less linguistic behavior is involved the 
better. Another conclusion t h a t seems to suggest itself is tha t one has 
to be extremely careful abou t the lexical semantic properties of words 
t ha t appear in such an experiment. A lexical ambiguity, even if it is too 
fine to be explicitly mentioned in a dictionary, could ruin the results.19 
It seems tha t although the distance between linguistic semantics and the 
philosophy of language has continuously increased in the past 25 years 
(cf. Nunberg 2002), they may still have something interesting to say to 
each other, and face similar problems. 
A final point is that t he relative and absolute weight of factors such 
as social expectations needs t o be carefully established if one has reason 
to believe t h a t they affect t h e answers given (even if as extrinsic factors), 
as also pointed out e.g., by Weinberg et al. (2001). 
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THE SEMANTIC CONTENT OF 
PARTIALLY DESCRIPTIVE NAMES* 
ZOLTÁN VECSEY 
Abstract 
According to contemporary Millianism the semantic content of an ordinary proper 
name is simply its referent. In his recent book Beyond rigidity Scott Soames elaborated 
a new version of millianism. He claimed t h a t some linguistically complex names such 
as Professor Saul Kripke or Princeton University have part ial ly descriptive semantic 
content. In addition to their unique referents, these names are always associated 
with a special kind of description. I argue in this paper t h a t Soames's theory of 
partially descriptive names fails, because descriptive contents can be found only in the 
background knowledge of competent speakers. 
1. Introduction 
Defenders of the traditional Millian doctrine often say that the seman-
tic content of an ordinary proper name is simply its referent. According 
to this popular view a particular nonmetaphorical, nonironical utterance 
of a declarative sentence s with a proper name n expresses semantically 
the information that the speaker is primarily concerned to communicate 
about the referent of n. That is to say tha t in normal everyday contexts 
proper names contribute to the asserted communicative information ex-
clusively with their referents. In addition, contemporary Millians claim 
that in such cases the asserted information content of a declarative sen-
tence is a singular or "Russellian" proposition. The most distinctive 
feature of singular propositions is tha t they contain objects and persons 
and their properties as constituents. Accordingly, in (1), the expressed 
singular proposition contains both the person Kripke and the property 
of living in Princeton. 
* T h e publication of the paper was suppor ted by the Research Group for Theo-
retical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the University of 
Debrecen. 
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(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. 
The somewhat metaphorical term "contains" means here tha t relative to 
the actual world the proposition is in fact about Kripke and the property 
of living in Princeton. In other words: the proposition at tr ibutes a real-
world property to a real-world person. 
It is of great theoretical importance tha t in singular propositions 
the individual constituents are directly represented, without mediation 
of any fur ther qualities. So in (1) the name Saul Kripke contributes to 
the expressed proposition only with the person to whom it in fact refers. 
In this specified sense of semantic content proper names pick out their 
real-world referents directly and never contain additional qualitative or 
descriptive informations. 
According to a slightly reformulated Millian view, defended recently by 
Soames (2002) and mentioned in agreement with him by Sullivan (2003), 
there are however interesting exceptional cases to this rule. Soames 
(2002) offers a detailed argument to show that certain Millian names 
have a twofold semantic structure. Although linguistically simple proper 
names typically do not contain any descriptive information, some com-
plex names such as the phrases Princeton University or Professor Saul 
Kripke are regularly associated with descriptive properties that apply 
only contingently to their bearers. Soames introduced the notion par-
tially descriptive names to deal with these complex phrases. 
The semantic structure of partially descriptive proper names consists 
of two separable parts. On the one hand, as ordinary Millian names all 
such names have in the actual world a unique referent. On the other 
hand, they are associated with contingent descriptive information. The 
semantic content of a partially descriptive name includes therefore both 
a nondescriptive and a descriptive component. The nondescriptive com-
ponent—the referent of t he partially descriptive name n — i s the histor-
ically or causally determined object o. This means tha t the object o, 
which s tands at the beginning of a historical or causal chain of trans-
mission of the name n, is initially determined by an ostensive baptism 
or by a descriptional stipulative naming. The descriptive component— 
the contingent property Pc attached to the object о—is specified in every 
particular case by the referential intentions of speakers, who utter declar-
ative sentences with the name n. On Soames's view these two compo-
nents play a parallel and complementary role in fixing the reference of 
the partially descriptive name n. It is supposed furthermore that the 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
THE SEMANTIC CONTENT OF PARTIALLY DESCRIPTIVE NAMES 3 0 5 
descriptive component is of substantial semantic importance, because it 
has a reference-fixing role in a long-term sense. Once the referent has 
been fixed, every competent speaker in the fu ture who ut ters declarative 
sentences in normal circumstances with the name n, will a t t ach the con-
tingent property Pc to o. Thus Pc remains permanently associated with 
the name as a timeless descriptive reference-fixing definition. 
It is clear at first sight t h a t Soames's t ra in of thought results in 
a hybrid theory, which aims to reconcile essential antidescriptivist and 
descriptivist insights concerning the semantics of proper names. This 
procedure is an ambitious research program in itself, surely, but I do not 
think that Soames's theory in its present form succeeds. In the following 
brief comment, I will give an argument that purports to show the main 
flaw in his reasoning. 
2. Competence conditions for partially descriptive names 
Let us first consider what governs our everyday linguistic behavior when 
we ut ter simple declarative sentences with ordinary proper names. Be-
cause of the great variety of communicative situations where proper 
names usually occur, and because of the possible diversity of speaker 
intentions in these situations, the question of the governing principles of 
everyday usage seems to be extremely complicated, but, fortunately, we 
can concentrate here on two salient and theoretically significant features 
of our linguistic practice. 
The first obvious thing to say about everyday usage is t ha t if speakers 
are to speak about an object or person, they must have a discriminating 
cognitive fix on the thing or person. It is tempting to explain this obvious 
fact by holding tha t from the point of view of speakers, the cognitive 
mechanism of discriminative fixing functions as a background condition of 
successful communication. Maybe, this discriminative ability can be seen 
as the necessary cognitive precondition for using words with referential 
power even in general. If so, then in the case of ordinary proper names this 
means that to use such names as Princeton or Saul Kripke successfully, 
speakers must have the corresponding cognitive intentions to discriminate 
the city and the person to which these names respectively refer. 
Beyond discriminative intentions speakers must also have some reflec-
tive linguistic capacity to count as competent wi th the public information 
content of proper names. The need for this second cognitive condition 
seems to be equally obvious for the simple reason that in declarative sen-
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tences ordinary proper names stand in general in subject position. There 
are, of course, relatively often used sentence forms where names occupy 
other syntactical places. Sometimes personal names may seem to occur 
predicatively, as, for example, in the sentence This smart guy is Saul 
Kripke. Names may appear naturally in an isolated position, too. In 
answering customary interrogative sentences, such as Who is this smart 
guy?, speakers could use personal names as syntactically unstructured 
one-word replies. But apart from these clear exceptional cases, in the 
vast majori ty of situations where a speaker uses the name n in simple 
declarative sentences to refer to the object o, she uses n in subject po-
sition to indicate which thing she is trying to convey information about. 
There is a schematic empty sentence form n is F, which must be filled in 
every case with a name and a property for the concrete utterance to say 
something definite. It follows from this that it must be known to speakers 
at least implicitly wha t it takes in normal contexts to assertively utter 
sentence tokens which contain proper names in their subject positions. 
That is, to be able to say of the referent (the object o) of n tha t it 
has the property F-hood speakers must be equipped with some reflective 
syntactic knowledge. Consider sentence (1) again: 
(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. 
(1) expresses the singular proposition that predicates the property of 
living in Princeton of Kripke. Therefore, speakers must reflectively un-
derstand that in all normal contexts by assertive utterances of (1) they 
are at tr ibuting to the referent of Saul Kripke the property of living in 
Princeton. 
Wi th similar considerations in mind, Soarnes mentions the following 
two competence conditions for ordinary proper names.1 
CI. Speakers must possess referential intentions t ha t determine о as the 
referent of n in normal conversational situations. This communica-
tive intention may arise either from a direct epistemic source (intro-
ducing an expression to name the object o, on the ground of personal 
acquaintance with o) or from an indirect linguistic source (intending 
to refer to the object о by way of linguistic reference).2 
1
 See Soames (2002, 65). 
2
 In what follows I will ignore the difference between epistemic and linguistic sources 
of referential intentions. 
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C2. With respect to a given context, speakers must realise that with 
assertive utterances in the form n is F they say about the referent 
of n (about the object o) that it is F . 
In my opinion, there is something deeply and indisputably right in the 
formulation of these two conditions. C I mirrors the intuitively right point 
of the externalist theories of intentionality that successful de re linguistic 
reference with singular terms requires always individuating mental inten-
tions. C2 invokes the plausible epistemic idea tha t (implicit) reflective 
knowledge about the functioning of the sentence scheme n is F counts as 
a prerequisite for assertively uttering sentences in a given context with or-
dinary proper names. Reading CI and C2 together as an integral whole, 
we can see what traditional Millianism says at a fundamental level abou t 
competence conditions concerning proper names. 
Wha t complicates matters a little bit, however, is the fact t h a t in 
contrast with ordinary proper names partially descriptive names are syn-
tactically structured linguistic entities. If we are prepared to agree with 
Soames's original hybrid theory, then we must suppose tha t these names 
have also certain competence conditions. Now what would be involved in 
the competence conditions of partially descriptive names? Soames seems 
to forget to discuss this important question.3 Before I t ry to fill this gap, 
consider the following short list of examples: 
Grammatical Types of Partially Descriptive Names 
(A) Princeton University, Yankee Stadium. 
(B) Whidbey Island, Snoqualmie Falls. 
(C) Professor Saul Kripke, Princess Diana. 
(D) Miss Ruth Barcan, Mr. Terry Thomas.4 
Here, in each case a proper name occurs as part of a noun phrase. In (A) 
and (B) we see ordinary proper names which are followed by common 
nouns. In (C) the phrases are structured of course in reverse order.5 Be-
yond this superficial syntactic remark, the decisive question is, I th ink , 
how these different phrasal constituents interact semantically. The an-
3
 This is a striking deficiency of his book, because he analyses the behavior of 
descriptive names in three different chapters . 
4
 All examples stem from Soames (2002). 
5
 For ease of discussion I abstract here f rom the somewhat problematic type (D). 
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swer seems to be perfectly straightforward: the interaction of ordinary 
proper names and common nouns in noun phrases yields semantic mix-
tures or semantic amalgams. If partially descriptive names are really 
genuine proper names, then they contribute to the prepositional content 
of declarative sentences only with their referents. Thus, they are rigid 
designators in the classical Kripkean sense. In possible worlds similar 
enough to our actual world the phrase Professor Saul Kripke, for exam-
ple, always refers to the same person, if it designates anything at all, 
since the name Saul Kripke is rigid. But , as Soames suggests, partially 
descriptive names behave, strictly speaking, not rigidly, because the kind 
of content they semantically express includes also contingent properties 
of their referents. ' ' That is, in the phrase Professor Saul Kripke the com-
mon noun professor is a nonrigid property designator. So there are such 
counteractual worlds in the modal space where the very person who in 
our actual world is a professor and bears t he name Saul Kripke, has an-
other profession, and for t h a t very reason the whole phrase cannot be 
classified without further ado as rigid. This modal anomaly arises from 
the plain semantic fact t ha t beyond its referent the name contains as ad-
ditional semantic information the contingent property of professor hood. 
And the observation generalizes smoothly t o the grammatical types from 
(A) to (D): there is a built in information mixture to the semantic profile 
of the enumerated names consisting in all cases of (i) t h e rigidly desig-
nated part icular objects, and (ii) the appropriate contingent properties 
attached nonrigidly to the designated part icular objects. To illustrate the 
hidden informational s t ructure of these names, Soames gives the follow-
ing general formula: the x: Dx &; x = y, where the definite description D 
represents t he contingent property at tached to the referent of the name, 
relative to an assignment of the variable y. According to this formula, 
the structure of the name Professor Saul Kripke must be analysed in the 
following way: the x: x is a professor Sz x = y, under an assignment of 
Saul Kripke to the variable y. ' 
6
 See Soames (2002, 120). 
' Soames (op.cit., 110) says in fact that t h a t the semantic contents of partially 
descriptive names are roughly the same as the semantic contents of certain definite 
descriptions. It is not entirely clear for me what the adverb roughly means in this 
context. If partially descriptive names are synonymous with definite descriptions, 
the synonymy relation between them must hold unambiguously. 
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If partially descriptive names are structured really this way, it follows 
tha t the previously mentioned two competence conditions CI and C2 
must be complemented by C3, or by something analogous with it. 
C3. In using a partially descriptive name n to refer to an object о in nor-
mal conversational situations speakers must permanently associate 
the contingent descriptive property Pc with the object o. 
At this point, we should accept the thesis, for the sake of argument at 
least, that in our actual world under normal circumstances an average 
speaker could have cognitive access to the whole semantic content of a 
partially descriptive name. Then the main question is whether these 
three conditions C l , C2 and C3 jointly show what speakers in our actual 
world must know in general to understand and use such names compe-
tently. I am sceptical concerning this question, because the condition 
about associated properties poses in my view an insurmountable prob-
lem for Soames's theory. What I would like to do in the remainder of the 
paper is to demonstrate why such a condition as C3 cannot be met. 
3. W h e r e does descriptive information come from? 
While ordinary proper names represent only their referents, a partially 
descriptive name, according to Soames, gets into the process of a partic-
ular conversation with a referent and an associated descriptive property. 
Consider what he would say about the following sentence pair, uttered 
alternatively in a situation where prior to the time of the concrete ut-
terance both the speaker and the hearer were competent users of the 
linguistically simple names Saul Kripke and Princeton (i.e., they satisfy 
in advance the requirements of CI and C2): 
(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. 
(2) Professor Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. 
As for the first sentence, Soames might insist tha t uttering these words 
with declarative intentions a speaker conveys no more content semanti-
cally than the information tha t the well-known philosopher of language 
Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. This seems to be intuitively very plausible 
because the sentence contains no overtly indexicai expressions or other 
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context-sensitive grammatical elements with varying referents from con-
text to context and the contextual value of the present tense of the verb 
counts in normal conversational settings as unambiguous, and because we 
supposed further t ha t the speaker knew tha t the hearer lias both names 
in her mental lexicon.8 
It is quite another matter tha t in special cases an ut terance of (1) 
could convey possibly more information than just the lean and seemingly 
trivial proposition t ha t Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. Agents who know 
various significant things about the life story and personality of Saul 
Kripke could perhaps know tha t he does not particularly like the city 
Princeton. They could know, perhaps from personal communication, 
tha t Kripke believes that Princeton is not pretty. In this hypothetical 
case, an utterance of (1) would imply the descriptive information con-
tent to the addressees that because he now lives there, Kripke probably 
changed his negative opinion about Princeton. This putative descriptive 
information would belong, however, to the inferential mechanisms em-
ployed in the interpretation of the sentence. According to Soames, who 
distinguishes sharply first-order semantic content from other types of as-
serted or implicated information, statements with ordinary proper names 
may carry occasionally some descriptive information which goes beyond 
the literal meaning of the uttered sentence token. No doubt, sometimes 
it is an extremely demanding interpretive exercise to determine precisely 
what this extra information content consists of. Soames acknowledges 
this, but it is important to see, he says, tha t this kind of information 
could be conveyed solely by second-order pragmatic means.9 
The best candidate for being the semantic content encoded by as-
sertive utterances of (1) is thus the mere information that Saul Kripke 
lives in Princeton. This is in agreement with other contemporary Millians 
like Salmon (1986) and Thau (2002) who would presumably maintain that 
in this sentence, under normal circumstances, the linguistically simple 
proper name Saul Kripke (and Princeton) lacks any descriptive content. 
But what about our second sentence? As C3 suggested above, to 
count as competent with the partially descriptive name Professor Saul 
Kripke speakers must permanently associate with the referent of the sim-
ple proper name Saul Kripke (i.e., with the person the name rigidly des-
ignates) the contingent property of professor hood. From this it follows 
8
 For detailed arguments see Soames (2002, 63-5). 
9
 Soames (op.cit., 86). For a similar view, see Capellen - Lepore (2004). 
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that in our hypothetical situation, where both the speaker and the hearer 
are competent users of the simple name Saul Kripke (and Princeton) — 
via satisfying the conditions CI and C2—an assertive utterance of (2), in 
contrast to (1), would express the descriptively enriched semantic content 
that the well-known philosopher of language Saul Kripke, the professor, 
lives in Princeton. Thus, Soames would conclude tha t in this case the 
putative descriptive information is carried by the common noun professor. 
4. Descriptive contents in mental files 
It seems to me that the aforementioned Soamesian inference cannot be 
justified. The decisive reason for this is tha t the descriptive content of the 
property designator professor does not enter necessarily into the asserted 
content of (2). I think tha t being a competent user of the proper name 
Saul Kripke in the actual world at a t ime t amounts to knowing, among 
other things, tha t the designated person is a professor.10 
On what grounds can one accept this claim? Prom a cognitive point 
of view, it can be argued tha t to count as competent with the name 
Saul Kripke a speaker must have a separate mental file about the person 
Kripke.11 Let us call it the Saul Kripke File. Beyond some mental 
pictures, memory-traces of moods and other types of stored information, 
the Saul Kripke File will be filled very likely with a great amount of 
contingent semantic information. According to the cognitive hypothesis 
all contingent semantic content in the Saul Kripke File will be associated 
with the name Saul Kripke. For competent users, for example, the sound 
of the words Saul Kripke provides access to all semantic information 
stored at the moment about Kripke. In this way, speakers may associate 
with the name such descriptive contents as he is smart, he has a beard, 
10
 Recall wha t condition CI says: competent users of a proper name must possess 
discriminating abilities, t ha t is, they must gain enough knowledge from epistemic 
or linguistic sources to pick out the designated object determinately. It is easy 
to imagine contexts in which the deferential source of such a name as Kripke in-
cludes regularly a contingent but characteristic feature of the referent. In science 
classroom contexts, for example, the first encounter with the name may bring 
about in s tudents a latent association between the person who is called Kripke 
and the contingent property of professorhood. Kroon would say t ha t this property 
becomes "resiliently" associated with the name. See Kroon (2004, 282). 
11
 About menta l files see among others Recanati (1993), Geirsson (2001) and Segal 
(2001). 
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he is a professor, and so on (if they have placed these linguistic items 
previously into their mental files). Tha t is, the associated descriptive 
contents help them cognitively track the individual named. 
This does not mean, of course, tha t the name contains in its seman-
tic profile these contingent pieces of information. But when competent 
speakers assertively ut ter sentences in a public language with the proper 
name Saul Kripke, they can lean on this previously acquired background 
knowledge. In successful cases, a coordinated mental file management 
takes place. Thus, the already known properties of the designated per-
son become part of the common ground among the participants in the 
conversation. If tha t is right, then the contingent fact or information 
that Saul Kripke is a professor must not be explicitly expressed by nor-
mal utterances of (2). I conclude, therefore, tha t for competent hearers 
(2) expresses the same basic proposition semantically as (1), namely t ha t 
Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. To take one more example, consider the 
following sentence pair (3) and (4). 
(3) Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel.12 
(4) Professor Peter Hempel was Professor Carl Hempel. 
Here it is even clearer tha t there could not be a significant difference 
between the expressed semantic content of the two sentences. I agree 
entirely with Soames's claims about the possible ut terance contents of 
(3). It is very likely tha t an average speaker could use (3) to communicate 
different things in different contextual settings. One could assert with (3) 
the contextually enriched identity statement, for example, that the man 
formerly known by the name Peter Hempel was in fact identical with 
the famous philosopher of science Carl Hempel. On another occasion 
the sentence might convey the metalinguistic proposition that there was 
only one famous philosopher named Hempel, and perhaps there are a 
few other real possibilities. According to Soames, however, (3) expresses 
semantically no more than the simple fact that the rigidly designated 
objects of the two proper names Peter Hempel and Carl Hempel are 
identical. And it is easy to see that the first-order content of this identity 
relation does not contain any descriptive information. So far so good. 
One problem now arising, though, is tha t contrary to the explicit 
expectations of Soames's theory (4) seems to express semantically the 
12
 For a detailed analysis of (3), see Soames (2002, 66). 
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very same content. If our hypothetical speaker has the required minimal 
background knowledge to be a competent user of ( 4 ) — t h a t is, she has 
a suitable mental file about the person Hempel—she may know, among 
other things, that Peter Hempel was a t a given t ime t professor, and she 
may also know that he was in fact identical with Carl Hempel. Therefore, 
the common noun component professor of the partially descriptive names 
Professor Peter Hempel and Professor Carl Hempel will stay, we could 
say, in an inert position in her everyday utterances of (4). It changes 
the ordinary proper names Peter Hempel and Carl Hempel into syntacti-
cally complex names, bu t does not provide them with new and significant 
descriptive semantic power. This semantic inertness of the property des-
ignator professor shows, in my view, tha t regarding first-order content 
there is no significant difference between (1) and (2), and similarly, (3) 
and (4) do not differ in their expressed semantic content. 
So it seems that Soames's general formula the x: Dx íi x = y does not 
represent accurately the hidden informational s t ructure of these names, 
when D is interpreted semantically. This formula should be reinterpreted 
in a way which fits bet ter with the cognitive competence conditions men-
tioned above. 
5. Conclusion 
As we saw before, there are good reasons for Soames and other contem-
porary Millians to accept C3. They are entitled to say that partially de-
scriptive names must express semantically contingent properties of their 
designated objects across normal contexts involving competent speak-
ers. We also saw, however, that prior to using such names in declarative 
sentences competently speakers must possess some discriminating back-
ground knowledge about their designated objects. This is why I doubt 
that there is a direct way to meet condition C3. 
It seems likely therefore that the main thesis of Soames's a t t ract ive 
theory fails, and partially descriptive names lack semantically valuable 
descriptive information; perhaps they are not names at all.15 At the 
same time, I am convinced that this failure does not threaten Soamesian 
Millianism about ordinary proper names. The above-mentioned two con-
ditions CI and C2 provide the strongest evidence why this is so. We may 
also reject the inherently unstable idea of partially descriptive names and 
yet still hang on to traditional Millianism in the case of ordinary names. 
13
 McKinsey (2004) argues similarly. He claims that Soames has produced no real 
examples of partially descriptive names. 
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René Bainierjea: Eskimos in Europe: How they got there and what happened to them 
afterwards. Bíró Family Nyomdaipari és Kereskedelmi Vállalat, London & Budapest, 
2004, 470 pp . 
This book deserves our attention from two particular points of view: the topic of the 
Eskimos (Inuits) and the author's personal background. It deals with the Eskimos who 
went willingly or were captured and taken away to Europe (Scotland, England, and 
Denmark). However, its main focus is on the first and not always peaceful contacts with 
these aboriginals and on a detailed account of the discovery of Greenland, Baffin Island 
and Labrador recorded from the first voyages of the Vikings up to t h e expeditions in 
the mid-19th century. 
As to the person of the writer, René Bannerjea was born in 1914, son of an Indian 
ethnologist and an English mother. His mother tongue is English but he mastered 
several languages. He accompanied his father to Hungary where, a f te r having enrolled 
to the Eötvös College in Budapest , he studied Hungarian and Uralic languages (as 
well as Eskimo, a Paleo-Siberian language). Bannerjea did his P h D and afterwards he 
taught English in the College as a lecturer. Having married a Hungarian woman, Ban-
nerjea spent eight years in Hungary up to the end of the forties. He learned Hungarian 
excellently; he even published translations from Hungarian poets into English and 
French and also some of his own poems (Ma route vers toi. Poèmes sur la Hongrie. 
Budapest 2001, 2 vols). 
In the volume reviewed here, the author meticulously compiled all the available 
da t a on the topic in 25 chapters, based on descriptions of voyages, diaries, articles 
of contemporary newspapers and gazettes, paintings and photographs of persons and 
objects; more than thirty pictures illustrate this book. Especially detailed narratives 
are devoted to two voyagers and discoverers: Capta in Martin Frobisher (1535-1594) 
and Captain Charles Francis Hall (1821-1871); see pp. 43-84 and 256-330. 
Some of the Eskimos in question, hardly more than 200 in number , subsequently 
returned to their homeland while others remained in Europe. They excited wide 
interest and spectacle in several European countries. Their physical appearance, their 
garments, their skill in making tools, in paddling, in kayak manoeuvring (and the 
kayak itself) were a great at tract ion at that t ime. 
In addition to the physical abilities of the Eskimos, most of them were baptized and 
were intelligent, mastered English or Danish excellently, and worked as interpreters. 
The lives and activities of two persons are especially reported in detail : Jack Sakeous 
(pp. 171-204) and Hannah (pp. 246-324), the former arriving in Edinburgh in 1816, 
the latter with her husband and daughter in 1854 in London. Sakeous' portrait appears 
on the back cover of this volume, and that of Hannah is shown on t h e front cover. 
The arrival of the Eskimos was not only a spectacle for the public; they were 
also presented to the monarchs, e.g., to King George III and his Queen in 1773 in 
the Opera House (p. 156), to the Queen of Sweden, wife of Charles XIV (Bernadotte) 
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in 1825 (p. 351), to Maximilian IV of Bavaria in Munich in the same year (p. 350). 
The occasion in that year was a tour of Eskimos in several cities in Central Europe, 
in Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Munich, Prague, Vienna, and also in Pozsony/Pressburg, 
then capital of Hungary (now Bratislava in Slovakia). 
As far as the Inuit linguistic data, words and personal names are concerned, their 
occurrence is scanty in comparison to the main topic. Moreover, they are mentioned in-
termittently throughout t he book. Most Inuit words and names are clumsily recorded 
in several variants, e.g., those of Sakeous: Sackhouse, Zaccheus, Zakaeus, Sakaeus, 
etc. (p. 202), probably f rom the Inuit root sak(e)- 'harpoon' or 'harpoon head' , and 
of Hannah: Tackalictoo, Tookoolito, Tukkulertu, etc. (p. 252, passim, 461) from taka-
likicaq 'butterfly ' or 'moth ' (p. 349). Banner jea emphasizes (p. 115) that the Eskimo 
language, a Paleo-Siberian one, can hardly be related to the Uralic or Indo-European 
languages. The author mostly refers to Will iam Thalbitzer (A Phonetic Study of the 
Eskimo Language, Copenhagen 1904) and Franz Boas ( The Central Eskimo, Washing-
ton 1988-85), well-known experts in Inuit. However, some later works, e.g., S. P. Klein-
schmidt's Grammatik der grönlandischen Sprache, Berlin 1951, I. Reed and others ' 
Yupik Eskimo Grammar, Fairbanks 1978, or S. Jakobson's Jup'ic Eskimo Dictionary, 
Fairbanks 1984, are not covered. 
Despite the scarcity of linguistic material, Bannerjea's volume largely contributes 
to the knowledge of the early contacts between the European peoples and the Inuit; 
moreover, it is an interesting reading of the cultural history of tha t area. 
István Fodor 
Jenő Kiss Ferenc Pusztai (Hrsg.): Magyar nyelvtörténet [Ungarische Sprachgeschichte). 
Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, 950 pp. 
1. Für den Unterricht der ungarischen Sprachgeschichte gab es lange Zeit nur ein 
Standardwerk im Hochschulwesen: das von Géza Bárczi, Loránd Benkő und Jolán Ber-
rár verfasste Lehrbuch A magyar nyelv története [Geschichte der ungarischen Sprache] 
(Benkő 1967). Das Buch war der Nachfolger der früher in Form von einzelnen Hef-
ten erschienenen Egyetemi Magyar Nyelvészeti Füzetek [Ungarische linguistische Hefte 
für den Universitätsunterricht], die aber keine richtigen Lehrbücher waren, sondern 
eher sprachhistorische Handbücher. Nach dem Erscheinen des einbändigen Kompen-
diums im Jahre 1967 hat auch László Derne (1968) in seiner Rezension das Ende der 
Zwangsehe zwischen Lehrbüchern und sprachgeschichtlichen Handbüchern begrüßt. 
Dieses neue Standardwerk ha t lange gute Dienste geleistet: 36 Jahre sind vergangen, 
bis endlich ein ähnlich voluminöses und gründliches Lehrbuch erschienen ist. 
In diesen Jahrzehnten ha t sich aber die historische Sprachwissenschaft viel ent-
wickelt. Nach den mehrheitlich auf die Synchronie gerichteten Forschungen der struk-
turellen und generativen Linguistik haben sich nämlich die historischen Forschungen 
im letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts wieder intensiviert — zum Teil durch die be-
fruchtende Wirkung der Soziolinguistik und der Pragmatik. Auch bei der theoretischen 
Linguistik zeigt sich ein s tändig wachsendes Interesse für Fragen des Sprachwandels 
und dessen mannigfaltige Ursachen. Die traditionelle ungarische Linguistik hat sich in-
zwischen— zum Teil durch die erfrischende Wirkung der Ergebnisse der strukturellen 
Richtungen—ebenfalls erneuert: Viele Phänomene werden anders als früher beurteilt 
und beschrieben. 
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All das führte dazu, dass seit dem Erscheinen des bisherigen Lehrbuchs bedeutende 
Fortschritte in den historischen Forschungen des Ungarischen erzielt worden sind: wich-
tige Standardwerke sind erschienen. Hierzu gehören einerseits die Wörterbücher, die 
die Herkunft des ungarischen Wortschatzes darzustellen versuchen, also das dreibändi-
ge historisch-etymologische Wörterbuch ( A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára 
[Historisch-etymologisches Wörterbuch des Ungarischen] Bd. 1 -3 = TESz.) und dessen 
später in deutscher Sprache verfasste und auch die neueren Forschungsergebnisse bear-
beitende Variante (Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Ungarischen Bd. 1-2 = EWUng.) . 
Nicht weniger bedeutend ist die von einer Arbeitsgruppe des Insti tuts für Linguistik 
der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften erarbeitete Historische Grammatik des 
Altungarischen (A magyar nyelv történeti nyelvtana Bd. I, H / l , И /2 = TNyt.). Diese 
unglaublich gründliche und detaillierte Beschreibung schildert die Morphematik und 
Syntax des frühen und des späten Alt ungarischen in drei dicken Bänden und fasst die 
Ergebnisse der diesbezüglichen Forschungen auf zeitgemäßem Niveau zusammen. Au-
ßerdem bietet sie eine Fülle von ausgezeichneten Textbeispielen aus unterschiedlichen 
Sprachdenkmälern. 
Neben diesen Standardwerken sind auch wichtige Quellensammlungen publiziert 
worden. Zu ihnen gehören die Bände des Erdélyi Magyar Szótörténeti Tár [Historisches 
Wörterbuch des siebenbürgisch-ungarischen Wortschatzes Bd. 1-11], die kritischen 
bzw. buchstabengetreuen Ausgaben von Kodizes, Glossarien, Briefen und sonstigen 
Sprachdenkmälern (z. B. die Bände der Serie Régi magyar kódexek [Alte ungarische 
Kodizes]). Auch zahlreiche sprachhistorische Monografien erschienen. 
Wenn man all das subsumiert, kann man wohl sagen, dass die Situation eigent-
lich schon lange reif dafür war, den Studierenden ein neues Lehrbuch der ungarischen 
Sprachgeschichte in die Hand zu geben; nach langem Warten erschien das ansehnliche 
Werk im Frühjahr 2003. 
2. Das Buch wurde vor allem von Mitarbeitern des Lehrstuhls für Ungarische Sprach-
geschichte, Soziolinguistik und Dialektologie der Eötvös Loránd Universität erarbeitet , 
aber unter den Verfassern befinden sich auch zwei Forscher aus dem Institut für Lin-
guistik der Akademie der Wissenschaften. Die Redigierung haben Jenő Kiss und Ferenc 
Pusztai auf sich genommen, die selber auch je ein längeres Kapitel geschrieben haben. 
Die übrigen Kapitel sind die Arbeit von acht weiteren Mitarbeitern, die je ein Teil-
gebiet ausgearbeitet haben. Die Verfasser gehörten mehrheitlich dem Arbeitskollektiv 
an, das auch die dreibändige Historische Grammatik des Altungarischen bearbeitet 
hat, und die überwiegende Mehrheit von ihnen verfügt über jahrzehntelange Erfah-
rungen im Unterricht bzw. in der Forschung über Themenbereiche der ungarischen 
Sprachgeschichte. 
Das Buch gliedert sich—nach der Einleitung auf Seite 7-9—in zwei unterschiedlich 
große Abschnitte. Der erste Abschnitt, der die von Jenő Kiss geschriebenen Kapitel 
beinhaltet, trägt den Namen Altalános kérdések [Allgemeine Fragen] (11-68), der zwei-
te mit dem Titel A magyar nyelv története [Geschichte des Ungarischen] beschreibt den 
Zustand bzw. den Wandel des Ungarischen in den unterschiedlichen sprachhistorischen 
Epochen (69-893). Nach diesem Teil folgen noch eine Literaturliste zu Sprachgeschich-
te und Sprachwandel (895-924), die Auflösung der Quellen und Abkürzungen (925-34), 
sowie ein Sachwortregister (935-50). Dem Buch wurden außerdem sechs farbige Kar ten 
beigefügt, die nützliche und übersichtliche Informationen über die ethnischen Verhält-
nisse des historischen Ungarn bieten. 
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3. Der erste wesentliche Unterschied des Buches im Vergleich zum früheren sprach-
historischen Lehrbuch ist der erste Abschnitt selbst. Damals wurden die allgemeinen 
Fragen des Sprachwandels nur ganz oberflächlich, aber die ungarischen Sprachdenkmä-
ler sehr ausführlich behandelt. Im neuen Lehrbuch ist die Lage gerade umgekehrt: hier 
werden die Quellen der Sprachgeschichte nur ganz kurz erwähnt (18-22), während Fra-
gen des Sprachwandels relativ ausführlich erörtert werden (23-68). Dieser Unterschied 
lässt sich auch damit erklären, dass sich dem Lehrbuch später noch ein Hilfsbuch mit 
dem Titel Nyelvtörténeti kalauz [Wegweiser für die Sprachgeschichte] anschließen soll, 
in dem unter anderem die wichtigsten Sprachdenkmäler (auch mit Bildern) vorgestellt 
werden. 
Das Kapitel stellt unter anderem kurz die verschiedenen Theorien des Sprach-
wandels (von den Junggrammatikern bis zur historischen Pragmatik) vor, beschäftigt 
sich mit der Notwendigkeit des Wandels und den Neologismen. Des Weiteren werden 
die wichtigsten Probleme des Sprachwandels in Form von Fragen und Antworten be-
handelt. In diesem didaktisch gut aufgebauten Abschnitt werden Fragen beantwortet, 
wie Warum änder t sich die Sprache?; Wo entsteht Sprachwandel?; Kann man Sprach-
wandel wahrnehmen bzw. werden Wandelerscheinungen bewusst?; Ist Sprachwandel 
prognostizierbar? usw. Die Erreichung des didaktischen Zieles wird auch durch die 
anschließenden Aufgaben gefördert, auf die ich später noch zurückkomme. 
4. Eine wichtige Neuerung im ersten Abschnitt ist auch die veränderte Periodisierung 
der ungarischen Sprachgeschichte (16-7). Einerseits verzichtet man auf die sog. Pro-
toungarische Periode (elömagyar kor), da über das Ungarische eigentlich erst ab dem 
Zeitpunkt gesprochen werden kann, als die Vorfahren der Ungarn sich von ihren finno-
ugrischen Nachbarn getrennt haben. Somit fängt die Geschichte des Ungarischen erst 
um 1000 v. Chr. an. Die Grenzen der einzelnen sprachhistorischen Perioden bleiben im 
Großen und Ganzen unverändert, mit Ausnahme der letzten Periode. Das Neuungari-
sche, das in den früheren Arbeiten zu diesem T h e m a mit der sog. Spracherneuerung 
(nyelvújítás) beginnt und bis heute dauert, wird in dem neuen Lehrbuch in zwei Ab-
schnitte geteilt: in die neuungarische (1772-1920) und in die neuere ungarische Periode 
(1920-). Diese Aufteilung wurde schon in Kiss (2003) und Pusztai (2000) vorgeschla-
gen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass im Jahre 1920 im Frieden von Trianon zwei Drittel der 
ungarischen Gebiete an die benachbarten Länder abgetreten werden musste, und da-
durch Millionen von Ungarn am Gebrauch ihrer Muttersprache in den Schulen und der 
staatlichen Verwaltung gehindert wurden. Das hat negative Spuren auch im Sprach-
erwerb der ungarischen Sprachteilhaber in den benachbarten Ländern hinterlassen: Der 
Einfluss der dortigen Staatssprachen wurde immer stärker, man kann auch sagen, dass 
Ungarische wurde eine plurizentrische Sprache. All das rechtfertigt die Einführung ei-
ner neuen Periode in der Geschichte des Ungarischen, aber nicht weniger wichtig ist 
in dieser Hinsicht auch die technische Entwicklung im 20. Jahrhundert , vor allem die 
informationstechnische Revolution in der Kommunikation (Telefon und Mobiltelefon, 
Fernseher, Computer und Internet usw.). Die Urbanisierung führt zu Änderungen in 
den Attitüden der Kommunikationspartner: Die Rolle der Dialekte geht zurück und 
die der Schichtensprachen nimmt zu. Durch die Massenmedien wächst auch der Ein-
fluss der Standardsprache auf den Sprachgebrauch. Neue Medienformen wie SMS und 
Chat schaffen einen neuartigen Sprachgebrauch, den man „geschriebene gesprochene 
Sprache" (írott beszéltnyelviség) nennen kann. All das begründet die Einführung einer 
neuen sprachhistorischen Periode. 
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5. Der andere — wesentlich längere—Teil des Buches (69-893) will dem Leser die 
historische Entwicklung des Ungarischen von der urungarischen bis zur neueren un-
garischen Epoche nahe bringen. Auch hier geht das neue Lehrbuch anders als sein 
Vorgänger vor. Während in Benkö 1967 die Beschreibung nach Wandelphänomenen 
erfolgt (Lautgeschichte, Geschichte der Syntagmen, Geschichte des Satzes usw.), wird 
hier den sprachhistorischen Epochen der Vorrang gegeben: Die Wandelphänomene wer-
den innerhalb der unterschiedlichen historischen Perioden gesondert behandelt. Damit 
wird hier die Geschichte des Ungarischen in den einzelnen sprachhistorischen Epo-
chen geschrieben. Diese Vorgehensweise kann sehr glücklich sein, wenn man im Un-
terricht nach sprachhistorischen Epochen vorgeht, also in unterschiedlichen Semestern 
alle Wandelerscheinungen einer sprachhistorischen Periode behandelt. Geht man aber 
möglicherweise nach Wandelphänomenen vor (Lautgeschichte usw.), ist diese Lösung 
weniger praktisch, da man im Buch hin und herblättern muss. Das wäre natürlich 
auch kein Problem, wenn nicht die beiden größeren Teile des Buches getrennte In-
haltsverzeichnisse hätten. So findet man auf Seite 5 nur eine ganz grobe Skizze des 
Inhaltsverzeichnisses, aus der hervorgeht, dass das Buch in zwei größere Kapitel un-
terteilt ist, während das detaillierte Inhaltsverzeichnis für die Allgemeinen Fragen auf 
Seite 12 und für die Geschichte des Ungarischen auf den Seiten 70-97 steht. Das macht 
das Auffinden der entsprechenden Textpassagen etwas umständlich. Bei einer weiteren 
Auflage könnte man vielleicht darüber nachdenken, ob das ganze Inhaltsverzeichnis 
nicht am Anfang des Buches stehen sollte, oder—und das wäre vielleicht noch prakti-
scher—die behandelten Wandelphänomene nicht durch unterschiedlich gefärbte oder 
positionierte Orientierungszeichen am Seitenrand einheitlich markiert werden können 
(ähnlich wie die Buchstaben in einem Wörterbuch). 
Diese strukturelle Konzeption hat auch noch andere Folgen: sie führt—zwangswei-
se—zu einer gewissen Wiederholung in den einzelnen Beschreibungsebenen. Da man— 
mit Ausnahme des Bedeutungswandels—alle Ebenen der Sprache in den unterschied-
lichen sprachhistorischen Etappen beschreiben wollte, ist es auch unumgänglich, dass 
gewisse Phänomene doppelt oder dreifach beschrieben werden. Gleichzeitig führt es 
aber auch zu einigen missglückten Lösungen. Einerseits ist es nämlich verständlich, 
dass man z. B. im ersten Kapitel über den Wandel des Wortschatzes (S. 173-203) die 
wichtigsten Wege der Wortschatzerweiterung vorstellen will. Dazu gehören—verständ-
licherweise— auch solche Lösungen, die erst neuerdings „praktiziert" werden oder für 
die man aus älteren Zeiten keine Beispiele hat. Trotzdem ist es einigermaßen störend 
und kurios, dass in einem Kapitel, das die urungarische Periode vorstellt, als Beispiel 
für die Kontamination ganz neuartige Belege wie citrancs ,vorgeschlagener Name für 
Grapefruit ' oder csalagút ,Name für den Tunnel unter dem La Manche-Kanal' zu finden 
sind oder als Beispiele für Akronyme Belege wie Gestapo, SS oder HIV vorkommen. 
Bei den Lehnübersetzungen gibt selbst die Verfasserin (Eva Zsilinszky) zu, dass diese 
Methode vor allem während der Spracherneuerungsbewegung beliebt war. Die ersten 
sicheren Belege—nach slawischen Mustern—stammen zwar aus dem Altungarischen, 
die Vorstellung des Phänomens in der urungarischen Periode ist jedoch etwas miss-
glückt. Wenn man aber das Phänomen schon hier behandelt, hät te man nicht nur die 
Teilübersetzungen (natúrszelet ,Naturschnitzel', adatbázis ,Datenbank') hier erwähnen 
sollen, sondern auch das Phänomen der sog. Lehnbedeutungen (tükörjelentés), wo-
für jedoch Beispiele erst auf Seite 810 zu finden sind (csenget ,telefonál', pénzt cserél 
,pénzt vált' usw.). 
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Das aber sind Probleme, die die Brauchbarkeit des Buches nicht verringern, höchs-
tens ab und zu etwas störend wirken. Da aber die meisten von ihnen vor allem im Zu-
sammenhang mit dem Wortschatz vorkommen, hät te man die Irritierungen vielleicht 
dadurch beseitigen können, dass man auch den Wortschatzwandel von den anderen 
Wandelphänomenen getrennt und ihm ebenso ein selbstständiges Kapitel gewidmet 
hätte wie dem Bedeutungswandel. Das wäre auch deshalb möglich gewesen, weil der 
Wortschatz eigentlich noch weniger Teil der Grammatik ist als die Bedeutung. Auf 
der anderen Seite garantiert die gewählte Lösung natürlich, dass man die in unter-
schiedlicher Zeit übernommenen Schichten der einzelnen Lehnwortgruppen in den ent-
sprechenden sprachgeschichtlichen Perioden platzieren kann. Trotzdem wäre m. E. in 
diesem Fall eine gesonderte Behandlung der historischen Entwicklung des ungarischen 
Wortschatzes geglückter. 
6. Auch die Entwicklung der ungarischen Rechtschreibung könnte man eigentlich in 
einem selbständigen Kapitel behandeln, da die Rechtschreibung auch nicht zu den 
Phänomenen der Grammatik gehört. Ihre Behandlung in den unterschiedlichen sprach-
historischen Epochen ist jedoch wesentlich angebrachter als die des Wortschatzes, da 
sie wesentlich mehr Attribute hat, die nur für gewisse Epochen charakteristisch sind. 
So ist für das Urungarische der Gebrauch einer Kerbschrift wahrscheinlich, für den 
Anfang des Altungarischen die Kanzleischrift, später eine Mischung von Kanzleisch-
rift und hussitischer Schrift mit diakritischen Zeichen. Im Mittelungarischen ist eine 
Teilung zwischen protestantischer und katholischer Schrift zu beobachten usw. Hier 
ist also eine Aufteilung der Geschichte der Rechtschreibung in unterschiedliche Epo-
chen eigentlich ganz angebracht. Außerdem muss man sagen, dass diese Kapitel, die 
von Klára Korompay geschrieben wurden, musterhaft kompakt und sehr übersichtlich 
sind, auch sind gewisse Tabellen über den Lautwert der verschiedenen Buchstaben 
(z. B. 286, 290) sehr nützlich. 
7. Die anderen Kapitel des Buches wollen den Wandel des ungarischen Sprachsys-
tems darstellen. In dieser Hinsicht wird der Akzent eindeutig auf die Struktur- bzw. 
Systemgeschichte gelegt. Während der Beschreibung ist die eindeutige Tendenz zu 
beobachten, dass die Verfasser wenn möglich überall versuchen, von konkreten histori-
schen Belegen ausgehend ein Problem zu demonstrieren und dann eine Erklärung für 
das entsprechende Phänomen zu finden. 
Als Muster für diese Kapitel dienten die entsprechenden Kapitel der Historischen 
Grammatik (TNyt.). Man hat also auch hier versucht, mit Hilfe der Belege scheinbar 
„synchrone Schnitte" des Ungarischen vorzunehmen und durch ihren Vergleich den 
Wandel des Ungarischen zu beschreiben. Es wird aber öfters betont (vgl. z. B. S. 66), 
dass solche Beschreibungen eigentlich nur „pseudosynchron" sein können, da den For-
schern nur beschränkt sprachliche Fakten in Form von Belegen zur Verfügung stehen 
(je mehr man in der Zeit zurückgeht, desto weniger), außerdem hat man auch nicht 
die Sprach- und noch weniger die Kommunikationskompetenz der damaligen Sprach-
teilhaber. Die Genauigkeit der Beschreibung hängt auch von der untersuchten Ebene 
der Sprache ab: Je geschlossener die jeweilige Beschreibungsebene ist, desto besser 
kann eine ziemlich exakte Systembeschreibung gegeben werden (so z. B. im Phonem-
system oder in gewissen Konjugationsparadigmen) und umgekehrt (z. B. Entwicklung 
des Wortschatzes oder der Bedeutung) — vgl. S. 67. 
Aus historischen Belegen lassen sich also keine richtigen synchronen Schnitte er-
stellen, schon weil sie—vor allem in älteren Zeiten—aus unterschiedlichen Mundarten 
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stammen oder zwischen ihnen möglicherweise eine längere Zeitspanne liegt. Daher 
soll betont werden, dass die untersuchten Perioden höchstens als sprachgeschichtli-
che Epochen, aber keinesfalls als „Synchronien" betrachtet werden dürfen. So kann 
man höchstens den Strukturwandel beschreiben, nicht aber den Wandel des Sprach-
gebrauchs. Ab und zu sind zwar aus den Belegen auch etliche Informationen für den 
Sprachgebrauch herauszuschälen, sie ermöglichen aber keinesfalls detaillierte Informa-
tionen über dieses Phänomen. 
Oben wurde schon erwähnt, dass das neue Lehrbuch gewissermaßen dem Mus-
ter der Historischen Grammatik (TNyt.) folgt. Die Grammatik konnte aber nur zum 
Teil als Ausgangsbasis für das neue Lehrbuch dienen, da diese nur die Geschichte 
des Altungarischen (und zum Teil des Urungarischen) beschreibt und zudem ohne die 
Lautgeschichte. Für das neue Lehrbuch musste also einerseits die Geschichte des unga-
rischen Phonemsystems geschrieben werden, andererseits waren alle Problembereiche 
für das Mittel-, Neu- sowie für das neuere Ungarische auszuarbeiten. 
Die lautgeschichtlichen Kapitel hat Erzsébet E. Abaffy bearbeitet. Es ist ihr gelun-
gen, die Fragen des Lautwandels sehr kompakt und allgemein verständlich zu behan-
deln, wodurch diese Kapitel, die sonst als sehr trocken und „telefonbuchartig" gelten, 
ganz übersichtlich und leicht zu lernen sind. Die Verständlichkeit verringert aber kei-
nesfalls das wissenschaftliche Niveau: In den Kapiteln werden Fragen der Phonotaktik 
genauso behandelt wie z. B. die Theorie über das phonologische Feld: auf Grund von 
Bárczi (1962), aber wesentlich einfacher und übersichtlicher wird z. B. die Geschichte 
der Explosivlaute im Urungarischen geschildert und auch in Form einer Tabelle dar-
gestellt. Aus dieser lässt sich ablesen, dass gewisse Lautwandelprozesse eine Leerstelle 
im Phonemsystem verursachen. Diese üb t im System einen „Sog" aus, der wiederum 
die Füllung dieser Leerstelle durch ein neues Phonem bewirkt (S. 117-8). 
Während die Kapitel der Lautgeschichte für alle sprachhistorische Perioden neu 
bearbeitet wurden, sind die Kapitel für die Geschichte der weiteren Ebenen der Sprache 
unverkennbar auf der Basis des größeren Vorbildes, also der Historischen Grammatik 
(TNyt.) aufgebaut. Die einzelnen Kapitel mussten natürlich auch für das Altungarische 
neu geschrieben werden, da die drei Bände der Grammatik etwa 2000 Seiten umfassen 
und nicht einfach gekürzt werden konnten, auch wenn die Kapitel für das Ur- und Al-
tungarische insgesamt über 450 Seiten umfassen (S. 101-576), also von allen anderen 
Kapiteln am detailliertesten ausgearbeitet sind. Manchmal hat man sogar das Gefühl, 
dass sie für ein Lehrbuch vielleicht zu „langatmig" sind: Wenn man heute im Hoch-
schulwesen arbeitet, hat man gewisse Zweifel, ob für die breite Masse der Studenten 
das Lehrbuch mit seinen insgesamt 950 Seiten nicht doch etwas überdimensioniert ist. 
Die Praxis wird zeigen, wie gut sich die Studenten das Material für die Prüfungen 
aneignen werden. Den Verfassern ist aber dieses Problem bewusst: Schon im Vorwort 
weisen sie darauf hin, dass sie lieber etwas mehr als zu wenig geben wollten, damit auch 
engagierte Studenten auf ihre Kosten kommen. Außerdem ist es den Lehrern überlas-
sen, was sie aus dem Buch auswählen. Dri t tens wollten sie nicht einfach ein Lehrbuch 
erarbeiten, sondern auch ein Handbuch der ungarischen Sprachgeschichte. 
Diese Kapitel weisen nicht einfach von der Struktur her die Spuren der Historischen 
Grammatik auf, sie wurden auch—wie schon erwähnt—von Mitarbeitern gefertigt, die 
selbst an der Grammatik des Altungarischen mitgewirkt haben oder an deren Fortset-
zung arbeiten. Das garantierte, dass die Arbeitsgruppe nach den schon für den großen 
„Bruder" ausgearbeiteten und bewährten Prinzipien arbeiten konnte. Die einzelnen 
Mitarbeiter waren für folgende Sachgebiete verantwortlich: Morphemgeschichte—Zsö-
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fia Sárosi, Geschichte der Wortar ten—Mária D. Mátai , Geschichte der Syntagmen— 
László Horváth, Geschichte des einfachen Satzes bzw. des Textes—Magdolna Gallasy, 
Geschichte der zusammengesetzten Sätze—Lea Haader. 
Die einzelnen Kapitel sind übersichtlich aufgebaut und gut gegliedert. Wichtige 
Feststellungen sind durch Fettsatz hervorgehoben, was die Übersichtlichkeit noch er-
höht. Außerordentlich nützlich sind auch die vielen Tabellen im Buch. Sehr übersicht-
lich ist z. B. die zusammenfassende Darstellung der ungarischen Nominalsuffixe im 
Kapitel der Morphemgeschichte von Zsófia Sárosi oder die Darstellung der Regeln der 
indeterminierten und determinierten Konjugation im Kapitel über die Geschichte der 
Syntagmen von László Horváth (S. 360-61 bzw. 442). Neben diesen Tabellen, die eher 
nur Phänomene zusammenfassen wollen, gibt es auch andere, die den Wandel gewisser 
Elemente oder Strukturen veranschaulichen (z. B. S. 346, 787, 799, 829-30 usw.) oder 
aus denen gewisse Zusammenhänge abzulesen sind (z. B. S. 107, 202, 815 usw.). 
Im Abschnitt der neueren ungarischen Periode findet man auch die Beschreibung 
gewisser heutiger Sprachvarianten, wie z. B. die Trennung der Fragepartikel -e vom 
Prädikat (z. B. Nem-e jött el? oder Meg-e jött már?) oder die Ausbreitung eines 
neuartigen Hauptsatztyps (z. B. Természetesen, hogy...-, Valószínűleg, hogy... usw.). 
M. E. ist es sehr positiv, dass die Verfasser diese Formen nur aus sprachhistorischer 
Sicht betrachten und nicht aus der Sicht der Sprachpflege. So werden die betroffenen 
Formen nicht als „falsch, fehlerhaft" abgetan, sondern nur als Varianten markiert, 
oft wird auch darauf hingewiesen, dass es ähnliche Formen schon seit Jahrhunderten 
gibt. Wenn möglich, wird auch versucht, ihre Ents tehung zu erklären (s. z. B. Lea 
Haaders Ausführungen über mögliche Ursachen syntaktischen Wandels in unserer Zeit, 
S. 841-4). 
Außer den klassischen Beschreibungsebenen der Grammatik wird in jeder unter-
suchten sprachhistorischen Periode auch die Ebene des Textes untersucht. Die Absicht, 
auch den Text in die Untersuchung einzubeziehen, ist eigentlich lobenswert und ver-
ständlich, da man so vom Phonem bis zum Text alle Sprachebenen berücksichtigt. 
Die Untersuchungsmethoden der Textlinguistik sind jedoch selbst für heutige Texte 
weniger ausgereift und da somit auch ihre Ergebnisse wesentlich geringer. Keinesfalls 
kann man aber Texte im Urungarischen untersuchen, man hät te m. E. auf dieses 
Kapitel im Abschnitt des Urungarischen bewusst verzichten können. Da dies nicht ge-
schah, konnte man—zwangsläuf ig—nur zu ganz allgemeinen Vermutungen kommen, 
wie z. B. „A megnyilatkozások és csoportjaik rövidebb vagy hosszabb volta terén a 
rövidségnek kellett inkább dominálnia" [Was die Kürze oder die Länge der Äußerun-
gen oder ihrer Gruppen betrifft, muss wohl die Kürze dominiert haben] (S. 274) oder 
„Az az általánosság mondható ki, hogy kellett lennie változásnak a szövegalkotás terén 
is, például az élőbeszéd jellege módosulhatott , a szövegtípusok köre is bővülhetet t . . . 
[Allgemein kann gesagt werden, dass es auch in der Text Verflechtung einen Wandel 
gegeben haben muss, so konnten sich z. B. die Eigenarten der gesprochenen Sprache 
verändert und sich auch der Kreis der Texttypen erweitert haben . . . ] " . 
Aber nicht nur mit dem Urungarischen gibt es auf diesem Gebiet Probleme: Die 
Textlinguistik des Altungarischen ist zwar relativ gut zusammengefasst, da dafür die 
entsprechenden Kapitel aus der historischen Grammatik zur Verfügung standen. Für 
die weiteren Perioden ist aber diese Ebene bei weitem nicht so gut ausgearbeitet wie 
die anderen Untersuchungsebenen, meistens befassen sich nur ein oder zwei Seiten mit 
dieser Problematik, und die Feststellungen sind oft auch ziemlich allgemein. Um der 
Gerechtigkeit willen sollte man aber auch erwähnen, dass die anderen Wandelphäno-
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mene mindestens in Form wissenschaftlicher Artikel oder früherer Handbücher für da s 
Mittel- und Neuungarische wesentlich gründlicher untersucht worden sind, während 
für die Geschichte des Textes die Grundforschungen noch ausstehen. 
8. In den Kapiteln, die die Wandelerscheinungen der neuungarischen Periode be-
schreiben, findet man auch noch sehr gute Zusammenfassungen über den Wandel ge-
wisser Phänomene durch die ganze ungarische Sprachgeschichte. So ist z. B. Már ia 
Mátais kompakte Zusammenfassung über die Ents tehung bzw. den Wechsel der Wor t -
arten sehr nützlich, und auch die anschließende Tabelle bzw. die Abbildung über die 
wichtigsten Tendenzen des Wortartenwechsels sind sehr lehrreich und übersichtlich 
(S. 828-30). Eben wertvoll ist auch der kurze Abschnitt , in dem Eva Zsilinszky den 
Wandel des ungarischen Wortschatzes überblickt: Wir bekommen Informationen über 
die sich ändernde Struktur der Wörter und erfahren, dass wegen Änderungen der pho-
notaktischen Regeln die Proportionen zwischen Vokalen und Konsonanten anders ge-
worden sind. Auch die Wortlänge ist gewachsen, und durch die unterschiedlichen Wort-
bildungsmethoden ist auch der Anteil der motivierten Wörter gewachsen. Man findet in 
diesem Abschnitt interessante Tabellen über die Anteile der unterschiedlichen etymo-
logischen Gruppen im Wörterbuch und über die prozentuale Verteilung der einzelnen 
Lehnwortgruppen in Texten aus dem 20. Jahrhundert . Diese Zusammenfassungen sind 
also sehr nützlich und es ist nicht ganz verständlich, warum sie nicht für alle Beschrei-
bungsebenen (so auch für die Morphematik oder die Syntax) erarbeitet wurden. 
9. Oben wurde schon erwähnt, dass der Bedeutungswandel nicht nach sprachhisto-
rischen Perioden dargestellt wurde, sondern ein selbstständiges Kapitel bekam. Diese 
Lösung ist absolut verständlich und zu begrüßen, da die Tendenzen und Wege des 
Bedeutungswandels wichtiger sind als die Frage, wann es bei einzelnen Wörtern zu 
diesem Wandel kam, was auch schwer feststellbar ist. Bedeutungswandelphänomene 
haben meistens auch keine zeitlichen Grenzen, es geht hier vor allem um kognitive 
Prozesse, die zeitlich unbegrenzt sind. In diesem von Ferenc Pusztai bearbeiteten Ka-
pitel findet man eine—auf Gombocz' und Ulimanns Semantik basierende—Typologie 
des Bedeutungswandels mit klaren und verständlichen Beispielen. Auch die Gründe 
des Bedeutungswandels werden gut zusammengefasst (S. 854-60). Richtig fand ich 
dabei, dass unter den Ursachen auch die Tabus erwähnt werden, diesen (und den Eu -
phemismen, die zur Vermeidung von Tabubruch dienen) kommt nämlich m. E. be im 
Bedeutungswandel eine wesentlich größere Rolle zu, als das ihnen in manchen Arbeiten 
zur historischen Semantik beigemessen wird. 
10. Nach dem Kapitel über den Bedeutungswandel folgt eine Literatur in Auswahl 
(S. 895-924). Es wird von den Herausgebern auch betont, dass es sich hierbei um eine 
Auswahl handelt: sie entstand durch die Zusammenlegung von Teilbibliographien, in 
denen die Verfasser der einzelnen Kapitel diejenigen Arbeiten aufgelistet hatten, die fü r 
sie—aus inhaltlichen oder methodologischen Gründen—wichtig waren. So werden hier 
Arbeiten, die etwas veraltet sind und eher der Wissenschaftsgeschichte angehören, nicht 
angegeben. In der immer noch ziemlich detaillierten Liste finden sich eher Arbeiten 
der neueren sprachhistorischen Forschungen und — i n geringerer Zahl — Arbeiten zur 
beschreibenden Linguistik des Ungarischen sowie Arbeiten über Sprachwandel und 
Sprachgeschichte in fremden Sprachen. Diese breite Auswahl ist für Studenten, die 
sich in die einzelnen Themenbereiche vertiefen wollen, sicherlich eine große Hilfe. 
Nach dem Literaturverzeichnis folgt noch die Auflösung der Quellenangaben und 
anderer Abkürzungen (S. 925-34) sowie ein gut strukturiertes Sachregister (S. 935-50), 
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das zusammen mit dem ebenfalls sehr detaillierten Inhaltsverzeichnis sichert, dass die 
Benutzer des Buches ziemlich leicht diejenigen Passagen finden, die Antworten auf ihre 
Fragen geben. Die Ausführlichkeit des Inhaltsverzeichnisses ergibt sich daraus, dass die 
einzelnen Kapitel sehr durchstrukturiert und in viele kleine Unterabschnitte gegliedert 
sind. Gerade dadurch kann man aber die gesuchten Textstellen schneller auffinden. 
Wie oben schon erwähnt, befinden sich a m Ende des Buches einige farbige und 
sehr informative Karten mit den Anteilen der ungarischen Bevölkerung und anderer 
Nationalitäten im historischen Ungarn. Durch sie erhält man ein aufschlussreiches Bild 
über die Verbreitung der ungarischen Sprache im Karpatenbecken im 11. Jahrhunder t , 
über die ethnischen Verhältnisse in Siebenbürgen im 13. Jahrhundert , über die ethni-
schen Verhältnisse Ungarns im 15., 18. und 20. Jahrhundert sowie über die Verteilung 
der Dialektregionen im heutigen Ungarn. 
11. Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass es den Herausgebern lind Verfassern ge-
lungen ist, mi t dem Buch ein Werk zu schaffen, das die Geschichte des Ungarischen 
vom Urungarischen bis zur neueren ungarischen Periode nach den neueren Erkennt-
nissen und Methoden der sprachgeschichtlichen Forschungen darstellt und das Ganze 
in den Rahmen einer zeitgemäßen Theorie des Sprachwandels einbettet. Das Blich ist 
nicht einfach ein Lehrbuch, es soll gleichzeitig auch ein Handbuch der ungarischen 
Sprachgeschichte sein. In dieser Hinsicht ist es wichtig, dass die Ergebnisse der His-
torischen Grammatik (TNyt.) für das Altungarische gut zusammengefasst wurden, 
wodurch das Material wesentlich leichter „verdaulich" wurde. Einen weiteren Gewinn 
für die historische Forschung bedeutet, dass auch die späteren sprachhistorischen Pe-
rioden des Ungarischen bearbeitet wurden — wenn auch nicht mit der Gründlichkeit 
der Historischen Grammatik, aber nach den gleichen Prinzipien. Schließlich ist auch 
beachtenswert, dass die ungarische Lautgeschichte für alle historischen Perioden neu 
bearbeitet und gut verständlich dargestellt wurde. 
Auch wenn das Buch als Lehrbuch manchmal zu umfassend wirkt, ist es für den 
Hochschulunterricht auf jeden Fall gut geeignet, zumal wenn die Lehrer aus dem Ma-
terial auswählen. Das Buch ha t aber auch noch weitere Charakterzüge, die es in didak-
tischer Hinsicht auszeichnen. Sehr gut sind nämlich die Aufgaben nach den einzelnen 
Kapiteln und die weiterführenden Literaturangaben. Letztere beinhalten oft auch Ar-
beiten, in denen man eventuell auch andere Erklärungen als im Buch findet. M a n 
wollte nämlich die Debatten über etliche Phänomene nicht in das Lehrbuch hineinar-
beiten. Deshalb gibt der Text den Standpunkt der Verfasser bzw. Herausgeber wieder, 
während man andere Auffassungen in den angegebenen Arbeiten nachschlagen kann. 
Diese sind of t auch für die Lösung der nach den Kapiteln stehenden Aufgaben wich-
tig. Was diese betrifft, behandeln sie Themen verschiedenen Umfangs: manche kann 
man bis zur nächsten Seminarstunde bearbeiten, manche wiederum fordern längere 
Forschungsarbeit und können auch als Ausgangsbasis für Diplomarbeiten oder sogar 
Dissertationen dienen. Diese Aufgaben sind schon deswegen sehr nützlich, weil sie eine 
Art Werkstattarbeit für den Unterricht anbieten: daran mangelt es nämlich am meisten 
in dem heutigen Massenunterricht der Hochschulen. 
Der Band will nach der Absicht der Herausgeber nicht nur die Studenten und Do-
zenten an den Universitäten und Hochschulen ansprechen, sondern auch die Ungarisch-
lehrer der Oberschulen. Aber nicht nur sie, sondern alle, die Interesse am Sprachwandel 
und vor allem an der Geschichte des Ungarischen haben, können darin Antworten auf 
ihre Fragen erhalten. 
Tamás Forgács 
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Bd. 8: Márta Vámszer). Kriterion, Bukarest. 
Mária Ladányi-Csilla Dér-Helga Hattyár (eds): „.. .még onnét is eljutni túlra". Nyel-
vészeti és irodalmi tanulmányok Horváth Katalin tiszteletére ["... getting even beyond 
that . . ." . Linguistic and literary studies in honor of Katalin Horváth]. Tinta Könyvki-
adó, Budapest, 2004, 499 pp. 
This volume contains fifty-nine studies honoring Dr. Katalin Horváth, associate profes-
sor of the Department of General and Applied Linguistics at Eötvös Loránd University 
in Budapest, on the occasion of her 60th birthday. 
The book starts with a preface by the editors followed by Dr. Horváth's professional 
vita, a tabula gratulatoria, and two congratulatory pieces (by Levente Bokor and Sándor 
Iván Kovács). The vita also includes Dr. Horváth's publication list. Most of her 
work has been published in Hungarian but she has two articles written in Esperanto 
about the semantics of this language and one paper in English: "The connection 
between the part and whole in forming sentences" (Annales Universitatis Scientiarum 
Budapestiensis, Sectio Linguistica, Tomus XXIII. 1992-1998, 208-220). While several 
of the studies in the volume are devoted to topics particularly akin to Dr. Horváth's 
work, László Elekfi's paper situates her work on subject-predicate relations within the 
general framework of Dr. János Zsilka. 
The range of topics covered matches the broad spectrum of the honoree's œuvre 
of the past 35 years. The papers are presented under five topical headings: 
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- descriptive grammar, historical linguistics, and etymology (with papers by József 
Attila Balázsi, Ilona Csilla Dér, László Elekfi, Mária Ladányi, Atti la Mártonfi, 
Mária D. Mátai, Renáta Németh, Giampaolo Salvi, Attila Starcevic, Lajos Pál 
Tóth, Tibor H. Tóth, and Erzsébet Zelliger); 
- semantics, lexicography, and stylistics (Edit Dési, Eva Gerevich-Kopteff, Agnes 
S. Huszár, Gábor Kemény, Gábor K i s s -Már ton Kiss, Viktor Nagy, Mihály Péter, 
and Éva Katalin Varga); 
- history of linguistics, cultural history, and onomasiology (Tamás Bécsy, József 
Веке, Edit G. Bogár, Géza Füssi Nagy, Piroska B. Gergely, Ferenc Havas, An-
namária Kábán, Árpád Kovács, Kinga Körmendy, Réka Lőrinczi, Kinga Márkus, 
Mariann Slíz, Lívia Sója, Ágnes Stemler, Enikő Szíj, and Zsuzsa Vladár); 
- natural and planned languages, language usage, and language pedagogy (Éva 
Andó, Csilla Bar tha , Gyöngyi Boldog, Helga Hattyár, Rita Hegedűs, Ilona Kassai, 
Klára Korompav, Ilona Koutny, Jenő Lőrincz, Péter Simoncsics, Katalin Szili, and 
Balázs Wacha); and 
- literary theory, analysis of prose and poetry (Ildikó Boros, Erzsébet Fehér, Emese 
Hadas, Anna Han, Géza S. Horváth, Katalin András Jobbágy, Géza Kállay, Huba 
Mózes, Barna Oravecz, Géza Orlovszky, and Marcellina Spannraft) . 
All but two of the papers are written in Hungarian. The two English-language papers 
are "An analysis of reference formulation in discourse" by Gyöngyi Boldog, which is a 
discourse study of a sociolinguistic interview recorded in the USA; and ' "The fragrance 
in your worship's imagination' and ' the phantom of our own selves': a reading of 
Hawthorne's Rappaccini's daughter through E. T. A. Hoffmann's The sandman"—an 
analysis by Géza Kállay of two works by N. Hawthorn from the angle of Hoffmann's 
aesthetics. Kállay suggests a possibly mutual influence between the two authors. 
A brief review cannot do justice to the wealth of da ta and analyses offered by 
this significant volume. (The full table of contents is available on the publisher's web 
page: http://www.tintakiado.hu.) Below, I will merely highlight studies tha t speak to 
seven issues central to general linguistics. These topics are linguistic categories, word 
formation, etymology, inflection, metaphors and metonymy, first language acquisition, 
and second language pedagogy. 
The characterization of syntactic and morphological categories is the theme that 
links the articles by Ilona Csilla Dér, Attila Mártonfi, Giampaolo Salvi, and Zsuzsa 
Vladár. Dér traces the history of certain postpositional constructions in Hungarian 
showing that they have arisen from adverbial participles (converbs) through gram-
maticalization. She concludes that the graduality of this historical process rules out 
the categorial identification of the various constructions that existed a t various stages. 
Mártonfi analyzes the Hungarian possessive affix -é (e.g., János-é ' tha t of John') and 
concludes that it is a bound demonstrative pronoun. It is interesting tha t this con-
clusion is supported by the English translation equivalent of the construction, which 
also includes a demonstrative. In the course of the analysis, Mártonfi also discusses 
the definitional characteristics of the various kinds of Hungarian pronouns. Salvi pro-
vides a historical analysis of two syntactic pa t te rns—the si-construction in Standard 
Italian, and the subjunctive in Rheto-Romansh — to show how syntactic categories 
evolve as the function of diachronic principles coupled with sheer chance. Vladár's 
s tudy relates to the thorny problem of defining particles and fitting them into a sys-
tem of word classes. She analyzes the use of the term in 17th century Latin grammars 
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of Hungarian and concludes that the usage has its roots both in Ancient Greek and 
Roman grammarians and in Latin grammars of Hebrew and English written in the 
16th and 17th century. 
Word formation is a central topic of the papers by Ilona Koutny and Mária Ladányi. 
Koutny's focus is a comparison of word formation in a planned language—Esperanto— 
and in natural human languages. She concludes that while the principles of Esperanto 
word formation are present in natural languages as well, the difference is tha t Es-
peranto applies these principles with perfect regularity: "what is semantically possible 
is realized morphologically" (368). Based on an extensive corpus study, Ladányi de-
scribes the formal and semantic characteristics of two Hungarian diminutive affixes 
(-ka/-ke and -cska/-cske) and asks why these characteristics are the way they are. 
Her explanations are in part diachronic, in part functional. For example, she explains 
why the latter affix is the more productive of the two by appeal to a principle by 
W. U. Dressier, according to which two-syllable words are optimal lexemes. Since -ka/ 
-ke is directly affixed to noun stems while -cska/-cske is always preceded by a linking 
vowel if the stem ends in a consonant, one-syllable nouns affixed with -ka/-ke, yielding 
two-syllable words, are more likely to be lexicalized than one-syllable consonant-final 
words affixed with -cska/-cske, in which case the resulting word is trisyllabic. 
Two of the papers on etymology (a recurrent topic in Dr. Horváth's scholarship) 
are by Attila József Balázsi and Renáta Németh. Balázsi investigates the origins of 
the Hungarian word róka 'fox'. He concludes that the root of the word, shared also 
by ravasz 'sly', goes back to the root ró meaning 'kill, destroy' (formerly 'cut ') , and 
shows how the evolution of the form and the meaning of the word received support 
both from trends in phonological, morphological, and semantic change in Hungarian 
and from general pat terns of naming animals across languages. Németh takes up the 
history of the word pair dulakodik ' to scuffle' and tülekedik ' to jostle'. She traces them 
back to a single form and a single meaning ( 'to fight with fists') and by supporting the 
relevant phonological and semantic changes with analogous examples she characterizes 
the broader system into which this pair of words fit. 
An outstanding feature of Hungarian verb inflection is the differentiation of the 
subjective and objective verb paradigms. Lajos Pál Tóth analyzes the cooccurrence 
constraints between the verb forms and the various pronominal objects and notes the 
unique, extra-paradigmatic status of the verbal affix -lak/-lek, used only if the subject 
is first person singular and the object is second person singular or plural. 
Metaphors and metonymy have been recurrent themes in Dr. Horváth's work and 
thus it is fitting tha t three of the papers in the volume should focus on these topics. 
Éva Gerevich-Kopteff reports on the Finnish translations of some metaphors in the 
poems of the 20th-century Hungarian poet Miklós Radnóti and notes a number of 
inevitable shifts in imagery and focus in the Finnish version. Gábor Kemény's paper 
is about descriptive metaphors in Hungar ian—that is, expressions that describe a 
notion periphrastically while also involving a metaphor. An example is the expression 
fekvő rendőr 'lying-down (prostrate) policeman' for speed bumps placed across streets 
to make drivers slow down. Using the example of E. A. Poe's famous poem The 
raven, Géza S. Horváth shows how words of ordinary language blossom into poetic 
tools through the poet embedding them in a network of métonymie and metaphoric 
relations with other words. 
Eva Andó's and Csilla Bartha 's studies address various aspects of child language 
acquisition. Based on examples of dialogues collected by her tha t involve a child's 
narrative, Andó shows how narration prompts the development of basic conceptual 
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categories and of basic communicative skills. Bar tha ' s essay is concerned with the 
linguistic development of deaf children. While in Hungary, deaf children are educated 
with emphasis on oral language—Hungarian—she suggests that a bilingual approach 
whereby the child is taught both the ambient language of the country and sign language 
is the optimal solution. 
The role of grammar teaching in second language pedagogy is a much-debated issue 
everywhere. Ri ta Hegedűs provides a brief historical overview of the literature and, 
while she is for a functional, ra ther than strictly grammar-based, approach, she em-
phasizes the significance of conscious—rather than merely intuitive—competence. She 
also notes that teaching the grammar of foreign languages presupposes some knowl-
edge of the native-language grammar . Klára Korompav reports on her experiences in 
teaching Hungarian to speakers of French focusing on the difficulties related to the 
subjective and objective verb conjugations. She provides a helpful chart summariz-
ing the major conditions under which the two verb paradigms are used and offers a 
flow-chart for students that lists the steps that need to be taken for the construc-
tion of syntactically, morphologically, and phonologically correct verb forms. Based 
on contemporary diary notes, correspondence, and other documents, Kinga Körmendy 
presents a delightful account of how the Austrian-born wife of the great 19th century 
Hungarian statesman István Széchenyi strove to acquire the Hungarian language for 
the sake of her beloved husband. 
In conclusion: thanks to its varied content and insightful analyses, this book has 
something to offer to almost everybody who is interested in Hungarian linguistics and 
in general linguistics. The t ransparent organization of the volume, its pleasing format, 
and the very fact tha t this worthwhile collection came to life bear witness to the three 
editors' competence and care, and to their warm devotion to the honoree.* 
Edith Moravcsik 
Yuri Alekseevich Tambovtsev: Tipologija funktsiouirovanija fonein v zvukovoj tsepochke 
indoevropejskih, paleoaziatskih, uralo-altaiskili 1 drugili jazykov mira: kompaktnost' 
podgrupp, grupp, semej i drugih jazykovyh taksonov [A typology of the functioning 
of phonemes iu sound sequences in Indo-European, Paleo-Asiatic, Ural-Altaic and other 
languages of the world: The compactness of subgroups, groups, families and other lan-
guage taxons]. Sibirskij Nezavysimvj Institut, Novosibirsk, 2003, 143 pp. 
The book under review is a welcome addition to Tambovtsev's theories, methods and 
sets of data published earlier (Tambovtsev 1994a,b; 2001a,b). I think that linguistics 
requires new da ta to support or to reject classical theories. More often than not, lin-
guists argue about this or that linguistic theory (e.g., the Uralic or Altaic language 
communities) without any new d a t a at hand. This new book by Yuri Tambovtsev 
provides such new data. Speaking about the application of statistical methods in lin-
guistics,** one must agree with Chris Butler that statistical techniques are often highly 
* I am grateful to Mária Ladányi for her comments on a previous version of this 
review. 
** Being a linguist by education, I naturally would not have been confident enough 
to discuss statistical methods without the help of specialists in mathematical 
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relevant for linguistic research because without them it is difficult to understand the 
linguistic phenomenon under investigation. It is especially important in any type of 
study involving differences in people's linguistic behaviour or in the pat terns of lan-
guages themselves (Wray et al. 1998, 255). Tambovtsev provides a large number of 
da ta on the phonological statistics of languages. He is one of the very few linguists 
who combine phonology with stylistics and typology (Teshitelova 1992, 157-81). In 
this book, as in his previous books, Yuri Tambovtsev considers the typology of reg-
ulation and chaos of the distribution of consonant phonemes in sound sequences in 
the languages of the world. In fact, Tambovtsev concentrates on variability in sound 
sequences. He adds essential insights to his theory and methods in the monograph 
under review, especially concerning phonostatistical universals in Finno-Ugric, Turkic, 
Indo-European and other languages. The author examines the homogeneity of texts 
in various languages from the point of view of the occurrence of phonemic groups in 
their sound sequences with the help of phonological statistics. Tambovtsev also inves-
tigates the rules of sound sequence division, as well as the frequency of occurrence of 
certain groups of consonants in the phonemic systems of various languages. Many new 
languages are investigated by this method, in comparison to his previous books (Tam-
bovtsev 1994a,b; 2001a,b). In fact, Yuri Tambovtsev has computed phonostatistical 
data on the occurrence of labial, coronal (i.e., front-lingual), palatal (mediolingual), 
back (velar, pharyngeal or glottal), sonorant, occlusive, fricative (constrictive) and 
voiced consonants in a large number of languages. This comprises eight phonological 
features. The articulation systems of these languages are also briefly discussed. There 
is also a short review of the ethnic history (ethnogenesis) of the nations speaking these 
languages. The author takes it to be of great importance to analyse language contacts 
during the history of their ethnic development. As far I am aware, Tambovtsev's first 
article in the field of phonological statistics was published in 1976. So, he has been 
working on the problems mentioned above for a long time, i.e., for some 30 years. 
Unfortunately, I cannot mention all his publications since he is the author of eight 
monographs and about 250 articles on language typology, phonostatistics and phonet-
ics. His studies involve the phonology of 156 languages of the world. In the book under 
review, Tambovtsev's conclusions are based on the data of the frequency of occurrence 
of phonemes in languages of the following families and groups: 
1. The Indo-European language family (including Indo-Aryan (8 languages), Ira-
nian (4 languages), Celtic (1 language), Italic (1 language), Romanic (5 lan-
guages), Germanic (7 languages), Baltic (2 languages), Slavonic (8 languages), 
genetically isolated Indo-European languages (5 languages), and an artificial 
language). 
2. The Ural-Altaic language community that includes the Uralic and Altaic lan-
guage communities: 
A. The Uralic language community: the Finno-Ugric language family, in-
cluding Ugric (5 languages), Permic (2 languages), Volgaic (5 languages), 
and Balto-Finnic (9 languages), as well as the Samoyedic language family 
(3 languages). 
statistics. I must thank Arkadiv Shemiakin, Vadim Efimov, Leonid Frumin and 
Valeriy Yudin for consultations and generous advice. 
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В. The Altaic language community: the Turkic language family (22 lan-
guages) and the Mongolian language family (3 languages). 
3. The Tungus-Manchurian language family (6 languages). 
4. The Yeniseyic language family (1 language). 
5. The Caucasian language family (2 languages). 
6. The Paleo-Asiatic language family (8 languages). 
7. The Sino-Tibetan language family (2 languages). 
8. The Afro-Asiatic language family (3 languages). 
9. The Bantu language family (2 languages). 
10. The Austro-Asiatic language family (2 languages). 
11. The Austronesian language family (5 languages). 
12. The Australian language family (6 languages). 
13. The language community of American Indians (20 languages). 
As a linguist I often feel I must use statistical methods in my studies of English, Ger-
man, and other languages. However, it is hard for a linguist to understand how to 
use them correctly, but at the same time in the easiest way. The author of the book 
teaches us how to do it. He does it on the example of the following methods of statisti-
cal calculation: s tandard quadratic deviation, variation coefficient, level of significance, 
confidence interval, the T-criterion of Student, the criterion of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
Chi-square criterion, and Euclidean distance. He also shows how to measure the statis-
tical reliability of linguistic results. Very often a linguist, who is a layman in linguistic 
statistics, may draw the wrong conclusions because his results are not statistically 
reliable. The book by Yuri Tambovtsev focuses not only on the mathematical statis-
tical methods tha t he employs in his linguistic research: it also discusses important 
problems of the classification of languages. The author touches on topics of the relia-
bility of mathematical statistical methods in linguistics; but the target of his research 
is to compare various languages within a single family as well as languages belonging 
to different families and groups. For this, Tambovtsev has generated mean values of 
frequency rates of various phonemes and phonemic groups. These mean values pro-
vide reliable correlations across languages. There are several mathematical methods 
allowing estimations of variation of major statistical values. Tambovtsev aims to esti-
mate regularities in the use of particular phonemes or phonemic groups in particular 
languages. He has chosen several methods of variability estimation and described tech-
niques of their application to phonological studies. In this respect, the issues of sample 
size are important: the larger the sample, the more reliable the results will be. One 
of the most important problems is that of the size of the portions (units) into which a 
text is divided. The portion should not be too small or too large. Tambovtsev takes 
the generally accepted sample portion in phonological research to be 1000 phonemes. 
He separates all his texts of the languages under discussion into units comprising 1000 
phonemes each. In statistics, the most reliable results are obtained on large samples. 
Thus, Tambovtsev argues tha t the minimally necessary sample should include not less 
than thirty thousand phonemes. 
The author applies, among other methods estimating statistical variation, the 
method of evaluation of mean quadratic deviation. The mean quadratic deviation 
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index is used in generating other evaluating indices. Quadratic deviation indices gen-
erated for two different texts can be compared if the sample sizes of the base texts 
are equal. Standard deviation data cannot be compared if the samples of texts are 
not equal in size. In cases where the sample sizes are different, other mathematical 
functions must be used. Tambovtsev chooses the estimation of confidence interval, 
"chi-square" criterion, coefficient of variance, etc. In my opinion, it is important to 
provide the reader with exact examples of how to calculate the mean quadratic de-
viation or s tandard deviation because a layman in phonostatistics, like myself, may 
do it in the wrong way. Yuri Tambovtsev provides us with d a t a on the occurrence 
of labial consonants in some Old English texts: Beowulf, Ohthere 's and Wulfstan's 
Stories, the Description of Britain, Julius Caesar, etc. He compares the use of labials 
in Old English to their use in Modern English. 
Variation coefficient represents another important tool in comparative linguistic 
research. It helps us compare incommensurable values. As it was stated above, the 
mean quadratic deviation characterises the degree of deviation of the frequency rate 
of a particular phoneme from the mean value. However, the mean quadratic deviation 
values do not take into account the fact tha t the number of labial phonemes is larger 
than that of medio-lingual (palatal) phonemes. Consequently, the absolute mean index 
of labial sounds is considerably larger than tha t of the palatal ones. On the other hand, 
coronal phonemes are usually more frequent than labial ones. This heterogeneity of 
features asks for additional methods of comparison, i.e., the variation index called the 
"coefficient of variance". Unlike mean quadratic deviation, the coefficient of variance 
allows correlation of frequency rates of those phonemes and phonemic groups tha t 
have produced different mean values. It is possible to make the measure of variability 
comparable by using the coefficient of variation. It can be used in linguistics in the way 
recommended by Fallik and Brown (1983, 111-2) for the behavioural sciences. The 
coefficient of variation is used as an indicator of the variation/stability of particular 
linguistic elements in a sample. The larger the value of the variation coefficient, the 
higher is the variability of a particular phonological feature (phonemic frequency in 
this case). 
Another important statistical notion is significance level. In his research, Yuri 
Tambovtsev chose the significance level value of 0.05, or 5%. To my mind, he chose it 
correctly since such a level of significance is usually used by the majority of researchers 
in linguistics and phonology. This significance level (i.e., 5%) tells us that we have 95% 
confidence in our linguistic research. This significance level, I believe, is important 
in any linguistic research, but especially important for correlations carried out on 
small samples, i.e., in samples of less than thirty thousand phonemes. Confidence 
interval evaluation is closely related to other statistical procedures like estimations of 
the minimum necessary sample at a fixed significance level. Tambovtsev proposes to 
invariably fix it at 5%. A higher level of significance usually requires larger samples, 
and thus, a lot more labour than necessary. In certain cases, one is advised to use 
the values of confidence interval. Confidence interval evaluation is more reliable for 
phonological research since it provides us with greater precision. The general rule 
is this: the narrower the confidence interval, the higher is the homogeneity of the 
parameter under discussion, i.e., a frequency parameter of a particular phonemic class 
or phoneme in speech. Usually, a text allows us to obtain narrower confidence intervals 
than a collection of phrases and words. In his book, the author finds a correlation 
between these three important parameters: sample size and confidence interval at a 
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fixed significance value. The available data have shown that the greater the sample 
size, the lower is the confidence interval at a fixed significance level in all languages of 
the world, irrespective of their genetic affiliation or grammatical type. 
Tambovtsev has also paid attention to the reliability of statistical results obtained 
in the course of his phonological research. He has received indices representing sta-
tistical error resulting from the fact that each sample represents only some portion 
of the general language aggregate. Such indices are called representation errors. The 
value of representation error depends mostly on sample size and on the variation ra te 
of a particular parameter. It is noteworthy tha t texts in different languages produce 
similar levels of representation error, irrespective of their morphological structures. 
This fact suggests a certain universal for phonemic groups of consonants functioning 
in genetically unrelated languages. However, I think that Tambovtsev has applied the 
strictest way of estimating representation error. On the one hand, this is inconvenient, 
since it requires larger samples for a fixed error value (e.g., 5% or less), but, on the 
other hand, it means that one can be surer of one's linguistic results. 
Yuri Tambovtsev mentions tha t many linguists who use statistics do not know 
that the T-test or "Student's" criterion was proposed by William Gösset, and not by 
some scholar called Student. "Student" was the name that William Gösset assumed 
as a pseudo-name. The Student 's criterion is employed in cases where it is necessary 
to compare two mean values found for two different texts. The reliability of difference 
between two mean values depends on the variability of parameters involved and on the 
size of the samples for which these variables have been generated. The "Student's" 
criterion can be applied for variables subject to normal dispersion. Within a sample 
of not less than 30 units, dispersion is considered normal. In the course of research, 
the "Student's" criterion has been calculated for two samples of the equal size of 31 
thousand phonemes. On the one hand, a scientific text was compared with a text of 
fiction, and on the other hand, two scientific texts were compared. The value of the 
former is nearly four times higher than that of the latter. This convinces us that t he 
"Student's" criterion can be safely applied for the stylistic analysis of texts. 
The statistical criterion called Kolmogorov-Smirnov test provides researchers with 
a mathematical method of analysis that does not depend on the restrictions that nor-
mally apply to statistical analyses. It concerns the following conditions: (1) Statistical 
analyses are carried out with independent accidental variables; (2) Aggregates of acci-
dental variables should demonstrate close mean and dispersion values; (3) Aggregates 
should comply with the law of normal dispersion. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterion 
belongs to the so-called "robust" non-parameter methods, which are not sensitive to 
deviations from standard conditions. Low values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
criterion mean t h a t the fluctuation of the linguistic parameters analysed is minor, 
tha t is, not linguistically significant. Tambovtsev argues that low values of the K - S 
criterion in his research support his hypothesis on a normal dispersion of the eight 
groups of consonants established within sound sequences. The representation of any 
language with the help of eight groups of consonants has served as a basis for his 
phonostatistical research. 
Tambovtsev also employs the "chi-square" criterion in his investigations. Wi th 
the aid of this criterion, he estimates differences between the empirical and expected 
values. If the difference is insignificant, it can be a result of accidental deviation. 
Otherwise, it reflects significant differences between factual (empirical) and expected 
(theoretical) values of frequencies of phonemic group occurrences in speech. Bolshev 
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and Smirnov (1983, 166-71) have generated a list of maximum frequency values re-
flecting insignificant fluctuations of variables with the "chi-square" technique, which 
Tambovtsev describes on page 33. It is qui te convenient because usually linguists do 
not have books on statistics at hand. Christopher Butler recommends the chi-square 
test to measure the independence vs. association of linguistic units in various sorts 
of linguistic material (Butler 1985, 118—26). Tambovtsev shows how to use it on the 
material of the occurrence of labial consonants in a sample of British and American 
prose (Agatha Christie, John Braine, Somerset Maugham, Jack London, Francis Scott 
Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, etc.). The chi-square values show that labials are dis-
tributed rather homogeneously. Tambovtsev draws the a t tent ion of the reader to the 
importance of calculating the degrees of freedom correctly (p. 30). He also compares 
the distribution of labial, coronal, palatal, and velar consonants in Kalmyk (a Mon-
golian language) and Japanese (a genetically isolated language), though not by this 
statistical criterion (p. 31). However, the same criterion shows close similarity be-
tween the distribution of five consonantal groups in Turkish and Uzbek (p. 32). The 
T-coefficient is less than 1 for 5 parameters, i.e., coronal, palatal , velar, sonorant and 
occlusive. Tambovtsev explains T-coefficient as the ratio of the obtained chi-square 
values and the theoretical values that can be found in the chi-square tables. If the T-
coefficient is less than 1, the statistical results are similar (pp. 31-3). It also shows close 
similarity between some other Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Samoyedic, Tungus-Manchurian, 
Slavonic, Germanic, Iranian and other Indo-European languages inside their taxons. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to issues of the genetic and typological classification of lan-
guages of the world. The author does not go into details on debates concerning inclu-
sion of certain languages in particular genetic groups and families, or the identification 
of a particular language variety as a separate language or a dialect. The m a j o r aim 
of the author is to provide a technique t h a t allows linguists to check the rightfulness 
of the inclusion of a particular language in a certain language group or family. Before 
analysing the compactness of subgroups, groups, families and other language taxons, 
Tambovtsev warns the reader that the problem of the division of languages into fami-
lies has not been completely solved. For instance, it is qui te necessary to discuss the 
problem if Turkic languages constitute a family in themselves or a branch in some 
other family, called the Altaic family. Actually, Turkic languages are considered to 
form a family by some linguists (e.g., Baskakov 1969 and other Russian linguists). 
However, some other linguists, especially those in the West, consider Turkic languages 
to be a group within the Altaic family spoken in Asia Minor, Middle Asia and South-
ern Asia (Voegelin-Voegelin 1977; Katzner 1986, 3). The other two branches of the 
Altaic family are Tungus-Manchurian and Mongolian. To my mind, it is more logical 
to consider Turkic languages a family, ra ther than a subgroup within the Altaic family. 
Altaic languages should be called a super-family, Sprachbund, language community or 
unity, since the true genetic relationship of Turkic, Tungus-Manchurian and Mongo-
lian languages have not been proved. If one goes along this line, then all languages on 
the Ear th may be called one family with lots of groups and branches. On t h e other 
hand, it is not productive to set up a separate language family consisting of a single 
language. For instance, in the 1960s Ket was considered an isolated language of the 
Paleo-Asiatic family (Krejnovich 1968, 453). However, today it is considered to form 
the so-called Yeniseyan family, consisting of only one language with its dialects and 
subdialects. Summing up the modern view, David Crystal remarks that Yeniseyan 
is a family of languages generally placed within the Paleo-Siberian group, now repre-
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sented by only one language—Ket, or Yenisey-Ostyak (Crystal 1992, 424). I do not 
think it is wise t o multiply language families in t h a t manner. Other linguists (e.g., 
Ago Kunnap, Angela Marcantonio, etc.) question the very existence of the Uralic 
language family (Marcantonio 2002). Among other language families, Tambovtsev de-
scribes the Finno-Ugric family. He argues that this language family includes two major 
groups: the Balto-Finnic and Ugric groups. The au thor considers the theories of those 
linguists who identify the following four groups in t h e Finno-Ugric family: (1) The 
Balto-Finnic group including Estonian, Finnish, Karelian, Vepsian, Izhorian, Votic, 
Livonian, and Saami (possessing some specific features); (2) The Volgaic group in-
cluding Erza-Mordvinian, Moksha-Mordvinian, Mounta in Mari, and Lawn or Meadow 
or East Mari; (3) The Permic group comprising Udmur t , Komi-Zyrian, and Komi-
Permian; and (4) The Ugric group comprising Hungarian, Mansi, and Khanty; as 
well as the Samoyedic language family comprising the Nenets, Selkup, Nganasan, and 
Enets languages. 
Finno-Ugric and Samoyedic are said to form the Uralic language uni t . Tambov-
tsev argues that until the present, no proto-language of this unit has been established. 
The languages of t he Uralic unit do not form a compact unity from the point of view 
of dispersal and frequency of phonemic groups. W i t h the aid of the coefficients tha t 
Tambovtsev calculated in his studies, the author has shown that the consonant indices 
and the compactness (dispersion) coefficients suggest a more compact unity for the 
Samoyedic language family (mean V = 18.29%; T = 0.16) than for the Finno-Ugric 
(mean V = 24.14%; T = 0.47). The Uralic language uni ty shows even more dispersion 
(mean V = 28.31%; T = 0.57). This fact has been interpreted as support ing the idea 
tha t languages of t he Samoyedic and Finno-Ugric families are more closely related to 
one another within the family than between the families. Thus, the idea of the Uralic 
taxon as a language family should be either rejected or considered with caution (p. 125). 
The Turkic language group includes Azeri, Baraba-Tatar , Bashkir, Gagauz, Karaim, 
Dolgán, Kazakh, Kamasin, Karakalpak, Karachai-Balkarian, Kirghiz, Crimea-Tatar, 
Kumyk, Nogai, Ta ta r , Tofalar, Tuvin, Turkish, Turkmenian, Uzbek, Shor, and Yakut. 
The author argues tha t a Turkic proto-language can be regarded as a real parent 
language for all t h e Turkic languages. He points out t h a t the Turkic proto-language 
( Ursprache) demonstrates closer relations to any of t h e present Turkic languages than 
these languages may have between one another today. However, he did not include 
Proto-Turkic in his studies because of the uncertainty in the pronunciation. The Mon-
golian language family includes only three languages: Buriat , Kalmyk, and Mongolian. 
It is the minimum possible group for statistical analysis. The Tungus-Manchurian lan-
guage group includes 10 languages: Manchurian, Nanai , Negidal, Oroch, Orok, Solon, 
Udege, Ulchi, Evenk (Tungus), and Even. Inclusion of the Turkic, Mongolian and 
Tungus-Manchurian language families into one language unity represents a debated 
topic in linguistics today. 
The Indo-European language family seems to be the most thoroughly investigated 
one. Major linguistic methods of investigation and comparative linguistic analysis 
were elaborated during the long history of studies of European languages. However, 
currently the ma jo r question concerning the existence of a single Indo-European proto-
language has not been resolved. It is noteworthy t h a t many linguistic debates have 
been carried out in terms of "similarity" and "linguistic distance". Yet, the terms 
themselves have not been clearly defined. Tambovtsev thinks that at the present state 
of understanding, modern languages represent either products of divergence or those 
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of the reverse process, i.e., convergence. In a historical perspective, both processes 
produced their impacts on the development of languages. Tambovtsev agrees wi th 
those researchers who think tha t the origin of all Indo-European languages f rom a 
single proto-language is mere fiction, while their co-existence and convergence in their 
development resulting in the appearance of certain common features is a scientific 
fact. The noted uniformity of the Indo-European languages can be explained as a 
secondary, later phenomenon, and differentiating features represent the original and 
early characteristics of each language of this family. However, no classifications other 
than the généalogie one have been elaborated, and Tambovtsev accepts the classifica-
tion of the Indo-European family into the Indian, Iranian, Baltic, Slavonic (including 
Eastern, Western, and Southern Slavonic as sub-groups), Germanic, Romanic, and 
Celtic language groups. 
Following Illich-Svitych, Tambovtsev believes that the Nostratic language uni ty 
can serve as a good model for linguistic investigations of various sorts, but he does not 
think these languages should be considered a language unity; moreover, this ra ther 
arbitrary construct is not recognised by all linguists. The Nostratic language uni ty 
includes the following language families: Indo-European, Finno-Ugric, Samovedic, 
Turkic, Mongolian, Tungus-Manchurian, Cartvelian, and Semito-Hamitic. Tambov-
tsev proposes a concept of compactness for linguistic studies. He defines compactness 
as a measure for more or less closely related languages within language sub-groups, 
groups, families, etc. In other words, he a t t empts to measure the distance between 
languages within analysed taxons or clusters. The distances are measured on the basis 
of frequency rates of particular linguistic (phonological) characteristics. The au thor 
uses the concepts of image recognition and regards language families as units wi th 
a more or less compact structure. In the branch of applied mathematics called pa t -
tern recognition, images of various sorts are recognised. One can consider language to 
be a sort of such image. Therefore, one can use the methods of pattern recognition 
to develop various types of classifications based on exact values of some coefficients 
(Zagorujko 1999, 195-201). The generated index of compactness can be regarded as 
an indicator of the opposing process of diffusion. Values of frequency rate of part ic-
ular parameters should not considerably deviate from the mean value established for 
a given language family or group. If the values of deviation are considerably higher 
than the established mean value, the given language does not belong to the language 
family under discussion. If the majority of languages produce these deviation indices 
higher than the mean value, we should state tha t the languages under study do not 
form a language group but rather a set of separate languages. Tambovtsev has for-
warded the hypothesis tha t the typological similarity of languages can be tested by 
statistical methods resulting in generating a set of indices described above. The hy-
pothesis claims that when a language is included in a particular language group, the 
generated indices of this new formation will show either a higher or lower degree of 
compactness. Closely related languages would increase the compactness indices and 
vice versa. The author illustrates this assumption by a series of examples. Thus , 
he analyses frequency rates of labial consonants in the Turkic languages compared to 
Mongolian. The frequency of labial consonants in Mongolian is 7.52%. In the Turkic 
languages the relevant figures vary from 5.98% to 12.80%. The to ta l fluctuation index 
is 6.28, the difference between the neighbouring languages is 0.49. The Altai language 
has produced the lowest index of labial consonant frequency, while Karakalpak has 
shown the highest index. The Turkic languages can be classified in the following way 
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by the labial consonant frequency indices: Karakalpak—12.80%; Turkish —10.41%; 
Uighur —9.83%; Azerbajani —9.66%; Uzbek —9.42%; Kumandin —9.22%; Baraba-
Tatar—9.04%; Turkmen—8.50%; Kirghiz—8.43%; Kazakh-Tatar—8.03%; Kazakh— 
7.99%; Hakas—7.82%; Yakut—6.10%, and Altai—5.98%. The place of the Mongo-
lian language (7.52%) is between Hakas and Yakut suggesting t h a t the distribution 
of labial consonants is more similar in these three languages compared to other lan-
guages of t he Turkic group. T h e Mongolian group has produced the following indices: 
Mongolian (7.52%), Buriat (7.67%), and Kalmyk (6.65%). These distribution indices 
fall within the same range as above—from 5.98% to 12.80%, while the total fluctua-
tion and the difference between the neighbouring languages are lower (1.02 and 0.34 
respectively). The Uralic language unity yields labial frequency indices in the range 
of 7.71%—13.72%, the difference between the neighbouring languages being 0.30. In-
dices of a language group compounding Mongolian and Tungus-Manchurian languages 
are from 7.52% to 12.46%, with mean difference of 0.70 between the neighbouring val-
ues. Consequently, we may infer considerable differences in the sound sequences of the 
Mongolian and the Tungus-Manchurian languages. 
On the contrary, the introduction of the Mans i language belonging to the Finno-
Ugric language family, on which language Turkic and Mongolian did not produce 
considerable influence, into the Turkic languages increases the diffusion index of this 
group. Consequently, the Mansi language, unlike Mongolian, does not belong to the 
Turkic language group. Analysis of frequency ra tes of the coronal consonants may serve 
as another example of the compactness of Turkic and Mongolian languages. Coronal 
consonants represent the most frequent sounds in the Turkic languages as well as in 
many other languages of the world. The range of frequency of coronal sounds in the 
Turkic languages varies from 32.35% to 40.24%. The overall fluctuation index is 7.89, 
the difference between the neighbouring languages (the mean difference) is 0.564. In 
Mongolian, t he range of frequency of coronal sounds is 36.57% of the total number of 
sounds. The mean difference for a compound group of Turkic languages and Mongo-
lian becomes lower (0.526). T h e relevant figures found for the Uralic languages are: 
frequency range 24.79%—36.78%; the fluctuation index is 11.99; the mean difference 
is 0.6. Apparently, the Turkic language group is more compact t han the Uralic. The 
Mongolian and Tungus-Manchurian language families have yielded similar indices in 
the range of 17.31% to 36.57%; the fluctuation index is 19.26; the mean difference is 
2.75. Paleo-Asian languages represent a still less compact group: their frequency rates 
vary from 20.02% to 36,74%; the fluctuation index is 16.64; the mean difference is 2.38. 
The author provides frequency indices on many languages and language groups. In 
order to show the general tendency in the distribution of speech sounds, he proposes to 
use the general coefficients of variation resulting from adding generated indices on each 
group of phonemes. He also uses the T-coefficient, which is generated on the basis of the 
"chi-square" index, as a reference index. The resulting general coefficients of variation 
(V) allow him to form the following sequence. T h e Ugric language group demonstrates 
the highest diffusion (V = 221.27%, T = 3.77). T h e Balto-Finnic languages yield V = 
185.90%, T = 2.79. The group of Volgaic languages is the most compact group with 
V = 143.19%, T = 1.02. Another interesting method of comparative analysis implies 
the introduction of isolated Asian languages into various language families in order 
to establish possible relationships. Thus, introduction of the Ket language into the 
Finno-Ugric family (V = 193.13%, T = 3.77) results in a higher diffusion (V = 198.04, 
T = 3.94). T h e same procedure with Yukaghir yields V = 199.17%; with Korean 
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V = 199.24%, T = 3.88; with Japanese V = 200.51%, T = 3.91; Nivkhi yields V = 
206.48%. On the contrary, Chinese has shown closer similarity with the Finno-Ugric 
languages: V = 190.01%, T = 3.65. As a result of his investigations, Tambovtsev has 
come to the following conclusions: 
(1) Coronal and occlusive consonants are the most evenly distributed across lan-
guage families. 
(2) Voiced consonants represent the most variable feature; some languages have 
no category called "voiced" consonants at all. 
(3) The Mongolian language family is the most compact one by the sum to ta l 
of the values of the coefficient of variation based on seven major groups of phonemes 
(without voiced consonants) and the coefficient T. The consequence with respect to the 
sum total of the coefficient of variation has been established as follows: the Mongolian, 
Samoyedic, Turkic, Tungus-Manchurian, and Finno-Ugric language families exhibit 
less and less compactness, in that order. The Paleo-Asiatic language family yields 
the highest diffusion (i.e., the lowest compactness) indices and consequently can be 
regarded not as a language family but as a loose language unity or community. 
(4) The general tendency has been shown that in general a language sub-group 
is more compact than a group, and a group is more compact than a language family. 
The least compact, tha t is, the loosest, is the language super-unity comprising all the 
languages of the world. 
(5) The collection of two language groups or two families into one unit results in 
higher diffusion rates than those characteristic of the original taxons. 
All in all, I can say tha t this book by Yuri Tambovtsev is a solid and profound 
investigation in the comparative analysis of the languages of the world. The author 
provides numerous tables with indices and coefficients generated through various tech-
niques for a large number of languages. The analysis of these data provides linguists 
with a method of linguistic investigation on the basis of numerical procedures. The 
book contains a large list of references. It is recommended to those students who are 
interested in phonology, linguistic statistics and the typology of languages. I think 
that, at the moment, many linguists are concerned with minor linguistic problems 
within a single language. Linguistics lacks books like this that deal with the mod-
ern classification of languages. Tambovtsev's book may give us new material for such 
language classifications. 
Ludmila Alekseevna Shipulina 
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HUNGARIAN BOOKS ON LINGUISTICS 
László Cseresnyési: Nyelvek és stratégiák, avagy a nyelv antropológiája [Languages and 
strategies, or, the anthropology of language]. Tinta Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2004. 
387 pp. 
This is a handbook of sociolinguistics written for students and researchers who want to 
become immersed in the relevant literature. It covers all areas of research on language-
and-society and includes a list of as many as 2810 references. A 'Glossary of sociolin-
guistic concepts' at the end of the book lists the English, German, French, Russian, 
Japanese and Chinese equivalents of approximately 300 Hungarian terms of sociolin-
guistics. In addition to Hungarian, English, and other oft-cited languages, several 
further — especially Asian — languages are mentioned, given t h a t the author thinks 
that one cannot talk about the diversity and multifariousness of languages without 
actually mentioning large numbers of languages. As the Chinese saying goes: "He who 
wants to know what a pear tastes like will have to taste a pear." 
Contents: 1. Principles and paradigms (How abstract is linguistics?; Linguistics 
as (almost) a natural science; Sociolinguistics: the birth of a paradigm?); 2. Codes, 
skills, and strategies (What is 'communicative competence'?; Linguistic politeness, for-
mality, honorificness; Codes and manipulations; Speech, writing, and literacy); 3. Lan-
guages in language (Types of language varieties; Slang, jargon, argot; Male language, 
female language (1 + 1 = 1); Linguistic variables, language change and speaker's age); 
4. Facts and judgements (National norm: politics or aesthetics?; Norms, academies, 
laws; Puristic superstitions — in Hungary and with other nations; Linguistic aware-
ness, linguistic value judgement); 5. Geolinguistics: languages of the world and world 
language (Language or dialect?; The demography of languages—and what surrounds 
it; Language and nation; "Important" languages, "equal" languages and the Euro-
pean Union); 6. Multilingualism, language planning, linguistic rights (Mother tongue, 
command of language, and a typology of bilingualism; Language planning, standardis-
ation, koiné; Cold days on both sides of the border; Human rights and language-related 
rights); 7. Linguistic ecology: contacts and conflicts (Language contacts and integra-
tion; Pidgins and Creoles; The life, death, and resurrection of languages); 8. Sign 
languages and artificial languages (Sign languages; Secret, imagined, and universal-
philosophical languages; Artificial auxiliary languages and world language); Glossary 
of sociolinguistic concepts; Bibliography; Index of names and subjects. 
Ferenc Kiefer: Lehetőség és szükségszerűség: Tanulmányok a nyelvi modalitás köréből 
[Possibility and necessity: Papers on linguistic modality]. Tinta Könyvkiadó, Budapest , 
2005. 144 pp 
The author is the most renowned Hungarian expert on modality; his papers on the 
topic are among the most valuable pieces of the international literature on issues of 
linguistic modality. In this volume, many ideas that first appeared in his papers on 
modality written in the past twenty-five years reappear in a unified framework; but 
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the material found here is more than a simple summary of earlier studies in at least 
two respects. First , the author has taken the recent literature, bo th in Hungary and 
abroad, into consideration: practically all theoretically relevant work that has been 
published in the past decades on modality has left its trace on the present book, 
especially its first chapter. And second, what is far more important , the analyses in 
the second, third, and fourth chapters rely heavily on the Hungarian National Text 
Corpus. What is new here, then, and not only within Ferenc Kiefer's oeuvre but also 
within the relvant international literature, is tha t the analyses are corpus-based. But 
the corpus has not only been used by the author in order to support his earlier ideas 
by real, rather t han made up, examples: rather, it has made it possible for him to 
reveal novel, intriguing aspects of the topics discussed. 
Contents: Introduction; 1. On the concept of modality; 2. The semantics of the 
modal suffix -hat/-het 'may' and of the modal auxiliary kell 'must'; 3. The semantics of 
the auxiliary tud 'can'; 4. Pragmatic aspects of modality; 5. Outlook; Literature; Index. 
Christopher Pii ión- Péter Siptár (eds): Approaches to Hungarian, Volume Nine: Papers 
from the Düsseldorf Conference. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 333 pp. 
Volume nine of t he series presents papers from the Sixth International Conference on 
the Structure of Hungarian (ICSH-6) held at Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf, 
Germany, on 12-13 September 2002. 
The topics discussed include a conception of morphology in which every mor-
pheme is t reated as a lexical i tem; the behaviour of / j / , / v / , and / h / with respect 
to voicing assimilation; an analysis of verbal particles in which their presence or ab-
sence is determined by the event structure of the sentence; two types of long-distance 
focus-raising in Hungarian; a new typology of question words in terms of Functional 
Grammar; problems for a purely stress-driven account of focus movement; an analysis 
of complex event nominals accounting for their striking clausal properties; various con-
version phenomena in Hungarian; an analysis of the linking properties of nominaliza-
tions and participles in Lexical Functional Grammar; single and multiple uJi-fronting; 
an optimality-theoretic analysis of the distribution and behaviour of H-type segments; 
the issue whether Hungarian has portmanteau agreement; and past tense suffixation 
discussed in te rms of the principle of contrast and the principle of uniformity of par-
adigmetically related inflected forms. 
Contents: Towards a totally lexicalist morphology (Gábor Alberti, Kata Balogh, 
Judit Kleiber and Anita Viszket); Another look at the misbehaving segments of Hun-
garian voicing assimilation (Sylvia Blaho); First steps towards a theory of the verbal 
particle (Katalin E. Kiss), Two strategies of focus-raising: movement and resumption 
(Judit Gervain); The typology of question words in Hungarian (Casper de Groot); 
Is "focus movement" driven by stress? (Julia Horváth); Nonfinite clauses in derived 
nominals (István Kenesei); Conversion in Hungarian (Ferenc Kiefer); Nominalization, 
participle formation, typology, and Lexical Mapping Theory (Tibor Laczkó); Trigger-
ing tt'/i-fronting (Balázs Surányi); Hungarian H-type segments in Optimality Theory 
(Szilárd Szentgyörgyi and Péter Siptár); Hungarian has no portmanteau agreement 
(Jochen Trommer); Re-presenting the past: Contrast and uniformity in Hungarian 
past tense (Viktor Trón and Péter Rebrus); Contents of previous volumes; List of 
cases in Hungarian. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
Call for papers 
Argumentum 
Editor-in-chief: András Kertész 
Managing Editor: Zsuzsanna Iványi 
The Graduate School for Linguistics of the University of Debrecen an-
nounces the new journal Argumentum. Argumentum is a peer-reviewed 
scholarly journal tha t is open to all high-quality contributions to language 
sciences and classical philology without any restrictions on possible top-
ics. Its primary goal is to offer Ph.D. students of linguistics and the staff 
of linguistics graduate programmes a fast and respectable forum of pub-
lication. The languages of publication are Hungarian, English, French, 
German, Russian, Latin, Italian and Spanish. Accepted papers will be 
immediately made accessible for download on the internet, and will be 
archived in annual volumes. 
Argumentum functions in every respect like printed journals. Pub-
lished papers will receive a consecutive page numbering within the annual 
volume, so they can be cited by volume, year, and page number. 
Papers intended for publication should be submitted in an electronic 
format as an attached file to the following e-mail address: argumen-
tum@puma.unideb.hu. All submitted publications will be refereed by re-
viewers who are selected by the editorial board. For further information 
see the website http:/ /argumentum.unideb.hu/. 
* * * 
Ausschreibung des Robert-Gragger-Preises 
Die Gesellschaft Ungarischer Germanisten schreibt den Robert-Gragger-
Preis aus, der von Prof. Dr. András Vizkelety, Mitglied der ungarischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Ehrenpräsident der Gesellschaft Ungari-
scher Germanisten, gestiftet wurde. Der Preis wird jedes zweite Jahr 
— zum ersten Mal 2006 — verliehen. 
Die Stiftung des Preises setzt sich zum Ziel, 
(a) die Aufmerksamkeit der wissenschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit auf die ger-
manistischen Forschungen zu lenken, 
(b) herausragende Forschungsergebnisse im Bereich der Germanistik an-
zuerkennen sowie 
(c) die weitere Forschungstätigkeit der Preisträger finanziell zu unter-
stützen. 
Um für den Preis nominiert zu werden ist 
(a) die Eigenbewerbung, 
(b) die Nominierung durch Hochschulinstitutionen oder Forschungsinsti-
tute der ungarischen Germanistik oder 
(c) die Empfehlung eines Trägers der Pro-Germanistica-Hungarica-Me-
daille 
notwendig. 
Teilnahmeberechtigt sind ungarische Staatsbürger und Staatsbürge-
rinnen oder in Ungarn tätige ausländische Wissenschaftler und Wissen-
schaftlerinnen, die zum Bewerbungstermin das 40. Lebensjahr noch nicht 
vollendet und innerhalb der letzten 5 Jahre ein wissenschaftliches Werk 
(Monographie, Aufsatz oder Textausgabe) von herausragender Qualität 
veröffentlicht haben. 
Die Bewerbungsunterlagen mit 
(a) der für den Preis vorgeschlagenen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit , 
(b) tabellarischem Lebenslauf und 
(c) dem Verzeichnis der wissenschaftlichen Publikationen 
sind bis zum 31. Dezember 2005 (Poststempel) an den Präsidenten Prof. 
Dr. András Kertész zu senden. Anschrift: Gesellschaft Ungarischer Ger-
manisten, H-4010 Debrecen, Pf. 47. 
Uber die Verleihung des Preises entscheidet das von der Vollver-
sammlung der Gesellschaft Ungarischer Germanisten gewählte Kuratori-
um. Die feierliche Preisübergabe erfolgt anlässlich der Vollversammlung 
der Gesellschaft Ungarischer Germanisten im Mai 2006. 
Weitere Informationen befinden sich auf der Webseite: 
http: / /www.gug.unideb.hu. 
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. . . as referred to by Hoover (1967, 56-78; 1976, 43). 
. . . mentioned by several authors (Elgar 1978, 77; Williams 1981, 154-6) . . . 
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C O G N I T I V E G R A M M A R : T H E S T A T E O F T H E A R T 
A N D R E L A T E D I S S U E S : A N I N T E R V I E W W I T H 
R O N A L D L A N G A C K E R * 
JÓZSEF ANDOR 
Abstract 
In this interview with the founder of cognitive g rammar as a model of description the 
following major issues have been raised and discussed: (i) relations between models of 
cognitive linguistics: cognitive g r a m m a r vs. construction grammar; (ii) t he na ture of 
lexical representation: the scope of wordhood vs. expressions; (iii) t he n a t u r e and role 
of domains vs. types of conceptual s t ruc tu re such as scenes, frames, and scripts; (iv) the 
s t a tus and scope of active zones in linguistic description; (v) the na tu re of economy 
in linguistic representation at various levels — lexical semantic vs. lexical pragmat ic 
issues; (vi) the t r ea tment of par t of speech relatedness in cognitive g rammar , with 
special emphasis on the s ta tus of adject ives; (vii) the not ion of linguistic modularity. 
A N D O R : Thank you very much for accepting my call for an interview. 
I am honored to have a chance to talk to one of the founding fathers 
of cognitive linguistics, founder of the paradigm called cognitive gram-
mar, in Budapest. My first question particularly concerns the relation 
between cognitive linguistics and cognitive grammar itself as a model. In 
the course of the past few decades cognitive-based studies of language have 
gained more and more ground, mainly as an alternative to the Chomskyan 
type of generative grammar and other types of formalistic or logically 
based linguistic theoretical paradigms. A number of models have been 
presented. We have to note, however, that an important common fea-
ture of all of them is that they are deeply rooted in studying the cognitive 
sources or bases of language, linguistic representation and expressibility. 
That is to say, they all share a common core: cognition. How do you view 
your own model, that of cognitive grammar, which I think constitutes one 
* This interview was recorded a t Eö tvös Loránd University, Budapest , on Decem-
ber 6, 2004. Special thanks go t o Professor Zoltán Kövecses in helping to orga-
nize it. 
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of the mainstreams of research with such a bias, among the varieties of 
models of cognitive linguistics? Basically, I would like you to comment 
on the relation and differences between the so-called 'cognitive linguistics' 
and 'cognitive grammar'. 
LANGACKER: I am not sure tha t there are differences. How much is sub-
sumed under cognitive linguistics, of course, is a very flexible mat ter . It 
could be construed very broadly. Some people would include, for example, 
Jackendoff's work under cognitive linguistics. I generally include Anna 
Wierzbicka's work under cognitive linguistics, and construction grammar 
in its various guises. So it is a broad view tha t could be construed more 
narrowly, e.g., to include people who would normally go to the ICLC 
(the International Cognitive Linguistics Conference). Tha t would, for 
example, exclude Jackendoff, and I would also exclude him from cogni-
tive linguistics (in the narrower sense) due to his belief in the autonomy 
of grammar. Thus, instead of saying that cognitive grammar is different 
from cognitive linguistics, I would say tha t it is only one version of it. 
Arguably, however, it is the best articulated and worked out as a compre-
hensive framework, with the possible exception of construction grammar 
(in which many more people are specifically working). Cognitive grammar 
is meant to be a potentially comprehensive model of language structure. 
I've tried to design it in such a way tha t it can be an umbrella for all the 
varied research done in cognitive and even functional linguistics. Many 
different levels and dimensions of linguistic s t ructure can be approached 
through cognitive grammar, even if they have not been equally explored. 
For example, there can and should be a cognitive phonology. I have dis-
cussed numerous aspects of phonology in various places, although I have 
not tried to work out a comprehensive account (not having been trained 
as a phonologist). I think there can and will eventually be a cognitive 
lexicography using the ideas of cognitive grammar . Sociolinguistic ques-
tions, diachronic problems like grammaticization, language acquisition— 
these can all be approached using the cognitive grammar framework. So 
even though relatively few people in cognitive linguistics actually do cog-
nitive grammar per se and work out descriptions in terms of it, I still 
think of it as a potential umbrella, as something which can ultimately 
model the various results being achieved in cognitive linguistics. 
ANDOR: Recently, one can experience some sort of a merging, or at 
least some sort of a linking between cognitive grammar and a more and 
more intensively emerging field: construction grammar. You yourself 
tackled the relations between these models in your plenary lecture given 
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recently at an important conference on cognitive linguistics in Logrono, 
Spain (2003). Let me add to this that Ray Jackendoff, who still considers 
himself a generativist, has also recently expressed his sympathy with con-
structionist types of grammar. Do you think that construction grammar, 
as outlined by Croft, Goldberg and others, and your model of cognitive 
grammar should go together as parallel, but quite closely related models, 
or perhaps, that they could or even should be merged in some way? 
L A N G A C K E R : I think you have to separate the basic idea of construc-
tionism from the more general ideas of cognitive grammar and cognitive 
linguistics. Even people in generative grammar now talk more in terms 
of templates and constraints than in terms of rules (in the classic sense of 
rewriting rules and derivations from underlying structures). So I think the 
basic idea has basically been established quite broadly. It was fundamen-
tal to cognitive grammar from the s ta r t , many years ago. It has become 
common even in generative approaches. And of course it is a basic no-
tion of Fillmore's construction grammar: the idea t h a t constructions are 
the basic objects of description is one parallelism between construction 
grammar and cognitive grammar. 
A N D O R : I did not refer to Fillmore as he never published the book version 
of it. 
L A N G A C K E R : Tha t ' s right. In any case, these ideas were worked out 
independently at about the same time. I didn't talk about 'constructions' 
as the object of descript ion—that was originally Fillmore's term. I never 
thought to use the term, but if you look at my model, tha t ' s exactly 
what it is, of course. So there are many similarities between construction 
grammar (in all its versions) and cognitive grammar, just because of t ha t 
common starting point: constructions as the basic objects of description, 
as well as a basic vehicle of description. Also the idea tha t constructions 
reduce to form-meaning pairings. T h a t ' s a common idea, up to a point. 
There are also many differences which I have talked about in various 
places, one being tha t paper from the Logrono conference, which will 
soon be published in a volume based on the conference proceedings. 
There I looked particularly at Crof t ' s radical construction grammar 
(2001) and Goldberg's version of classic construction grammar (1995). 
There's one major difference, which is really the fundamental difference 
between cognitive grammar and those other kinds of construction gram-
mar. It reflects the fact t ha t Fillmore and the people who have followed 
him have never even tried to totally reduce grammar to meaning and 
symbolic relationships. There are s t i l l—and this is wha t I tried to point 
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out at various places—vestiges of autonomous grammar in construction 
grammar. As formulated, this is true of bo th Croft 's version and Gold-
berg's version. It is apparent when they talk about wha t goes into a 
form-meaning pairing. As for meaning, people working in construction 
grammar tend not to do very much with it, at least with meaning in 
my sense of the term. They don' t get into the details of construal, and 
they usually don' t bring in metaphor, fictivity, or mental spaces. These 
fundamental matters tend to be omitted in construction grammar, a t 
least in practice. I don' t know how people feel about it in principle. 
But certainly, basic ideas like construal, profiling, t ra jector- landmark 
organization, perspective, metaphor, etc. are not very visible in their 
analyses. Still, there is agreement that meaning figures in grammatical 
description. Now what about form? In discussions of construction gram-
mar, what is referred to as ' form' includes not just phonology, but also 
grammatical form. Indications of grammatical category (like noun and 
verb) and grammatical relations (like subject and object) are adopted as 
semantically unanalyzed notions. Though subsumed under form, they 
are not phonological and not perceptually observable. W h a t I tried to 
show in the paper mentioned, among other things, was t h a t in cognitive 
grammar ' form' is limited to phonology and other symbolizing structures 
—e.g., ges ture—but does not include syntactic categories, nor grammat-
ical relations. Despite the traditional terminology, referring to these as 
matters of ' form' is inappropriate. I analyze those notions in terms of 
symbolic relationships. A noun, for example, is not something which has 
a meaning, a phonological representation, and another aspect of form, 
namely its s ta tus as a noun. Rather, it is something which has a mean-
ing and a phonological representation, being a noun precisely because of 
what kind of meaning it has. Status as a noun is not something distinct. 
So, whereas in the other versions of construction grammar the 'form' 
part of form-meaning pairings includes aspects of grammar, for me form 
is limited to phonology (and other symbolizing structures). All aspects 
of grammar are inherent in the pairing of those other two. Grammar is 
not something tha t participates in symbolic relationships as par t of what 
is doing the symbolization. Rather, it is implicit in the symbolic rela-
tionships themselves, where these reduce to meanings and phonological 
structures. 
ANDOR: One of the interesting issues related to your theory concerns the 
status and scope of the linguistic notion and concept of 'word'. You don't 
seem to use the notion to serve as a linguistic unit. What you do use, 
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systematically, is the term 'expression'. However, 'expression' seems to 
have a broader status in your theory. One can say, it has even a differ-
ent scope. I mean, even full utterances can be taken to be expressions, 
but single lexical items can also have such a status. If I understand you 
correctly, expressions emerge as units in discourse, which suggests to me 
that they are units of performance, and that thus they have a high rate 
of flexibility of content under the dominance of the particular 'domain' 
that they linguistically map. Can you clarify and outline the notions of 
'expression' and 'lexical item' as linguistic units in your view (you do 
tend to use the term 'lexical item ' rather than 'word ' in your papers and 
books —1987, 425-8; 1990; 1999a, b), and reflect on their relation to the 
conventional notion of wordhood? Actually, let me note that John Taylor, 
who is also a cognitivist, uses the term 'word' in Chapter 9 of his volu-
minous textbook on cognitive grammar published in 2002 and elsewhere 
(talking about the taxonomy of symbolic units), and you cannot find the 
term 'expression' in the index of that book. 
L A N G A C K E R : Well, Taylor was doing what he was doing for purposes of 
writing a textbook, and I th ink he was probably following the traditional 
textbook practice of talking about words in a rather informal way. Let 
me not address t h a t seriously; I think tha t was done for practical reasons. 
First, a preliminary terminological point . I use the t e rm 'unit ' in a 
technical sense, as something which has become an established cognitive 
routine. So technically speaking, a novel expression cannot be a unit, nor 
can we talk of "units of performance". 
Now, the word 'word' is very much abused by linguists in writing 
textbooks and elsewhere. I t ' s very common in textbooks of English to 
talk about lexical items as words. You can get away with t ha t in English, 
because so many lexical i tems are pretty much coextensive with words, 
we don' t have a highly inflected morphology, and so on. Bu t in general we 
need to distinguish a 'lexical i tem' or ' lexeme' from a 'word' . In polysyn-
thetic languages, or any language with a lot of complex morphology, a 
'word' is usually a 'novel expression' in some way. There is typically 
a lexical stem plus a number of derivational and inflectional elements, 
and while each of these is familiar individually the totali ty is quite of ten 
novel. So for m e — a n d I 'm being conservative here—a word is the kind 
of thing you would write with spaces around it in a European language. 
Or to take the classic Bloomfieldian definition, a word is a minimal free 
form, and a word boundary a natural place to pause (1933, 177-89). I 
think a word is a kind of psychological unit , at least in certain kinds of 
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languages. And for me it 's basically a phonological unit . I don' t have 
much by way of a cognitive grammar analysis, so I haven't used it or 
tried to define it technically. But I do mean to limit 'word' to "words" in 
the ordinary sense of the term, things you write wi th spaces (assuming 
the practice were rationalized a bit). Understood in this way, we can-
not talk about a language consisting of words, or people just producing 
words. You need some other term for wha t I call 'expressions'. You are 
right tha t the term 'expression' is used very broadly here. Besides words, 
it includes phrases, entire sentences, entire utterances, i.e., any kind of 
utterance of any size. There is no reason why sequences of sentences 
could not be called 'expressions', but in practice I use the term only up 
to the sentence level. And you do need some term: if you want to talk 
about grammar in a general way, you cannot talk jus t about words, or 
about phrases, or about clauses. You need something for raw d a t a of 
any size, and 'expression' is what I use. I t ' s not really a technical term, 
so I haven't defined it carefully, but in volume 1 of Foundations t he re is 
quite a long section about the subtleties of this notion (1987, 425-8). It 
is not self-explanatory, and what counts as an 'expression' depends on 
the purpose of one's analysis, how closely you look at the data. 
In my view terms like 'lexical i tem' and 'lexicon' are also much 
abused, being used in different ways often based on gratuitous assump-
tions. The only definition t ha t makes sense to me, one that is useful and 
approximates the tradit ional understanding of it, is to define a 'lexical 
item' as a 'fixed expression'. It 's not coextensive with 'word', i t ' s not 
coextensive with expressions that are in some way unpredictable or ir-
regular. For me, then, a 'lexical i tem' is something you would list in a 
dictionary as a fixed expression—an expression t h a t people learn as a 
unit, regardless of its size. In many languages it is typically smaller than 
a word, but there is no reason not to regard fixed expressions larger t han 
words as lexical items, since there is no natural stopping point. So these 
terms have different functions, and I t ry to use all of them in a fairly tra-
ditional and consistent sense. A 'word' is basically a phonological unit, 
'expression' is a general t e rm for sequences that are produced and need 
to be analyzed, and 'lexical items' are fixed expressions. 
A N D O R : With this notion of expressions and wordhood as outlined, what 
do you think of the role and status of dictionaries as linguistic aids for 
native and non-native speakers of a language? What do they represent? 
And, in particular, what sort of, what type of information should they 
represent? Ongoing research in frame-based semantics, which I would 
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rather term 'frame-based pragmatics', suggests that dictionaries of the fu-
ture should be frame-based, they should provide a more thorough and pre-
cise representation of world, that is, conceptual, encyclopaedically-based 
knowledge. Research with a related scope of interest, called WordNet, is 
carried out in Princeton. By the way, cognitive grammar claims to be an 
encyclopaedically-based model of representing linguistic conceptualization. 
L A N G A C K E R : Your question is largely practical, and I 'm not a very prac-
tical person. So my answer will be rather limited. 
The notion of semantics being encyclopaedic in scope simply means 
tha t linguistic expressions, and lexical items in particular, are not vessels 
full of content. Instead they give us semi-structured ways of accessing 
conceptual content which is largely there for independent reasons. And 
there is no principled dividing line between what can be evoked via lexi-
cal i tems and general knowledge. I think this is very important to realize 
from a theoretical standpoint. The point is crucial if you want to un-
derstand language, how it works, how it 's represented psychologically, 
and how it relates to the rest of cognition. But this doesn't translate 
into descriptive practice of any principled or any practical sort. Taking 
the point seriously would actually imply t ha t i t 's impossible to write a 
dictionary, if you understand a dictionary as characterizing how speak-
ers represent things in their own minds. A real dictionary is necessarily 
artificial, in the sense that it has to be limited in scope. But this doesn't 
mean tha t people shouldn't wri te dictionaries or grammars for practi-
cal purposes. And those practical concerns dictate what should go into 
them. Wha t thoughts I have on the matter are not based on detailed re-
search or detailed lexicography of either a practical or a theoretical sort. 
For an optimal dictionary, I th ink tha t examples are very important to 
show how expressions are actually used. Something that is really critical, 
and typically left ou t of dictionaries, are indications of the normal ways 
of phrasing things in the language. I know this from personal experi-
ence. I studied various languages in college, and was good at studying 
them the way they were taught in those days, and in some places still 
are. T h a t is, I 'd learn all the lexical items presented in a course, and 
mastered everything in the grammar book. But this itself does not guar-
antee real fluency or the practical ability to use a language effortlessly 
in everyday conversation. Pa r t of the problem is register, par t of it is 
diglossia, part of it is not being exposed enough to the culture and all 
the things members of the culture talk about from day to day. There 
is a vast amount of background knowledge required to bridge the gap 
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between the way languages are classically taught and what is needed to 
use them in practice. But one particular factor s tands out in my mind as 
essential. Given tha t you have learned all the rules in a grammar book, 
and all the basic vocabulary, you still face the following problem: if you 
want to say something, there might in principle be dozens, hundreds, or 
even infinitely many different ways to say it in the language—all equally 
grammatical using basic vocabulary. But speakers would normally say 
it in one particular way, out of all these options. The problem, then, is 
knowing how one normally phrases things in the language. T h a t ' s a level 
which tends to be absent in language instruction, because it is not just a 
mat ter of grammar or of lexicon in the traditional sense. I cannot suggest 
a practical solution to the problem, but it does need to be addressed. 
ANDOR: However, talking about constituency, more particularly about the 
compositionality of expressions, you suggest that "components are nei-
ther fixed nor predetermined in their semantic or phonological shape, but 
are flexibly construed to accommodate adjacent elements and the overall 
context; hence they may never have exactly the same value on any two 
occasions" /Grammar and Conceptualization, 1999b, 152). How can this 
issue be tackled in discussing the representation of meaning and meaning 
facets in dictionaries, that is, in sourcebooks of lexical organization and 
—for the future, when frame-based — of lexical relations? 
LANGACKER: Well, t ha t ' s a hard question. A first point is tha t there is 
indeed something tha t one can call the linguistic meaning (or meanings) 
of a lexical item. I emphasize flexibility in saying tha t what you can access 
through a lexical item is indefinite in scope, tha t you can reach into any 
associated domain of knowledge, and that you adjust and accommodate 
a lexical item's meaning to surrounding elements. These are not however 
equivalent to saying tha t a lexical item has no definite meaning, or that it 
can mean anything at all. I t 's not the case tha t anything goes. You have 
to avoid two equally wrong positions, and my formulation tries to do that . 
One position is tha t the meaning of a lexical item is fixed, determined, and 
quite limited, tha t we can figure out what it is, and that it 's distinct from 
general knowledge. This is the classic view of the dictionary metaphor. 
The representation is generally assumed to be fairly small, roughly the 
size of actual dictionary entries (although Wierzbicka 1985 sometimes 
formulates very lengthy—albei t still limited —definitions). It is often 
conceived as being just a bundle of semantic features. 
The other extreme is to say tha t , all right, since in the right context 
we can construe a te rm as meaning almost anything, lexical i tems don't 
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have any fixed meanings. Things mean whatever we want them to mean. 
This, I think, is just obviously wrong. People know tha t words have 
meanings and tha t we stretch them to accommodate new circumstances. 
This implies that there is something we s tar t from, something we stretch 
when needed. 
So I talk about a lexical item being a structured and partially de-
termined way of accessing encyclopaedic knowledge. A particular lexical 
item takes certain aspects of its referent (certain cognitive domains) as 
being central to its characterization, and others more peripheral. If there 
is no specific cut-off point as to what is potentially accessed through a 
lexical item, at least there are degrees of centrality, as a particular lexical 
item sets it up. 
Which aspects of general knowledge tend to be evoked in using a 
lexical item is to some degree conventionalized. There is a gradation 
perhaps, but access is partially structured instead of random. At various 
places I give specific examples. My classic case is roe vs. caviar. If you 
think about it, we can access the total body of knowledge associated 
with either lexical item through the other one. People who know what 
caviar is know that i t 's made out of fish eggs, which is also called roe; and 
people who talk about fish eggs and use the term roe know it can be made 
into caviar. Effectively, then, the relevant portion of our encyclopaedic 
knowledge base is really the same for both. But if you use the term caviar, 
you expect it to more saliently invoke the finished product , the notion of 
expense and fancy parties, and all tha t . If you use the te rm roe, you are 
expected to be talking about fish reproduction, as opposed to what you 
eat on crackers at fancy parties. It takes some work to contravene those 
tendencies, as each lexical item accesses the same overall knowledge base 
from different directions. Tha t ' s conventional, t h a t ' s linguistic, t ha t ' s 
built into what we can call the linguistic values of these lexical items. It 
is not a mat ter of their meanings being encapsulated, bu t rather of the 
different kind of access they afford to the shared knowledge base. This 
constitutes a difference in meaning. 
Given that lexical items do have conventional meanings, it is still 
the case tha t context determines how in particular they are likely to be 
construed. This includes the effect of adjacent items t h a t you alluded to 
in the passage quoted. Now, how to represent that in dictionaries, well, I 
don't know. Maybe dictionaries could do a better job of making it clear 
that lexemes give access to domains of independent knowledge, instead 
of just providing a concise definition. I 'm not sure how tha t could be 
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done. I think dictionaries are a little bit misleading by trying, in jus t a 
couple of lines, to offer a verbal definition which supposedly represents a 
lexeme's meaning. But a typical definition is not the sort of thing anyone 
would ever say. Dictionary definitions have a certain style, and they don ' t 
clearly indicate that we are accessing structured bodies of knowledge in 
a certain way. 
I have just one other comment on these practical mat ters (which I 
have not thought about in any depth). I t is simply t ha t people are very 
adept at making sense of things, of flexibly construing lexical meanings 
to accommodate adjacent elements and the overall context. They make 
these adaptat ions so easily and automatically that they pose few problems 
in a practical sense. So perhaps dictionary writers don ' t have to worry 
much about it. 
ANDOR: The role of 'domains ' plays a critical role in your theory, which 
expresses the view that lexical items rank these domains. You also stress 
that related senses of lexical items (see p. 4 of the book Grammar and 
Conceptualization,) comprise networks being linked by categorizing rela-
tionships. Let me quote: "[...] a lexical item evokes a set of cognitive 
domains as the basis for its meaning, and exhibits considerable flexibility 
in this regard. The access it affords is anything but random, however. 
First of all, the domains a lexical item invokes are primarily limited to 
those in which the entity it designates (i.e., its conceptual referent) fig-
ures directly. As part of its conventional value, moreover, a lexical item 
ranks these domains: it accords them particular degrees of centrality [...]" 
(Langacker 1999b, 4~5)- All this certainly refers to the networks of con-
ceptual structures that provide the sources of a relevantly mapped lexical 
representation. I mean, to networks such as scenes, frames, and scripts. 
I would say, lexical items are saliently mapped in and from such struc-
tures of cognitive activity. Why don't you use these terms referring to the 
particular type of conceptual activity rather than the considerably opaque 
term 'domain'? And why don't you use the notion of lexical-pragmatic 
'salience', rather than 'ranking a domain'? 
LANGACKER: 'Domain' is not one of my favorite terms. I needed to invent 
a lot of te rms in formulating cognitive grammar, since there were so many 
notions t ha t had no names previously, and since I thought a lot of prior 
terminology was infelicitous. Not every terminological choice I made to 
meet those needs proved optimal over what is now almost three decades. 
If I could invent the necessary terminology now, instead of having done so 
25 years ago, I would make some other choices. So I don ' t totally defend 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
AN INTERVIEW WITH RONALD LANGACKER 351 
all the terms I use. But there was a reason for using 'domain' instead of 
terms like 'scene', ' frame', or 'script', namely the need for a general term. 
'Script ' carries with it the notion of a sequence of actions, and tha t ' s too 
narrow. W h a t I wanted was a general term to talk about meanings, or 
the conceptual content of meanings (as opposed to construal). 'Domain' 
allows me to talk about meanings in a general and coherent way, without 
making totally arbitrary divisions. For instance, we need to describe the 
source of the conceptual content for, say, a color term, as well as for 
something based on the restaurant script. 
A N D O R : But how about 'frames'? Isn't that concept better for such pur-
poses? Frames could be understood to be quite general, as opposed to 
scripts. 
L A N G A C K E R : YOU could also have included 'idealized cognitive model' 
(Lakoff 1 9 8 7 ) . Although Lakoff has said he understands the term I C M 
very generally, it is still too narrow. 'Frame' does come closest to being 
an adequate term. If I were doing things from scratch, I might well 
adopt ' f rame' . But it would have to be in a totally general sense. Would 
Fillmore say tha t color space is a frame? 
A N D O R : That's exactly the problem, that the term 'frame' has also been 
extensively very much abused. A lot of people who were talking about 
scripts and scenes and other kinds of scenarios, actually were thinking of 
frames rather than these other domains. So it has also been extensively 
abused, I should say. Which is a major problem. See Fillmore's alter-
native proposal to checklist theories of meaning (1975), his early steps to 
outline the theory of frame semantics (1982), and Schank and Abelson's 
classical work on frames (1977). 
L A N G A C K E R : Right. Fillmore uses ' frames' , gives a list of things tha t he 
calls frames in his paper on frame semantics, but he didn ' t obviously cover 
basic domains — e.g., time, space, color space—which are also crucial 
to semantics. So that ' s my reason for using 'domain': the need for a 
general term. You also asked about 'salience' versus 'ranking'. Those 
are both very general terms covering certain aspects of construal. I have 
no principled reason for using the latter instead of the former in regard 
to domains. 
A N D O R : Actually, for me, the most important aim was to clarify what 
'domains ' are and so on, using it as a general term, or perhaps, frame 
could have been a better candidate. That was the issue I intended to raise 
here. 
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LANGACKER: Yes. There was a motivation, primarily the need to sub-
sume basic domains as well as non-basic domains under one term. Fill-
more was focusing on only certain kinds of notions as frames, though 
obviously the term could be generalized. 
ANDOR: I would also like to ask you about active zones, concerning their 
role in serving as a discourse cohesive or coherence factor. In your work 
on active zones that I have had a chance to study, starting with your 1984 
paper that appeared in the Berkeley Linguistics Society meeting handbook 
of that year up to fairly recent work, and also in Eve Sweetser's 1999 
paper with ample reference to your work, the role of active zones is dis-
cussed within the framework of utterances rather than in texts. Perhaps it 
would be interesting to study their role in discourse organization, partic-
ularly as a discourse cohesive facet, and also as a factor in charge of the 
economical nature of linguistic, particularly of discourse representation. 
And we should also study their frame-related factors. Would this, in your 
view, be a feasible research project? 
LANGACKER: I could answer just by saying "yes". But probably you 
expect something more. 
I think the areas you mention are part of using the notion of 'active 
zone' in the first place. You cannot divorce this from questions of frames 
or domains, obviously. 
ANDOR: That's exactly why I bring this up, from the point of view of 
providing some sort of organizing principle, or the kind of thing applicable 
for discourse interpretation. 
LANGACKER: Yes. I don' t think I ever conceived of the notion active 
zone as applying to utterances or spoken language, as opposed to texts. 
It was meant to be general, for any kind of language production. 
ANDOR: I brought this up because when you were talking about active 
zones, you always had the utterance length kinds of structures highlighted. 
LANGACKER: It is certainly t rue tha t I characterized active zones with 
respect to a relational expression and its arguments; I talked about a 
profiled relationship, and then the things tha t function as its t ra jector 
or landmark. T h a t ' s the level at which I introduced the term and the 
purpose for which I introduced it. This ties the notion to a particular 
relational expression and associated nominals, e.g., a verb and then a 
clause. Maybe you are raising the question of whether a particular clause 
with a particular verb in it can be interpreted independently, or whether 
you sometimes have to look at the whole discourse context in order to 
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determine the active zones. Another possible question is whether there 
might be some higher-level phenomenon tha t you could handle in a way 
analogous to positing active zones for verbs. Those are two different 
mat ters tha t could be investigated, but I haven't really thought about 
either one. 
A N D O R : That's exactly the thing. I am also thinking of cases of syn-
onymy. I have done quite extensive research in this issue. Taking verbs 
of jumping, for instance, why exactly people use a given member of a syn-
onym set in a lexical field under the conditions of a certain context rather 
than another. Why do we tend to use the prototypical member of a set to 
overgeneralize, rather than use a specific one? Or, under what conditions 
do we use a specific one rather than the prototype? So I was thinking 
of a case where your concept of active zones could be very helpful in this 
domain, saying that, for instance, in certain types of contexts, you would 
choose to use a verb such as vault rather than j ump . You would do that 
on such grounds because of the context, without mentioning some inte-
gral elements that go together with the verb, such as pole, for instance. 
I thought that choosing this particular verb rather than another one from 
a synonym set in some way could be related to active zones, which would 
provide the kinds of conditions relevant from the point of view of yielding, 
contributing to discourse coherence. That was my idea. 
L A N G A C K E R : I th ink tha t has to be worked out with particular illustra-
tive examples to see concretely how it could be useful at tha t level. I do 
think i t 's worth looking at, it 's a reasonable idea. To say more, I 'd have 
to think in terms of specific cases. 
A N D O R : Pursuing the topic of active zones a little bit further, let me 
ask your opinion about whether I'm right to say that the way you address 
active zones is closely related to the approach of certain pragmaticians, 
including Jason Stanley, François Recanati, Kent Bach and others, and, 
of course John Perry, in analyzing cases of unarticulated constituents, 
for instance in utterances such as 
(i) Mary took out her key and opened the door. 
in which a bridging inference has to be made by the hearer, resulting in 
with it or 
(ii) He eats rabbit, (implying 'rabbit meat') 
(Hi) He wears rabbit, (implying 'rabbit fur'), 
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demonstrating cases of free enrichment? Actually, the above-mentioned 
pragmaticians all happen to study the same examples that you analyze 
related to the issue of active zones, such as 
(iv) I finished the book. 
(v) John heard the piano. 
And others. See, for instance, Recanati (2004)• Which analysis by both 
parties, as I understand, refers to case-studies of the economy of linguistic 
representation. Is this a correct understanding? 
LANGACKER: I wouldn't want to speak for those other analysts, because 
this is a little bit outside my usual scope of reading. But I think it 's 
a good characterization for my standpoint . Yes, economy of linguistic 
representation is an important point here. As I tried to argue in talking 
about some of these examples, if you tried to be fully precise, instead of 
relying on the active zone phenomenon, you could never say anything. 
You can always be more precise. Every linguistic expression has to be 
oversimplified, and leave things out, and make a choice as to what will 
be explicit, and rely on established scenarios, established frames, etc. 
for people to fill in the details and make sense of it all. There are con-
ventionalized ways of doing tha t , as well as free, new ways of doing it. 
This is all pa r t of one big problem from my standpoint. The term 'ac-
tive zone', as I said, was invented to cover a fairly narrow phenomenon, 
but I would never claim t h a t the limitation is anything more than one 
of convenience, and a mat te r of what happened to a t t ract my attention 
first. There is a danger in using the same term for too many things, in 
which case you need more specialized terms to distinguish subcases tha t 
are interesting for their own reasons. So there are different strategies 
here. Some te rms I tend to use fairly narrowly, even though they could 
in principle be extended quite broadly. 'Reference point ' is another one: 
anything could be a reference point phenomenon, if you want to think 
about it t h a t way. But there are some things where tha t aspect is so 
special and central tha t it seems best to confine the term to those cases, 
at least for purposes of exposition. So tha t ' s what I tend to do. 'Active 
zone' is a t e r m of that sort. 
ANDOR: I would like to ask three more questions, time providing. The 
first concerns your notional approach to 'parts of speech '. You devoted 
considerable effort to discussing the case of verbs and nouns. I would 
particularly be interested in your way of thinking about the adjective cat-
egory, which you consider to be an atemporal relation, that is to say, a 
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state, summary scanned (as described on pp. 78-9 of Concept, Image, 
and Symbol (1990)). But first, what is your view about the predicative 
use of adjectives representing cases of the [± statine/dynamic] distinction, 
such as in 
(vi) John is hard-working. 
(vii) John is malicious 
(viii) John is being malicious, 
and the the classic examples of 
(ix) John is careful. 
(x) John is being careful (with the vase). 
I guess you would say that these examples demonstrate cases of processes. 
L A N G A C K E R : Well, you are raising some fairly complex issues here, and 
there 's a lot going on in these examples. So we have to approach them 
from different angles. 
First of all, I believe the characterization I gave is correct when fully 
explicated. When I say that an adjective profiles an atemporal relation, 
this doesn't mean tha t time is not involved. For example, in adjectives 
like early or late, t ime obviously is involved. W h a t matters is how time is 
involved. When I describe a verb as profiling a temporal relationship (or 
'process'), I mean by tha t two things. First, the relationship is conceived 
as evolving or extending through time. And secondly, in accessing it and 
using the expression as a verb, the relationship is scanned sequentially 
through time as opposed to being scanned in summary fashion. So a 
verb is temporal in both these senses: the profiled relation is conceived 
as extending through time, and at some level of processing we access it 
by scanning sequentially along tha t axis. 
Time can perfectly well be involved in the first sense, bu t if we view 
it in summary fashion, by definition it is atemporal , or bet ter 'non-
processual', a t e rm I generally use these days. Time is still involved, 
just not involved in both ways figuring in the definition of a verb. That 
is an important initial point of clarification. 
Now, one thing we have to take account of is the fact tha t the ex-
amples you gave all contain the verb be. They do not use an adjective 
by itself, they combine it with be. So all of these are full clauses, and I 
would say that in every case what ' s being profiled is a process. 
A N D O R : In Hungarian you would have iterative suffixation added to the 
root, and you would be using these words as verbs which have an adjectival 
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base. In the Hungarian version of John is being stupid, for instance, you 
have the word bu ta (the corresponding adjective for s tup id ) , and you have 
butáskodik (is being stupid), with rich morphology added to the root. 
LANGACKER: Tha t ' s comparable to what you are doing here. In effect, 
be is our English morphology. I t ' s just a separate word sometimes, to 
some degree. 
ANDOR: Under example (x), however, John is being careful with the 
vase, you could just use János ügyes a vázával in Hungarian, which would 
translate literally as John careful with the vase. That is, there would not 
be any be there in Hungarian. 
LANGACKER: Well, I have enough trouble analyzing English without 
trying to analyze Hungarian, which I don't know. So you are bringing 
in still more complexities. I would not say t ha t using an adjective to 
head a clause, thereby construing it as a process, always requires some 
overt morphological indication. T h a t ' s certainly not true. An adjectival 
relationship can also be viewed as extending through time by virtue of 
being plugged into a particular construction which imposes this construal. 
It does not have to be done by a separate morphological element, but can 
just be a mat ter of constructional meaning. However you are still doing 
something beyond using the adjective in its basic sense. It jus t happens 
tha t in English we have a particular way of doing this in a construction 
which involves adding another verb. 
So we have to str ip away the contribution of be or that higher-level 
construction and talk about the meaning of the adjective itself. Of course, 
tha t ' s not really feasible here totally, either. Let 's look at (viii) John is 
being malicious and (x) John is being careful. Those are, I think, the same 
phenomenon, as opposed to John is malicious, and John is careful. Here 
again, we are start ing with be malicious or be careful. But in (viii) and 
(x) these are not being used alone. There is a higher level of organization 
involved, and there are different ways of talking about it. W h a t I want 
to say about (viii) and (x) is t ha t in each case the be + adjective combi-
nation is not being construed as an imperfective verb but as a perfective 
verb. They profile bounded events. The overall event of be malicious is 
bounded, and be careful is bounded. They are thus perfective processes. 
We can say tha t this happens through a zero derivational process, or we 
can talk about them as representing a special, higher-level construction, 
making it an aspect of constructional meaning. I don' t have any favorite 
way of talking about it at present. But the point is, if be careful or be 
malicious in its basic sense describes a person having a certain prop-
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erty tha t extends indefinitely through t ime, in (viii) and (x) we have a 
use designating an event, an occurrence, a manifestation of this property 
through some bounded span of time. The sentences could be translated 
as something like act malicious or act careful (although act is a bit too 
strong). And because the complex predicate is construed as perfective, it 
takes the progressive (which in English is limited to perfectives), which 
has to be used for present t ime. There is thus a difference between just 
ascribing or describing a property versus describing a manifestation of 
a property in one bounded occurrence. Tha t is what these particular 
examples hinge on. I suppose Laura Michaelis would talk about this in 
terms of 'coercion' by a higher-level construction, and I 'm happy with 
tha t , too. T h a t ' s one way tha t I could approach the phenomenon. So 
you see, there are various dimensions to your question. We have cov-
ered several already. Did you have something with example (vi), John is 
hard-working, other than what we've already discussed? 
A N D O R : Well... 
LANGACKER: Now, there is something very deep and important here 
tha t I don' t yet have a good grasp of. T h a t is this notion of a 'property ' . 
First of all, any adjectival property, when it 's actually manifested, is 
manifested through time, either a point in t ime or a time span of indefinite 
extent. One way or another, t ime is involved in ascertaining or observing 
an adjectival property. The temporal aspect is more salient in some 
cases, e.g., in John is hard-working, as opposed to John is tall. Jus t by 
glancing at a photograph we can see t h a t John is tall. But for John is 
hard-working, you have to observe him on various occasions for extended 
periods. However, the two adjectives are parallel linguistically, in t h a t 
both of them designate the situation of t h a t property being characteristic 
of the person, as either a locally or globally valid ascription. T h a t ' s 
different from the actual manifestation of t he property, or the observation 
and verification of it. You have to sort all these things out. W h a t I 
think is a ra ther deep and important problem, one I haven' t worked out 
to my own satisfaction yet, is to specify what happens conceptually in 
converting these various observations into the ascription of a constant 
property. 
A N D O R : Which is very exciting. 
LANGACKER: Yes. And i t 's not just adjectives. The same holds for 
mental s tate predicates. For example, when I say that John believes that 
X , probably a t the moment I utter the sentence John isn' t even think-
ing about X . There are probably very few occasions in his life when he 
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thinks about X , but he can still believe t ha t X . So, having this belief is a 
kind of stable property of John, or at least it 's something constant. Bu t 
it 's only occasionally manifested. So we have this difference between the 
manifestation of something and the stable aspect of having it, whether 
it 's a belief or a property like tall, hard-working, or whatever. Exact ly 
how to think about the conceptual step in going to t ha t level is something 
I 'm not sure about yet. But clearly we do it, and it 's manifested linguis-
tically in the difference between perfective and imperfective expressions. 
The resulting expressions (e.g., John is hard-working) are imperfective 
in form, because we are talking about something t ha t ' s stable and fixed. 
But what exactly is it t ha t we are talking about? I know there are clas-
sic philosophical problems involved in this. I won't address it from t h a t 
direction, but I 'd like to address it f rom a conceptual direction in more 
detail t han I have in the past. 
ANDOR: Studying the semantic value of possessive elements and posses-
sive constructions seems to be one of your favorite topics of investigation. 
The most recent paper I read on this issue was a conference lecture given 
as a plenary talk in Braga in 2003, published in 2004, гп which, I believe 
correctly, you expressed an anti-localistic view (Langacker 2004, 
opposing the views of case grammarians such as John Anderson (1971). 
Here, I would like to inquire about your view concerning the pragmat-
ics of possessives in structures where the Saxon genitive or a possessive 
pronoun is used. Let me take just three examples: 
(xi) John's dinner was very tasty. 
(xii) Their knives were very sharp. 
(xiii) Their film was very interesting. 
All three demonstrate the same issue: the possessor can be understood 
either as an Experiencer (perhaps even as a Locus, à la Anderson and 
the localists), or as an active controller of an act of production, i.e., an 
Agent. When asked to associate, informants show a significant difference 
in making judgements about the role. How would you interpret, describe 
this difference in interpretability in your own framework? Certainly, re-
ferring to some sort of an attenuation of the active controller role would 
not work in such cases. The case is interesting, as we would be facing 
exactly the same issue if the sentences were translated into Hungarian, 
for instance. 
LANGACKER: The problem I face here is how to answer that question 
without delivering the entire paper. First of all, I th ink any of these 
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sentences could be interpreted in lots of different ways, or any of the 
nominals can certainly be interpreted in lots of different ways. So there 
is nothing fixed about their interpretations. What you are alluding to 
here are their default interpretations. 
ANDOR: For instance, whether John prepared the dinner, or perhaps he 
ate it. 
LANGACKER: Right. You'd think of those interpretations, or maybe one 
in particular, rather than dozens of other possibilities, e.g., that John's 
dinner is the one he is responsible for delivering or poisoning. Those 
wouldn't come to mind. 
ANDOR: But still, when people are asked to associate, you know, one 
rather than another type of association for a certain kind of context or 
frame would pop out as most typical and perhaps most salient. I wonder 
why that is. From among a number of chances available to them, people 
still stick to certain sorts of things, they spontaneously recognize some 
sort of saliency. Like in most cases, for instance, in the utterance Their 
knives were very sharp, I believe they would typically think of the produc-
ers. Their dinner was very tasty for somebody who ate it or had it, or 
something like that, rather than referring to somebody who prepared it. 
But it's a matter of interpretation within a domain or a frame. 
LANG ACKER: Right. All these invoke some frame, at least implicitly, 
for their interpretation. You can bias it with the following adjective. 
But even without the adjective, there are factors like familiar scenarios, 
standard uses, and the frequency of occasions of talking about particular 
kinds of things. These result in different degrees of salience for various 
interpretations. 
ANDOR: Let's take one more of these examples, for instance, Their holi-
days were excellent, thinking of whether they are travel agents or perhaps 
clients of them. 
LANGACKER : Sure. Any plausible scenario you can come up affords a 
viable interpretation, but for some interpretations it takes a lot more work 
to construct an appropriate context. The kinds of factors mentioned bias 
things in certain direction. Now, from my standpoint that's interesting 
and very true. But it wasn't what I was talking about. 
ANDOR: I know. 
LANGACKER: The question I was addressing was: What can you say 
about the meaning of this Saxon genitive construction in general? You 
don't want to list all the individual kinds of relationships there can be 
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between possessor and possessed, and say that that's all there is to it. 
This won't work, since there is no end to the possible relationships that 
might be involved, if you are talking about things at the level of eating 
something, making something, etc. 
At the other extreme, you can say that there is no semantic value 
at all that the possessive construction or the possessive morpheme has; 
because it's so varied, there is just no content that all uses share. And 
if you're strict about the word 'content', maybe I would agree with that, 
but I wouldn't agree that there is no shared meaning at all. Possessives 
are not semantically vacuous. I think the possessive construction (and/or 
the possessor morpheme) has a schematic meaning as well as prototypical 
values. But the prototype could conceivably vary from noun to noun. 
Obviously, only some things are likely to be owned, so ownership is only 
relevant with certain kinds of nouns. There are only certain kinds of 
things we make, and so forth. But what I try to show is that the reference 
point model naturally accounts for the schematic level of characterization. 
Secondly, I try to show that the reference point relationship—men-
tally accessing the target through the reference point — represents the 
subjective construal of all of the objective kinds of relationships that are 
typical of possessive constructions, including actively controlling some-
thing, or owning something, holding something, etc. Conceptually, those 
relations (controlling something, holding something, making something, 
seeing something, having exclusive access to something, etc.) are direc-
tional and asymmetrical. Conceptualizing them involves mentally ac-
cessing the possessor and the possessed successively, in that order. This 
sequence is inherent in conceiving of X controlling Y, in any of those 
varied ways. I assume that one crucial aspect of this conception is trac-
ing a mental path from X to Y : evoking X and then using that as a 
basis for evoking X interacting with Y. Schematically, that's all posses-
sion amounts to: first evoking the possessor, which makes it possible to 
then evoke the possessed. This subjectively construed relationship is the 
schematic value of the reference point relation, and that's what all pos-
sessives have in common. The reason certain orders are natural, so that 
we generally can't reverse things and say, for instance, the dinner's John, 
is precisely that specific instantiations imply a certain directionality just 
to apprehend them in the normal way. 
ANDOR: My final question concerns the issue of linguistic modularity, 
that of the human language faculty. Do you share the modular view of 
language as outlined by Fodor (1983), that is, a view according to which 
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there exists a language module which is encapsulated, its output repre-
sentation is shallow, and which does not communicate freely with other 
modules or the central systemic units of processing? Or, perhaps, would 
you sympathize with Jackendoff's model of representational modularity, 
which outlines a number of interfacing sub-modules of the linguistic sys-
tem (2002)? Once, on p. 13 of Vol. 1 of your groundbreaking work (1987), 
you expressed the view that knowledge about language is not advanced or 
mature enough to be able to tackle such issues. Do you still hold the same 
view at the current level of the state of the art? 
L A N G A C K E R : I am uncomfortable with any modular view of language. 
One reason this is tricky is that it's clear that the brain is not just a 
homogeneous bank of neurons. I mean, the brain is organized in a mod-
ular fashion in many respects. There are columns of neurons that do 
particular things, areas of the brain that do particular things in coordi-
nated ways, and so forth. There is certainly modularity in how cognition 
works at the brain level. And if you look at any particular linguistic 
phenomenon, like a clause or just a noun phrase, you can talk about dif-
ferent features of it as independent problems of analysis. You can talk 
about the problem of grounding, or of conceiving a physical object, or 
the problem of categorization. Those are separate problems, and there 
can be many such problems separable to some degree as issues. Linguists 
have a tendency—if you question modularity—to cite cases like these as 
showing the need for a modular view. There are however different things 
that might be called modularity. The question is whether these include 
the particular things that linguistic theorists like Fodor and Jackendoff 
have been dedicated to. Is the language as a whole a module? Or partic-
ular subcomponents of a language, like lexicon, syntax, or morphology? 
I think not, although I would not presume to have convincing arguments 
that would sway the opinion of a modularist. This is a vast question, 
and not one I feel qualified to focus on personally in my own work. I 
think I'm pretty clear about the matter, if I wasn't in 1987. I think those 
particular kinds of modules are gratuitous from the linguistic standpoint. 
I don't believe, for example, in any distinction between the lexicon, as 
people call it, and the syntax. I think it's an erroneous distinction based 
solely on tradition. That's the clearest case. But the same holds for the 
language as a whole. Certainly there are kinds of knowledge I consider 
to be linguistic. But typically these result from drawing together and 
exploiting independently existing phenomena. They are packaged in a 
certain way, so the resulting package is specifically linguistic. But lin-
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guistic units are not independent of the rest. Encyclopaedic semantics is 
an obvious and simple example. It just doesn't make any sense to try and 
separate what's linguistic and what's non-linguistic from the meaning of 
a lexical item, for reasons argued in other places. 
Here's the way I like to think about such matters. It concerns both 
modularity and the question of innateness, which, of course, is closely 
tied up with it. We can start with this basic question: Is there an innate 
language capacity, or an innate universal grammar? At one level the an-
swer is obviously "yes". We have inborn bases for learning languages, we 
have a compulsion to learn languages when we are children—that's all 
wired in. The next question is: Are these specifically linguistic? Or is it 
all done on the basis of more general abilities? That leads to the issue of 
whether there is a language module, which is a different question. There 
is a universal basis for learning language, but certainly all kinds of other 
knowledge and abilities have to be in place and contribute to learning 
a language. These include pragmatic factors: being able to know that 
people have intentions when they are speaking, and to apprehend those 
intentions. These skills are typically ignored by Chomskyans when they 
argue for the impossibility of learning languages. Obviously, language 
learning cannot occur by itself; it requires a certain foundation. But 
given this foundation, I believe it is all describable in terms of seman-
tic structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between them. 
There's nothing special like a syntactic component with irreducible syn-
tactic primitives, etc. I am willing to believe that something specifically 
linguistic is involved, not just general knowledge. I'm pretty sure that 
we don't learn languages just on the basis of general abilities. I think 
we have a specific language learning capacity, which partially shapes lin-
guistic structure. But what is it that's specifically linguistic? I don't 
believe there's any particular content that's specifically linguistic. The 
analogy I like to draw is with the physical organs of speech. We pro-
duce speech with the lungs, the trachea, the vocal chords, the mouth, 
the nose, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, and so forth. But these organs 
of speech are all there for other reasons, independently of speech. In the 
evolution of language they have been adapted, adjusted, and fine-tuned. 
These adaptations are obviously innately specified—we're born with the 
vocal apparatus in a certain configuration that chimpanzees don't have. 
Still, nothing is physically involved that isn't more broadly grounded and 
doesn't have other uses in the human organism. It is only the particular 
detailed configuration this apparatus assumes, reflecting the particular 
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adjustments that have occurred, which make it all work together to give 
us articulate speech. These are innately specified, and specifically for 
linguistic purposes. And for the rest of language, I'd like to think of it as 
being analogous. Conceptualization, semantics, symbolization, and from 
these grammar—they all rely on things which are independently there 
and have other functions. But we do much more with them than we 
could if it were not for innate specifications. It's a matter of tweaking 
the system, so to speak. And those tweaks are the specifically linguistic 
innate specifications. Language is not modular in that sense. This is a 
non-modular view of linguistic uniqueness. 
A N D O R : We, who have followed the development of your cognitive gram-
mar paradigm with great attention on a regular basis, all know the starting 
point, the initial motivations for it. All of us would now be greatly in-
terested in your plans to develop or extend your theory, and we would 
like to know what are the topical issues of your research interest for the 
immediate or the more distant future. 
L A N G A C K E R : I'd like to know that, too. It's a hard question, since there 
are major problems that need a lot of work. These include things I've 
reflected on in recent work and have to be investigated at a deeper and 
more extensive level. One is the need for a cognitive lexicography along 
the lines of the constructs suggested in cognitive grammar. I am think-
ing of a program analogous to what Wierzbicka does with her natural 
semantic metalanguage (1996). I cannot imagine personally undertaking 
anything on a scale comparable to hers, examining so many lexical items 
across so many languages. I would however like to work out representa-
tive areas of the lexicon in comparable semantic detail, specifically from 
the cognitive grammar perspective. Since I'm now formally retired, there 
may be time to have fun with this in coming years. It's important to 
see just what is involved. 
Two themes have come up a lot in recent work. One is "fictivity" 
(or "virtuality"), e.g., the fictive motion that Talmy (1996) and others 
have written about. Fictivity is so extensive that I'm not convinced we 
ever talk directly about actuality. Perhaps we always talk about fictive 
entities, relating them to actuality only secondarily. But whether that's 
true or not, fictivity is a certainly major theme which I've written about 
a lot. I suspect we are only beginning to understand its pervasiveness 
in language. 
Next is "dynamicity", a term that alludes to the time course of any 
conceptualization. It extends naturally to the time course of conceiving 
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the form and meaning of a complex expression, like a clause or a sentence. 
And that shades into questions of grammatical processing — the time 
course of it, what's going on semantically at each stage, etc. Obviously 
it also ties into discourse, which I am gradually becoming more involved 
with. Eventually there needs to be a unified view of semantics, grammar, 
processing, and discourse. While I have ideas along these lines, they are 
far from being well-developed or ready to present in detail. 
Those are some big themes in the back of my mind. They are all very 
closely related. In choosing topics, I generally work on what I have to at a 
certain period in order to get a paper ready for a conference or a volume. 
In a sense these practical matters drive the agenda. But the topics are all 
related and mutually informing, they push in the same general direction. 
I think it has worked out pretty well and will continue to in the future. 
In any case, the topics I mentioned should be quite important. 
One concern is to make it clear how all of the specifics of the model 
and this way of viewing grammar actually follow from an initial focus 
on the social-interactive context of speech. It is actually fairly clear in 
my work, if you really look at it. For instance, I talk about usage events 
as the basis for all linguistic units, I talk about things like grounding, 
which is where the speaker-hearer interaction meets grammar. All the 
way through I have ways of accommodating the social side of things, the 
cultural side of things, the interactive side of things, the discourse side 
of things. But this has always been looked at in piecemeal fashion. I am 
often accused of talking about pure conception and not focusing on these 
issues. But if you look at the framework and what I actually have talked 
about, that's not really accurate. 
One thing I'm gradually working around to, and hope to do seriously 
at some point, is to articulate the framework in a way that starts with the 
social-interactive and the contextual-cultural basis of language, showing 
how the rest all emerges from it, instead of going in the other direction. 
This may be more a matter of presentation than of different substance, 
but I think it's important to work it out along those lines. 
Those are some major issues that I'll be thinking about in the future. 
ANDOR: And we might be expecting some more of those big volumes in 
the future. 
LANGACKER: Big ones, small ones, or articles, I don't know. But cer-
tainly I'll keep writing for a while. 
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A N D O R : YOU are a very happy man, I should say, having these kinds 
of ambitions which, I think, is great for somebody who is working as 
seriously as you do on these issues. 
LANGACKER: Well, I think I'm actually just getting started, in terms of 
figuring out these problems. 
A N D O R : But this is exactly the fantastic thing about it. So, Ron, thank 
you very much for giving me this interview. It certainly has significantly 
enriched my understanding of your theory and I do very much hope that 
it will influence its readers in the same way. 
LANGACKER: Thank you for taking the time, as well as for the interest 
and all the preparation. 
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S P E E C H R E P O R T C O N S T R U C T I O N S I N R U S S I A N * 
JONATHAN E. M. CLARKE 
Abstract 
This s tudy is concerned with the strategies for repor t ing speech in contemporary 
Russian. It analyses the salient features of direct and indirect speech report construc-
t ions and examines the shif ts t h a t accompany the t ransformat ion of a direct speech 
repor t construction into its corresponding indirect construction. It demonstra tes t h a t 
while most speech repor t construct ions in Russian are multiclausal, monoclausal con-
s t ruct ions using evidentials are also possible and tha t a speech report cont inuum exists 
where some constructions display features of bo th direct and indirect speech reports. 
1. Typological profile 
Russian is an Indo-European language that belongs to the Eastern branch 
of Slavic (along with Belorussian and Ukrainian). All three languages 
use the Cyrillic alphabet with variations for each language. Much of the 
abstract vocabulary of Russian and some grammatical forms are derived 
from Church Slavonic, a South Slavic language tha t was first codified in 
the ninth century. Russian has a highly developed system of inflectional 
morphology. There are six cases in the nominal morphology, with vestiges 
of a seventh (the vocative), and two aspects (imperfective and perfective) 
and three tenses in the verbal morphology. There are no definite or 
indefinite determiners. Word-formation makes use of a complex array of 
affixes, especially suffixes. In terms of the typology of the Slavic languages 
Russian may be considered to be peripheral, like Bulgarian and Czech, 
showing significant features not shared by any other Slavic language (for 
example, absence of a high-frequency lexeme corresponding to ' to have' in 
English). Syntactic constructions in Russian generally show dependency 
marking. It has AVO/SV constituent order, though in direct speech 
* I wish to acknowledge the suppor t I have received f rom RCLT, Professor Dixon 
and Professor Aikhenvald in preparing this paper . Where examples of Russian 
sentences have been taken f rom published sources, t he source is indicated af ter 
the example. 
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report constructions, where the complement comes before the reporting 
verb, partially or fully, the order in the clause containing the reporting 
verb is VS. (See (5) and (6) below.) Order is relatively free in comparison 
to English. Compare the following sentences:1 
(1) (а) Анна любит Бориса . 
Ann-aA l jub- i tpRED.TRANS Boris-ao 
Anna-nom love-3sg.pres Boris-acc 
'Anna loves Boris.' 
(b) Б о р и с а любит Анна. 
Boris-ao ljub-ITPRED.TRANS Ann-aA 
Boris-acc love-3sg.pres Anna-nom 
'I t 's Boris Anna loves.' 
Russian has complement clauses of different types: some contain a com-
plementiser and finite verb form, others just an infinitive as predicate. In 
some cases both types are possible. See (13a-b) below. By comparison 
with English, Russian has a diverse set of complementisers. In Russian 
different complementisers can serve to draw semantic distinctions that 
in English are conveyed by using different verbs or different construc-
tions. Compare the two following sentences: only the complementisers 
are distinct (как versus cto). 
(2) (а) Мать не заметила как сын ушел. (Svedova 1970, 704) 
m a t ' A ne N EC zamet i - lapRED.TRANS k a k s y n s 
m o t h e r - s g . n o m . f e m n o t n o t i c e - s g . f e m . p a s t h o w s o n - s g . n o m . m a s c 
USe-lpRED.INTR 
l e a v e - s g . m a s c . p a s t 
'The mother didn ' t notice her son leave.' 
(b) Мать не заметила, что сын ушел. 
m a t ' A neNEG zamet i - l apRED.TRANS c t o s y n s 
m o t h e r - s g . n o m . f e m n o t n o t i c e - s g . f e m . p a s t t h a t s o n - s g . n o m . m a s c 
USe-lpRED.INTR 
l e a v e - s g . m a s c . p a s t 
'The mother didn ' t notice tha t her son had left. ' 
1
 Abbreviations: A: transitive subject; acc: accusative; ADV: adverb; CC: copula 
complement; comp: comparative; COP: copula; CS: copula subject; dat : dative; 
fem: feminine; fut: future; gen: genitive; imp: imperative; inf: infinitive; instr: 
instrumental; I N T R : intransitive; loc: locative; masc: masculine; NEG: negative; 
neut: neuter; nom: nominative; O: transitive object; OBJ: object; P A R E N T H : 
parenthetic; PERI: peripheral; P R E D : predicate; près: present; S: intransitive 
subject; subj: subjunctive; T R A N S : transitive; V: verb. 
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2. Speech report constructions 
2.1. Introduction 
Like English and many other languages, Russian draws a formal distinc-
tion between direct and indirect speech reports. Direct speech is termed 
prjamaja rec' indirect speech kosvennaja rec'. (The adjective prjamoj 
also translates as 'straight ' , 'right ': prjamoj ugol 'right angle', prjamaja 
linija 'straight line'; kosvennyj t ranslates as 'oblique': kosvennyj padez 
'oblique case'.) The typical indirect speech report construction t h a t cor-
responds to a simple declarative sentence in the direct speech complement 
is multiclausal consisting of a reporting verb and a complement clause 
introduced by the complementiser cto ( ' that ' ) . Unlike English, Russian 
makes use of other complementisers to express supposition and doubt . At 
the same time Russian provides evidence of a speech report continuum 
with some speech report constructions showing features of bo th direct 
and indirect speech. Note that in a direct speech report construction in 
Russian the direct speech complement is usually indicated in the writ ten 
language by an initial dash, not by quotation marks. (Quotation marks 
indicate a direct speech report within direct speech.) 
2.2. Direct speech report constructions 
The typical direct speech report construction in Russian a t t empts a ver-
bat im report and consists of a direct speech complement and reporting 
verb. The position of the complement in relation to the reporting verb 
can vary with implications for constituent order. Consider the following 
two typical examples of a direct speech report construction. 
(3) Иногда она спрашивала меня: — Ч т о вы читаете? 
(Gor'kij, Pul 'kina et al. 1968, 592) 
inogda ón-ад sprasiva-lapRED.TRANs menjao cto0 vyA 
sometimes 3sg.nom.fem ask-sg.fem.past lsg.acc what-acc 2pl.nom 
cita-etepRED.TRANs 
read-2pl.pres 
'Sometimes she would ask me, "What are you reading?" ' 
(4) Студент сказал: — Завтра будет экзамен. 
studentA s kaza - lpRED.TRANS zavtra b u d - e t p R E D . I N T R èkzamen s 
student-sg.nom.masc say-sg.masc.past tomorrow be-3sg.fut exam-sg.nom.masc 
'The student said: "There'll be an exam tomorrow." ' 
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In both these examples the direct speech complement follows the report-
ing verb. If t he complement precedes the reporting verb, either in full 
or in part, then the reporting verb must come before the subject , as in 
the following examples. This constituent order is characteristic of direct 
speech reports introduced by the complement. 
(5) — З а в т р а будет экзамен,—сказал студент. 
zavtra bud-etpRED.iNTR èkzamens SKAZA-lpRED.TRANS 
tomorrow be-3sg.fut exam-sg.nom.masc say-sg.nom.masc 
student* 
student-sg.nom.masc 
'"There'll be an exam tomorrow," said the s tudent . ' or 
'"There'll be an exam tomorrow," the student said. ' 
(6) —Хочу я спросить тебя ,—тихонько сказала она ,—что ты всё читаешь? 
(Gor'kij, Pul'kina et al. 1968, 591) 
XOC-UMODAL jaA spros i t ' INF tebjao, t ixon'ko skaza-laP R ED.TRANS 
want-lsg.pres lsg.nom ask-inf 2sg.acc soft-adv say-sg.fem.past 
o n - a A , c t o o t y A v s e cita-es'pRED.TRANS 
3sg.fem.nom what-acc 2sg.nom ail read-2sg.pres 
' "I want to ask you," she said softly, "what are you reading all the time?" ' 
Note that in example (6) an adverb (tixon'ko) is interposed between the 
direct speech repor t and the reporting verb (not possible in English). 
In the direct speech report construction the complement can often 
be discontinuous, as in (6). In this case the clause containing the report-
ing verb functions syntactically as a parenthesis. Note tha t in the direct 
speech report construction the constituent order in the clause with the 
reporting verb varies according to its position in relation to the comple-
ment. Only if t he reporting verb comes before the complement can the 
reporting verb follow its subject . This contrasts with English. Compare 
(4) and (5). 
A direct speech complement can sometimes be introduced by a non-
reporting verb, as in the following example. (Such a sentence cannot be 
transformed into an indirect speech report construction according to the 
normal t ransformation. Another verb must be added.) 
(7) Он покачал головой: — Б у д е т еще хуже. (Sestakov 2002, 96) 
ons pokaca-lpRED.iNTR golov-ojoBj bud-e tcoP.PRED 
3sg.masc.nom shake-sg.masc.past head-sg.fem.instr be-3sg.fut 
esce A Dv x u z e c c 
even bad. comp 
'He shook his head: "It will be even worse." ' 
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2.3. Indirect speech report constructions 
The typical indirect speech report construction is multiclausal. A simple 
declarative s ta tement in a direct speech report corresponds to a com-
plement clause using the complementiser cto in the indirect speech re-
port . (The complementiser cannot be omitted except possibly in collo-
quial Russian.) There is a shift in person deixis, but no shift in tense (in 
contrast to English). Note tha t Russian has only three tenses, bu t the 
verbal system has a well-defined set of aspects. Compare the following 
direct and indirect speech report constructions. 
(8) О н сказал: — Я скоро уезжаю. 
o n A skaza-lpRED.TRANS j a s skoro uezza-juPRED.MTR 
3sg.nom.masc say-sg.masc.past l sg .nom soon leave-lsg.près 
'He said: "I'm leaving soon." ' 
(9) О н сказал, ч т о он скоро уезжает. 
onA skaza-lpRED.TRANS c to ons skoro uezza-etpRED.iNTR 
3sg.nom.masc say-sg.masc.past t h a t 3sg.nom.masc soon leave-3sg.pres 
'He said tha t he was leaving soon. ' 
In bo th (8) and (9) the verb in the complement clause is in the present 
tense. 
(10) Девушка с к а з а л а : — М ы придем в шесть часов . 
devusk-aA skaza-laPRED.TRANs my s prid-empRED . |NTR 
girl-sg.nom.fem say-sg.fem.past lp l .nom arr ive- lp l . fu t 
[v sest ' cas-ov]pERi 
a t six hour-pi.gen 
' T h e girl said: "We'll arrive at six." ' 
(11) Девушка с к а з а л а , что они п р и д у т в шесть часов . 
devusk-aA skaza-laPRED .TRANS c to on-is prid-utPRED.iNTR 
girl-sg.nom.fem say-sg.fem.past t ha t 3pl.nom arrive-3pl.fut 
[v sest ' cas-ov]PERi 
a t six hour-pi.gen 
' T h e girl said t h e y ' d arrive at six.' 
There may be a change in modality. An imperative can occur only in a 
direct speech report construction: in the corresponding indirect speech 
report construction the complementiser ctoby is used or simply an infini-
tive. Compare the following examples. 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
372 J O N A T H A N E . M . C L A R K E 
(12) Он попросил меня: Помоги мне решить задачу. (Svedova 1980, 486) 
onA poprosi-lpRED.TRANS menjao pomog- i M P mne0Bj res i t ' ш к  
3sg.masc.nom ask-sg.masc.past lsg.acc help-sg.imp lsg.dat solve-inf 
zadac-Uo 
problem-sg. acc. fem 
'He asked me: "Help me solve the problem." ' 
(13) (а) Он попросил меня, ч т о б ы я помог ему решить задачу. (Idem..) 
onA poprosi- lpRED.TRANS m e n j a 0 ctoby j a s 
3sg.masc.nom ask-sg.masc.past lsg.acc so t h a t lsg.nom 
pomogpRED.iNTR emuoBj resit'iNF zadac-u 0 
help-sg.masc.past 3sg.dat solve-inf problem-sg.acc.fem 
'He asked me to help him solve the problem. ' 
(Literally: 'He asked me t h a t I should help him solve the problem. ') 
An indirect speech report construction t ha t is an alternative to (13a), 
without ctoby bu t using an infinitive, would be as follows. 
(13) (b) Он попросил меня помочь ему решить задачу. 
onA poprosi- lpRED .TRANs menjao p o m o c W e m u 0 B j 
3sg.masc.nom ask-sg.masc.past lsg.acc help-inf 3sg.dat 
r e s i t ' i N F z a d a c - u o 
solve-inf problem-sg.acc.fem 
'He asked me to help him solve the problem. ' 
When the direct speech report expresses advice, the corresponding indi-
rect speech report uses the same complementiser ctoby, as in the following 
examples. 
(14) Мать посоветовала сыну: — Т ы бы отдохнул. (Idem.) 
m a t ' s p o s o v e t o v a - l a p R E D . i N T R s y n - u 0 B j t y s 
mother-sg.nom.fem advise-sg.fem.past son-sg.dat.masc 2sg.nom 
bypARTICLE OtdoxnU-lpRED.INTR 
subj rest-sg.masc.past 
'The mother advised her son: "You should have a rest." ' 
(15) Мать посоветовала сыну, чтобы он отдохнул. (Idem.) 
m a t ' s p o s o v e t o v a - l a p R E D . i N T R s y n - u 0 B j c t o b y 
mother-sg.nom.fem advise-sg.fem.past son-sg.dat.masc so tha t 
o n s otdoxnU-lpRED.INTR 
3sg.masc.nom rest-sg.masc.past 
'The mother advised her son t h a t he should have a rest. ' 
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When the direct speech report expresses a possibility or wish (using the 
subjunctive/condit ional particle by), there is no shift in modality and 
the complementiser cto is used in the indirect speech report construction. 
Note the syntactic similarity between the direct speech report in (14) and 
(16). Both make use of the particle by. 
(16) Он сказал: — Я бы помог тебе. (Svedova 1980, 486) 
onA s k a z a - l p R E D . T R A N s jas Ь у р а к г ю ь е p o m o g P R E D . i N T R tebeoBj 
3sg.masc.nom say-sg.masc.past lsg.nom subj help-sg.masc.past 2sg.dat 
'He said: "I could help you." ' 
(17) Он сказал, что помог бы мне. {Idem.) 
onA skaza-LPRED.TRANS cto POMOGPRED.INTR BYPARTicLE тпеовл 
3sg.masc.nom say-sg.masc.past t ha t help-sg.masc.past sub j lsg.dat 
'He said that he could help me.' 
(18) Больной сказал: — Я бы выпил чаю. {Idem.) 
bol 'n-ojA skaza-lpRED.TRANs jaA b y P A R T i c L E 
patient-sg.nom.masc say-sg.masc.past lsg.nom subj 
Vypi - lpRED.TRANS C a - j u 0 
drink-sg.masc.past tea-sg.gen.masc 
'The patient said: " I 'd like to drink some tea." ' 
(19) Больной сказал, что выпил бы чаю. {Idem.) 
bol'n-ojA skaZa- lpRED.TRANS cto Vypi-lpRED.TRANS 
patient-sg.nom.masc say-sg.masc.past that drink-sg.masc.past 
bypARTicLE ca-juo 
sub j tea-sg.gen.masc 
'The patient said tha t he'd like to drink some tea.' 
From the examples of indirect speech report constructions given above 
it will be observed tha t Russian, unlike English, can use various comple-
mentisers in the indirect speech report . As well as cto and ctoby, the 
complementiser budto may be used to express doubt or absence of full 
confidence in the trustworthiness of the reported statement. In English 
such doubt is expressed by a particular reporting verb, in Russian by a 
complementiser. Compare the following sentences. 
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(20) Она утверждает, что слышала этот шум. (Svedova 1980, 485) 
on-aA u t v e r z d a - e t p R E D . T R A N S cto s l y s a - l a p R E D . T R A N S 
3sg.fem.nom insist-3sg.pres that hear-sg.fem.past 
[èt-ot sum]o 
this-sg.acc.masc noise-sg.acc.masc 
'She insists tha t she heard this noise.' 
(21) Она утверждает, будто слышала этот шум. (Idem.) 
on-aA u t v e r z d a - e t p R E D . T R A N S budto s l y s a - l a P R E D . T R A N S 
3sg.fem.nom affirm-3sg.pres as if hear-sg.fem.past 
[èt-ot sumjo 
this-sg.acc.masc noise-sg.acc.masc 
'She claims tha t she heard this noise.' 
(22) Приезжал с фронта фотокорреспондент Ромов, он уверял, будто видел в 
апреле Васю. (Erenburg, Evgen'eva 1981-1984, I: 121) 
p r i e z z a - l p R E D . i N T R [s f r o n t - a J p E R i [fotokorrespondent 
arrive-sg.masc.past from front-sgGEN.masc photojournalist-sg.nom.masc 
Romovjs onA u v e r j a - l p R E D . T R A N s budto 
Romov-sg.nom.masc 3sg.masc.nom assure-sg.masc.past as if 
v i d e l p R E D . T R A N S [v a p r e l - e ] P E R I Vas-ju0 
see-sg.masc.past in April-sg.loc.masc Vasja-sg.acc.masc 
'The photojournalist Romov arrived from the front. He gave an assurance that 
he had apparently seen Vasja in April.' 
Related to budto both in form and meaning are the compound comple-
mentisers budto by, cto budto by, как budto, as in the following example. 
(23) Нам сказали, как будто все уехали. (Svedova 1970, 703) 
патов : s k a z a - l i p R E D . T R A N s как budto vses u e x a - l i p R E D . i N T R 
lpl.dat tell-pl.past as if all-pl.nom leave-pl.past 
'We were told tha t everyone had apparently left. ' 
The complementiser jakoby functions in a similar way to budto to express 
absence of certainty, as in the following sentence. Note the semantic 
change in the reporting verb. 
(24) Говорят, якобы он уехал. (Ozegov 1970, 899) 
g o v o r - j a t p R E D . T R A N s jakoby on s u e x a - l p R E D . i N T R 
say-3pl.pres as if 3sg.masc.nom leave-sg.masc.past 
'They claim he has left. ' 
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If the direct speech report contains a question without an interrogative, 
then the corresponding indirect speech report will use t he interrogative 
particle li after the verb (which stands in initial position in the comple-
ment clause). Compare English whether, i f . The rules governing shifts 
remain the same. 
(25) Ученик спросил: — З а в т р а будет экзамен? 
ucenikA sprosi- lpRED.TRANS zavtra b u d - e t P R E D . I N T R 
pupil-sg.nom.masc ask-sg.masc.past tomorrow be-3sg.fut 
ékzamens 
exam-sg.nom.masc 
'The pupil asked: "Will there be an exam tomorrow?" ' 
(26) Ученик спросил, будет ли завтра экзамен. 
ucenikA sprosi- lpRED.TRANS bud-e tpRED . INTR li zavtra 
pupil-sg.nom.masc ask-sg.masc.past be-3sg.fut whether tomorrow 
ékzamens 
exam-sg.nom.masc 
'The pupil asked whether there would be an exam tomorrow.' 
In contrast to English, in Russian the indirect speech report construc-
t ion must contain a complementiser. On the other hand, t he complement 
clause may omit the subject, if it coincides with the subject of the report-
ing verb. This cannot occur in English. Consider the following sentences. 
(27) Она сказала, что она поговорит с профессором. 
o n - a A skaza- lapRED .TRANS cto on-as pogovor - i tpRED . INTR 
3sg.fem.nom say-sg.fem.past t ha t 3sg.fem.nom speak-3sg.fut 
[s p r o f e s s o r - o m J p E R i 
with professor-sg.instr.masc 
'She said she'd have a chat with the professor.' 
(28) Отец обещал детям, что подарит им эту книгу. (Svedova 1980, 486) 
otecA o b e s c a - l p R E D . TRANS d e t - j a m 0 B j cto 
father-sg.nom.masc promise-sg.masc.past children-pl.dat tha t 
podar-itpRED.TRANS IMOBJ [et-u knig-u]o 
give-3sg.fut 3pl.dat this-sg.acc.fem book-sg.acc.fem 
'The father promised his children that he'd give them this book. ' 
In (28) the subject of the complement clause is omitted. See also (21) 
and (22). 
In the indirect speech report construction the complement clause 
functions similarly to other complement clauses. 
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2.4. Monoclausal speech report constructions 
While the typical speech report construction in Russian is multiclausal, 
Russian also has monoclausal speech report constructions using the evi-
dentials -de, deskat', mol. The items -de and mol are usually described as 
particles (casticy), deskat' as a parenthetical word (vvodnoe slovo). They 
cannot be easily identified, except in terms of etymology, with any other 
word class (the verb, for example). (Compare English 'they say'.) They 
have no function except as evidentials. -de and mol carry no stress, while 
deskat' is often unstressed. They are confined to the vernacular regis-
ter. These particles emphasize that the statement is reported. (Compare 
Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Ukrainian. In Czech the evidential is the unin-
flected form pry, while in Ukrainian there are four evidentials, all cognate 
with Russian mol: mov, movby, movbyto, movljav. Of these mov, movby, 
movbyto can also serve as complementisers, similar t o budto in Russian.) 
(29) Т а р а с Петрович С е р е д а часто притворялся , что его не волнует мнение 
старших начальников: он, дескать, солдат и воюет не ради похвал. 
(Kazakevic, Evgen'eva 1970-1971, I: 281) 
[Taras Petrovic Seredajs casto 
Taras-nom.masc Petrovic-nom.masc Sereda-nom.masc often 
pritvorja-l-sjapRED.INTR cto egoo neNF,G volnu-etPRED.TR 
pretend-sg.masc.past that 3sg.masc.acc not worry-3sg.pres 
[mneni-e stars-ix nacal'nik-ov]A 
opinion-sg.nom.neut senior-pl.gen.masc chief-pl.gen.masc 
one deskat' OCOP.PRED soldatcc i 
3sg.masc.nom reportedly be-pres soldier-sg.nom.masc and 
voju-etpRED.INTR neNEG [radi poxval]PERI 
fight-3sg.pres not sake praise-pl.gen.fem 
'Taras Petrovic Sereda often pretended t h a t he was not worried by the opinion of 
his superiors: he was a soldier, he said, and did not fight for the sake of praise. ' 
These evidentials can also be used within multiclausal indirect speech 
report constructions as a way of stressing the reported statement. 
(30) Р а з — п о д самый под Троицын д е н ь — к ней пришли и сказали, что князь, 
мол, убит на дуэли. (Aluxtin, Evgen 'eva 1981-1984, II: 289) 
[raz pod sam-yj pod Troicyn d e n ' ] P B R i 
once towards very-sg.acc.masc towards Trinity-sg.acc.masc day-sg.acc.masc 
[k nej]PERI prisl-IPRED.INTR i skazalipRED.TR c t o k n j a z ' c s 
to 3sg.fem.dat come-3pl.past and say-3pl.past tha t prince-sg.nom.masc 
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molpARTicLE, 0COP.PRED ubitcc [na duel-i]pERi 
reportedly be-pres killed-sg.masc in duel-sg.loc.fem 
'One day—on the eve, the very eve of Trini ty—they came to her and said that 
the prince had been killed, it was said, in a duel.' 
Evidentials may be used to indicate a direct speech report, as in the 
following passage. Note the use of different evidentials in successive sen-
tences. 
(31) — Позновил по телефону из б ю р о пропусков. Так, мол, и так , с вами 
говорит Кротов. Мне, дескать, необходимо с вами срочно поговорить об 
Елизавете Ивановне. (Lin'kov, Evgen'eva 1970-1971, I: 281) 
pozvoni-lpRED.iNTR [ p o t e l e f o n - u ] P E R i [iz b j u r o 
call-sg.masc.past by phone-sg.dat.masc from office-sg.gen.neut 
p r o p u s k - o v ] p E R i t a k A D v HIOIPARTICLE i t ak A Dv [s vami] P E Ri 
permit-pl.gen.gen so reportedly and so wi th 2pl.instr 
govor-itpRED.iNTR Krotovs m n e 0 B J deskat'PARTICLE 0COP.PRED 
speak-3sg.pres Krotov-nom.masc lsg.dat reportedly be-pres 
neobxodimocc [s vami] PERI srocnoADv p o g o v o r i t ' i N F 
necessary-sg.neut with 2pl.instr urgently speak-inf 
[ob Elizavet-e Ivanovn-e]PERi 
about Elizaveta-sg.loc.fem Ivanovna-sg.loc.fem 
'He called on the phone from the office of permits. Like this, he says, i t ' s like this, 
i t ' s Krotov speaking to you. I need, he says, t o have an urgent chat with you 
about Elizaveta Ivanovna.' 
The particle -de functions as an enclitic (and is usually marked in the 
written language with a hyphen). It is often attached to the first con-
stituent of the main clause in the speech report. It can be repeated several 
times in the one speech report, if the report consists of several clauses. 
(32) [Ногтев] продолжал говорить: если бы ему д а л и все необходимое, он-де 
наладил бы питание. (Azaev, Evgen'eva 1981-1984, II: 374) 
[Nogtev]A prodolza-lpRED.TRANS gOVOrit'iNF esli bypARTICLE 
Nogtev-nom.masc continue-sg.masc.past speak-inf if subj 
EMUOBJ dal-ipRED.TRANS [vs-e neobxodim-oe]0 
3sg.masc.dat give-pl.past all-sg.acc.net necessary-sg.acc.neut 
onA- DEPARTICLE naladi-lpRED.TRANS BYPARTICLE pitani-eo 
3sg.masc.nom reportedly arrange-sg.masc.past s u b j food-sg.acc.neut 
'[Nogtev] continued speaking: if he were given everything necessary, he said, he 
would arrange the food.' 
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3. Report ing verbs and framers 
In Russian the set of reporting verbs tha t can be used with a direct speech 
complement is extensive and largely coincides wi th the set t h a t can be 
used with an indirect speech complement. Report ing verbs of commu-
nication taking the complementiser cto include govorit' 'say', doklady-
vat' ' report ' , zajavljat' 'announce, declare', izvescat' 'inform, notify ' , in-
formirovat' ' inform', molvit' 'say', opovescat' 'notify, inform', osvedoml-
jat' ' inform', ob'javljat' 'declare, announce, proclaim', pisat' 'write', 
rasskazyvat' 'tell, narra te , recount ' , soobscat' 'communicate, report , in-
form, announce', skazat' 'say, tell ' . But the set of reporting verbs in 
Russian shows significant semantic differences f rom the set of reporting 
verbs in English. For example, skazat' corresponds to both 'say' and 
'tell ' , govorit' to b o t h 'say' and 'speak', while sprasivat' sebja, literally 
'ask oneself', t ransla tes 'wonder'. At the same t ime in Russian there are 
some non-reporting verbs that can frame a direct speech complement that 
do not readily combine with an indirect speech complement. Consider 
the following sentences taken from a Russian crime novel of the Soviet pe-
riod. Each sentence is multiclausal and shows t h e characteristic inversion 
of subject and verb after a direct speech complement. 
(33) — Вы, значит, пешком решились? — улыбалась Тихомирова, довольная 
что встретила-таки его. (Sestakov 2002, 64) 
v y s znacitPARENTH, p e s k o m A D v resil-is'PRED.INTR ulybalas'PRED.INTR 
2pl.nom so on foot decide-pl.past smile-sg.fem.past 
Tixomirovas d o v o l ' n - a j a P E R I cto vs t re t i l -aPRED.TR t ak i P A RricLE 
Tixomirova-sg.nom.fem pleased-sg.nom.fem that meet-sg.fem.past nevertheless 
egoo 
3sg.acc.masc 
'"So you decided to walk?" Tixomirova smiled, pleased that she had met him 
after all.' 
This may be described as ellipsis: it occurs in Russian where English 
retains the reporting verb, as in the following example. 
(34) — Э т о школа наша ,—махнула Ирина прутиком на красное здание. 
(Sestakov op.cit., 65) 
èt-ocs 0COP.PRED [skol-a nas-a]Cc maxnu- la P R E D . INTR 
this-sg.neut.nom be-pres school-sg.fem.nom our-sg.fem.nom wave-sg.fem.past 
Irin-as prutik-omoBj [na krasn-oe zdani-e]PERI 
Irina-sg.fem.nom switch-sg.masc.instr at red-sg.neut.acc building-sg.neut.acc 
'"This is our school," said Irina, waving a small switch at a red building. ' 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
SPEECH REPORT CONSTRUCTIONS IN RUSSIAN 379 
As well as reporting verbs, verbs of cognition and thinking can also in-
troduce a complement clause with cto. The same shifts (or absence of 
shift, in the case of tense) apply. 
4. Speech report continuum 
While s tandard Russian formally distinguishes direct and indirect speech 
report constructions and characterizes each with cer tain distinctive fea-
tures, it is also possible to find speech report constructions that show fea-
tures of both direct and indirect speech reports. This suggests a speech 
report continuum. Consider the following sentence (difficult to t rans la te 
into English without distortion). It has a reporting verb and the com-
plementiser cto typical of an indirect speech report, b u t lacks the usual 
shifts characteristic of such a report: the complement clause contains 
imperatives (postupaj , uezzaj) and a 2nd person pronominal ( tvoja) t ha t 
correlates with a 3rd person pronominal (emu) referring to the person 
addressed by the subject of the reporting verb. 
(35) Когда он пришел домой, я ему сказала, что или поступай, или уезжай из 
дому, а что всякая твоя ночь мне стоит год жизни, . . . 
(S. Tolstaja, Svedova 1980, И: 487) 
kogda on s prise-lpRED.iNTR domojADv jaA emuOBj 
when 3sg.masc.nom come-sg.masc.past home lsg.nom 3sg.masc.dat 
skaza-lapRED.TR cto ili postupajiMp ili uezzajiMp [iz dom-u]pERi a 
say-sg.fem.past that or act-sg.imp or leave-sg.imp from home-sg.gen.masc and 
cto [vsjak-aja tvo-ja noc']A mne0Bj 
that each-sg.nom.fem your-sg.nom.fem night-sg.nom.fem lsg.dat 
StO-itpRED.TR [god zizn-i]o 
cost-3sg.pres year-sg.acc.masc life-sg.gen.fem 
'When he came home, I said to him that either do something, or leave home, and 
that each night of yours costs me a year of my life, . . . ' 
5. Indirect speech reports in colloquial Russian 
In colloquial Russian (razgovornaja rec') one can observe particular fea-
tures of indirect speech reports not found in the s t andard literary lan-
guage. Colloquial Russian shows a higher degree of freedom of con-
sti tuent order than the s tandard language and permi ts discontinuous 
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indirect speech reports. Take the following sentences, where the sub-
ject of the indirect speech complement is placed before t h e subject of the 
reporting verb. Note the presence of the complementiser cto after the 
reporting verb. 
(36) Конфеты он сказал что вкусные. (Zemskaja 1973, 398) 
konfet-ycs onA s k a z a - l p R E D . T R A N S c to 0COP.PRED vkusn-yecc 
sweet-pl.nom 3sg.masc.nom say-sg.masc.past t ha t be-pres tasty-pl.nom 
'He said t h a t the sweets were tasty. ' 
(Standard Russian: Он с к а з а л , что конфеты вкусные.) 
(37) Его сестра говорят что приехала . (Idem.) 
[ego sestr-a]s g o v o r - j a t p R E D . T R A N S cto pr iexa-laP R ED.INTR 
3sg.masc.gen sister-sg.nom.fem say-3pl.pres that arrive-sg.fem.past 
'They say t h a t his sister's arrived. ' 
(Compare: 'His sister they say that she's arrived.') 
(Standard Russian: Говорят, что приехала его сестра.) 
6. Speech r e p o r t constructions and s ty l e 
In works of l i terature direct and indirect speech report constructions of-
t en reflect significant stylistic differences and allow for contrasting modes 
of expression. Generally speaking, direct speech reports, being a more 
faithful representation of w h a t has been said (though not necessarily an 
exact representation), can contain lexical elements (slang, expletives, col-
loquialisms, non-standard grammatical forms) not usually found in the 
stylistically more neutral indirect speech reports. For th i s reason some 
Russian writers (Babel', for example) have deliberately cultivated direct 
speech in their writing as a n immediate way of confronting the reader 
with the reality of what is being portrayed. (Here one may compare the 
photograph to the drawing or painting, though all can involve a degree 
of artifice.) If we consider t h e short story by Babel', enti t led The Death 
of Dolgusov, we discover t h a t of the 140 lines of text, 77 lines (or 55%) 
represent direct speech repor ts . 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion it should be noted that Russian distinguishes both direct 
and indirect speech report constructions which are typically multiclausal. 
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Russian also has monoclausal speech report constructions t h a t employ a 
vernacular evidential (mol, deskat' or -de.) At the same t ime it is possible 
to demonstrate the existence of a speech report continuum in Russian, 
where some constructions display features of both direct and indirect 
speech reports, such as the complementiser cto and imperative verb forms. 
While Russian makes use of a large set of report ing verbs in speech report 
constructions, it can also deploy non-reporting verbs as f ramers of direct 
speech complements. 
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THE GRAMMATICALIZATION OF TEMPORAL 
SUBORDINATING CONJUNCTIONS IN SURGUT OSTYAK 
KATALIN GUGÁN 
Abstract 
This paper investigates two subordinating conjunctions of the Surgut dialect, one of 
the Eastern dialects of Ostyak. One of these, kuntd 'when, if' acquired the function of a 
conditional conjunction in addition to its ancient function of a temporal question word; 
a special feature of its grammaticalization is t ha t whereas it occurs clause initially as 
a question word, in its conditional function it occurs clause finally. The other i tem 
investigated, kùc, may have four different functions in this dialect: it can serve as (a) a 
temporal conjunction expressing contact anteriority, 'as soon as'; (b) a conjunction of 
concession, 'although'; (c) a paired concessive-disjunctive conjunction, 'whether . . . or ' ; 
and (d) the anterior constituent of various compounds in 'any-' (e.g., 'anyone'). I t s 
origin is debated: it is either a Russian loanword or else an Ob-Ugrian innovation. Th is 
paper argues that , in view of the results of research on grammaticalization in general, 
the former claim can be discarded with a high degree of probability. Finally, the paper 
investigates the debated issue of whether these items can be regarded as conjunctions 
proper and concludes tha t nothing warrants their exclusion from tha t category. 
In addition to an earlier form of subordination involving a non-finite 
verb form and no conjunction (and one that is consistent with the basic 
SOV word order), subordinate clauses involving conjunctions and finite 
verb forms constitute a more recent phenomenon in the various Ostyak 
dialects.1 Studies of primary and secondary grammaticalization with re-
spect to conjunctions—i.e., the investigation of what types of lexical 
items tend to turn into conjunctions and what novel functions the con-
junctions already in existence tend to develop, respectively—are both 
widespread. The subject-matter of the present paper will be two linguis-
tic items that are usually classified as subordinating conjunctions and 
1
 It is impossible to tell exactly when subordination involving a conjunction first 
appeared in the language but certain conclusions can be drawn from early text col-
lections. Looking at Southern Ostyak texts, Csepregi (1996) claims that around 
the turn of the century (i.e., around 1900) subordination with non-finite verb 
forms still prevailed but some finite subordinate clauses had already occurred. 
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tha t can definitely be brought into connection with temporal reference 
but have developed other functions, too, hence the changes involving 
them mainly belong to t h e area of secondary grammaticalization. Their 
semantic characteristics will be reviewed first, followed by a summary of 
their syntact ic properties.2 
One of these items is kuntd, having two distinct functions: an inter-
rogative pronoun meaning 'when' as in (1), and a subordinating conjunc-
tion meaning ' if ' as in (2): 
(1) kùnta ig.kokoânàm manjan? 
when home go.prs.2sg 
'When do you go home?' (Paasonen-Vértes 2001, 24/6) 
(2) os t 'ena anta àwtat kunta, weaiaaw törama pàwat. 
also thus not cut.prt.pass.3pl if reindeer.Px.pl.lpl sky.lat freeze.prt.pass.3pl 
'If we h a d not driven t hem inside, they would have got frozen.' 
(Csepregi 1998, 62/4) 
Which of t h e two functions is the earlier one is not at issue: the in-
terrogative pronoun goes back to the Proto-Uralic pronominal s tem ku-
~ ko- (Rédei 1986-1988, 191). It can be observed in general t ha t lan-
guages of ten employ interrogative pronouns as conjunctions in order to 
express subordination (Harris-Campbell 1995, 293-8). Semantic changes 
that conjunctions tend to undergo, including the development of their 
additional functions, can be traced back to pragmatic factors: certain 
conversational implicatures that are frequently associated with sets of 
clauses linked by the given conjunction get semanticized during language 
use and become permanent components of its meaning (Hopper-Traugott 
1993, 72—7). One of these implications is tha t of two events occurring in 
a temporal sequence the earlier event may be a condition for the later 
event: the conventionalization of the implication is reflected by condi-
tional conjunctions developing from tempora l ones. 
The derivation of t he semantic change of the other conjunction we 
look at in this paper, kúc, is more problematic. Four different functions 
2
 This paper is based on d a t a coming from the following sources: Paasonen-Vér tes 
(2001), Honti (1978a;b), Hont i -Rusva i (1977), Csepregi (1998). For the sake of 
philological accuracy, as well as in order to avoid mistakes that might crop in 
while t he primary data are brought to a consistent format, linguistic da t a will be 
cited in terms of the au thors ' own transcription systems and with the authors ' 
own translations ( translated into English). 
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of tha t item can be distinguished: contact anteriority, 'as soon as', as in 
(3); concession, 'although', as in (4); paired concessive-disjunctive use, 
'whether . . .or ' , as in (5); and particle-like use, 'any-', as in (6): 
(3) (фкокД, Làijtââ [э: Larjtaá] kçts ráqapas, owpî i^ttsaya kènam 
in step.inf as begin.prt.3sg door middle.translat dig.partperf 
m8Y-woi)kà kQr-yas. 
earth-pit . lat fall.prt.3sg 
'As he began to enter, he fell into the earth-pit dug in the middle of the doorway.' 
(Paasonen-Vértes 2001, 96/1) 
(4) má колуэ t 'àpaq л0у0-алэ1)лат enta pómaxat, kóc piras 
my yet rotten bone-end.Px.pl.lsg not catch.fire.pass.prs.3sg although old 
ko wSsam. 
man be.prs. lsg 
'My old bones have not yet burnt up, although I am old.' (Honti 1978b, 128/4) 
(5) iki, kóc jisa, kóc ал jisa, ime ös л1лэг)кэ 
old.man whether cry.imp.2sg or not cry.imp.2sg wife.Px2sg again alive.translat 
enta jëx. 
not become.prs.3sg 
'Old man, whether you cry or not, your wife will not come to life.' 
(Honti-Rusvai 1977, 225/6) 
(6) t 'ukim mat , öntaAna nömaksax, t 'aka kùc múwaAi wäxijat, л а ц л а т 
so tired in.herself think.prs.3sg well a n y t h i n g be.imp.3sg step.prs.lsg 
pana t 'e t t i jaka. 
and thus in 
'She was so tired that she said to herself: "Whoever should be in there, I will 
enter." ' (Csepregi 1998, 74/2) 
Some authors (including Munkácsi 1894, 216; Kálmán 1961, 182; Steinitz 
1966, 588) t race this item back to the Russian conjunction хоть, dialectal 
хошь 'albeit, though; whe the r . . . or' whose cognates can be found, in 
addition to Ostyak dialects, also in Vogul. (In an earlier paper, Gert 
Sauer also subscribes to tha t view, cf. Sauer 1993, 355.) 
However, Csepregi (1996) calls the reader 's attention to the problem-
atic nature of tha t derivation. In the Southern Ostyak texts she studied, 
two kinds of forms are attested: a conjunction küs 'as soon as' (also oc-
curring as an anterior constituent in Kr. Sav.3 küspa 'if only') on the one 
3
 Abbreviations: Kr.: Krasnojarsk dialect, Sav.: Savodnija dialect, Vj.: Vasjugan 
dialect. 
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hand, and the paired conjunction xos-xos 'whe ther . . . or' on the other. 
She does not reject derivation from the Russian conjunction mentioned 
in the case of either, bu t she claims t h a t the former must be an earlier 
borrowing, in view of its subsequent phonological and semantic changes, 
whereas with respect t o the latter she writes: "the paired item . . %os 
is a t runcat ion of the Russian verb хочешь 'you want ' and as such it is 
related to the conjunction küs, but appears to be a much later borrow-
ing" (Csepregi op.cit., 62). Gert Sauer, too, presents a rather altered 
view in his recent paper (1999): he says tha t the item at hand is not a 
loanword but an internal development going back to an Ob-Ugrian origin. 
Although the functions of Russian хоть and Ostyak кос largely overlap, 
this is due to mere chance in his opinion, given tha t the Ostyak word— 
unlike the Russian one — has a temporal meaning, too. The syntactic 
behaviour (word order) of the Ostyak conjunction, too, differs from tha t 
of the Russian word; if it were a case of borrowing, the syntactic pa t te rn 
of the source language would have to be copied as well. Furthermore, he 
claims, phonological factors also disprove the Russian origin of the word. 
He adds, however, t ha t certain occurrences of the given item may be in-
fluenced by the Russian conjunction of similar form and meaning (e.g., 
wherever its word order is of the Russian type), and tha t in certain di-
alects one can observe a homonymous but borrowed item as an anterior 
constituent: Vj. kös'-koji 'anyone'. 
As can be seen, then, three kinds of explanations exist with respect 
to the origin and functions of Ostyak kùc: (a) Russian borrowing (in all 
roles); (b) multiple/multi-stage borrowing (in view of the differences); 
and (c) an internal development tha t occasionally may follow a borrowed 
syntactic pat tern and has a homonymous borrowed counterpart. 
In this case, we can rely on the results of general research on gram-
maticalization,4 in particular, those concerning grammaticalization con-
tinua t ha t are characteristically taken to be unidirectional. Such a con-
tinuum is the range of semantic changes of conjunctions (Hopper-Trau-
gott 1993, 178): temporal > conditional (or causal) > concessive. It is 
definitely to be taken into consideration tha t , were we to reckon with bor-
rowing from Russian, we would be forced to derive the temporal meaning 
from the concessive one, contrary to the strong tendency of the direc-
tion of semantic change referred to. (Since Russian хоть can be traced 
4
 Dér (2002) employs a similar method when she discusses the history of a Hun-
garian suffix of debated origin and takes a stance on that issue on the basis of 
general statements of grammaticalization research. 
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back to the grammaticalization of a participial form of хотеть (Vas-
mer 1958, 268), t he idea that the two Ob-Ugrian languages might have 
borrowed an earlier, temporal meaning, can be excluded.) 
Returning to the above grammaticalization continuum, its discrete 
staging is necessarily arbitrary since it does not allow for transitional 
phases that are exactly the periods in which the added pragmatic mean-
ing referred to above becomes a component of the meaning of the given 
conjunction. And in view of the fact that such changes are usually not 
"supplantive" but additive, and hence the phenomenon of layering also 
occurs, it is to be expected tha t intermediate domains of the continuum 
will be possible to at test , too: t ha t examples can be found to fall be-
tween the assumed initial stage, the purely temporal relation as in (7) 
and the assumed final stage as in (8). The lat ter example also shows 
tha t the conjunction can have a concessive meaning in positions other 
than clause initially: 
(7) kem kúc A'iwotAun, ma t'i jowatAam. 
out as go.prs.2sg I behold come.prs.lsg 
'As soon as you get out, I will come then. ' (Csepregi 1998, 82/3) 
(8) nùi) töm töram, töm L\am pálakna káw, t 'u kúc 
you that sky tha t front side.iness stone that though 
powAe, muyti wicapa anta pitaA. 
blow.prs.3sg.sgobj through never get.prs.3sg 
'On the other side of the world, there is a stone. No matter how strongly you 
blow it, you will never go through it. ' (ibid., 64/3) 
This latter example may also serve as an instance of the implication 
involved in concession, as follows (where Si and S2 are clauses): "With 
a sentence of the form bár Si, mégis S2 'al though S1? nevertheless S2', 
the speaker states 'SI and S 2 ' and (s)he pragmatically presupposes or 
believes that 'given Si, it could not/should not be the case tha t S2'" 
(Bánréti 1983, 10). In the above example, the statement is tha t the 
wind blows the stone and cannot go through it; the presupposition is: 
if it blows the stone (strong enough), it should be able to go through 
it. Concession, then, is bound up with condit ionally, opposition, and 
causality; in the case of the conjunction at hand, tha t implication has 
turned into part of the meaning of an originally purely temporal item. 
In the texts we have studied, quite a number of examples involve 
this conjunction linking clauses tha t are, beyond temporal relations, in a 
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semantic relationship with one another t ha t is not quite concession but 
has something to do with the neighbouring categories of conditionality, 
opposition, or causality. In these cases, it is context tha t is more or less 
responsible for such additional meaning. 
(9) kern kùc A'iwat, к е т э п patayAem. 
out as go.prt.3sg outside dark 
'As he goes out (he sees tha t ) it is dark outside. ' (Csepregi 1998, 84/7) 
Context: "In the house, it is broad daylight. What could have happened, he 
thinks. Has the sun risen? He leaves the house." 
Potential presupposition: If it is light inside, it should be light outside, too. 
(10) ay0as ört kóc ney0ramay, äy0aAat kótna töt pit. 
Chukchee leader as jump.prt .3sg sledge.pl middle there fall.prt.3sg 
'The Chukchee leader jumped, and he fell between the sledges in the middle.' 
(Honti 1978b, 135/1) 
Context (broader): The leader is bragging; earlier he has proven tha t he is good 
at jumping. It is an unexpected consequence tha t he now nevertheless falls down. 
(11) kern kùc A'iwatAat, ajmata war pa antam. 
out as run.prs.3pl something thing in.fact is.not 
'As they run out, there's nothing outside.' (Csepregi 1998, 82/3) 
Context: "Suddenly some loud noise is heard, the earth begins to tremble all 
around. [...] The people all run out, but you should not." 
Potential presupposition: If there is some noise outside, something must have 
caused it. 
(12) tacwwat iùwc kçts kontL, (tçwwo kù, tacwt) ta0wwat iùw antèm, 
fire wood as search.prs.3sg fire wood is.not 
'As he is looking for firewood, firewood there is none.' 
(Paasonen-Vértes 2001, 68/2) 
The last example, in which there is clear contradiction between the two 
clauses, minimally differs from the next one, exhibiting a purely conces-
sive relation: 
(13) kçts wîyoL, (jçwattij,,) jQwttft antèm. 
as call.prs.3sg come.partimp.3pl is.not 
'Even though he calls, there 's no one coming.' (Paasonen-Vértes 2001, 22/5) 
It could be expected that causal relations should be linked to temporal 
relations with a higher probability (concession being in general a very 
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complex logical relation that is normally grammaticalized rather later; 
Hopper-Traugot t 1993, 178), yet in these texts there are only two pairs 
of clauses (both occurring in the same tale and being almost identical) in 
which the event expressed in one of them follows from the event expressed 
in the other, rather than contradicting the other clause or the context: 
(14) рапэ t 'u imina nök rùwattaAna iki tayapa kùc 
and the woman.loc up confuse.partimp.Px3sg.loc old.man here as 
saqkkint, to owpi màca kataA - t 'ukima paryinam pötaymin 
wake.up.prt3sg ? door-post.lat grab.prt3sg such.lat back draw.advpart 
jay-
become.prt.3sg 
'And as the old woman tried to wake him, the old man woke up, he grabbed at 
the door-post, so much did he withdraw. ' (Csepregi 1998, 94/25) 
(As the giant woke up, the boy grabbed at the door-post because he was so 
frightened.) 
As can be seen, then, the Surgut dialect da ta widely reflect not only 
the initial and final phases of the assumed functional expansion of the 
conjunction but also its transitional phases. Hence I think tha t , wherever 
the temporal , concessive, or transitional conjunction occurs in a preverbal 
position, it is unjustified to take it to be of a Russian origin; rather, 
internal development can be assumed and indeed demonstrated. Word 
order cannot be taken as decisive in the dialect under scrutiny anyway: 
with few exceptions, concessive kùc also occurs in a preverbal position 
(cf. (8)), whereas there are examples of clause-initial temporal kùc, too:5 
(15) kùc jamya AejaAtaya jay - t 'äka terni käntak ko optât, 
as good.translat watch.inf begin.prt.3sg well this Ostyak man hair.pl 
'As he looks at it closer: well, it is human hair.' (ibid., 92/22) 
Since in the dialect under investigation there is no phonological dis-
tinction between anterior constituent-like or paired ( 'whether . . . or') and 
temporal-concessive kùc, we cannot take a stand as to whether this is the 
result of internal development or kùc follows the Russian pa t te rn in this 
funct ion—neither possibility can be excluded. 
5
 Also, we are cautioned by the fact tha t word order variability in Ostyak in general 
and the Surgut dialect in particular is far from clearly understood, hence it is 
hardly possible to decide whether the cases at hand are those of the Russian 
pa t te rn being copied or the conjunction raises from its preverbal position due to 
stress reasons. 
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While so far the subject-matter of our investigation was the meaning 
or the semantic extension of the two conjunctions, in what follows, we 
will turn to their grammatical behaviour. In particular, we will ask if 
these items can be seen as subordinating conjunctions. Traditionally 
they are classified as such; but Sauer (1999) and Härtung (1999, 165-70) 
argue that th is classification is the wrong one. Här tung has the following 
reasons not t o take Ostyak clause-linking items to be conjunctions (and 
to call them junctors instead): 
- conjunctions in general introduce clauses, whereas the items at hand 
do not: many of them go back to particles and continue to function 
as particles, too; they often occur after the focused word; 
- conjunctions in general cannot be suffixed but some of the Ostyak 
ones can (those tha t go back to interrogative or deictic pronouns); 
- some of them can take postpositions or possessive suffixes, especially 
those linking items t h a t occur within subordinate constructions, in 
complement or relative clauses. 
She also notes that , in Ostyak, coordination and subordination cannot 
be clearly told apart: only clauses whose conjunction is of a pronomi-
nal origin are undoubtedly subordinate ones. From this, and from the 
foregoing, it follows tha t in her view it would be difficult to define un-
ambiguously which linking items qualify as conjunctions, even though on 
the basis of such a definition setting up the broader category of junctors 
could be avoided. 
With respect to the two items that are investigated in this paper, only 
the first of t he above criteria is applicable since they cannot be suffixed. 
Indeed, kite most often is in a position within the clause (immediately 
before the verb, as in (1), (3), (8), (10), (12); if there is a preverb, then 
between the preverb and the verb, cf. (7), (9), (11)) where otherwise 
only particles occur. As a conditional conjunction, kunta normally occurs 
clause finally,6 whereas the interrogative pronoun from which it developed 
into a conditional conjunction, just like other interrogative pronouns tha t 
are also used as relative pronouns, are clause initial. (In the texts under 
survey, no instance can be found of kunta as a temporal conjunction 
occurring clause initially.) Wha t it shows parallel word order behaviour 
with is the synonymous conditional construction involving a particle: the 
particle ka also occurs at the end of its own clause, but whereas the latter 
6
 There is a single attested example in which it occurs immediately before the verb. 
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occurs in a clause containing a person-marked present participle, kunta 
appears in finite clauses. 
(16) os mà kjjtam kà rut ' käntay tiy0ta xàtna 
also I leave.partimp.lsg if Russian Ostyak appear.part imp time.iness 
колпэ wáAAi. 
how kill.pass.prs.3sg 
'If he leaves me, how do people kill him when they appear?' (Honti 1978b, 128/7) 
Temporal relations are of ten expressed by person-marked participle + 
postposition constructions: 
(17) jäka jöwat ta Aatna t'i cemotinan tarn, ax in t ta 
home get.partimp.2sg time.iness this suitcase.Px2sg there lie.down.partimp.2sg 
Aatna töw äsam uxijana imte. 
time.iness there pillow edge.Px2sg.lat put. imp2sg 
'When you go home, put your suitcase beside your pillow at bedtime.' 
(Csepregi 1998, 80/12) 
It is imaginable then tha t the word order position of t he conditional con-
junction has been fixed a t the end of t he clause on the model of t he 
position of conditional particles or of postpositions. Thus the word order 
of our two items does not indeed follow t h e "expected" conjunction pa t -
tern but one of them takes the position of particles, t h e other takes t h a t 
of postpositions, whereas the rest of pronoun-based conjunctions occur 
clause initially. However, position in itself cannot play a decisive role: 
the two edges of clauses are in fact designated positions for conjunctions 
but this is not an absolute universal. The grammatical s ta tus of the two 
items at hand can be approached from two different angles: from the rela-
tion between the clauses they conjoin, and from the par t of speech s ta tus 
of the two words. That is, it has to be demonstrated t h a t the items at 
hand are conjunctions (rather than particles) and t h a t the clauses they 
connect are related by subordination (or if they are not , what kind of 
relation there is between the two clauses). 
To draw a distinction between conjunctions and particles is not un-
problematic since they do not unambiguously differ either morphologi-
cally or syntactically (both parts of speech can be characterized by the 
following properties: they have no role as sentence constituents, they 
cannot be modified, they cannot be asked questions about , they do not 
enter into syntactic relationships with other words in the clause, and 
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they cannot be suffixed; Keszler 2000, 268-81). Thus it is their functions 
alone ("whether their role is primarily linking or particle-like [modal, 
estimating, topic-enhancing]", ibid., 280) tha t can be used to tell t h e m 
apart . Since other clauses containing particles are stand-alone sentences, 
whereas those containing the items discussed here require another clause 
to cooccur with, we should rather say their function is linking: 
(18) (a) t ' äka äwas ört konya t ' i wajyantay. 
'And the Nenets leader withdrew.' (perfecivising particle) 
(Csepregi 1998, 96/4) 
(b) *kem kùc A'iwataat 
'As he ran o u t . . . ' 
The other criterion we mentioned is whether these linking items signal 
subordination or coordination, although these are not necessarily two 
distinct categories, either. According to traditional grammatical descrip-
tions, coordination differs f rom subordination in that coordinated clauses 
are merely connected by some logical relation, some relation of content . 
By contrast, a subordinate clause is typically a clausal expression of some 
constituent of the main clause (Keszler op.cit., 472, 531). But there is 
a transitional range of clauses with a specific semantic content, one sub-
type of which involves types tha t are par t ly detached from their role of 
expressing some constituent of the main clause. Within this latter cat-
egory, concession is the type that is the most independent of the ma in 
clause (ibid., 520). 
Generative classification is based on the interchangeability of clauses: 
in coordination, the conjunction does not belong to either clause, hence 
the clauses are interchangeable if the conjunction is left where it is (be-
tween the two clauses) bu t not if it moves along with the second clause. 
By contrast, in subordination, the conjunction is part of the subordinate 
clause, hence it can move along with its clause but it cannot be left be-
hind by moving the clause without it. However, this tes t does not apply 
in all cases: there are pairs of clauses in a concessive relation in which 
the conjunction is within the second clause, and conversely, not all sub-
ordinate clauses can in fact be moved. Another possibility of drawing a 
distinction is the investigation of binding relations of noun phrases in t he 
clauses. This method also yields a transit ional category: ' independent 
subordination' belongs to subordination on the basis of movability, bu t 
the distribution of binding relations is neither that of subordination nor 
tha t of coordination: it is a third type (Kenesei 1992, 537-52). 
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Finally, a third type of classification (Hopper-Traugot t 1993, 163-75) 
tells the kinds of relationships between clauses apart on t he basis of their 
degree of grammaticalization; this method gives us three classes to begin 
with. 'Parataxis ' is the kind of connection where it is only intonation 
or — in cases of a higher degree of grammat ica l iza t ion—a conjunction 
tha t links the two clauses. The individual clauses are independent 'nu-
clei'. In 'hypotaxis' , the dependence between the two clauses (the 'nu-
cleus' and the 'margin') is mutual. This kind can be recognized, e.g., 
by all verbal categories being represented in the nucleus only. The rel-
ative independence of t he margin, however, is shown by the fact t h a t 
it may have its own illocutionary force, e.g., its own modality. Finally, 
in subordination, the clauses cannot have different illocutionary forces, 
the subordinate clause is equivalent to a constituent of the main clause, 
and the clauses are conjoined in some way. Taking all three systems of 
classification into account, then, the following discriminative criteria can 
be taken into consideration: 
1. constituent role or logical relation, 
2. interchangeability, 
3. binding relations, 
4. illocutionary force, and 
5. downgradedness, nucleus/margin relationship. 
The first of these (as well as the fifth criterion that is ra ther close to the 
first) tells us t ha t the clauses under inspection belong to subordination 
(temporal clause) or to the intermediate range (conditionality, concession, 
either built on a constituent role or independent of i t) . Looking at the 
order of clauses, it appears t ha t in an overwhelming majo r i ty of cases the 
clauses containing the conjunctions at hand are in initial position, bu t 
the inverse order is also a t tes ted for b o t h conjunctions, hence the clauses 
are in principle interchangeable: 
(19) ma awam imiya wëja, лаг)сле kunta. 
'Marry my daughter, if you love her.' (Honti-Rusvai 1977, 225/5) 
(20) t 'u niqe use ларавэл kóraytaYa jay, töwa kúc jöwatAan. 
'The storehouse of your wife will have all bu t collapsed by the t ime you get there. ' 
(Csepregi 1998, 94/25) 
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The interchangeability of t he clauses would be characteristic of subordi-
nation; but the rarity of the available examples and their loose 'af ter-
thought ' character requires some caution here. 
The investigation of binding relations and of whether the two clauses 
can or cannot have different illocutionary forces would both be very im-
po r t an t—bu t these cannot be studied on a closed corpus, the task would 
require access to the competence of a native speaker. Finally, the crite-
rion of downgradedness leads us back to t he issue of function. The clauses 
containing the conjunctions under scrutiny here involve finite verb forms, 
yet they require complementation, a fact t h a t — a t least in pairs of clauses 
in a temporal relat ionship—may be connected to the aspect of the clause 
whose temporal structure is completed by that of an event expressed in 
another clause. All in all, it is highly doubt fu l whether setting up a novel 
part of speech category is justified, given tha t the two i tems studied here 
can be described in terms of existing categories and their properties. 
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, we wish to conclude th is 
paper by saying that , on t he basis of their behaviour, b o t h kúc and kunto 
are to be regarded as i tems grammaticalized into conjunctions; as well as 
tha t—in view of the fact t h a t the development of concessive meaning into 
temporal meaning is made rather unlikely by conclusions drawn from t h e 
general theory of grammatical iza t ion—the derivation of Surgut Ostyak 
kúc from Russian can probably be discarded. On the same account, it 
is expedient to regard the temporal meaning as pr imary within Ostyak, 
too. In its temporal function, this i tem is part of a system containing 
numerous synonymous possibilities, as the temporal relationship between 
two propositions can be expressed in several ways: by a non-finite verb 
form + personal suffix T postposition, by a non-finite verb form + per-
sonal suffix + case marker, or by a non-finite verb form + personal suffix 
on its own. Concession can easily be derived from a temporal meaning, 
and complex examples also abound. 
Conditionality can also be expressed by synonymous constructions 
in addition to the conjunction kunta, for instance, by a present partici-
ple + personal suffix + particle complex as referred t o above. At t h e 
same time, we do not have attested instances of th is conjunction in-
troducing temporal subordination (or any other kind of subordination) 
clause initially, whereas clause finally it has a characteristically condi-
tional meaning; it appears tha t this word order pa t t e rn is a peculiarity 
of its grammaticalization. 
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ASPECT MARKERS GRAMMATICALIZED FROM 
VERBS IN KAMAS 
GERSON KLUMPP 
Abstract 
The article presents some results of research into aspectual auxiliaries of Kamas (South-
ern Samoyed; extinct). Code-copied from Turkic, Kamas started to use verbs with 
salient aspectuality to modify the aspectual meaning content of another verb or the 
representation of a whole state of affairs. The formal means by which this modifica-
tion could take place was a converb construction, in which the modified main verb 
figured as the non-finite verb form (the converb). At the end of the grammaticaliza-
tion process, some of the auxiliaries ended up as suffixes. Within K a m a s sources from 
the middle of the 18th to the beginning of the 20th century, the various degrees of 
grammaticalization are documented. The relevant grammaticalization processes are 
semantic reduction, fixation and formal reduction; t he first two processes can be un-
derstood as prerequisites for the third process which puts an end to the coexistence 
of grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized items. The main Kamas auxiliaries are 
listed and, according to their function, grouped into non-transformative vs. initial-, 
final-, and momentaneous-transformative auxiliaries. 
In Kamas 1 sources, one can observe a multi-stage grammaticalization 
pa t te rn in which full verbs turned into aspectual auxiliaries as a first 
step, and then into aspectual suffixes. In older sources on Kamas, espe-
cially Castrén (1847), most auxiliaries still occur in their full form, cf. 
also Schiefner (1854). Some 65 years later, Donner (1912/1914) found a 
few auxiliaries tha t are bet ter taken to be aspectual suffixes. The use of 
Kamas aspectual auxiliaries is an instance of code copying from neigh-
bouring Turkic languages, especially Hakas; the further development of 
suffixalization is an internal development in Kamas.2 
1
 Kamas is a Southern Samoyed language that was still spoken in the early twen-
tieth century by approximately 50 people on the northern side of the Eastern 
Sayan Mountains. In Abalakova, their last village, Castrén (1847) and Donner 
(1912/1914) collected language data . Kamas had been strongly influenced by 
Turkic languages for centuries but its last speakers shifted to t h e use of Russian. 
2
 The Kamas system of auxiliaries replaced an earlier system in which aspect had 
been marked by endings inherited from Proto-Samoyed. T h a t system can be 
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In what follows, t h e two main s teps of that grammaticalization pro-
cess will be discussed, along with t h e major auxiliaries and aspectual 
suffixes, respectively. 
1. First, we have to mention the syntactic device that consti tutes a 
link between the auxiliary and the main verb it modifies. This device 
is known as converb construction involving the general Kamas converb 
-LA?. Converbs are non-finite verb forms that are in an adverbial rela-
tionship with another verb form. The te rm 'converb' can be replaced by 
'adverbial participle', 'gerund' , or Russian deeprichastie. 
Converb constructions are in principle multifunctional, i.e., their ex-
act meaning depends on context.3 In (1), there are two events of which 
one precedes the other: 
(1) saskan mola? nergolü?bij;>? 
magpie become.cv4 fly.inch.past.3pl 
'Turning into magpies, they [the ghosts] flew away.' ( 'Af ter they had turned into 
magpies, the ghosts flew away.' or 'The ghosts tu rned into magpies and flew 
away.') 
(Joki 1944, 98: säskan тдлапегди'и'лиЫ; Klumpp 2002, 120) 
found in Selkup, the nearest relative of Kamas. The endings in that system can 
part ly still be found in Kamas, but they ceased to be productive there: e.g., 
Kamas кап- 'go away' : kanda- 'go' = Selkup Taz qen- 'go away' : qenti- 'go' , but 
this imperfective ending, *-NTa, is never found on any of the numerous Turkic 
loan verbs found in K a m a s (whereas other inherited verbal derivation pa t te rns are 
productive even on Turkic loan verbs, cf. Klumpp 2002, 47). Aspectual auxiliaries 
are used in the whole Turkic language family. Similar code copying—without 
formal reduction, however—occurs in other Uralic-Turkic contact regions, e.g., in 
the Volga-Kama region in Mari and Udmur t , where the models had been Chuvash 
and Tatar constructions (cf. Pischlöger 2001 for an overview); Mator aspectual 
auxiliaries are independent borrowings from Turkic (Helimski 1997, 188). Selkup 
also has converb constructions whose meaning is aspectual (e.g., Bolzhunovskava 
1998), but the concrete aspectual auxiliary systems of Selkup and Kamas can 
hardly be seen as common inheritance. 
3
 This is formulated by König (1995, 60) as follows: " the semantic contribution 
made by the converb itself to ut terance meaning must certainly be analyzed in 
such a way as to be a suitable basis for all possible interpretations." 
4
 Abbreviations: # = word boundary, aor = aorist, cv = converb, def = definite 
conjugation, Gram = grammatical morpheme, inch = inchoative, Lex = lexical 
morpheme, mom = momentaneous, tf = transformative. 
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The connection between the two events can often be interpreted as pur-
pose (2) or cause (3): 
(2) ijaba pele? kambi 
mother.acc.3sg search.cv go.away.past 
'He left looking for his mother. ' ('He left in order to look for his mother. ' or 'He 
left to look for his mother. ' or 'He left and looked for his mother. ' ) 
(Joki 1944, 197: iäb3 p'ele kárnbi; Klumpp 2002, 122) 
(3) mazarogan mändola? dï ne ba?lu?bi bïssitta 
smoke-hole.loc see.cv this woman stop.mom.past drink.inf.lat 
'Seeing [the man-eater] in the smoke-hole, the woman stopped drinking. ' ('Because 
she saw the man-eater in the smoke-hole, she stopped drinking.') 
(Joki 1944, 90: mäzaröyon тэп<10ла di ne ЬалиЫ bisitti; Klumpp 2002, 121) 
As can be seen in (3), other items may intervene between the converb 
and the finite verb. According to the unmarked word order, the converb 
precedes the finite verb, but the inverse order is also possible, as in (4): 
(4) man ej t ïmnem paijdala? 
I not know.pres. lsg write.cv 
'I cannot write. ' 
(Joki 1944, 196: man g% tömném piagdlä; Klumpp 2002, 123) 
2.1. The posterior constituent of such a construction can also be an 
aspectual auxiliary. In tha t case, word order is not free: the auxiliary 
invariably follows the converb and no other material can intervene. This 
phenomenon is referred to by Lehmann (1995, 158) as 'fixation', a process 
whereby 'syntagmatic variability' is reduced. 
A frequently occurring auxiliary is г?Ьэ whose main-verb meaning 
is 'lie'. The function of t ha t auxiliary is marking imperfective aspect. 
In the next example (5), coming from Castrén 's material, the auxiliary 
picks one of the two possible meanings of the verb nu (perfective 'stop' 
and imperfective 'stand') . 
A purpose or cause reading of this construction, as in (2) and (3), 
would be highly curious: ' ' I s tand in order to lie', ? ' I s tand because I lie'. 
I ts temporal reading, as in (1), would be possible ('I stand, then I lie') but 
Castrén's gloss ' стою' does not suggest this. We can conclude tha t the 
verb 'lie' does not occur here in its original meaning but as an auxiliary 
(see 2.2. for details on its function). At this stage of grammaticalization, 
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(5) nula? i?bam 
s t o p / s t a n d . c v L i E 5 . a o r . l s g 
'I am standing.' (Literally: 'I lie standing. ') 
(Castrén 1847, 115: nula'i'bym-, Klumpp 2002, (45a)) 
it is impossible to decide whether the posterior constituent of the converb 
construction is an auxiliary or a full verb except on the basis of semantic 
criteria. This is because formally the two verb forms are not distinct, 
see (6) where the posterior constituent of the converb construction, г?Ъэ 
'lie' is a full verb: 
(6) t än kada mola? i?bal 
you how become.cv lie.aor.2sg 
'Why are you lying here?' 
(Joki 1944, 99: tän káda m°la' г'рэл; Klumpp 2002, 68) 
It is a widely known phenomenon in grammaticalization research tha t 
grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized forms, respectively the old 
and the new use, survive side by side. This phenomenon is called split by 
Heine-Reh (1984, 57), and divergence by Hopper-Traugot t (1993, 116-
20).6 
2.2. The function of the auxiliary 'lie' in (5) is to select the imperfective 
meaning ( 'stand') of the verb nu ' s top/s tand ' . I t has a similar func-
tion in (7) where it is in construction with the verb tu?bda 'row'. Tha t 
biaspectual stem has two meanings: semelfactive 'perform one stroke' 
and iterative 'perform several/many strokes'. The auxiliary selects the 
imperfective (iterative) meaning: 
5
 SMALL CAPITALS in glosses indicate t h a t the verb occurs here as an auxiliary, 
rather than in its full meaning. 
6
 Unfortunately, the Kamas sources do not give relevant information concerning 
stress. Still, it seems to be fair to assume that the auxiliary construction had 
a different stress pa t te rn . At least in Turkic languages, such difference can be 
found (cf., e.g., Demir 1993, 74). 
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(7) tu?bla? i?bam 
r o w . c v LlE.aor . l sg 
'I am rowing' (Literally: 'I lie rowing') 
(Castrén 1847, 115: thu'bla'i'bym; Klumpp 2002, (46a)) 
In short , the function of the auxiliary 'lie' is to mark an event as an 
unbounded situation. The meaning of the verb 'lie', on the other hand, 
can be described as "a body is positioned on a base such tha t a larger 
part of the former touches the lat ter and it is likely that no change of 
that position will occur for a while". Of these meaning components, "no 
change" is important for imperfective aspect. The verb 'lie' can transfer 
that inherent aspectual property onto the whole event described in the 
converb construction. Another component of its meaning, "a larger part 
of the body touches the base" is unimportant , indeed disturbing. In order 
for the verb 'lie' to t u rn into an aspectual auxiliary, it is not only required 
for it to contain the relevant meaning component but also for its non-
appropriate meaning components to fade. This can be called semantic 
reduction. The grammaticalized auxiliary will not be called "semantically 
reduced verb" but ra ther "semantically reducible verb" here, given tha t it 
may retain some other meaning components unreduced. Schönig (1984) 
speaks of "full verb meaning transfer" with respect to Tatar auxiliaries; 
cf. (8) where the meaning 'lie' is not incompatible with the meaning 'sleep' 
of the main verb, yet Castrén's gloss shows tha t the verb 'lie' occurs here 
in its auxiliary role: 
(8) kunolla? i?bam 
sleep.cv lie.aor.lsg 
' сплю; I am sleeping' (Literally: 'I lie sleeping.') 
(Castrén 1847, 186: kunolla'i'bym; Klumpp 2002, (44a))7 
2.3. In addition to г?Ьэ 'lie', the items атпэ 'sit ' , nu ' s tand' , kandd 'go' 
and m m 'go' also occur as imperfective auxiliaries, marking durative, fre-
7
 Another example involving the verb sa?ma 'fall' expressing momentaneous aspect 
is as follows. In the first sentence, the original meaning has completely faded away, 
whereas in the second, it may have been retained: 
(i) t ï niikke korola? sa?mabi 
'This woman got angry ["fell angry"]' (Joki 1944, 197; Klumpp 2002, (534)) 
(ii) nuna läbala? sa?mabi 
'A rocky wall collapsed ["fell collapsing"]' (Joki 1944, 85; Klumpp 2002, (535)) 
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005 
402 GERSON KLUMPP 
quentative, iterative, or habituative aspect readings (aktionsarten). The 
function of perfective auxiliaries, on the other hand, is to indicate tha t 
the event involves a definite change of situation. This can be entering 
a situation (ingressive and inchoative aktionsarten), leaving a situation 
(egressive and resultative actionsarten), or crossing both borders at once 
(momentaneous aktionsart). These three subgroups will be called, fol-
lowing Johanson (1971) and Schönig (1984), initial-transformative, final-
transformative, and momentaneous-transformative, respectively, whereas 
the imperfective group will be referred to as non-transformative. 
Let us mention two examples of the perfective group. The first is the 
opposite of the imperfective (5) above. Here, the auxiliary kan- whose 
full verb meaning is 'go away', selects the perfective meaning 'stop' of 
the biaspectual verb nu- ' s top /s tand ' . 
(9) inet nula? kambi 
horse.3sg s top/s tand.cv GO.AWAY.past 
'His horse stopped. ' (Literally: 'His horse went stopping.') 
(Joki 1944, 92, met пилйтЪц Klumpp 2002, (440a)) 
Apart from кап-, final-transformative auxiliaries also include so- 'arrive', 
кип- 'lead away' and ba?bdo- ' throw away'; initial-transformative auxil-
iaries are u?bdo- 's tand up' and kojo- 's tay' . The use of the momentaneous-
transformative auxiliary sa?mo- 'fall' can be exemplified as in (10): 
(10) Ket ' t ' ün güd'ar [ . . . ] u î l a? saVmobi 
Ket ' t 'ün güd'ar stand.up.cv FALL.past 
'K.g. jumped up. ' (Literally: 'K.g. fell standing up. ') 
(Joki 1944, 95: ket'sün-guid'uir [...] и 'la sa'msbr, Klumpp 2002, (532)) 
3.1. The grammaticalization of some Kamas auxiliaries stopped at the 
stage at which there is no formal difference between the original main 
verb and the auxiliary. Other verbs, like 'lie', went through further de-
velopment whereby they changed not only in their meaning but also in 
their form. In the case of 'lie', the result of formal reduction is the fol-
lowing ((11a) = (5)): 
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(11) (a) nula? i?bam 
s t o p / s t a n d . c v L i E . a o r . l s g 
' I a m s t a n d i n g . ' 
(Castrén 1847, 115: nula4'bym; Klumpp 2002, (45a)) 
(b) nu la îbam 
stand.imperf .aor. lsg 
'I am standing. ' 
(Donner 1912/1914, 147: nyJa'bgm; K l u m p p 2002, (105b)) 
( c ) b a z o ? a ? d ' a g a n n u l a ? b a 
again road.loc stand.imperf .aor. lsg 
'He is s tanding on the road again.' 
(Joki 1944, 98: bäza а'Рэуэп nu'labo-, K l u m p p 2002, (105d)) 
In all three examples, the same derivation is seen, with an important 
difference. The first example has four syllables and comes f rom Castrén's 
material collected in 1847. T h e second and thi rd examples, however, were 
recorded by Donner in 1914, and consist of only three syllables. Hence, 
formal reduction resulted in the diminution of syllable count , a process 
t h a t initiates what Heine and Reh (1984, 21) refer to as erosion: "bisyl-
labic > monosyllabic > simple consonant/vowel > germination > tona l / 
stress rule". Lehmann (1995, 126) calls th i s type of grammaticalization 
"phonological at tr i t ion", the relevant parameter being "integrity". Bybee 
et al.'s (1994, 19) hypothesis says that "semantic reduction is paralleled 
by phonetic reduction" (emphasis mine, G.K.). In the case of Kamas 
auxiliaries, as we saw, there are semantically reduced verbs that are for-
mally non-reduced. The converse situation does not arise. Therefore, 
it is better t o say that semantic reduction is a prerequisite for formal 
reduction. 
3.2. Which items undergo formal reduction? It is not t h e whole auxil-
iary that changes: only its s tem does. B u t the change does not merely 
concern the s tem of the auxiliary—it also affects the ending of the con-
verb before it. 
(12) n u + l a ? # i?ba+m > n u + l a ? b a + m 
s tand+cv l ie+lsg s tand+LIE+lsg 
Lexa+Grama Lexb+Gramb > Lex a +Gram c - | -Gramb 
More exactly, it is not only the verb 'lie' tha t is grammaticalized: it 
is the verb 'lie' and the ending of the converb that a re grammatical-
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ized together. Bybee et al. 's (1994, 4-5) definition of grammaticalization 
reads like this: " . . . grammaticalization theory begins with the observa-
tion t h a t grammatical morphemes develop gradually out of lexical mor-
phemes or combinations of lexical morphemes with lexical or grammatical 
morphemes" (emphasis added, K.G.) . 
3.3. Of course, there are some morphosyntactic consequences of this 
change: one is the loss of word s t a tus by the auxiliary. In a converb 
construction, syntactically, the auxiliary is the main verb, whereas se-
mantically the non-finite verb is the main verb. Af te r formal reduction, 
the original auxiliary ceases to be a separate word; ra ther , its stem merges 
with the converb ending into a new, complex suffix. T h e change does not 
extend to other morphological information like tense, person, or number . 
Tha t information continues to be represented after t h e segment t h a t used 
to be the stem of the auxiliary. But t he new carrier of that information 
is now the original non-finite main verb tha t has t u rned into a finite verb 
with the suffix(es) of the former auxiliary, thus becoming a main verb 
syntactically, too. The rest of the converb ending does not signal word 
boundary any more but becomes the initial portion of a new, complex 
suffix. Since all auxiliaries were grammaticalized on the basis of t he gen-
eral LA?- converb, formal reduction has yielded a new, L-initial class 
of aspectual suffixes. These new aspect markers occupy the position of 
the inherited valence suffix and the tense/mood suffix in the word, as 
shown by (13): 
(13) dï sïkt-ô-làm-bi (< sïktôleï kambi) 
he strangle.intr.aspect.past (< strangle.intr.cv go.away.past) 
'He hanged himself.' 
(Joki 1944, 58b: di sbktuialàmbi] Klumpp 2002, 286) 
The result of the increase in "coalescence" or "boundedness" (Lehmann 
1995, 148), i.e., the suffixalization of t he former auxiliary, can be clearly 
seen from the change of vowel harmony pattern, see (14) where back-
harmonic amna 'sit' tu rned front-harmonic as an auxiliary: 
(14) dï sü?bdöbi gijan bü bejlemne (< bejle? amna) 
he wake.up.past where.loc river cross.imperf.aor (< cross.cv sit.aor) 
'He woke up where they cross the river.' 
(Joki 1944, 98: dd siu'bdöbi giien bűi bejlemne; Klumpp 2002, (33)) 
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The loss of word status has not only phonological bu t also syntactic crite-
ria; see (15) where the original intransitive verb атпэ- 'sits' is g rammat -
icalized to the extent tha t it may receive an object-conjugation marker 
tha t would have been ungrammatical earlier: 
(15) pan tabando ularzaqda t ' abolamnat (< t ' abo la? *amna+t) 
tree.gen trunk.loc.3sg sheep.pi.3sg keep.imperf.aor.3sg.def 
(< keep.cv sit.aor.3sg.def) 
'She is [sitting and] keeping her sheep a t the trunk of the tree. ' 
(Joki 1944, 95: p'an täbandg, luiärzaijda t'abÖAamnad; K lumpp 2002, (20)) 
4. Formal reduction includes a number of processes like apocope -LA? 
атпэ- > -ЬАтпэ-, -LA? u?bd9- > -LU?(bdd)- or consonant loss -LA? 
kandd- > -LAndd-, -LA? ba?bds- > -LA?(bdd)-, cf. t he four stages of the 
reduction of the verb ba?bda- (in Cas t rén 's and Donner 's original notes): 
(16) (a) phällebaäbdewiäm 'I put it down' (Castrén, cf. Klumpp 2002, (340)) 
(b) man kuxaaväbiom 'I killed it ' (Donner, cf. Klumpp 2002, (370d)) 
(c) sublaabdewiam 'I scooped it ' (Castrén, cf. Klumpp 2002, (349)) 
(d) d 'áyám küáa'bijóm 'I caught sight of the river' 
(Donner, cf. Klumpp 2002, (377c)) 
Table 1 below summarises the results of formal and semantic reduction 
of twelve Kamas verbs.8 In the fifth column, formally reduced forma-
tions can be seen. Here (if not earlier) we have to do with a formally 
and functionally homogeneous paradigm, due to "paradigmaticization" 
(Lehmann 1995, 135). 
5. It becomes clear from the table t h a t the degree of grammaticaliza-
tion among Kamas auxiliaries is not uniform. In my view, it is unlikely 
that this has purely phonological reasons: if, for instance, the к of kan-
8
 The number of auxiliaries is even larger; but the other auxiliaries are not listed 
in the table because they also have directive and other functions in addit ion to 
aspectual ones (i- ' take' , i- 'be', тг- 'give', йгэ- 'dismount'), or else their funct ion 
cannot be ascertained due to lack of sufficient data (i?da- 'hit ') . The verb nu-
' s tand ' can be found in the table, al though its indirective (evidential) function is 
also likely to exist: Kamas -LA? nu- is formally equivalent to Turkic -(I)ptlr- < 
-(V)p turur that is a "marker of indirectivity" (Johanson 2000, 72). 
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Table 1 
Semantic and formal reduction of K a m a s aspectual auxiliaries 
A
S
P
E
C
T
 
A S P E C T 
R E A D I N G 
A U X I L I A R Y 
S U B C L A S S 
S E M A N T I C A L L Y 
R E D U C I B L E 
A U X I L I A R I E S 
F O R M A L 
R E D U C T I O N 
D E R I V A T I O N > 
C O N J U G A T I O N 
W 
> 
P 
И 
H 
Durative, 
frequenta-
tive, i terative 
and habitive 
aktionsarten 
Non-trans-
formative 
stative 
auxiliaries 
атпэ- 'sit' 
i?ba- 'lie' 
nu- 'stand' 
> -LAmna-
> -LA?ba- Imperfective 
present? 
ta 
cd 
W 
ta 
S 
Non-trans-
formative 
dynamic 
auxiliaries 
kanda- 'go' 
min- 'go' 
> -LAnda-
Inchoative 
and ingres-
sive aktions-
arten 
Initial-trans-
formative 
auxiliaries 
u?bda- 'stand up ' 
kojo- 'stay' 
> -LU?(bda)-
P
E
R
F
E
C
T
IV
E
 
Resultative 
and egressive 
aktionsarten 
Final-trans-
formative 
auxiliaries 
кап- 'go away' 
so- 'arrive' 
кип- 'lead away' 
ba?bda-
'throw away' 
> -LÄN-
> -LA?(bda)-
Momen-
taneous 
aktionsart 
Momenta-
neous-trans-
formative 
auxiliaries 
sa?ma- 'collapse' — 
can disappear, why tha t of кип- cannot? Or, if b- can be dropped from 
ba?bda, why is it that m- cannot be dropped from m m ? Hence, the 
question arises whether we have to do wi th a unitary derivation of as-
pects at all, or whether the re is a correlation between the two stages 
of grammaticalization and the two functions. In his well-known defin-
ition, Kurylowicz (1965/1975, 52) points out that "grammaticalization 
consists in t he increase of t he range of a morpheme advancing from a lex-
ical to a grammatical or f rom a less grammatical to a more grammatical 
status, e.g., f rom a derivative formant t o an inflexional one" (emphasis 
added, G.K.). The more highly grammaticalized aspectual auxiliary 'lie' 
occurs very frequently in Kamas texts. Interestingly, it never occurs in 
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the past tense, only in unsuffixed aorist.9 The Hakas (Turkic) verb for 
'lie', cat-, has been grammaticalized to present tense, -(p)cAw (e.g., An-
derson 1998, 25; Johanson 1995, 93). From this, it might be concluded 
tha t the suffix -ЬА?Ьэ- in Castrén's and Donner 's sources already corre-
sponded to the present, past, and future markers, and belonged to the 
paradigm of each verb, e.g., in the case of nu- ' s top/s tand ' : 
(17) Present: nu-ga-m 
Imperfective present: nu-la?ba-m 
Future: nu-la-m 
Past: nu-bja-m 
If -ЬА?Ьэ- is indeed a kind of present tense marker, we would expect it to 
exist in negative forms, as well, given that Hakas present tense also has 
a negative version (see e.g., Anderson 1998, 45; Baskakov-Borgoyakov 
1975, 202). However, in Kamas sources, -ЬА?Ъэ- is not found in negative 
forms. This may be due to mere chance, bu t it is also possible tha t 
-LA?bo- is still a marked aspectual form that has no negative counterpart 
because the aspectual modification concerned is only relevant if the event 
actually takes place (Klumpp 2001, 124). I think the grammaticalization 
of -ЬА?Ьэ- for present tense was under way when the extinction of Kamas 
in the first half of the twentieth century put an end to tha t change. 
6. Certain conclusions can be drawn from the grammaticalization of Ka-
mas auxiliaries, even if these are not entirely new insights within gram-
maticalization research: in order for a lexical i tem to assume grammat-
ical function, an appropriate meaning component is required (2.2). Its 
disturbing meaning components may fade away, but its original mean-
ing may also survive (2.2). The semantic reduction of the item un-
dergoing grammaticalization and the fixation of its position within the 
syntagm (2.1) are prerequisites for formal reduction (3.1). Formal re-
9
 It is true tha t it may also occur in the present or fu ture tenses. In these cases, 
its function is inchoative-transformative (Klumpp 2002, 202), e.g., 
dï bazo? süna paVlaVbalje 
he again fire-lat sink.inch.tf.pres 
'He sinks into the fire again [and stays in it].' 
(Donner 8 : IX, <T bäzui suiniu po'lä'bli; Klumpp 2002 (108)) 
10
 -(p) is the original converb ending that only survived postvocalically. 
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duction puts an end to the coexistence of grammaticalized and non-
grammaticalized item. The deletion of the formal means of grammat-
icalization (3.2) restores the balance between syntax and semantics (3.3). 
Formal reduction does not take place in a uni tary manner (4) and fur-
ther grammaticalization can remove certain items from the paradigm of 
grammaticalized items (5). 
To finish with, let us say a few words about the frequency of Ka-
mas aspectual auxiliary constructions. This can be illustrated by Don-
ner 's Tale 8 (Joki 1944, 94-9) in which 120 finite verbal predicates are 
found of which 41, or 34%, are aspectual converb constructions (Klumpp 
2002, 330). This suggests t ha t aspectual auxiliaries cannot be taken to 
represent a marginal phenomenon; rather, they must have played a cen-
tral role in the Kamas verbal system. 
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Abstract 
The focus of this paper is on a probably universal type of grammatical izat ion whereby 
body par t t e rms tu rn into place-denoting morphemes (adverbs, postposi t ions or local 
case markers) . T h e linguistic expressions of t he m a j o r areas of deictic orientation in 
the Mansi language are analysed on the basis of their lexical sources. According to 
general typological studies, t he lexical origin of spat ial morphemes shows considerable 
agreement across languages of t h e world: mos t of them go back to names of body 
parts. The pape r shows tha t body part t e rm sources follow the universal pa t t e rns in 
Mansi, too: in t h a t language, 'back ' , 'head' , and 'hear t ' have turned into general spat ia l 
markers. Explor ing the system of spatial morphemes in Mansi, t h e paper argues t h a t 
the etymology of those morphemes often reveals wha t is called a "relational object -
par t" origin; t h a t class of sources is frequently a t tes ted in the typological l i terature, 
too. Finally, t h e paper tries t o find out how unequivocally the body par t te rms t h a t 
have turned into spatial markers can be de termined. It is concluded tha t d a t a f rom 
the various Uralic languages contradict some of the general s t a t ements found in t h e 
typological l i terature . 
1. Introduct ion 
This paper will be concerned with one of the most general and presumably 
universal types of grammaticalization: t ha t of names of body parts. The 
grammaticalization of names of body par ts may take several directions: 
they may t u r n into pronouns (primarily reflexive, emphatic, or recipro-
cal ones), or numerals; the noun meaning 'hand' often develops into a 
possessive marker (cf. lay one's hands on sg > (begin to) possess sg), the 
noun meaning 'head' occurs in a variety of abstract grammatical roles 
(cf. the head as the centre of intellectual activity). Names of body par t s 
may also develop into various other types of suffixes (e.g., English -ly < 
* % 'body': manly < *mann-lig).1 The most general direction of their 
grammaticalization, however, results in place-denoting expressions: ad-
verbs, adpositions, or suffixes (Heine et al. 1991, 152; Heine 1997, 19-29, 
35-66; Heine 1999; Svorou 1993, 70-77). 
1
 Cf. Bybee: h t tp : / /www.unm.edu /~ jbybee /Cogn i t ive .doc 
1216-8076/$ 20.00 © 2005 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
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The linguistic parti t ioning of space, i.e., the linguistic projection of 
spatial orientation is a topic that has for a long time occupied the a t ten-
tion of not only linguists but also researchers in other disciplines more or 
less related to linguistics, simply because the relationship between spa-
tial cognition and language raises a number of diverse issues. Due to an 
upswing of cognitive linguistic research, a number of projects have tar-
geted this area in the past few decades and numerous papers have given 
new perspectives to these issues. As a consequence of the basic charac-
ter of cognitive research, such investigations are often concerned with to 
what extent and in what ways spatial systems found in the individual 
languages are universal or language particular. 
2. Egocentric and anthropomorphic 
features of spatial orientation 
It is a mat te r of common knowledge tha t languages are fundamentally 
anthropocentric; one of the most telling examples of this is that most spa-
tial terms are anthropomorphic. In determining the various directions, 
positions, and places, our own body and its parts consti tute a na tura l 
(central) point of departure . The semantics of body parts is relational 
in the first place as the meanings of these terms involve part /whole re-
lationships and—consequent ly—posi t ional components. Due to the an-
thropomorphic and egocentric nature of language, what is behind us is a t 
the back, what is to the right or to the left is sideways, what is in front 
of us is facing us, etc. The body part origin of the most general locative 
expressions is widespread in any language. 
Tha t "body-centred" character is present in other features of spatial 
language as well. Our perception of space is organized along three axes: 
the vertical axis is based on our experience of gravitation but the hori-
zontal axis producing the opposition FRONT-BACK2 as well as the lateral 
axis telling right from left are based on the human body. If we want to 
refer to the position of inanimate objects, we have to localize them in the 
given space and we have to determine their parts (front, back, etc.), an 
activity in which an anthropocentric starting-point is essential. A factor 
that plays a role in t h a t process is similarity of shape, the analogy of 
the human body, whenever a body-like perception of the given object is 
2
 Terms like FRONT, BACK, IN, OUT, UP, DOWN , etc. are symbols of basic spatial 
categories. 
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possible. In fact, th is is what accounts for t he widespread polysemy of 
body part terms observable in all languages, e.g., the leg of a table, the 
eye of a needle, the neck of a bottle, the toe and tongue of a shoe, the 
back of a chair, the spine of a book, the rib and the foot of a hill, etc. 
Such anthropomorphic and egocentric character is also observable where 
there is no similarity whatsoever between the given object and the hu-
man body (or the body of an animal). We can furthermore observe tha t 
the orientation of objects may also be influenced by their functions. The 
front of a cupboard is at its door, tha t of a T V set is at its screen, and 
tha t of a telephone is on the side where you can dial. Tha t is, the front 
of an object is the pa r t at which human activity is directed in the case of 
the given object. This is explained partly by egocentrism, and partly by 
anthropomorphism, since it is obvious with respect to a human body, too, 
which side is the dominant one (we face forward, we communicate for-
ward, the activity of our hands is also directed to the front). In the case 
of moving objects, the direction of motion determines their orientation. 
The par t of an object that is in the direction of its motion is perceived as 
its front; again, the similarity with the human body is straightforward.3 
Also, the concepts of IN and OUT, just like the category of BOUNDARY in 
general, are based on the analogy of the boundaries of, and the cavities 
within, the human body. 
Anthropocentricity is also revealed by the existence of local expres-
sions tha t are applied to people only. This property is exhibited, e.g., 
by Finnish adverbs of the kasvokkain (< kasvo 'face'), nenäkkäin (< 
nenä 'nose'), nokikkain (< nokka 'beak') 'opposite ' type whose use gen-
erally implies a human participant (Ojutkangas 2001, 66). The Hungar-
ian postposi t ion/adverb szemben 'opposite' ( < szem 'eye') is historically 
similar: its early uses were in the sense 'in somebody's field of sight' 
(Benkő 1967-1976, III.712). Interestingly, such anthropocentrism also 
characterizes local expressions tha t are not of a body par t origin. For 
instance, Svorou writes with respect to the earliest attested prepositional 
uses of before, behind tha t they initially occurred with pronouns referring 
to people (Svorou 1993, 119). All of that is natural ly connected to the 
basically anthropocentric nature of spatial perception. 
3
 According to Jackendoff and Landau , such orientat ion of objects is determined by 
their natural axes: t he nature of t he main axes (horizontal vs. vertical, directed 
vs. undirected, etc.) determines what is referred t o as the beginning or end of a 
given object, i ts top or bottom, etc. ( Jackendoff -Landau 1992, 99-123). 
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Spatial terms of a body part origin may be based on both human and 
animal bodies; tha t is, they may be both anthropomorphic and zoomor-
phic in character. But even the la t ter are anthropocentric: in the percep-
tion of the body of an animal, too, human perspective prevails: animals' 
bodies are usually perceived in te rms of species tha t are impor tan t for 
people, i.e., domestic animals or game.4 In languages where t he lexical 
source of the reference area UP is a body part t e rm referring to t he back 
of an animal, the semantic change may have been fostered by the fact 
tha t people mount (sit on top of) saddle animals. 
3. Universal features of grammatical izat ion of the t y p e 
b o d y part > spatial morpheme 5 
In what follows, spatial terms tha t originate in body part names will be 
investigated. 
Typological studies of such semantic changes of body part t e rms have 
been conducted by Svorou (1993, 70-109), as well as Heine and his co-
workers (cf. Heine 1997, 35-65). Svorou's studies are based on d a t a from 
languages belonging to a variety of language families (he collected spa-
tial terms going back to names of body parts from 55 languages); Heine 
primarily built his own investigations on data coming from languages of 
Africa and Oceania. In what follows, I will briefly review claims of the 
studies mentioned tha t may serve as an important basis of comparison 
from the point of view of the present paper. Although the methods of 
these two authors were slightly different, the nature of my own investi-
gations makes it possible to "add up" their claims and discuss probably 
universal lexical sources of spatial morphemes in an integrated fashion. 
(This is not difficult to do partly because the linguistic d a t a — t h e source 
lexemes—themselves are largely identical.) 
Wi th respect to the lexical sources of place-denoting morphemes, 
Svorou says tha t nominal sources are the most frequent but , less often, 
verbs and sporadically other part-of-speech categories (adverbs, adjec-
tives, participles, and even conjunctions and numerals) are a t tes ted in 
4
 Heine (1989) calls this the 'pastoralist ' model, pointing out tha t such names 
are mainly characteristic of East-African pastoral communities. Given tha t this 
type also occurs elsewhere, the te rm 'zoomorphic' seems to be more appropriate 
(Svorou 1993, 73). 
5
 Svorou—-following Bybee—uses the term 'spatial gram' (op.cit., 216). 
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tha t role. She classifies nominal sources into four groups (op.cit., 66-9), 
of which the most general group involves (1) names of body par ts proper, 
followed by (2) the "relational object-part class" (side, middle, back, 
front, etc., cf. Hungarian elöl ' in front' , alul 'a t bottom') , (3) the "envi-
ronmental landmark class" (sky, land, field, road, trace, house, etc., cf. 
Hungarian után 'after ' < út ' road') , and (4) the "abstract spatial notion 
class" (place, length, direction, etc., cf. Hungarian között 'between' < köz 
' interstice, interval'). Heine divides nominal sources into (1) body par t 
names and (2) landmark terms. With respect to relational part names, 
forming a distinct group in Svorou's classification, he points out t h a t 
these come from either body par t names or general spatial terms; hence, 
etymologically, they can be seen as belonging one or the o ther group. 
On the basis of the data it can be concluded that local expressions 
going back to body part terms axe usually static in character but coun-
terexamples also occur: in some languages it can be observed that t he 
word meaning 'eye' has turned into an allative marker ' toward, in t he 
direction of ' or tha t the word for 'hand' has grammaticalized into a n 
ablative marker (Svorou 1993, 78). 
Let us now survey the ways in which the main areas of deictic ori-
e n t a t i o n , 6 t h e r e g i o n s of UP, DOWN, FRONT, BACK, BESIDE a n d IN7 h a v e 
been given names by the languages these two authors investigated. 
UP: The name of the notion UP is based on a body p a r t in most lan-
guages, and in particular on the word for 'head'. Further body 
part terms that serve as sources of local expressions belonging 
here are 'face', 'shoulder' , 'hair', 'forehead', and 'back' . 
Wi th respect to 'back', we have to mention t h a t the spatial expressions of 
languages may not only follow the anthropomorphic model but also t he 
6
 Spatial orientation can be subdivided into absolute (cardinal) and relative (de-
ictic) orientation. For the former, the position of the observer is irrelevant (e.g., 
orientation in terms of cardinal directions), whereas in the relative framework, 
orientation is always with respect to something. The base of comparison is usu-
ally the speaker. Spatial grammatical morphemes based on body part terms, 
understandably, mostly belong to the realm of deictic orientation. 
' The main reference areas differ between Heine's and Svorou's studies: Heine fails 
to mention the region BESIDE, whereas Svorou further adds BETWEEN, AT THE 
EDGE OF, TOWARD, THROUGH, etc. The six categories investigated in the present 
paper are the most general relative areas based on a canonical view of the human 
body. 
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zoomorphic one (cf. section 2). On t h e basis of an animal body, 'back' is 
UP, 'head' is in FRONT, and 'tail' or ' r ump ' is at t h e BACK. The investi-
gations have not revealed a single language whose spatial expressions are 
exclusively based on t h e zoomorphic model, the anthropomorphic model 
being more general in all cases. Zoomorphic te rms are secondary also 
in the sense that while they presuppose the existence of anthropomor-
phic ones, the converse does not hold. Spatial t e rms of the zoomorphic 
kind typically evolve f rom body part names that are only used for animal 
bodies (like 'tail ')8 (Svorou 1993, 75). 
D O W N : According t o Heine, it is only in the case of the DOWN area 
t ha t body p a r t s are in a minority as conceptual sources. In 
this area, the sources are mainly connected to what is called the 
landmark model, characteristically having a basic meaning like 
' land' or ' ear th ' . In terms of Svorou's da ta , on the other hand, 
this area also follows the b o d y part pa t t e rn in the first place. 
Sources of a body part origin include 'bo t tom' , ' rump' , ' foot ' , 
and 'hip'. 
F R O N T : For this meaning, it is basically 'face' and 'eye' t h a t are 
attested, bu t 'breast ' , ' forehead' , 'mouth ' , 'head', and 'belly' 
also occur as sources. 
B A C K : Here the use of the body pa r t term 'back ' is practically uni-
versal (in the languages of Oceania, it represents 95%), but — 
presumably using the zoomorphic pat tern — 'bottom', ' rump ' , 
'groin', and ' anus ' also occur. 
B E S I D E : The body par t sources of the spatial morphemes belonging 
here are 'side', ' r ib ' , 'belly', 'hear t ' , and 'ear ' . 
IN: The body pa r t names meaning 'belly', ' pa lm ' , ' tooth' , 'hear t ' , 
'liver', 'bowels', 'mouth' , 'neck' , and 'blood' serve as conceptual 
sources here. 
8
 On t h e basis of t he foregoing, it can b e s ta ted tha t t h e HUMAN - ANIMAL dis-
t inct ion among body p a r t terms may b e implemented in three different ways: 
(1) "parallel" body p a r t s have different names (e.g., Hungar ian kéz ' h a n d ' vs. 
manes 'paw' , arc ' face ' vs. pofa 'muzzle'; (2) a body p a r t name only appl ies to 
people or only to an imals (e.g., Hungar i an váll ' shoulder ' , hónalj ' a r m p i t ' vs. 
farok ' ta i l ' , szarv ' ho rn ' ) ; (3) the grammatical izat ion of t h e same body p a r t t e rm 
results in different concepts (e.g., 'back ' > BACK vs. UP). 
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In the Appendix, the entries of World Lexicon of Grammaticalization 
(Heine-Kuteva 2002) that show grammaticalization of body par t terms 
are listed, as well as the ones discussing the lexical sources of the main 
spatial positions. The above are in agreement with what is included in 
tha t lexicon although the latter includes some novel elements, too. 
4. Spatial morphemes based on b o d y part terms in Mansi 
In what follows, the results of typological studies will be compared to the 
da t a of the Mansi language. 
In Mansi, the body part terms listed here have developed into adverbs 
and postpositions of local relations:9 purjk 'head' , sis 'back', sim 'heart ' .1 0  
N purjk~ porjk, LM LU pprjk~ päijk, P p0rjk, К pärjk, Т р0т) 'head' 
serve to refer to the concept UP, and with case suffixes added they can 
also signal the usual "three-directional" pat tern ( ' t o ' / ' a t ' / ' f r om ' ) . Their 
postpositional use for denoting local relations is attested primarily in 
folklore texts, it is not characteristic of newer Mansi texts. Cf.: 
(1) (a) LM wágkhö pârjkné ' to above the pit ' [pit-head-lat.] 
(Munkácsi-Kálmán 1986, 481) 
(b) T v0r)0l-p0r]t tojt pötím ál 'on top of the log there is snow' [log-head-loc.] 
(Munkácsi 1892-1921, IV.402) 
(c) T tàrèm-p0r)nèl 'from the sky' [sky-head-abl.] 
(Munkácsi 1892-1921, IV.401) 
The body par t name tha t has grammaticalized to the largest extent and is 
also used as a preverb is N sis, LM T sis, LU P sis ~ sis, К sès 'back', cf.: 
(2) (a) LU kwäl sisne minèn! 'Go behind the house!' [house-back-lat.] 
(Munkácsi-Kálmán 1986, 552) 
(b) N ant-nâlém sisirj kwol sisèmnèl ti vielem 'I have produced my arrow made 
of horn from behind my house' [house-back-PxSgl-abl.] 
(Munkácsi 1892-1921, 11.178) 
9
 Mansi case suffixes do not include any with a demonstrably body part origin. 
Adverbs and postpositions going back to body part names invariably contain a 
local case marker; telling them apart from "simple" case-marked nominals may 
be problematic in some cases, cf. section 8. 
10
 Abbreviations: N = Northern dialect, LM = Middle-Lozva dialect, LU = Lower-
Lozva dialect, P = Pelym dialect, К = Kondinsky dialect, T = Tavda dialect, 
PU = Proto-Uralic, PFU = Proto-Finno-Ugric. 
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(с) N akw-mat-ert sisät xàtpâ l'ayi 'somebody suddenly started to speak behind 
him' [back-PxSg3-loc.j 
The word occurs as a local expression both in folklore texts and in more 
recent field notes; it is one of the most general signals of the reference 
area BACK along with juji-pält. Similarly to other place adverbials, it 
may cooccur with the word päl 'side, region, half ' : sis-pdl 'behind' , sis-
pälndl 'from behind ' (cf.: num-pält 'above', joli-pält 'below', ëli-pdlt 'be-
fore', etc.), and it can also occur as a preverb: сысы минантанкве 'уез-
жать ' , сысы минункве ' уехать , уйти ' , сысы тотыглалункве 'уно-
сить ' (Rombandeeva-Kuzakova 1982, 115). In its role as a preverb, 
abandoning its original local meaning, it may also fulfil a perfectivising 
function. 
The body par t te rm to signal the area IN is N sim, LM LU P sim, 
К sèm, T sám ~ s0m, meaning 'heart , inner par t , central par t ' (in some 
dialects, also 's tomach') . Cf.: 
(3) (a) N mäxmanä âs-simtè nalém xûl'txinte'it 'his people swing down there in the 
middle of the river Ob' [Ob-heart-loc.] (Munkácsi 1892-1921, 11.213) 
(b) N luwêr) kärtä simânêl 'from the middle of his yard with horses' [yard-PxSg3-
heart-PxSg3-abl.] (Munkácsi 1892-1921, 11.325) 
The locative use of sim mainly occurs in folklore texts; in colloquial 
Mansi, a more general term for this area, also of a nominal origin, is the 
postposition kiwer ( < 'internal par t , the inside of sg'). 
Comparing the Mansi da ta with the typological claims reviewed 
above, we can see tha t , with respect to the range of body par t terms 
used as conceptual sources, Mansi does not depar t from the pat terns tha t 
are usual in other languages: 'head' and 'back' are the most widespread 
there, too, for UP and BACK; 'hear t ' also occurs in other languages as a 
possible name for IN. 
5. T h e origin of spatial morphemes in Mansi 
In order to get the full picture of the spatial system of Mansi (remain-
ing in the framework studied so far), let us review the most general or 
primary terms (i.e., the most frequent ones, occurring outside folklore 
texts, exhibiting the three-directional system, and occurring both as ad-
verbs and as postpositions) for the six spatial positions. In the list, only 
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northern dialects are included with their etymologies as in the Uralisches 
Etymologisches Wörterbuch: 
(4) UP: пит- < *пи-тз 'das Obere, Himmel; Got t ' PU (Rédei 1986-1988, 308) 
DOWN: jol- < *ala 'Raum, unter etw., Unter-, das Untere-' PU (ibid., 6) 
FRONT: ël- < *eőe 'das Vordere, Raum vor etw., Vorder' P F U (ibid., 71) 
BACK: sis- < *cäncä 'Rücken' P F U (ibid., 56) 
juji (ju-) 'back part, at back (inside)' < ? 
BESIDE: pöx- 'side, at the side' < ? 
IN: kiwsr < *Ыгкз 'Inneres, Höhlung' PFU (ibid., 161) 
sim < sißä(-m3) (вйба(-тз)) 'Herz' PU (ibid., 477) 
(cf. also: juji, ju-) 
The stems serving to refer to the six basic areas of deictic orientation in 
Mansi are drastically shortened function words of an ancient origin, and 
the conceptual sources cannot as a rule be captured in the synchronic 
system of the language. The etymology of these words reveals, in many 
cases, a rather general basic meaning of the type ' the front, lower par t , 
inside, etc. of something'. Exceptions are the body par t origins of sis 
for BACK (< 'back') and sim for IN (< 'heart ' ) . On the basis of the 
ancient meanings assumed for UP, we could perhaps suspect the presence 
of the landmark model. For the rest of the areas, the conceptual sources 
belong to the second most frequent category of Svorou's system, relational 
par ts of objects. T h e connection between relational concepts and spatial 
morphemes can be spotted not only by historical analysis but also within 
the synchronic system, cf. kiwor ' the inside of sg' : kiwom ' into' - kiwort 
' in' - kiwarndl ' f rom (inside)', pöx 'side' :pöxan 'bes ide ' -рохэ1, pöxanol 
' f rom beside, f rom the side of ' , os 'surface, face' : T ásón 'onto' - ásnál 
'off ' - àSt 'on ( top of) ' . 
Svorou (1993, 84-5) claims that these nouns also used to be body 
par t terms (or names of spatial positions), and their turning into rela-
tional part names in fact represents the first step of their grammaticaliza-
tion. This assumption is definitely supported by the general tendency of 
semantic change concrete > abstract , as well as the fact tha t , in a num-
ber of languages, lexemes of this type are often polysemous with some 
body part term, cf. Mansi pöx 'side in general; side of the (human) body' , 
os 'surface; face'. Heine (1997, 39-40) claims tha t such relational terms 
simply cannot be told apart f rom spatial terms; their differences are mor-
phosyntactic at best . Whereas the latter belong to the group of adverbs 
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or adpositions, the former are nouns. They cannot be seen as prototypical 
nouns, however; they often lack features like number or definiteness. 
6. Proto-Ural ic antecedents 
A hypothetical proto-language system exhibits similar phenomena:1 1 the 
source of spat ial position markers basically comes from the group of re-
lational concepts that is claimed by Svorou to be close in frequency (as 
a source domain) to body par t terms (Svorou 1993, 83-5). 
(5) UP: *wilä 'Oberfläche, ober-, das Obere' PFU, ?PU (Rédei 1986-1988, 573) 
DOWN: *ala 'Raum unter etw., Unter-, das Untere' PU (ibid., 6) 
FRONT: *eSe 'das Vordere, Raum vorder etw., Vorder' P F U (ibid., 71) 
BACK: *taka 'Hinterraum, das Hintere' P U (ibid., 506) 
IN: *siéâ ~ siiicä 'Inneres' P U (ibid., 480) 
If we accept Svorou's and Heine's opinion with respect to the origin of 
relational pa r t names, we can add another point to the semantic re-
construction of the above etymologies. The assumed basic meanings of 
the spatial morphemes reconstructed for Proto-Uralic may reflect a kind 
of grammaticalized stage already, and these words may have originally 
referred to body parts or elements of human environment, as the re-
sults of typological studies suggest. A detailed study of the etymons and 
of the semantic changes observed in the individual daughter languages 
may make it possible to draw more concrete conclusions with respect the 
proto-language meaning of the individual etymologies. 
7. Further issues 
Finally, let me t ry to answer the question of whether it is possible to 
unambiguously determine the range of body part terms tha t may be 
11
 Several considerations support our choice of the above etymons from among those 
reconstructed with a spatial role in Rédei (1986-1988): on the one hand, in several 
languages of the family, the basic spatial terms are continuations of just these 
etymons, and on the other hand, these words constitute a rather homogeneous 
system with respect to their proto-meanings reconstructed on the basis of their 
role in the daughter languages (cf. also Ojutkangas 2001, 29). 
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grammaticalized into spatial markers. This question may be formulated 
in a more general manner: will our increasingly detailed knowledge of 
grammaticalization processes eventually allow us to detect and determine 
the non-grammatical source of each and every grammatical category? 
Can the source-target relationship be seen as universal (cf. Heine et al. 
1991, 155)? 
In the case of the lexical group discussed in this paper , the issue of 
which parts of the human body may represent a base of comparison for 
spatial orientation mostly logically follows from the s t ructure and natura l 
position of the body. T h a t is why we observe that in many languages the 
same body part terms part icipate in grammaticalization processes result-
ing in space marking linguistic elements. However, individual languages 
may exhibit departures from the general tendencies, and we have to con-
tradict Heine's following statement (formulated as a question): "What 
induces people worldwide to decide t h a t a body-part like face, ra ther 
than navel or kneecap, provides the favorite model for developing ex-
pressions for the spatial concept ' f ront ' ? And why not the body-part 
nose? Why, in fact, is the nose notoriously ignored as a source for spatial 
orientation?" (Heine 1997, 47). 
The Uralic languages partly disprove the examples mentioned by 
Heine. In Finnish, the noun for 'nose' has adverbialized to mean 'oppo-
site' (nenäkkäin < nenä, cf. section 3), and it is characteristic of Finnish 
in general t ha t a considerable percentage of body par t names also occur 
as spatial markers (Jaakola 1997; Suoniemi-Taipale 1996). In Mansi folk 
songs, the body part name meaning 'knee' can also fulfil a spatial func-
tion, cf. N am sdnsêmnê jüw tüläln, am pàltèmnè tï ' tüläln! 'bring him 
home to my knee, bring him to me' [knee-PxSgl-lat.] (Munkácsi 1892-
1921, IV.7). However, these examples raise another problem: it is not 
easy to define the concept of grammaticalized body par t name unambigu-
ously. Occasional uses of body part te rms in referring to spatial positions 
abound in languages, cf. Hungarian itt lohol a sarkamban/nyakamban 
'he is close on my heels/breathing down my neck'; olyan közel hajol, 
hogy szinte az ember szájában van 'he leans as close as almost into one's 
mouth' ; a város szívében ' in the heart of town'; a hegy gyomrában 'in t he 
belly of the mountain' , etc. In these examples, local relations are involved 
(behind, before, in something), yet t he body part names involved can-
not be taken to be place adverbs or postpositions; their spatial uses are 
rather bound, idiomatic. A criterion of grammaticalization could there-
fore be the lack of lexical boundness, a feature that goes together with an 
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increase of the productivity of the given linguistic i tem. Further criteria 
can be borrowed from the general l i terature on grammaticalization: t he 
process is characterised by a weakening and abstraction of the semantic 
content of the lexeme concerned. In the case of Finno-Ugric languages, 
another criterion may be participation in the three-directional system 
(cf. Hungarian szemben - szembe - szemből 'opposite [a t / to / f rom] < szem 
'eye', Finnish päällä -päälle -päältä 'above [a t / to / f rom] ' < pää 'head ' ) . 
Reconsidering the Hungarian examples listed above, we find that the case 
suffix use of such body par t terms used for spatial position marking is 
also rather bound; they sound a lot less natural with case suffixes refer-
ring to other directions: gyere a sarkamba! 'Don ' t come into my 
heels [too close to me]'; U) Gyere ki a sarkamból. 'Come out of my heels 
[follow me less closely]'. Another criterion suggesting a higher degree of 
grammaticalization is where a body par t term may express more abstract 
relations than local ones since more abst ract roles (like temporal or causal 
relations) have to be preceded by more concrete (local) roles, cf. Hun-
garian a házzal szemben 'opposite the house' - ezzel az érvvel szemben 
' against /as opposed to this argument ' , also Finnish päästä 'after ' < pää 
'head', Estonian käsil 'during ' < käsi 'hand ' , etc. 
However, it is impossible to formulate a thumb rule to tell us which 
body par t names can be seen as "grammaticalized already", and it is 
likewise impossible to predict exactly which body pa r t names will be 
grammaticalized in any particular language. 
Appendix 
Source Target Target 
before 
Source 
back > (1) after < (1) eye 
(2) behind 
(3) cause 
(4) earlier 
(5) then 
behind < (1) back 
(2) first (temp) 
(3) front 
(2) buttocks 
(3) follow 
(4) footprint 
(6) up (spatial) 
belly > (1) in (spatial) 
(2) in (temp.) 
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Source Target Target Source 
body > (1) intensive refl. down < (1) bottom 
(2) middle (2) buttocks 
(3) reciprocal (3) descend 
(4) reflexive (4) earth 
bottom > down (spatial) (5) fall 
bowels > in (spatial) (6) foot 
breast > front front < (1) breast 
buttocks > (1) behind (2) eye 
(2) down (3) face 
ear > locative (4) forehead 
eye > (1) before (5) head 
(2) front (6) mouth 
face > (1) front in (spatial) < (1) belly 
(2) up (2) bowels 
flank > side (spatial) (3) center 
foot > down (4) heart 
forehead > front (5) interior 
hand > (1) agent locative < (1) area 
(2) five (2) ear 
(3) locative (3) edge 
(4) possessive (4) hand 
head > (1) front (5) home 
(2) intensive-refl. (6) house 
(3) middle (7) lip 
(4) reflexive (8) liver 
(5) up (9) locative copula 
heart > in (spatial) (10) neck 
lip > locative (11) place 
liver > locative (12) side 
mouth > front middle < (1) body 
neck > locative (2) head 
shoulder > up (3) reflexive 
side (spatial) < flank 
up < (1) back 
(2) face 
(3) head 
(4) shoulder 
(5) sky 
(Heine-Kuteva 2002) 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Péter S ip tá r - Miklós Törkenczy: The phonology of Hungarian. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000, 319 pp. 
This excellent, rule-based description of Hungarian phonology was published in 2000. 
It is the only extensive description of Hungarian in English in a modern (post-SPE) 
framework. The phonology of Hungarian (henceforth PH) is divided into three parts: 
'Background', 'Systems', and 'Processes'. The 'Background' section contains two chap-
ters. Chapter 1 is an introduction, which outlines the aims, scope, and coverage of 
the book, a brief overview of previous literature, and a description of the framework 
and assumptions that the authors adopt. Chapter 2, entitled 'Preliminaries', contains 
brief descriptions of the Hungarian language in terms of its speakers, classification, 
and word stock, vowel and consonant inventories and their orthographic representa-
tions, dialect variation, stress and intonation, derivation and compounding, verbal and 
nominal inflection, and word order. The 'Systems' section has three chapters, the first 
deals with the vowel system, including length alternations and vowel harmony, the 
second covers the consonant system, including voicing and the s tatus of / х / and / v / . 
The third is devoted to the phonotactics of Hungarian. The 'Processes' section is 
divided into four chapters. The first is devoted to processes involving vowels, partic-
ularly vowel harmony and lengthening and shortening processes. The second focuses 
on processes involving consonants: palatalization, sibilant rules, voicing and devoicing, 
and processes involving nasals and liquids. The third is devoted to processes condi-
tioned by syllable structure. The fourth covers various surface phenomena including 
variation in vowel length, compensatory lengthening, hiatus filling, degemination, and 
cluster simplification. 
This book contains a wealth of useful information. The chapter on phonotactics is 
particularly noteworthy for its extensive coverage. Anyone contemplating working on 
any area of Hungarian phonology should consult PH, for it contains not only discussions 
of the previous literature and many examples, it also contains information that is not 
included in more superficial discussions of the phenomena. For example, in spite of the 
attention to obstruent voicing and voice assimilation in the recent literature, including 
that on Hungarian, there are facts about voicing in Hungarian obstruents tha t have not 
been treated in the literature. For instance, although Hungarian has obstruents with 
voicing during closure in word-initial position (including stops that are prevoiced), and 
clusters of obstruents in word-initial position, there are no voiced obstruent clusters in 
word-initial position in Hungarian, as S&T point out. In this respect, then, Hungarian 
is different from Polish and Russian, for example, which also have word initial clusters 
of obstruents, have prevoiced stops, but do have clusters of voiced obstruents word 
initially. 
The strengths of this book are the clear and comprehensive d a t a presentation 
and the extensive coverage of the literature. The weakness, if there is one, is in the 
contribution to linguistic theory. But , since the primary aim of the book is to provide a 
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comprehensive and clear description of Hungarian phonology, it cannot be faulted for 
not having broad-reaching theoretical implications.The analysis is couched (mainly) 
in Lexical Phonology. 
As S&T note, one of the best known phenomena in Hungarian is vowel harmony, 
and hence readers will be particularly interested in their t reatment . Chapter 3 presents 
a detailed description of vowel harmony, including discussion of neutral (transparent) 
vowels, disharmonie stems, and stems with vacillating suffixes. Extensive examples of 
all types of stems are given. S&T's analysis of vowel harmony (Chapter 6) is somewhat 
difficult to understand because of significant typographical errors, and hence it seems 
worthwhile to discuss their proposal in some detail. They assume that vowels are 
specified as follows: 
COR LAB DOR 
— o p e n ! 
i Ü U — o p e n 2 
Ö О 
- t - o p e n 2 
+ o p e n i e a 
The chart given here is corrected. There is an unfortunate typo in this chart in the 
book (p. 55): the feature [+open2] (bold on chart) is given as [—open2]. (These features 
are from Clements-Hume (1995): [—open2] equals [+high], [+open2] equals [—high], 
[—openi] equals [—low] and [+openj] equals [+low]). 
In their analysis of vowel harmony, S&T assume that , in general, the place features 
(COR, LAB, DOR) are assigned to the entire morpheme rather than associated with 
specific vowels. In the simplest cases, morphemes have a single floating place feature. 
There is a general rule, Link Place, tha t associates a floating place feature with every 
vowel tha t is unspecified for place ((3a), p. 158) and a specific Link DOR rule ((3b), 
p. 159) which applies to floating DOR features. 
(2) Link Place (v ) 
I I I 
è 
The Link DOR rule has a crucial typo in figure (3b) on p. 159: The rule should link 
any floating DOR feature to any vowel, w h e t h e r it i s s p e c i f i e d f o r p l a c e o r n o t . Hence, 
the V should not be encircled as it is in the figure. This typo is extremely unfortunate, 
since it may render the proposed analysis incomprehensible to the reader. The correct 
formulation of the rule is given in (3). This linking rule also applies maximally, meaning 
targets may be non-adjacent. 
(3) Link DOR у 
where V = t he VOCALIC node 
P = any place fea ture 
encircling: unassociated (placeless V or floating P ) 
apply maximally (multiple t a rge t s may be non-adjacent) 
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S&T assume tha t in cases where both link rules are applicable, the more specific rule, 
Link DOR, takes applicational precedence. A stem with only front, round vowels, such 
as köszörű 'grinder' , would have, in the underlying representation, only the floating 
LAB place feature, which would be linked to all vowels by the rule Link Place (see (4) 
below). Much is left to the phonetic implementation module (p. 55) which interprets 
the first two vowels, which are [LAB, +open2] on the surface, as a mid front rounded 
[Ö] and the last, which is specified as [LAB, —open2], as a high, front, round vowel, [Ü:]. 
In contrast, a s tem with only back vowels, such as koszorú 'wreath' , would only have a 
floating DOR feature. Here, both Link Place and Link DOR could potentially apply, but 
Link DOR would take precedence. The first two vowels would then be specified as [DOR, 
+open 2 ] after t he application of Link DOR, and would be phonetically interpreted as 
mid, back, round vowels, [о]. The final vowel would be interpreted as a high, back, 
round vowel, [u:] (see (4) below). The basic idea of the analysis is that morpheme-
size floating place features determine the harmony type for the whole word, including 
suffixes. A stem with a floating DOR will always govern back harmony. A stem with a 
floating COR (which will only contain neutral vowels, e.g., rekettye 'gorse') will always 
govern front harmony, and a stem with a floating LAB feature will always govern front 
harmony, too: 
(4) (a) koszorú 
V V V 
(b) köszörű 
V V V 
(с) rekettye 
V V V 
\ I / \ t / \ I / 
D O R 
\ I / \ I / \i/ 
LAB COR 
Link DOR applies in the derivation of ház-nak 'for (the) house' and ház-tói 'from (the) 
house' as follows. 
(5) (a) ház-nak 
V V 
I / 
DOR 
[+openx] 
(b) ház-tói 
V V 
DOR 
[+open2] 
In addition to the two linking rules, S&T assume a rule tha t specifies vowels tha t 
have no place specification as COR, Default COR, and two constraints. One constraint 
prevents vowels from being specified as both COR and DOR (i.e., it prevents vowels 
being specified as both front and back) and one prevents vowels from being specified 
as both [-t-openj] and LAB, since there are no low, front, round vowels in Hungarian. 
The default COR rule is reproduced in (6), and the constraints in (7): 
(6) Default COR ® 
COR 
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(7) (a) *V 
COR 
(b) 
[+openi] 
DOR LAB 
In the case of a stem with a floating LAB feature, such as tűz 'fire', the rules and 
constraints apply as in (8): 
(8) (a) tüz-ünk 'our fire' 
V V 
[ -open 2 ] 
(b) tűz-nek 'for (the) fire' 
V V 
[+openj] 
LAB LAB LAB 
COR (by Default COR) 
(с) tűz-höz ' to (the) fire' 
у у  
J / ' [ - o p e n j ] 
LÁB 
In the case of (8a), the floating LAB associates with the stem vowel by the general Link 
Place. Nothing else happens (the suffix vowel is already specified for place) and the 
suffix vowel is interpreted as a front, round, high vowel. In the case of (8b), again the 
floating LAB associates with the stem vowel. Although the suffix vowel is not specified 
for place, the general Link Place is blocked by the constraint (7b). The default COR 
then applies to specify the suffix vowel as COR. In (8c), the floating LAB is associated 
with both vowels by Link Place. 
In the case of a floating COR feature, such as in viz 'water' , the rules and constraints 
apply as in (9): 
(9) (a) viz-iink 'our water ' 
Y v 
[ -open 2 ] 
LAB 
COR 
(с) víz-hez ' to (the) water' 
V V 
(b) víz-пек 'for (the) water ' 
V 
/ [+openj] 
COR 
COR 
Here in (9a) the floating COR is linked to the stem vowel by Link Place. Link Place 
does not apply to the second vowel because it is already specified as LAB. LAB vowels 
that are not also specified as DOR , automatically are interpreted as front. In the case 
of (9b) and (9c), however, the floating COR is linked to the suffix vowels because they 
have no place features. 
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In cases such as piros 'red' and papír 'paper ' , these rules and constraints operate 
as in (10). 
(10) (a) piros-unk 'our red one' (b) piros-nak 'for (the) red one' 
V V V V У V _  
/ [ - o p e n 2 ] ! / [+openi] 
/ L A B 
CÓR I / C O R I/ 
D Ó R DÓR 
(с) piros-hoz ' to (the) red one' (d) papir-unk 'our paper ' 
V V V V V V 
COR 
-open i ] -open 2 ] 
LAB 
COR 
D O R 
(e) papir-nak 'for (the) paper ' 
V V V^  
[ + o p e n i ] 
CÓR 
D Ó R 
D Ó R 
In the case of the stem piros the first vowel is linked to COR and there is a floating 
DOR feature. In (10a) the suffix vowel is specified as LAB. By Link DOR, the floating 
DOR is linked to all vowels except the first, which is blocked by the constraint t h a t 
prohibits vowels from being linked to both DOR and COR. In the case of (10b), t he 
suffix vowel is specified only as [+openjJ, and again, by Link DOR, the floating DOR 
is linked to the suffix vowel, bu t not the preceding stem vowel. In (10c) the floating 
DOR feature is linked to the suffix vowel which is not specified as LAB, but this vowel 
is interpreted as round, since all DOR vowels a re interpreted as round except those 
specified as [+openi] . These forms exhibit t h a t in S&T's analysis the back vowels 
[o] and [u] are sometimes specified as both DOR and LAB (as for example in the suffix 
vowel in (10a)) and sometimes only as DOR (as, for example, in the suffix vowel in (10c) 
and the second stem vowel in (10a)). Hence, representationally different vowels are 
interpreted as phonetically identical. Such representational differences are, of course, 
necessitated by the analysis: a suffix vowel tha t is always round must be specified as 
LAB, whereas a non-low stem vowel that is always back may be jus t DOR and will be 
interpreted as round. 
In the case of papír the stem is specified with a floating DOR feature and the second 
stem vowel is linked to COR. In (lOd) the floating DOR links to t h e first stem vowel 
and the suffix vowel by Link DOR, which is assumed to apply maximally, i.e., to targets 
that are not necessarily adjacent. The second COR vowel is skipped because linking 
the DOR to th is vowel would violate the constraint against D O R / C O R vowels. In (10e) 
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the DOR feature is linked, again by Link DOR, to the suffix vowel which is specified 
as [+openi]. (There is an error in the diagram representing the derivation of (10e) 
papir-nak ((21c) in the book on p. 168), which has been corrected here.) 
Stems like hid 'bridge', which S&T call antiharmonic, and which exceptionally 
govern back harmony, have the stem vowel linked to a COR feature and also have a 
floating DOR feature. The DOR cannot link to the stem vowel (because of the constraint 
against vowels specified as both DOR and COR), but by Link DOR it is linked to suffix 
vowels as illustrated in (11): 
(11) (a) hid-unk 'our bridge' 
V 
[ - o p e n 2 ] 
/ LAB 
/ 
DÓR 
V 
I 
COR 
(b) hid-nak 'for (the) bridge' 
V
 -
COR / [+openi] 
D O R 
In the case of a form like öreg 'old', S&T assume tha t both the s tem vowels are linked 
to place features, the first to LAB and the second to COR. It appears, however, t h a t 
the same results obtain if the COR is floating as illustrated in (12). 
(12) (a) öreg-ünk 'our old one' 
V V V 
[ - o p e n 2 ] 
(b) öreg-tői 'from (the) old one' 
V V V 
[+open2] 
LAB LAB LAB [ LAB 
COR CÔR 
(c) öreg-nek 'for (the) old one' (d) öreg-hez 'to (the) old one' 
V V V V V V 
LAB 
[+openx] 
L A B 
COR 
-openi] 
COR 
In the case of (12a) and (12b), the floating COR would be linked, by Link Place, to 
the second stem vowel. It could not link to the suffix vowels in either form because 
that vowel is already specified for place. In (12c) and (12d), however, the floating COR 
would link to both the second root vowel and the suffix vowels. 
In the case of a stem like szemölcs 'wart ' , there is a mismatch between the t ex t 
and the diagram. The intent in the text is clearly that the LAB feature be associated 
with the suffix vowel to give szemölcs-höz ' to (the) wart ' , but t he LAB is not associated 
in the diagram in (19d) in the book (p. 167). If forms with front unrounded vowels 
which precede front rounded vowels (such as szemölcs) are assumed to have COR linked 
to the first vowel and a floating LAB feature, then the correct forms will be derived. 
This is illustrated in (13): 
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(13) (a) szemölcs-ünk 'our war t ' 
V V V 
[ - o p e n 2 ] 
LAB LAB 
COR 
(c) szemölcs-nek 'for (the) wart ' 
V V V 
[+open1] 
(b) szemölcs-tői ' f rom (the) wart' 
V y V 
[+open2] 
LÁB LAB 
COR 
(d) szemölcs-höz ' to (the) wart' 
V V V 
LAB 
I / 
; / 
LÁB 
-openj J 
COR COR (by Default COR.) COR 
In addition to the two linking rules, the two constraints, and t h e default COR rule, 
S&T assume two spreading rules, Spread Place and Spread DOR. T h e spreading rules 
are given in (14). 
(14) (a) Spread Place 
(b) Spread DOR V 
DOR 
apply locally (targets adjacent) 
i terat ive left-to-right 
apply locally (targets adjacent) 
i terat ive left-to-right 
The Spread Place rule applies to spread a linked place feature t o any adjacent vowel 
tha t is not already specified for place. The Spread DOR rule spreads any linked DOR 
feature to an adjacent vowel, whether that vowel is specified for place or not. As wi th 
the Link rules, the more specific Spread DOR takes applicational precedence if b o t h 
are applicable. 
These rules are involved in the derivations wi th exceptional s tems such as nüansz 
'nuance', which have both front and back harmonic vowels. 
(15) (a) nüansz-unk 'our nuance' (b) nüansz-nak 'for ( the) nuance' 
V V 
LAB 
V 
LAB 
[—open2] 
V 
LAB 
DOR 
(c) niiansz-hoz 'to (the) nuance' 
V V V  
/ [ - o p e n d 
V V 
DOR 
[+openi] 
LAB 
DOR 
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In the case of (15a), both the Spread Place a n d the Spread DOR rules are applicable, 
but the specific Spread DOR applies to link t h e DOR feature t o the suffix vowel. In 
(15b) again the Spread DOR applies to spread t h e DOR feature t o the suffix vowel t h a t 
is unspecified for place. In (15c), again the DOR feature is spread to the adjacent suffix 
vowel by Spread DOR. 
In a form such as sofőr 'driver' , the first vowel is linked to t h e feature DOR, and 
the second vowel underlyingly linked to both LAB and COR. Th i s dual specification is 
necessary to block the DOR feature from incorrectly spreading to it. As illustrated in 
(16a), nothing happens when a suffix vowel linked to LAB follows this stem. 
(16) (a) sofőr-ünk 'our driver' 
V V V 
[-open 2] 
(b) sofőr-nek 'for (the) driver' 
V V V ^ 
[+openi] 
COR 
LAB L A B 
D O R 
(c) sofőr-höz ' to (the) driver ' 
V V V 
[ -open i ] 
LAB 
DOR 
LAB 
D O R 
In (16b), the COR specification spreads, by Spread Place, to t h e suffix vowel. LAB 
cannot spread because it is blocked by the constraint against LAB [+openjj vowels. In 
(16c) both COR and LAB spread to the suffix vowel by Spread Place. 
In this discussion, we have seen how the analysis proposed by S&T works, some-
thing that is made quite difficult by several serious typographical errors in the book 
under review. W h a t is particularly interesting is t ha t the Spread rules turn out t o be 
necessary only to account for exceptional forms. As illustrated above, all the regular 
cases (and even one exceptional case, the hid 'bridge' type) a re accounted for wi th 
the two general Link rules and the Default COR rule, and two constraints t h a t are 
necessary in any analysis. Hence, the analysis proposed by Siptár and Törkenczy is 
actually much simpler than it might appear a t first glance. 
Catherine O. Ringen 
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HUNGARIAN BOOKS ON LINGUISTICS 
Katalin É. Kiss: Anyanyelvünk állapotáról [On the condition of our mother tongue]. 
Osiris Kiadó, Budapest , 2004. 190 pp. 
Many Hungarians, including the majori ty of the cultural elite, share the feeling t h a t 
the Hungarian language is in danger; it keeps deteriorating. What is more, the Hun-
garian population—finding themselves in five countries after the Versailles Treaties in 
1920, and in eight countries after the breaking up of Czechoslovakia, t he Soviet Union, 
and Yugoslavia—also share the conviction that t h e Hungarian nat ion is at present 
primarily a linguistic entity with a common cultural and historical heritage, hence t h e 
deterioration of the Hungarian language endangers the survival of t he nation itself. 
The anguish of Hungarians that they cannot preserve the sophistication, the flexibility 
and the beauty of their language sustains in the media a particular genre aimed a t 
'language cultivation', pointing out various symptoms of the corruption and abuse of 
the language, and giving advice on how to speak and write correctly. 
E. Kiss's book is a linguist's answer to the worries of laymen. The first ma jo r 
chapter of the book addresses the question "Is the Hungarian language deteriorating?" 
The author argues tha t the worries of Hungarian speakers are unfounded; what seem 
to be symptoms of deterioration are merely symptoms of the slow change that is an 
inherent property of every living language. She examines the m a j o r phonological, 
morphological and syntactic phenomena which seem to be changing; which display 
conservative and novel variants. Although the new forms necessarily violate the norm 
prevailing among educated Hungarians, they are claimed to be neither grammatically 
incorrect, nor functionally inadequate or impoverished; they are shown to be derived 
by the regular rules of grammar, and to be able t o fulfil the same range of functions 
tha t their s tandard counterparts can. They simply represent variants which only exist 
in certain—regional or sociological—dialects of t he language. The author points ou t 
about a large number of the allegedly new, corrupted forms that they have been present 
in the language for centuries; in some cases, since the very first wr i t ten documents in 
the 12th-13th century; the only problem with t h e m is that they had not been pa r t 
of the dialect tha t formed the basis of literary Hungarian. The au thor concludes t h a t 
fighting against the slow changing of the language is both unnecessary and useless. 
Wha t 'language cultivation' can do is make speakers aware of the different sociological 
and stylistic values of the coexisting versions. 
The corruption is also believed to have affected the lexicon; it is allegedly man-
ifested in the language borrowing English words by the thousand, instead of creating 
new words from Hungarian stems. The author proves that this is a myth, too. She 
examines the vocabularies of three dictionaries collecting the new words of the pas t 
twenty years, and she finds tha t the proportion of loan-words among the 5600 new 
words compiled is less than 20%. 
One third of the Hungarian population are minorities in neighbouring countries. 
They are (Hungarian-Romanian, Hungarian-Slovak etc.) bilinguals, and their second 
language affects their use of Hungarian. The contact variants of Hungarian differ 
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from the s tandard language in minor respects (mainly in their lexicon; much less in 
their grammar) , and the contact phenomena are claimed to be natural, unavoidable 
consequences of bilingualism, rather than symptoms of language corruption. 
In sum, the author's answer to the quest ion asked in the t i t le of the first chapter 
(Is the Hungarian language deteriorating?) is "no, not at all". 
The question asked in the second half of the book, "Will the Hungarian lan-
guage survive?", is not answered so unequivocally. A language remains intact only 
if a community uses it as their primary means of communication in every sphere of 
their private and social life. If the types of situations in which a language can be 
used are constrained, if the use of a language is restricted to private life, it begins 
deteriorating, and eventually dies. The au thor demonst ra tes—by quoting stat ist ical 
data and the results of large-scale sociolinguistic research carried out among minori ty 
Hungar ians—that the use of Hungarian is so much constrained in the neighbouring 
countries t h a t more and more Hungarians find it neither possible nor worthwhile to 
acquire, to preserve, and to pass on the language of their ancestors. She summarizes 
what sociolinguistics has revealed about the motivation, the stages, and the means of 
language loss/language change, and she describes how this process has turned into an 
accelerating spiral among minority Hungarians. 
A section of the book deals with linguistic rights; to wha t extent law can pro-
vide help against forced assimilation. Finally, the question is considered whether the 
processes t h a t have led to Hungarian losing ground with respect to the state languages 
in the neighbouring countries can also take place in the European Union. If, as a 
consequence of globalization and European integration, Hungarian is replaced by Eng-
lish in various segments of public life, in t h e long run we can reckon with the same 
consequences tha t minority Hungarians have experienced. 
László Varga: Metrikus fonológia és a ritmikai hangsúlyváltozás [Metrical phonology and 
rhythmical stress alternation]. Tinta Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2005. 135 pp. 
This book discusses rhythmical stress al ternat ion in English and Hungarian, and, 
through this discussion, it offers a thorough introduction to metrical phonology. 
It is a well-known fact t h a t most English words and phrases that are double-
accented in isolation (e.g., thirteen or five o'clock) may change their stress pa t t e rn un-
der embedding: they may lose their first or their second accent, depending on whether 
they are preceded or followed by another accent in the matrix phrase. These changes 
are the two subtypes of rhythmical stress al ternation. It is less well-known tha t , mu-
tatis mutandis, similar changes have been observed in a variety of other languages 
(German, Dutch, Polish, Hebrew) and tha t , t o a limited degree, they also occur in 
Hungarian. Since rhythmical stress alternation raises important theoretical questions, 
its examination has always been one of the main areas of metrical phonological re-
search (the other main area being the stressing of individual words), and has remained 
an important issue until today. 
The first, bigger, par t of the book presents the most influential works t h a t have 
appeared in English in connection with rhythmical stress alternation, and it is t he first 
detailed critical survey of this area of metrical phonology wri t ten in the Hungar ian 
language. T h e second part of the book explores the Hungarian counterparts of rhyth-
mical stress alternation and, after confronting them with the metrical phonological 
theories presented in the first part , it offers an original explanation of them. 
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Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Linear and non-linear phonologies; 3. The be-
ginnings of metrical phonology (Liberman and Prince's tree-and-grid based model); 
4. Hayes' theory of metrical adjunction (the rule of Rhythmical Adjustment and its 
extension by Kager and Visch); 5. Selkirk's grid-based model; 6. Halle and Vergnaud's 
grid-based model; 7. Gussenhoven's accent-based model; 8. The facts of Hungarian 
rhythmical stress alternation; 9. Approaches to Hungarian rhythmical stress alterna-
tion (adaptations of Selkirk's, Hayes', Gussenhoven's models); 10. The 'split analysis' 
of Hungarian rhythmical stress alternation (Hayes' précompilation rules, Kaisse's P I 
rules, Varga's proposal of splitting Hungarian rhythmical stress alternation into a pre-
compiled and a P I component); 11. Short summary. The book is closed by a subject 
index. 
Nóra Wenszky: Secondary stress in English Words. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. 
248 pp. 
This study examines what regulates secondary stress placement in English words. Af-
ter discussing and criticising some influential stress theories, the author proposes a 
modification of the framework presented in Luigi Burzio's Principles of English stress 
(1994). She then tests the modified framework against a corpus of almost a thou-
sand words with all their variant pronunciations. The discussion is centred around the 
following problems: (i) factors influencing pretonic secondary stress placement, with 
special emphasis on prefixes and classical compound-initials; (ii) the stressing of words 
ending in -ative\ and (iii) the stressing of words ending in -atory. The analyses pre-
sented prove tha t Erik Fudge's classification of prefixes and compound-initials (English 
word stress, 1984) can successfully be incorporated into Burzio's framework: these are 
assigned pre-determined structures here. The author finds tha t stress preservation 
plays a major role in the placement of pre-tonic secondary stresses of affixed items. 
The hypothesis t h a t initial heavy syllables attract stress is not confirmed. Rather, the 
author proposes tha t one heavy syllable may be left unparsed (and thus unstressed) 
a t the beginning of words, though this is rarer than an initial unstressed light syllable. 
Based on her analysis of -atory words, the author furthermore suggests tha t a new 
foot type, (HWW), should be included in the inventory of well-formed feet. This foot 
type is not discussed in Burzio's book but it helps the present author to provide a 
systematic analysis of words tha t must be treated as exceptional in the lack of such a 
foot. At the end of the volume, an extensive list of all analysed items is provided. 
Contents: 1. General introduction; Part One: The background; 2. Literature 
review; Part Two: Pre-tonic secondary stress; 3. Introduction to Part Two; 4. The 
place of secondary stress; 5. Prefixes and classical compounds; 6. Analysed words; 
Par t Three: Post-tonic secondary stresses; 7. Introduction to Par t Three; 8. The back-
ground; 9. The ending -ative\ 10. The ending -atory, Par t Four: Summary; 11. Con-
clusions and major findings; Bibliography, Appendices. 
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